HUNDLEY v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
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SOCIAL SECURITY APPEAL ORDER denying 12 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 14 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 11/10/16. (cha)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SHANE E. HUNDLEY,
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Plaintiff,
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 16-153
AMBROSE, Senior District Judge.
OPINION AND ORDER
Synopsis
Plaintiff Shane E. Hundley (“Hundley”) appeals an ALJ’s denial of his claim for
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income benefits (“SSI”)
under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433, §§ 1381-1383.
Hundley filed his claim on May 9, 2012, alleging a disability beginning on February 1,
2011. (R. 14) He claims to be disabled due to, among other things, schizoaffective
disorder, bipolar disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder (“OCD”), and anxiety
disorder.1 The application was denied and Hundley filed a timely request for a hearing.
(R. 14) Following a hearing, during which a vocational expert testified, the ALJ denied
Hundley’s claim for benefits. Specifically, the ALJ concluded that Hundley had the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a range of sedentary work with some
limitations. (R. 18) Hundley appealed. Pending are Cross Motions for Summary
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Although Hundley initially also alleged physical impairments, he does not challenge the ALJ’s finding that those
impairments are not disabling. See ECF Docket No. [13], p. 2. As such, I will not discuss Hundley’s physical
limitations.
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Judgment. See ECF Docket Nos. [12] and [14]. After careful consideration and for the
reasons set forth below, this case is affirmed.
Legal Analysis
1. Standard of Review
The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence
exists in the record to support the Commissioner=s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d
37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as Amore than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate.@ Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Determining whether substantial evidence exists is
“not merely a quantitative exercise.” Gilliland v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 178, 183 (3d Cir.
1986) (citing Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983)). “A single piece of
evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if the secretary ignores, or fails to resolve,
a conflict created by countervailing evidence. Nor is evidence substantial if it is
overwhelmed by other evidence – particularly certain types of evidence (e.g., that
offered by treating physicians).” Id. The Commissioner=s findings of fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. '405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606
F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the
Commissioner=s decision or re-weigh the evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995
F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if the court would have
decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir.
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1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however,
the district court must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. '706.
2. The ALJ’s Assessment of Medical Evidence under the Regulations
Hundley takes issue with the ALJ’s assessment of the medical evidence. I note
that a large portion of Hundley’s Brief in Support of his Motion for Summary Judgment is
devoted to recounting the evidence that supports his claim for disability. Hundley’s
efforts in this regard are unpersuasive. The:
question is not whether substantial evidence supports Plaintiff’s claims, or
whether there is evidence that is inconsistent with the ALJ’s finding. …
Substantial evidence could support both Plaintiff’s claims and the ALJ’s finding
because substantial evidence is less than a preponderance. Jesurum v. Sec’y of
U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). If substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s finding, it does not matter if substantial evidence also
supports Plaintiff’s claims. Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003).
Weidow v. Colvin, Civ. No. 15-765, 2016 WL 5871164 at *18 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2016).
The question before me is simply whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
findings. Hundley challenges the ALJ’s assessment of the opinions rendered by Dr.
Rogers, his psychiatrist, Dr. Craig, who performed a consultative psychological
examination, and Sue Burke, his treating therapist. According to Hundley, the ALJ failed
to properly apply the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c) and § 404.1527(c)
relating to the weighing of medical evidence.
The amount of weight accorded to medical opinions is well-established.
Generally, the ALJ will give more weight to the opinion of a source who has examined
the claimant than to that of a non-examining source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) and §
416.927(c)(1). Additionally, the ALJ typically will give more weight to opinions from
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treating physicians, “since these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most
able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant’s] medical impairment(s)
and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained
from the objective medical findings alone or from the reports of individual examinations,
such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)
and § 416.927(c)(2). If the ALJ finds that “a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of
the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s) is well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the
other substantial evidence [of] record,” he must give that opinion controlling weight. Id.
If a treating physician’s opinion is not given controlling weight, the ALJ must consider all
relevant factors that tend to support or contradict any medical opinions of record,
including the patient / physician relationship; the supportability of the opinion; the
consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; and the specialization of the
provider at issue. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6) and § 416.927(c)(1)-(6). “[T]he more
consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight [the ALJ generally]
will give to that opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(4). In the event of conflicting medical
evidence, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained:
A cardinal principle guiding disability determinations is that the ALJ accord
treating physicians’ reports great weight, especially ‘when their opinions
reflect expert judgment based on continuing observation of the patient’s
condition over a prolonged period of time.’” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d
310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d
Cir. 1999)). However, “where … the opinion of a treating physician
conflicts with that of a non-treating, non-examining physician, the ALJ may
choose whom to credit” and may reject the treating physician’s
assessment if such rejection is based on contradictory medical evidence.
Id. Similarly, under 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2), the opinion of a treating
physician is to be given controlling weight only when it is well-supported
by medical evidence and is consistent with other evidence in the record.
