AMBROSE v. COLVIN

Filing 14

OPINION and ORDER denying 10 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 12 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 4/3/17. (slh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BRITTANY AMBROSE,
Plaintiff,
-vsNANCY A. BERRYHILL,1
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 16-488

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

OPINION
Pending before the court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 10 and
12). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (ECF Nos. 11 and 13). After
careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth
below, I am denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 10) and granting
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 12).
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security (ACommissioner@) denying her applications for supplemental security income (“SSI”)
and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) pursuant to the Social Security Act (AAct@). Plaintiff filed
her applications alleging she had been disabled since August 15, 2011. (ECF No. 8-5, pp. 2, 4).
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), Leslie Perry-Dowdell, held a hearing on June 3, 2014. (ECF
No. 8-2, pp. 37-62). On September 12, 2014, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled
under the Act. (ECF No. 8-2, pp. 16-23).
After exhausting all administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed the instant action with this

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Nancy A. Berryhill became acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, replacing
Carolyn W. Colvin.

court. The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 10 and 12).
The issues are now ripe for review.
II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.

Standard of Review

The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner=s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as Amore than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.@ Ventura v. Shalala, 55
F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
Additionally, the Commissioner=s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive. 42 U.S.C. '405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A
district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner=s decision or re-weigh the
evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if
the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360
(3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however,
the district court must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. '706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. '423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use
when evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. '404.1520(a). The ALJ must
determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,

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whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) if the
impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant=s impairments
prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional
capacity. 20 C.F.R. '404.1520. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by
medical evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4).
Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful
activity (step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the
decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745
F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
B.

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) 2

Plaintiff argues that ALJ improperly determined her RFC.

(ECF No. 11, pp. 5-6).

Specifically, Plaintiff suggests that because the ALJ found she had “severe” irritable bowel
syndrome status post cholecystectomy, the ALJ was required to make an accommodation for
that impairment in her RFC. Id. I disagree. “[S]uch a presumption would conflict with the
regulatory scheme for determining whether a claimant is disabled, under which the
determination of whether a claimant is severely impaired precedes a separate determination of
whether the claimant, despite his severe impairment, retains the [residual functional capacity] to
perform substantial gainful activity.” Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991). Thus,
just because an impairment is found to be severe does not mean necessarily that it erodes a
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RFC refers to the most a claimant can still do despite his/her limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a),
416.945(a). The assessment must be based upon all of the relevant evidence, including the medical
records, medical source opinions, and the individual’s subjective allegations and description of his own
limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a).

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plaintiff’s RFC. Franklin v. Astrue, No. 10-CV-02532-PAB, Civ No. 10-cv-2532, 2012 WL
1059995, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 28, 2012) (“Simply because plaintiff established a ‘severe
impairment’ which only ‘requires a de minimis showing of impairment,’ does not necessarily
require that the ALJ conclude that the impairment materially erodes plaintiff's RFC.”). In this
case, the ALJ discussed and thoroughly considered Plaintiff’s irritable bowel syndrome status
post cholecystectomy in her discussion of the RFC. (ECF No. 8-2, pp. 21-29). In fact, the RFC
formulated by the ALJ limited Plaintiff to sedentary work which necessarily limits one’s ability to
bend or stoop. S.S.R. 83-10 (defining sedentary work and exertional level requirements). Thus,
I find the ALJ properly reviewed the same and that the RFC is based on substantial evidence.
Therefore, remand on this basis is not warranted.
C.

Weighing of Opinion Evidence

Plaintiff next asserts that the ALJ erred in weighing the medical opinion evidence. (ECF
No. 11, pp. 7-19). The amount of weight accorded to medical opinions is well-established.
Generally, the ALJ will give more weight to the opinion of a source who has examined the
claimant than to a non-examining source. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(1). In addition, the ALJ
generally will give more weight to opinions from a treating physician, “since these sources are
likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a
claimant’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence
that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual
examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.” Id. § 416.927(c)(2). If
the ALJ finds that “a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of [a
claimant’s] impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence [of] record,” he
must give that opinion controlling weight. Id. Also, “the more consistent an opinion is with the
record as a whole, the more weight [the ALJ generally] will give to that opinion.” Id. §
416.927(c)(4).

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In the event of conflicting medical evidence, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has explained:
“A cardinal principle guiding disability determinations is that the ALJ accord
treating physicians’ reports great weight, especially ‘when their opinions reflect
expert judgment based on continuing observation of the patient’s condition over a
prolonged period of time.’” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999)). However, “where .
. . the opinion of a treating physician conflicts with that of a non-treating, nonexamining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit” and may reject the
treating physician’s assessment if such rejection is based on contradictory
medical evidence. Id. Similarly, under 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2), the opinion of a
treating physician is to be given controlling weight only when it is well-supported
by medical evidence and is consistent with other evidence in the record.
Becker v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., No. 10-2517, 2010 WL 5078238, at *5 (3d Cir. Dec.
14, 2010). Although the ALJ may choose whom to credit when faced with a conflict, he “cannot
reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Security, 577
F.3d 500, 505 (3d Cir. 2009).
In this case, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ inappropriately rejected the medical opinions of
Dr. Dunaevsky (a treating primary care physician), Dr. Mitre (a treating gastroenterologist) and
Dr. Helfrich (a treating rheumatologist) simply because they are treating physicians with
longitudinal history, two of which are specialists, and the consistency of the opinions. (ECF No.
11, pp. 7-9). An ALJ’s rejection of a treating doctor’s opinion is not improper simply because
that doctor was a treating doctor.

As set forth above, when there are conflicting medical

opinions, the ALJ may choose whom to credit. Becker, 2010 WL 5078238 at *5; Diaz, 577 F.3d
at 505. After a review of the record, I find the reasons given by the ALJ in weighing the medical
opinions of Drs. Dunaevsky, Mitre and Helfrich to be appropriate, sufficiently explained and
supported by sufficient evidence of record. (ECF No. 8-2, pp. 21-29); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927,
404.1527 (discussing the evaluation of medical opinions). Furthermore, a treating physician=s
assertion that a plaintiff is Adisabled@ or Aunable to work,@ is not dispositive of the issue. 20
C.F.R. §' 404.1527, 416.927. Such ultimate questions of disability are reserved solely for the

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ALJ. Id. Therefore, I find no error in this regard on the part of the ALJ. Consequently, remand
is not warranted on this basis.
An appropriate order shall follow.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BRITTANY AMBROSE,

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Plaintiff,
-vsNANCY A. BERRYHILL,3
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 16-488

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

ORDER OF COURT
THEREFORE, this 3rd day of April, 2017, it is ordered that Plaintiff=s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Docket No. 10) is denied and Defendant=s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket
No. 12) is granted.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
United States Senior District Judge

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Nancy A. Berryhill became acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, replacing
Carolyn W. Colvin.

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