COULTER v. PAUL LAURENCE DUNBAR COMMUNITY CENTER et al

Filing 27

ORDER DENYING 25 Motion for Recusal and DENYING 26 Motion for Stay of Proceedings. Signed by Judge Arthur J. Schwab on 3/25/16. (eet)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JEAN COULTER,
Plaintiff,

16cv0125
ELECTRONICALLY FILED

v.
PAUL LAURENCE DUNBARD
COMMUNITY CENTER ET AL,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECUSAL (DOC. NO. 25)
AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS (DOC. NO. 26)
Plaintiff Jean Coulter initiated this lawsuit on February 1, 2016, alleging that Defendants
(1) breached a contract or an implied contract to repay a $50,000.00 loan Plaintiff made to
Defendant Paul Laurence Dunbar Community Center in July 2013; (2) were negligent in the
management of the Paul Laurence Dunbar Community Center; and (3) engaged in fraud and a
civil conspiracy in the failure to repay the loan to Plaintiff. Doc. No. 1. On February 29, 2016,
Defendant Paul Laurence Dunbar Community Center made an offer of judgment to Plaintiff in
the amount of $59,000.00 inclusive of interest, if any, plus costs accrued to the date of the offer.
Doc. No. 2.
This case was originally assigned to Magistrate Judge Lenihan, who entered an order
recusing herself under 28 U.S.C. § 455 on March 2, 2016. Doc. No. 4. The case was then
randomly assigned to the undersigned District Judge. See Docket Entry on March 2, 2016. The
Court scheduled an Initial Case Management Conference and ordered Defendants to respond to
the Complaint by March 17, 2016. Doc. No. 8. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on March
3, 2016, (doc. no. 10), and the Court accordingly vacated the order setting the Initial Case

Management Conference and indicated that it would reschedule the conference after the Court
rules upon Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (doc. no. 13).
To manage the Court’s caseload and ensure that this case moves along efficiently, the
Court set March 14, 2016 as the deadline for Plaintiff to respond to Defendants’ Motion (doc. no.
14), and also ordered the Plaintiff to register for the District Court’s Electronic Case Files (ECF)
system (doc. no. 15). Defendants then filed a second Motion to Dismiss (doc. no. 17) and the
Court set Plaintiff’s response deadline for March 21, 2016 (doc. no. 18).
On March 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Extension of Time to respond to
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (doc. no. 20) and the Court set a new deadline of March 25,
2016 for Plaintiff to respond to both Motions. Doc. No. 22.1 On March 21, 2016, Plaintiff filed
another Motion for Extension of Time to file her Response which was denied by the Court. Doc.
Nos. 23 and 24.
Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Recusal (doc. no. 25) and Motion for Stay of Proceedings
(doc. no. 26) which are the subject of this Memorandum Order. For the reasons set forth below,
these Motions will be denied.
A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal
The basis of Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal of the undersigned District Judge appears to
be that (1) the Court has imposed a “fast-tracked” schedule2 for her to respond to Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss; (2) the Court has denied her requests for Discovery as premature (see doc.
1

Plaintiff also resisted registering for the Court’s ECF system as ordered, (see doc. no. 19), however, the Court
found that Plaintiff does not have good cause for failing to register for ECF and again ordered Plaintiff to register for
ECF by March 25, 2016 - - as many pro se litigants are so ordered in this District. Doc. No. 22.
2
Coulter objects to the Court’s efficient management of this case despite noting that the case initially “sat for a
month” prior to the undersigned District Judge being assigned. Doc. No. 25, ¶ 9. Coulter accuses the Court of
issuing “highly prejudicial Orders within hours after the new assignment.” Id. The assignment was made March 2,
2016. On March 3, 2016, the Court entered orders scheduling an Initial Case Management Conference and setting a
deadline for Defendants’ Answer to the Complaint (doc. no. 8) and an order designating the case for placement into
the District Court’s Alternative Dispute Resolution program (doc. no. 9) as all civil cases in this District have been
since June 1, 2006. See LCvR 16.2.

no. 22 denying Coulter’s request for discovery, styled as a Motion for Special Relief at doc. no.
21); and (3) the Court has required Coulter to register for the ECF system. Doc. No. 25.
Plaintiff also accuses the Court of bias “against Pro Se Litigants in general,” or “perhaps . . . in
favor of the Defendants in this matter, either personally or as members of a favored group
(perhaps Board Members of Non-Profits (?)[.]” Doc. No. 25, p. 5.
Plaintiff’s accusations of bias are wholly without factual support and her dissatisfaction
with the Court’s scheduling and management of this lawsuit is not a proper basis for recusal.
Recusal is not required for a litigant’s “dissatisfaction with District Court rulings.” In re Brown,
623 Fed. App’x 575, 576 (3d Cir. 2015). Further, a litigant’s accusations of bias which are
“unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation” do not require recusal. Id.
B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay the Proceedings
Plaintiff has moved to stay this lawsuit because she has contacted the Pennsylvania
Attorney General regarding Defendants’ “questionable expenditures of funds” and she believes,
again without any factual support, that the Attorney General “may chose [sic] to enter into this
case, in order to protect the resources remaining under the control of Dunbar Community
Center.” Doc. No. 26. In this Motion, Plaintiff raises the issue of a charitable bequest that is not
mentioned in her Complaint or otherwise alleged to have any connection to her claims. Id.
Plaintiff has not set forth a sufficient reason to stay these proceedings. In the first
paragraph of her motion, Plaintiff again complains of the Court’s “fast-tracked schedule.” Id. If
the Plaintiff has found that she is not prepared to proceed with the case that she initiated on
February 1, 2016 - - nearly two months ago - - then she may avail herself of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41, which allows a Plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss an action without prejudice

prior to an answer or motion for summary judgment being filed by the Defendants. She may
then re-file her action when she is better prepared to litigate her claims.
Otherwise, the Court will manage this case - - as it manages all others - - in accordance
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, which encourages the “just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.”
Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal is DENIED. Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay the Proceedings is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED this 25th day of March, 2016
s/Arthur J. Schwab_______
Arthur J. Schwab
United States District Judge