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Becker v. Comm’r. of Social Sec., 403 Fed. Appx. 679, 686 (3d Cir. 2010).
The ultimate issue of whether an individual is disabled within the meaning of the
Act is for the Commissioner to decide. Thus, the ALJ is not required to afford special
weight to a statement by a medical source that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to
work.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1)(3) and § 416.927(d)(1), (3); Dixon v. Comm’r. of
Soc. Sec., 183 Fed. Appx. 248, 251-52 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating, “[o]pinions on disability
are not medical opinions and are not given any special significance.”). Although the ALJ
may choose who to credit when faced with a conflict, he “cannot reject evidence for no
reason or for the wrong reason.” Diaz v. Comm’r. of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 505 (3d
Cir. 2009). The ALJ must provide sufficient explanation of his or her final determination
to provide a reviewing court with the benefit of the factual basis underlying the ultimate
disability finding. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981). In other words, the
ALJ must provide sufficient discussion to allow the court to determine whether any
rejection of potentially pertinent, relevant evidence was proper. Johnson v. Comm’r. of
Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 203-4 (3d Cir. 2008). “It is not for this Court to reweigh the
medical opinions in the record but rather to determine if there is substantial evidence to
support the ALJ’s weighing of those opinions.” Lilly v. Colvin, Civ. No. 13-1561, 2016
WL 1166334 (D. Del. March 23, 2016), citing, Monsour Medical Center v. Heckler, 806
F.2d 1185, 1190 (3d Cir. 1986).
Significantly, I note that while § 404.1527(c) and § 416.927(c) set forth the
framework for the ALJ’s assessment of medical evidence and indeed instruct an ALJ to
consider factors such as examining relationship, treatment relationship, supportability,
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consistency, and specialization, the regulations do not dictate how the ALJ should
memorialize his or her decision. Indeed, my colleague has specifically rejected such an
argument. See Laverde v. Colvin, Civ. No. 14-1242, 2015 WL 5559984 at *6, n. 3 (W.D.
Pa. Sept. 21, 2015) (Diamond, D.J.) (rejecting the idea that § 404.1527(c) requires an
ALJ to “explicitly list” and discuss “each of the six factors set forth” in the regulation,
declining to impose such a requirement, and finding that the ALJ need only adequately
explain her evaluation of the medical evidence in such a manner so as to allow the court
“to conduct meaningful review” and satisfy the court that “she adhered to the standards
of § 404.1527(c)….”). Thus, any argument by Hundley that the ALJ did not explicitly
discuss each factor is unpersuasive.
Against this backdrop, I turn to the specific issues Hundley raises. He contends
that the ALJ failed to “acknowledge or address” that Dr. Rogers and Dr. Craig are
specialists in their fields, which is a factor to be given consideration under 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(5) and § 416.927(c)(5). See ECF Docket No. [13], p. 15. I disagree. The
ALJ clearly acknowledged that Dr. Craig was a psychologist and that Dr. Craig actually
examined Hundley. (R. 19) (stating that “[t]he claimant attended a consultative
psychological evaluation with Dr. Craig….”) (emphasis added). He recognized Dr.
Rogers as a psychiatrist as well. (R. 20) (stating “[i]n February 2013, the claimant began
treating with Dr. Rogers, a psychiatrist, in addition to Ms. Burke.”) (emphasis added).
Similarly, he observed that Ms. Burke provided therapy as a social worker. (R. 19)
(stating, “[s]oon after his discharge, the claimant began a Suboxone treatment program
for his narcotic addiction, and he also began treating with Ms. Burke, a social worker, for
therapy.”) (emphasis added). The ALJ was clearly aware of Dr. Rogers’, Dr. Craig’s and
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Ms. Burke’s status as specialists and the import that had under § 404.1527(c)(5) and §
416.927(c)(5). Consequently, Hundley’s contentions are not convincing in this regard.
Hundley also urges that the ALJ did not consider the longitudinal nature of the
treating relationship he had with Dr. Rogers and Ms. Burke. See ECF Docket No. [13],
p. 16. According to Hundley, Dr. Rogers saw him on eight occasions between February
2013 and January 2014 and he presented to Ms. Burke 30 times between March of
2012 and October of 2013. Id. Again, I find Hundley’s contention to be misplaced. The
ALJ noted that Hundley began treating with Dr. Rogers in February of 2013 and
acknowledges that Hundley had been seeing Ms. Burke since 2012. (R. 19-20)
Moreover, he details many of the findings set forth in those office visits, including
notations that Hundley’s mental status exams were “normal,” with “good insight and
judgment” and that “Dr. Rogers noted that the claimant had made marked improvement
in only a short period of time.” (R. 20) Indeed, the ALJ observed that the treatment
notes described Hundley as continuing to “do well over the next several months on the
same medications,” with an increase in GAF scores. (R. 20) The ALJ referenced a
treatment note following the summer of 2013 in which “the claimant reported that his
moods were stable and that he was enjoying fishing frequently as a hobby. He seemed
to be in good humor and made some jokes about fishing with Dr. Rogers.” (R. 20) The
ALJ similarly referenced Hundley’s last visits with Dr. Rogers, where Hundley
complained of some increase in depression after decreasing his medication because he
was running low on pills. (R. 20) The ALJ noted that Dr. Rogers recorded Hundley’s
GAF score as 60 and found his mental status exam to be normal. (R. 20) The ALJ also
cites to Ms. Burke’s treatment notes. (R. 19) Consequently, I reject Hundley’s
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contentions that the ALJ failed to misapprehend that longitudinal nature of the treating
relationship provided by Dr. Rogers and Ms. Burke. As stated above, neither the
regulations nor the case law require the ALJ to discuss the treating relationship via any
particular language.
