REYNOLDS v. COLVIN
Filing
15
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 10 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying 12 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Case is remanded for further evaluation in light of this Order. Signed by Judge Alan N. Bloch on 2/28/2017. (dpo)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PATRICK LYNN REYNOLDS,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 16-576
ORDER
AND NOW, this 28th day of February, 2017, upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 12) filed in the above-captioned matter on October 11, 2016,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said Motion is DENIED.
AND, further, upon consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No.
10) filed in the above-captioned matter on October 10, 2016,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART. Specifically, Plaintiff’s Motion is granted to the extent that it seeks a remand to the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) for further evaluation as set forth below, and
denied in all other respects. Accordingly, this matter is hereby remanded to the Commissioner
for further evaluation under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) in light of this Order.
I.
Background
On September 13, 2010, Plaintiff, Patrick Lynn Reynolds, filed a claim for Supplemental
Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383f. Plaintiff
claimed that he became disabled on December 1, 1987, due to a back injury with chronic back
pain, joint pain and numbness in the left arm and both legs, shortness of breath even with light
1
exertion, inability to lift over five pounds without pain, inability to stand for more than 15
minutes without pain, fatigue, pain and shortness of breath walking a short way, and other health
issues. (R. 11).
After being denied initially on December 13, 2010, Plaintiff sought and obtained a
hearing on January 11, 2012, before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) David Brash. (R. 24-62).
An additional hearing was held before the ALJ on June 13, 2012. (R. 63-88). In a decision dated
July 19, 2012, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s request for benefits. (R. 8-23). The Appeals Council
declined to review the ALJ’s decision on February 12, 2014. (R. 1-6). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a
timely appeal with the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, and
by Order dated April 21, 2015, the Court remanded the case for further administrative
proceedings. In particular, the Court found that the ALJ’s RFC assessment was
not supported by substantial evidence because, in failing to address the question
of Plaintiff’s left hand impairment, it is not clear whether the ALJ chose to reject
a limitation concerning Plaintiff’s left hand, whether the ALJ felt that the RFC
fully accounted for Plaintiff’s left hand limitations, or whether the omission of a
limitation concerning Plaintiff’s left hand was merely unintentional. While the
ALJ was by no means required to simply adopt all of the findings of Dr. Tayal, he
was required to explain his basis for rejecting them if he chose to do so,
particularly in light of the fact that he expressly gave additional weight to this
opinion in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC. On the other hand, it is possible that the
ALJ expected that limiting Plaintiff’s overhead reaching also adequately
addressed any additional left hand problems Dr. Tayal detected, but, without a
specific explanation by the ALJ of his reasoning, it is not apparent to the Court
whether this general limitation also accounts for any more specific left hand
limitations.
(R. 477). Accordingly, the case was remanded “for further discussion as to the rationale for not
including specific left hand limitations in determining Plaintiff’s RFC and in formulating the
hypothetical question to the VE.” (R. 477-78).
Upon remand, a supplemental hearing was held before the ALJ on January 22, 2016. (R.
420-435). In a decision dated March 9, 2016, the ALJ issued a partially favorable decision to
2
Plaintiff, having concluded that beginning became disabled as of June 3, 2014, the date his age
category changed, but was not disabled prior to that date. (R. 403-414). Having exhausted his
administrative remedies for the second time, Plaintiff filed this action, and the parties have filed
cross-motions for summary judgment.
II.
Standard of Review
Judicial review of a social security case is based upon the pleadings and the transcript of
the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review is limited to determining whether the
Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the record, as a whole, contains
substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s findings of fact. See Matthews v. Apfel, 239
F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any
fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g))).
“Substantial evidence” is defined as “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate” to support a conclusion. Plummer v.
Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999). However, a “single piece of evidence will not satisfy
the substantiality test if the [Commissioner] ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by
countervailing evidence.” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Kent v.
Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983)). “Nor is evidence substantial if it is overwhelmed
by other evidence – particularly certain types of evidence (e.g., that offered by treating
physicians) – or if it really constitutes not evidence but mere conclusion.” Id.
