HAMMONDS v. TEMPLETON
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION re 5 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by JAMES HAMMONDS, 8 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by KARA N. TEMPLETON. Signed by Chief Judge Joy Flowers Conti on 11/18/2016. (vrk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JAMES HAMMONDS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KARA N. TEMPLETON, Director of
Bureau of Drivers Licensing,
Defendant.
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Case No. 2:16-CV-00836-JFC
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CONTI, Chief District Judge.
I. Introduction
Pending before the court is the motion to dismiss the complaint filed by Plaintiff James
Hammonds (“Plaintiff”). [ECF No. 8]. In the motion, Defendant Kara N. Templeton, Director
of Bureau of Driver Licensing (“Defendant”), seeks to dismiss the claims asserted by Plaintiff
against her. Plaintiff, after initially failing to respond, filed a “response to show cause” setting
forth his opposition to the motion to dismiss. [ECF No. 13]. For the reasons set forth below,
Defendant’s motion will be granted, with prejudice.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff, a pro se litigant proceeding in forma pauperis, filed his complaint against
Defendant on June 22, 2016. [ECF No. 3]. In his complaint, Plaintiff states that on or about
April 28, 2016, he received a “restoration requirements letter” from Defendant, in her official
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capacity, informing him that, in order to restore driving privileges that he lost following a 2002
conviction in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, he had to successfully complete a
court ordered treatment program under Act 122 and apply for an Ignition Interlock License. Id.
¶¶ 4-5. Plaintiff attached a copy of the letter (dated April 21, 2016) to his complaint. [ECF No.
3-1, at 1-2]. He also attached a copy of an Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
County dated July 22, 2002, in which the judge purportedly sentenced Plaintiff to probation for
one year but did not check the boxes requiring completion of a regional alcohol program or an
interlock device as special conditions. [ECF No. 3-1, at 3]. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is
therefore attempting to enforce a “ghost court order” that does not exist in violation of Plaintiff’s
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
[ECF No. 3 ¶¶ 6-14].
Along with his complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary
injunction alleging irreparable harm and seeking a court order enjoining Defendant from further
issuing and enforcing “ghost court orders” such as that referenced in the complaint. [ECF No. 5].
On July 19, 2016, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to
state a claim and a brief in support. [ECF Nos. 8, 9]. In the motion, Defendant contends that this
lawsuit is merely a continuation of a prior action, Hammonds v. Templeton, Civil Action No.
14-514 (W.D. Pa.) (“Hammonds I”), in which this court dismissed the same allegations Plaintiff
raises in the present case. Accordingly, Defendant argues, the complaint is barred by the doctrine
of collateral estoppel and must be dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice. [ECF Nos. 8, 9].
Defendant attached to her motion three exhibits from the record in Hammonds I, including an
April 11, 2014 restoration requirements letter from the Bureau of Driver Licensing (Ex. 1); a
Report of the Clerk of Courts dated July 25, 2002 (Ex. 2); and a letter to Plaintiff from Defendant
dated May 22, 2014, indicating, inter alia, that Plaintiff did not need to comply with ignition
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interlock (Ex. 3). [ECF No. 8-2].1
As of October 5, 2016, Plaintiff had not responded to the pending motion to dismiss.
Therefore, on that same date, this court entered an order to show cause why Defendant’s motion
should not be granted. [ECF No. 12]. On October 21, 2016, Plaintiff filed a “Response to Show
Cause” in which he opposes the instant motion. [ECF No. 13].2 The matter is now fully briefed
and ripe for disposition.
III. Standard of Review
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently reiterated the standards and procedures
that a district court must apply when deciding a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6):
A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” But detailed pleading is not generally required.
The Rules demand “only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ...
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99,
2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.; see also Sheridan v. NGK
Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). Although the plausibility
standard “does not impose a probability requirement,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556,
127 S. Ct. 1955, it does require a pleading to show “more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937.
A complaint that pleads facts “merely consistent with a defendant's liability ... stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The plausibility determination is
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In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court may consider the complaint, attached exhibits, matters of public record, and
undisputedly authentic documents not attached to the complaint if the complainant’s claims are based on those
documents. Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).