Hundley similarly contends that the ALJ erred in his reliance upon and reference
to the GAF scores. As recognized in Harris v. Colvin, Civ. No. 14-4444, 2015 WL
10097520 at * 5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2015):
[t]he GAF scale appears to have fallen into disfavor. “Due to concerns about
subjectivity in application and a lack of clarity in the symptoms to be analyzed,
the [American Psychiatric Association] abandoned the GAF score in its recently
published fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders.” Solock v. Astrue, 2014 U.S. District LEXIS 81809, 2014 WL 2738632,
at * 6 (M.D. Pa. June 17, 2014). “It was recommended that the GAF be dropped
from DSM-5 for several reasons, including its conceptual lack of clarity … and
questionable psychometrics in routine practice.” See AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N., DIAGNOSTIC AND STAT. MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, DSM-5
16 (5th ed. 2013). In response the Social Security Administration now allows ALJs
to use GAF ratings as opinion evidence when assessing disability claims
involving mental disorders; however, a “GAF score is never dispositive of
impairment severity,” and thus an ALJ should not “give controlling weight to a
GAF from a treating source unless it is well supported and not inconsistent with
other evidence.” SSA AM 13066 at 5 (July 13, 2013).
Harris v. Colvin, 2015 WL 10097520 at * 5. Here, it is clear that the ALJ did not give the
rising GAF scores dispositive consideration. The ALJ did note that Hundley’s GAF
scores had continuously increased from a low of 45 at his first appointment to a high of
60 during a January 2014 appointment. (R. 21) He concluded that the “these rising GAF
scores also indicate that the claimant is improving with treatment and medication and
are given some weight.” (R. 21) His use of the scores as mere “opinion evidence” is
entirely appropriate, contrary to Hundley’s contentions.
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Hundley also criticizes the ALJ for discounting Dr. Craig’s opinion, in part,
because it was based upon Hundley’s subjective complaints.2 Yet this is entirely
appropriate under case law to discount portions of a physician’s opinion that are based
upon a claimant’s subjective complaints. See Morris v. Barnhart, 78 Fed. Appx. 820,
825 (3d Cir. 2003); Hernandez-Flores v. Comm’r. of Soc. Sec., 2015 WL 4064669 at *
4 (D. N.J. July 1, 2015) (stating that “an ALJ may discount aspects of a medical opinion
that are based on the claimant’s subjective symptoms, even where the claimant has
alleged a psychological impairment.”) and Krueger v. Colvin, 2015 WL 1444949 at * 4
(W.D. Pa. March 30, 2015).3
Finally, Hundley urges that, if the ALJ was inclined to discount Dr. Craig’s opinion
as outdated, he should have arranged for another consultative examination. I disagree.
The decision to order a consultative examination is within the sound discretion of the
ALJ. Thompson v. Halter, 45 Fed. Appx. 146, 149 (3d Cir. 2002); 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1517, 416.917. An “ALJ’s duty to develop the record does not require consultative
examination unless the claimant establishes that such an examination is necessary to
enable the ALJ to make the disability decision.” Id. Other circumstances necessitating a
consultative examination include situations where a claimant’s medical records do not
contain needed additional evidence, or when the ALJ needs to resolve a conflict,
inconsistency or ambiguity in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1519(a), 416.919(a).
Based on the existing medical records in this case, I find that the ALJ was not required
to order an additional consultative examination. I find no conflicts or ambiguities in the
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I note that the ALJ clearly explained that he also placed little weight on Dr. Craig’s opinion because it “was made
before the claimant began treating with Dr. Rogers so it does not reflect the claimant’s current functioning after a
year of therapy and medication.” (R. 21)
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I note that Hundley is not claiming to be suffering from fibromyalgia, or chronic fatigue symptom, where
subjective complaints are of elevated importance.
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medical records that would have necessitated a second consultative examination. Thus,
I find no error in this regard.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SHANE E. HUNDLEY,
Plaintiff,
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 16-153
AMBROSE, Senior District Judge.
ORDER OF COURT
Therefore, this 10th day of November, 2016, it is hereby ORDERED that the
decision of the ALJ is affirmed and that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Docket No. 12) is denied and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No.
14) is granted.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
United States Senior District Judge
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