A disability is established when the claimant can demonstrate some medically
determinable basis for an impairment that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial
gainful activity for a statutory twelve-month period. See Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 3839 (3d Cir. 2001). “A claimant is considered unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity
3
‘only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only
unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy . . . .’”
Id. at 39 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)).
The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) has promulgated regulations incorporating a
five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is under a disability
as defined by the Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. In Step One, the Commissioner must determine
whether the claimant is currently engaging in substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(b). If so, the disability claim will be denied. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140
(1987). If not, the second step of the process is to determine whether the claimant is suffering
from a severe impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). “An impairment or combination of
impairments is not severe if it does not significantly limit [the claimant’s] physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.921(a). If the claimant fails to show that his
or her impairments are “severe,” he or she is ineligible for disability benefits. If the claimant
does have a severe impairment, however, the Commissioner must proceed to Step Three and
determine whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals the criteria for a listed impairment.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). If a claimant meets a listing, a finding of disability is automatically
directed. If the claimant does not meet a listing, the analysis proceeds to Steps Four and Five.
Step Four requires the ALJ to consider whether the claimant retains the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform his or her past relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(e). The claimant bears the burden of demonstrating an inability to return to his or her
past relevant work. See Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1994). If the claimant is
unable to resume his or her former occupation, the evaluation moves to the fifth and final step.
4
At this stage, the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner, who must demonstrate
that the claimant is capable of performing other available work in the national economy in order
to deny a claim of disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g). In making this determination, the ALJ
should consider the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and past work experience. See id. The ALJ
must further analyze the cumulative effect of all the claimant’s impairments in determining
whether he or she is capable of performing work and is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.923.
III.
The ALJ's Decision
In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not been engaged in substantial gainful
activity since September 13, 2010. (R. 405). The ALJ also found that Plaintiff met the second
requirement of the sequential evaluation process insofar as he has the following severe
impairments: “chronic obstructive lung disease, asthma, cervical and lumbar degenerative disc
disease, obesity, lower extremity peripheral polyneuropathy, diabetic neuropathy with ataxia,
status-post thoracic compression fracture, carotid artery aneurysm and stroke syndrome/pontine
infarct.” (R. 405-06). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet any of the
listings that would satisfy Step Three. (R. 406-07).
The ALJ went on to find that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform sedentary work with
the following additional limitations: “[h]e can stand no more than 1 hour, cumulatively, in an 8hour day[;]” “[h]e can never climb a ladder, rope or scaffold[;]” “[h]e can never climb[;]” “[h]e
can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, or crouch[;]” “[h]e must use a handheld device in one
hand while ambulating[;]” “[h]e must avoid all exposure to unprotected heights, dangerous
machinery, and like hazards[;]” and “[h]e must avoid even moderate exposure to gases, fumes,
and like respiratory irritants.” (R. 407). In discussing the evidence in support of that assessment,
the ALJ noted that this Court had “specifically instructed [him] to address [Plaintiff’s] left hand
5
manipulation abilities.” (R. 410). To that end, the ALJ “acknowledge[d] that the EMG showed
very mild left ulnar neuropathy at the wrist and ulnar groove and that clinical findings were
generally normal with only a few Tinel’s and Hoffman’s signs which are used to detect nerve
injury such as carpal tunnel syndrome and not residuals from a stroke.” (Id.). “In addition,” the
ALJ wrote, “although there are a few findings of decreased grip strength, there are many normal
findings for grasp and upper extremity strength.” (Id.). “Thus,” he concluded, “I find that the
claimant’s left hand and upper extremity limitations have been appropriately accommodated
within the sedentary weight limitations found above.” (Id.).