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The order to show cause indicated that the court would deem Plaintiff’s continued failure to respond consent to the
motion to dismiss being granted. [ECF No. 12]. Because Plaintiff responded to the order to show cause within the
timeframe given, the court will consider his opposition and evaluate the motion to dismiss on its merits.
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“a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679, 129 S. Ct. 1937.
Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing
the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps. First, it must “tak[e] note of
the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675,
129 S. Ct. 1937. Second, it should identify allegations that, “because they are no
more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679, 129
S. Ct. 1937; see also Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir.
2011) (“Mere restatements of the elements of a claim are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” (citation and editorial marks omitted)). Finally, “[w]hen there
are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and
then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. 1937.
Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2016).
At the final step of the analysis, the court is to assume all well-pled allegations of
“historical fact” to be true, construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
draw all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of plaintiff, and ask whether those facts
“raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” to support the legal claim
being asserted.
Id. at 789.
Allegations of historical fact are assumed to be true even if
“unrealistic or nonsensical,” “chimerical,” or “extravagantly fanciful.” Id. at 789-90 (citing
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). “Put another way, Twombly and Iqbal expressly declined to exclude
even outlandish allegations from a presumption of truth except to the extent they resembled a
‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a ... claim’ or other legal conclusion.” Id. at 789.
Pro se plaintiffs are held to a less stringent standard than individuals represented by
counsel. Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008). A pro se plaintiff,
however, is still required to adhere to standard rules of civil procedure. See McNeil v. United
States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). While the court must accept as true all factual allegations in a
complaint, it “need not credit a complaint's ... legal conclusions when deciding a motion to
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dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997) (citing In re
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429–30 (3d Cir.1997)). Although a court
must construe allegations in a pro se complaint liberally, a litigant “is not absolved from
complying with Twombly and the federal pleading requirements merely because s/he proceeds pro
se.” Thakar v. Tan, 372 F. App'x 325, 328 (3d Cir.2010) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint—even a pro se complaint—must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
When a plaintiff's pleading is deficient, leave to amend generally must be granted unless
amendment would be futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Phillips v. Cnty. of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). An amendment is futile when it would not cure the
deficiency in the complaint, or, in other words, when the complaint, as amended, would still fail to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir.
2000) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1434).
IV. Discussion
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
[ECF No. 9, at 3-4]. After careful review, the court agrees with Defendant that collateral estoppel
precludes Plaintiff from pursuing the instant action.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of issues adjudicated in a prior action.
Peloro v. United States, 488 F.3d 163, 174 (3d Cir.2007). The parameters of this doctrine have
been defined by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit as follows:
Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, prevents parties from relitigating an issue
that has already been actually litigated. “The prerequisites for the application of
issue preclusion are satisfied when: ‘(1) the issue sought to be precluded [is] the
same as that involved in the prior action; (2) that issue [was] actually litigated; (3) it
[was] determined by a final and valid judgment; and (4) the determination [was]
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essential to the prior judgment.’” Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Hyundai
Merch. Marine Co., 63 F.3d 1227, 1231–32 (3d Cir.1995) (quoting In re Graham,
973 F.2d 1089, 1097 (3d Cir.1992)); see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 326, n.5, 99 S. Ct. 645, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1979).
Peloro, 488 F.3d at 174–75 (footnote omitted).
Because the final judgment upon which
Defendant bases her claim of collateral estoppel was issued by this court in Hammonds I, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's formulation for federal collateral estoppel
applies. Id. at 175 n.11 (citing Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Agusta, 178 F.3d 132, 145 (3d
Cir.1999)).
All the above requirements for the application of collateral estoppel exist in this case.
Plaintiff filed an almost identical complaint against Defendant in Hammonds I, which the court
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. See
Hammonds v. Templeton, Civil Action No. 14–514, 2015 WL 106618 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2015).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit entered a judgment affirming the
decision. Hammonds v. Director Pa. Bureau of Driver Licensing, 618 F. App'x 740 (3d Cir.
