MATEY v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY FAMILY DIVISION ADULT SECTION

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM ORDER dismissing complaint. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint on or before May 9, 2016 in accordance with this Memorandum Order. The case shall be ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSED until Plaintiff files an amended complaint. Signed by Judge Arthur J. Schwab on 4/19/16. (eet)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN GERALD MATEY,
Plaintiff,
v.

16cv451
ELECTRONICALLY FILED

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
ALLEGHENY COUNTY FAMILY
DIVISION ADULT SECTION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff John Gerald Matey (“Plaintiff” or “Matey”) initiated this action against
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Division Adult Section (Defendant) by
filing a Complaint on April 15, 2016. Doc. No. 1. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that his
property has been unreasonably seized “via the judicial system due to either gender bias or
unethical conduct by the Defendant.” Doc. No. 1 ¶ IV. He further alleges that garnishment of
his wages by Defendant has thwarted his attempt to appeal a verdict reached against him by
placing him “under financial duress.” Id.
For the reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint without
prejudice, sua sponte, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, and under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine which prohibits
federal district courts from entertaining claims that have already been adjudicated in state court
or that are inextricably intertwined with a state adjudication because the federal district court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over such claims. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284-287 (2005) (discussing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 461 (1983)).

I.

Legal Standards

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” Detailed factual pleading is not required - - Rule 8(a)(2) calls for a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” - - but a
complaint must set forth sufficient factual allegations that, taken as true, set forth a plausible
claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Complaints must be construed so
“as to do substantial justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f), and pro se complaints should be construed
liberally. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004).
The plausibility standard does not require a showing of probability that a claim has merit,
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007), but it does require that a pleading
show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. Determining the plausibility of an alleged claim is “a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
After Twombly and Iqbal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
explained that a District Court must take three steps to analyze the sufficiency of a complaint:
First, the court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to
state a claim. Second, the court should identify allegations that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.
Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted).
The Court may not dismiss a complaint merely because it appears unlikely or improbable
that the plaintiff can prove the facts alleged or will ultimately prevail on the merits, but the facts

alleged must raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary
elements of the claim(s) asserted by the plaintiff. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8; 556. In sum, a
a complaint should be dismissed if the plaintiff fails to allege facts which could, if established at
trial, entitle him to relief. Id.
B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents cases “brought by state-court losers complaining
of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil,
544 U.S. at 284. The Court of Appeals has found four requirements that must be met for the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply:
(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff
complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgments; (3)
those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed;
and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and
reject the state judgments.
Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010)
(internal citations omitted). If Rooker-Feldman applies, the district court is without jurisdiction
to hear the case and it must be dismissed. Id.
II.

Analysis

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to provide the “who, what, and when” necessary to give “fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Connelly v. Lane Const.
Corp., 809 F. 3d 780 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Instead, Plaintiff has
set forth a very short statement comprised of legal conclusions. Conclusory statements are not to
be presumed truthful by the Court when considering the sufficiency of a complaint on a motion
to dismiss. Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789-90 (3d Cir. 2016).

“[T]he clearest indication that an allegation is conclusory and unworthy of weight in
analyzing the sufficiency of a complaint is that it embodies a legal point.” Id. at 790. Even
construing Plaintiff’s Complaint quite liberally, the Court is only able to determine that Plaintiff
believes a state court verdict against him was entered because of “either gender bias or unethical
conduct” by the state court. Doc. No. 1 ¶ IV. Plaintiff must do more than simply state legal
conclusions to set forth plausible claims and avoid dismissal of his Complaint under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6).
Further, based upon the allegations in the Complaint, it appears that Plaintiff seeks only
to challenge a state court adjudication. Such a challenge in federal district court to a verdict or
judgment rendered by a state court is foreclosed by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiff must
assert an injury caused by Defendant’s actions - - and must set forth sufficient factual allegations
to establish a plausible claim for relief - - and may not simply challenge the state court verdict.
III.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiff is hereby granted leave to file an amended complaint by May 9, 2016, but is cautioned
that his amended complaint must set forth factual allegations regarding the specific conduct by
Defendant which violated his rights and/or caused him injury, and must set forth a plausible
claim, to avoid dismissal with prejudice. This case will be ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSED
until Plaintiff files an amended complaint.
SO ORDERED this 19th day of April, 2016,
s/Arthur J. Schwab_______
Arthur J. Schwab
United States District Judge