KNOCH v. THE UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION DENYING re 2 First MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by RYAN DOUGLAS KNOCH. Signed by Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy on 8/31/2016. (ajt)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PITTSBURGH
RYAN DOUGLAS KNOCH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH, DR.
PATRICIA BEESON, KENYON BONNER,
BARBARA RUPRECHT, ANTHONY
BLEDSOE, CYNTHIA TANANIS,
JENNIFER SENG, JANE DOE, AND;
JOHN DOE (#1), AND; AND JOHN DOE
(#2),
Defendants,
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2:16-CV-00970-CRE
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CYNTHIA REED EDDY, United States Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiff Ryan Douglas Knoch’s (“Plaintiff’s”)
Motion for Preliminary Injunction. [ECF No. 2].
In his motion, Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendants violated his due process and equal protection rights under Title IX of the Education
Amendment of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in taking disciplinary
action against him and suspending him from the University of Pittsburgh’s (the “University’s”)
Swanson School of Engineering. Plaintiff seeks a Court Order directing the University to allow
Plaintiff to register for classes at the University for the Fall 2016 and Spring 2017 semesters
notwithstanding his suspension. In the underlying Complaint, Plaintiff also seeks monetary
damages for his financial loss, psychological and emotional distress, loss of standing in his
community, damage to his reputation, his family’s unreimbursed out of pocket expenses incurred
in response to his suspension, and attorneys’ fees and costs.
A preliminary injunction hearing was held on August 22, 2016. At the hearing, the Court
1
heard from Richard Fann, a University Judicial Board Hearing Panel member, Barbara Ruprecht,
the University’s Student Conduct Officer, Cynthia Tananis, a University Review Board member,
Kenyon Bonner, the University’s Vice Provost and Dean of Students and Plaintiff Ryan Knoch.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.1
For the reasons that
follow, Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction is denied.
I.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Plaintiff has been enrolled as a student at the University since Fall 2012. Joint Stip. [ECF
No. 21] at ¶ 1. Plaintiff has to complete fourteen credits, or approximately one semester, to
graduate. Tr. at 149. The facts underlying the instant action concern Plaintiff’s suspension from
the University of Pittsburgh’s Swanson School of Engineering for alleged violations of the
Student Code of Conduct (“Code”). Joint Stip. at ¶ 12. Plaintiff was alleged to have violated the
Code in connection with his interaction with a female University Student, J.S. that occurred on
January 28, 2016. Tr. at 46; Pl’s Ex. 8 1/28/16 Judicial Referral. On that date, an argument
ensued between Plaintiff and J.S. at J.S.’s residence. Pl.’s Ex. 8 1/28/16 Judicial Referral. The
two were in or had been in a romantic or intimate relationship. Id. During the incident, Plaintiff
is alleged to have placed his hands on J.S. in a way that could cause bruising and threw her
laptop off of her kitchen table. Id. J.S. contacted the City of Pittsburgh Police Department who
arrived on the scene. Id. Plaintiff was then arrested by the City of Pittsburgh Police Department
and charged in Allegheny County with one count of Simple Assault and one count of Criminal
Mischief. Joint Stip. at ¶ 7. These charges were later withdrawn at the magisterial level after
Plaintiff completed twenty-four sessions of a batterers intervention class. Id. at ¶¶ 2-3. On that
1
All parties have consented to jurisdiction before a United States Magistrate Judge;
therefore the Court has the authority to decide motions for preliminary injunction and dispositive
motions, and to eventually enter final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636, et seq.
2
same date, a University complaint alleging that Plaintiff violated certain Code provisions, also
referred to as a Judicial Referral, was filed against Plaintiff by University Police Officer
Jonathan Beck who responded to the call involving the domestic dispute between Plaintiff and
J.S. Id. at ¶¶ 9-11.
a. University of Pittsburgh Student Code of Conduct and Judicial Procedures
The University Student Code of Conduct and Judicial Procedures establishes procedures
by which it adjudicates alleged conduct violations involving its students. Def.’s Ex. 1 2015
University Student Code of Conduct. Under the Code, ““[a]ny University official or member of
the University community may institute a proceeding against a student . . . by filing a judicial
referral with the Office of Student Conduct.” Id. at 17. The Code defines a “judicial referral” as
“a report filed regarding violations of the Code,” Id. at 13, which must set forth the Code
violation(s) alleged to have occurred, the parties to the alleged Code violation(s), the facts
surrounding the alleged violation(s), and any witnesses to the alleged violation(s). Id. at 17.