2015). Although the Court of Appeals held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar Plaintiff’s
claims to the extent he sought, as here, prospective injunctive relief, the court nevertheless upheld
the dismissal of Plaintiff’s case because he failed to state a § 1983 claim for procedural due process
upon which relief could be granted. See id. at 742 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). Specifically,
the Court of Appeals explained:
Assuming that Hammonds purports to assert that he has a Fourteenth Amendment
interest in his driver's license, he does not contend that defendant Templeton denied
him adequate process. While we construe the allegations of a pro se pleading
liberally, see United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3d Cir.1999), we fail to
discern either a procedural due process claim—or any other claim under
§ 1983—against defendant Templeton here. We have carefully reviewed
Hammonds's submissions in this Court and the District Court, and are satisfied that
further amendment of the amended complaint would have been futile. See Phillips
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v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir.2008). We therefore conclude that
the District Court properly dismissed it.
Id.
Because the issue whether Defendant’s alleged actions concerning the restoration of
Plaintiff’s driver’s license violated his procedural due process rights, or any other federal rights,
was “actually litigated” and was “essential” to “a final and valid judgment,” collateral estoppel
applies and bars Plaintiff from attempting to relitigate these repeated claims here. See, e.g., Fink
v. Bishop, 641 F. App’x 134 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam); Phillips v. James, Civ. Action No.
13-1196, 2014 WL 1652914 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2014); Tauro v. Allegheny Cnty., Civ. Action No.
09-0354, 2009 WL 4262977 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2009), aff’d, 371 F. App’x 345 (3d Cir. 2010).
Even if Plaintiff's claims are not so precluded, his complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted for the same reasons set forth by the court of appeals in Hammonds I.
The only difference between this case and Hammonds I is that Plaintiff received a new restoration
requirements letter from the Bureau of Driver Licensing. Aside from its date, however, the new
letter is substantively identical to the letter at issue in Hammonds I, and nothing therein gives rise
to a plausible due process claim. The mere fact that Plaintiff invokes the due process clause
likewise does not lend credence to his claims. Burtch, 662 F.3d at 224 (“Mere restatements of the
elements of a claim are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” (citation and editorial marks
omitted)).3 Even construing the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint liberally in light of his pro se
status, the pleading fails to provide any plausible basis to support a procedural due process claim.
In his response to the order to show cause, Plaintiff does not respond directly to
Defendant’s arguments in support of dismissal. Rather, Plaintiff claims that his motion for
preliminary injunction, and not his complaint, is the “controlling weight for the basis of this
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Plaintiff also ignores the letter he made part of the record in Hammonds I that clarified he is not required to apply for
an ignition interlock license. See ECF No. 8-2, Ex. 3; Civil Action No. 14-514 (W.D. Pa.), ECF No. 5-2, Ex. A.
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action.” See ECF No. 13, at 1 (noting that the complaint is “only an exhibit” to the preliminary
injunction motion). For the reasons set forth above, however, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he
is likely to prevail on the merits of his claims in light of the arguments raised in Defendant’s
motion to dismiss. Because the underlying complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, the motion for preliminary injunction must be denied as moot. See Klay v. United
Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1097–98 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[I]f the plaintiff's rights have not
been violated, he is not entitled to any relief, injunctive or otherwise.”).
V. Conclusion
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that district courts should
not dismiss a pro se complaint without allowing the plaintiff leave to amend unless amendment
would be inequitable or futile. Kim v. I.R.S., 522 F. App’x 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Alston
v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004)). In this case, for the reasons set forth above, leave to
amend Plaintiff’s pro se complaint would be futile with respect to his § 1983 claim. Accordingly,
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss will be granted, and Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim will be dismissed with
prejudice. To the extent Plaintiff’s complaint can be construed as raising any state law claims,
these claims will be dismissed without prejudice.4 Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction
will be denied as moot.
An appropriate order will be entered.
BY THE COURT:
Dated: November 18, 2016
/s/ Joy Flowers Conti__________
Joy Flowers Conti
Chief United States District Judge
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Although Plaintiff’s complaint does not appear to allege a violation of state law, Plaintiff’s “Response to Show
Cause” alludes to both state and federal constitutional claims. [ECF No. 13]. Thus, out of an abundance of caution
in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the court makes the distinction here.
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