At Step Four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work, so he moved on to
Step Five. (R. 412). The ALJ then used a vocational expert (“VE”) to determine whether or not a
significant number of jobs existed in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. The VE
testified that, given Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, Plaintiff could perform
jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy, such as assembler, surveillance
system monitor, and document preparer. (R. 413). The ALJ noted that, consistent with the VE’s
testimony, even if Plaintiff “were limited to occasional fingering and feeling, the surveillance
system monitor would remain with 7,000 jobs in the national economy.” (R. 413). Accordingly,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled prior to June 3, 2014, the date that Plaintiff’s age
category changed. (R. 413-14). Beginning on June 3, 2014, however, Plaintiff became disabled
through the application of Medical-Vocational Rule 201.09. (R. 414).
IV.
Legal Analysis
As noted above, this case has already been remanded once for reconsideration. As the
Court explained in its prior Order, in his first decision, the ALJ failed to properly address the
6
issue of Plaintiff’s left hand impairment in formulating his RFC.1 Unfortunately, remand is
again required for that very same reason. Although the ALJ considered the evidence related to
Plaintiff’s left hand limitations at somewhat greater length than in his first decision, he once
again failed to address those limitations in sufficient detail and set forth any “rationale for not
including specific left hand limitations in determining Plaintiff’s RFC[.]”
In particular, the record reveals that, in addition to mild weakness in his left hand, which
the ALJ acknowledged, Plaintiff had “[m]ild left-sided hyperreflexia and decreased fine finger
movements.” (R. 382, 392) (emphasis added). Plaintiff was also noted to have “decreased
proprioception in the upper and lower extremities.” (R. 748). The former findings were noted in
the treatment records from Plaintiff’s neurologist, Dr. Ashis H. Tayal, in January and February
2012. (R. 382, 392). The ALJ reviewed and discussed Dr. Tayal’s findings, including with regard
to Plaintiff’s decreased fine finger movements, and purported to give them “great weight.” (R.
411). Yet, despite the fact that Dr. Tayal found that Plaintiff had decreased fine finger
movements and the fact that Plaintiff gave Dr. Tayal’s overall assessment “great weight,” the
ALJ did not include any restrictions on fine finger movements in his RFC assessment and
offered no explanation why. Indeed, the ALJ did not even include the restriction on overhead
1
RFC is defined as “that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations
caused by his or her impairment(s).” Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 40 (3d Cir. 2001). See
also 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a). Not only must an ALJ consider all relevant evidence in
determining an individual’s RFC, the RFC finding “must ‘be accompanied by a clear and
satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests.’” Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 41 (quoting Cotter
v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981)). “‘[A]n examiner’s findings should be as
comprehensive and analytical as feasible and, where appropriate, should include a statement of
subordinate factual foundations on which ultimate factual conclusions are based, so that a
reviewing court may know the basis for the decision.’” Id. (quoting Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705).
See also S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (S.S.A.), at *7 (“The RFC assessment must include a
narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific
medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities,
observations).”).
7
reaching that he included in his first RFC assessment, so his revised RFC was actually less
accommodating that his first RFC.
To be sure, the ALJ was not required to adopt all of Dr. Tayal’s findings. He could have
adopted some and rejected others in favor of contrary evidence in the record, as it was ultimately
up to him to decide Plaintiff’s RFC. Cf. S.S.R. 96–5p, 1996 WL 374183 (S.S.A.), at *4
(“Adjudicators must remember, however, that medical source statements may actually comprise
separate medical opinions regarding diverse physical and mental functions, such as walking,
lifting, seeing, and remembering instructions, and that it may be necessary to decide whether to
adopt or not adopt each one.”). Before doing so, however, the ALJ was required to provide some
explanation for why he was not adopting the restrictions regarding Plaintiff’s ability to use his
left hand found in Dr. Tayal’s assessment. Absent that, the Court cannot say whether the ALJ
failed to incorporate these limitations into his RFC for “no reason or the wrong reason.”
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999).