The Code grades the severity of the judicial referral based on incident levels as to the
alleged conduct. Id. at 14-19. Here, Plaintiff’s alleged violation was graded as a Level II
incident. Tr. at 67. Once a Level II incident judicial referral has been filed, a disciplinary
conference is scheduled in order to allow a Student Conduct Officer to review the charges with
the alleged offender. Def.’s Ex. 1 2015 University Student Code of Conduct at 19. At this
meeting, the respondent is permitted to elect to hold a full hearing before the University’s
Judicial Board to determine the veracity of the alleged Code violations. Id. At the Judicial Board
hearing, the Student Conduct Officer serves as moderator and three Judicial Board Members sit
as panel members during the hearing. Id. at 19-20. The student is not permitted to a full “legal”
evidentiary hearing and no technical rules of evidence are applied at the hearing. Id. However,
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the Student Conduct Officer in serving as the moderator controls the admissibility of evidence at
the hearing and is guided by the “[r]easonable rules of relevancy” in determining whether
evidence or testimony is admissible. Id. at 20.
After a Judicial Board hearing is held, the Judicial Board renders a decision and submits a
recommendation to the Vice Provost and Dean of Students for final adjudication or decision. Id.
at 19; 22.
The Dean of Students may adopt the Judicial Board’s recommendation or alter the
recommended sanctions “if he or she believes that the totality of circumstances, including but not
limited to any prior offenses and University precedents, justifies it.” Id. at 22. The Dean of
Students’ final decision is then issued to both the complainant and the respondent. Id. at 22.
If the respondent disagrees with an adverse decision, the student retains the right to an
appeal the decision to the University Review Board (“URB”). Id. at 22. The URB’s scope of
review is limited and may consider “whether rights affirmed by the Board of Trustees have been
denied,” whether the initial hearing was conducted “fairly and in conformity with properly
prescribed procedures,” and whether the findings and sanctions were “arbitrary and capricious”
in nature. Id. at 23. The URB has discretion to determine the appeal based on the submission of
the documents from the parties alone, with or without oral argument. Id. at 24. The URB then
must render a final, written decision recommending action to the Provost, and may remand a
matter to the Student Conduct Office for further proceedings if it determines that there are
insufficient written findings or prejudicial procedural errors. Id. at 25. The Provost may either
accept or reject the URB’s recommendations. Pl.’s Ex. 29 at URB Rec. at 8.
b. Plaintiff’s Alleged Violations of the University’s Student Code of Conduct
The Judicial Referral filed on January 28, 2016 alleged that Plaintiff violated three
provisions of the Code in connection with his interaction with J.S. pertaining to physical abuse,
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threat of physical abuse, and relationship violence. Joint Stip. [ECF No. 21] at ¶ 12.
Plaintiff was represented by counsel, and on February 4, 2016, Barbara Ruprecht
(“Ruprecht”), the University’s Student Conduct Officer, informed Plaintiff and his counsel that a
Judicial Board Hearing would be held on February 25, 2016.2 Id. at ¶¶ 13-15. On February 11,
2016, Plaintiff’s counsel requested that three witnesses be permitted to testify at the February 25,
2016 hearing, including licensed psychologist Dr. Shannon Edwards. Id. at ¶ 16. Plaintiff sought
for Dr. Edwards to testify as to the symptoms of mental disorders that J.S. allegedly reported
suffering from and how those mental disorders would affect J.S.’s credibility at the Judicial
Board Hearing. Tr. at 39-41.
Ruprecht denied Plaintiff’s counsel’s request to permit Dr.
Edwards to testify at Judicial Board Hearing, because Dr. Edwards had never treated J.S., and in
Ruprecht’s opinion, Dr. Edwards’ proposed testimony regarding J.S.’s alleged mental disorders
was not relevant to the issue of whether Plaintiff violated the University’s Code of Conduct.
Joint Stip. at ¶ 17.
On or about February 14, 2016, J.S. supplemented the January 28, 2016 Judicial Referral
to include alleged events from August, October and November 2015 in which Plaintiff allegedly
threatened, intimidated and/or used physical force against J.S. Id. at ¶ 18. At a meeting with
Plaintiff, his counsel and parents shortly after J.S. supplemented the January 28, 2016 referral,
Ruprecht informed Plaintiff that if he admitted responsibility or was found responsible for the
violations of the Code for which he was accused, Ruprecht would recommend a two-term
suspension for Plaintiff’s infractions. Id. at ¶ 19. On February 16, 2016, Plaintiff’s counsel
requested and was granted a postponement of the February 25, 2016 Judicial Board Hearing in
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Ruprecht attempted to schedule a Judicial Board Hearing on the January 28, 2016
Judicial Referral on February 11, 2016 and February 18, 2016, but the parties were unable to
mutually agree upon either date. Id. at ¶ 14.
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order to properly investigate and prepare witnesses based on J.S.’s supplementation to the
January 28, 2016 Judicial Referral. Id. at ¶¶ 20-21. The Judicial Board Hearing was rescheduled
for March 17, 2016, to take place following the University’s scheduled spring break. Id. at ¶ 22.