This lack of clarity must be addressed on remand. Once again, the ALJ is directed
specifically to address the findings regarding Plaintiff’s manipulative limitations and either (1)
incorporate them into his RFC assessment and the hypothetical he poses to the VE or (2) explain
why he is not adopting them. See Nickens v. Colvin, No. 14-140, 2014 WL 4792197, at *2
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2014) (remanding case where the ALJ gave substantial weight to nonexamining agency consultant’s opinion, but did not include all of the limitations expressed by the
consultant in his RFC assessment); Shaw v. Colvin, No. 14-1501, 2015 WL 4162446, at *3
(W.D. Pa. July 9, 2015) (remanding case in which “it [was] uncertain why the ALJ chose to
incorporate certain limitations” in a medical source statement “and not others”).
8
Perhaps the ALJ believed that by limiting Plaintiff to sedentary work, he was, in fact,
accommodating any of Plaintiff’s fine finger movement limitations. However, that is not
necessarily the case. As explained in Social Security Ruling 96-9p:
Most unskilled sedentary jobs require good use of both hands and the fingers; i.e.,
bilateral manual dexterity. Fine movements of small objects require use of the
fingers; e.g., to pick or pinch. Most unskilled sedentary jobs require good use of
the hands and fingers for repetitive hand-finger actions.
Any significant manipulative limitation of an individual’s ability to handle and
work with small objects with both hands will result in a significant erosion of the
unskilled sedentary occupational base. For example, example 1 in section
201.00(h) of appendix 2, describes an individual who has an impairment that
prevents the performance of any sedentary occupations that require bilateral
manual dexterity (i.e., “limits the individual to sedentary jobs which do not
require bilateral manual dexterity”). When the limitation is less significant,
especially if the limitation is in the non-dominant hand, it may be useful to
consult a vocational resource.
S.S.R. 96–9p, 1996 WL 374185 (S.S.A.), at *8 (emphasis in original). See also S.S.R. 85-15,
1985 WL 56857 (S.S.A.), at * 7 (“‘Fingering’ involves picking, pinching, or otherwise working
primarily with the fingers. It is needed to perform most unskilled sedentary jobs.”). So if it is
determined that Plaintiff’s manipulative limitations are significant, the unskilled sedentary
occupational base may be eroded. As such, the issue should not have gone unaddressed by the
ALJ – particularly since he purported to afford Dr. Tayal’s findings “great weight.”
Defendant, however, argues that the ALJ’s failure to incorporate any fine finger
movement limitations into his RFC was harmless because “the job of alarm monitor/surveillance
monitor does not involve significant handling, finger dexterity, or manual dexterity” and “the VE
testified that even if Plaintiff were limited to occasional fingering and feeling, he would remain
capable of performing” the surveillance monitor job. (Def.’s Br. at 17). True as that may be, the
Court cannot decide, in the first instance, whether Plaintiff can actually engage in “occasional
fingering and feeling.” He may be more restricted. It will be up to the ALJ, upon remand, to
9
make that determination, after taking into consideration the evidence the Court has highlighted in
this Order and addressing it in the manner set forth above. In that same vein, the Court takes no
position as to the remaining issues raised in Plaintiff’s brief. Nor does the Court express any
opinion as to whether the ALJ’s RFC assessment could be supported by the record. Instead, it is,
once again, the need for additional explanation by the ALJ that necessitates a remand in this
case.
V.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision is not
supported by substantial evidence. In short, the ALJ failed to properly address the evidence
related to Plaintiff’s fine finger movement limitations. The Court is very cognizant of the age of
this case and that the ALJ has already conducted three hearings regarding Plaintiff’s claim. In
view of that, the Court is somewhat reluctant to remand it again for further consideration.
However, the record does not permit the Court to reverse and remand the case for an award of
benefits. See Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 221-22 (3d Cir. 1984). Instead, the ALJ must
specifically address the manipulative limitations described herein, determine whether to
incorporate such limitations into his RFC, and, if so, determine, via the testimony of a VE,
whether the limitations erode the occupational base for sedentary work. Accordingly, the Court
hereby remands this case to the Commissioner for reconsideration consistent with this Order.
The Court urges the Commissioner to adjudicate the matter as expeditiously as possible.
s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf:
Counsel of record
10
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?