On or about March 1, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Judicial Referral against J.S. alleging various
violations of the Code. He alleges that on a trip to Chicago he had taken with J.S. and her family
in August 2015, J.S. had taken Plaintiff’s debit card out of his wallet and used it without asking
Plaintiff, and when Plaintiff confronted her, she pepper-sprayed him and threw his backpack out
of the two-story apartment they were staying in. Id. at ¶ 23; Pl.’s Ex. 12 3/1/2016 Judicial
Referral. Likewise, Plaintiff alleges in the Judicial Referral against J.S. that during the January
27, 2016 incident that occurred at J.S.’s apartment, and subject to the Judicial Referral filed
against him, she punched him in the chest, and while she was flailing her arms, he put his hands
on her arms to hold them down, possibly causing bruising. Pl.’s Ex. 12 3/1/2016 Judicial
Referral. Plaintiff also included a complaint that J.S. had filed false allegations against him and
provided misrepresented information to university officials and police officers about previous
incidents. Id.
On March 8, 2016, Ruprecht informed Plaintiff that she would not join Plaintiff’s March
1, 2016 Judicial Referral against J.S. to the January 28, 2016 and February 14, 2016 Judicial
Referrals that were the subject of the rescheduled March 17, 2016 hearing. Joint Stip. at ¶ 24.
But, Ruprecht informed Plaintiff that he was “free to reference any of the information contained
in [his] referral as part of [his] testimony in that hearing, to the extent that the information [was]
relevant.” Id. at ¶ 25.
Pursuant to the University’s Code of Conduct and Judicial Procedures, the University
held a hearing before a three-member Judicial Board on March 17, 2016. Id. at ¶ 26. The three
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members of the panel for the Judicial Board Hearing were Defendants John Doe #1 – Zachary
Davis, John Doe #2 – Richard Fann, and Jane Doe – Carol Lippert. Id. at ¶ 27. Pursuant to the
Code, Plaintiff’s counsel was permitted to be present at the Judicial Board Hearing to act in an
advisory role, but was not permitted to question the witnesses. Id. at ¶ 28.
Plaintiff was
appointed a law student from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law as his representative to
question any witnesses. Tr. at 74. No contemporaneously created stenographic, audio, or video
record of the March 17, 2016 Judicial Hearing exists, and the University does not create any
records of any Judicial Board Hearings and destroys all notes made in the hearing. Joint Stip. at ¶
29; Tr. at 11. Any contemporaneously created notes made by any person present at the Judicial
Hearing, including notes made by Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s advisor, Plaintiff’s student representative,
Plaintiff’s counsel and the Defendants were not permitted to leave the hearing room and were
immediately destroyed following the hearing. Joint Stip. at ¶ 30. Plaintiff alleges that a student
witness, which the Court will refer to as “Dylan,” testified as to J.S.’s untrustworthiness, but that
exculpatory evidence was not cited in the Judicial Board recommendation and any evidence that
Dylan testified was destroyed. Tr. at 44-45; 158-159.
By document dated March 17, 2016 and signed on March 22, 2016, the Judicial Board
found Plaintiff responsible for violating three provisions of the University’s Code of Conduct,
and recommended that he be suspended from the University for two semesters and provide proof
that he completed domestic violence classes as part of a court arrangement related to his January
arrest. Joint Stip. at ¶ 31.
On or about April 4, 2016, Defendant Kenyon Bonner, the
University’s Vice Provost and Dean of Students, approved the Judicial Board’s recommendation.
Id. at ¶ 32.
On April 8, 2016, Plaintiff timely appealed the decision of the Judicial Board to the three
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member panel of the University Review Board (“URB”), and also sought a postponement of
sanctions pending his appeal. Id. at ¶ 33. Plaintiff’s motion to postpone sanctions pending his
appeal was granted and he was able to complete his spring semester classes on April 26, 2016.
Id. at ¶¶ 36-37. During this time, Plaintiff was only permitted to be on campus and only in
University buildings during the time his classes were held. Tr. at 47-48; 176. He was not
permitted to be on University grounds for any other reason. Ibid. The three members of the URB
panel who received Plaintiff’s appeal and motion to postpone sanctions were Defendants
Anthony Bledsoe, Jennifer Seng and Cynthia Tananis. Joint Stip. at ¶ 34. In accordance with the
University’s Code of Conduct, Defendant Seng of the University’s Office of General Counsel
served as the URB moderator for Plaintiff’s appeal. Joint Stip. at ¶ 35; Tr. at 100.
On May 17, 2016, Plaintiff was notified that his petition for appeal was denied. Joint
Stip. at ¶ 38. Defendant Patricia Beeson, in her capacity as Provost for the University, signed the
URB’s Acceptance of Recommendation on May 12, 2016. Id. at ¶ 39. As a result, Plaintiff’s
two-term suspension was upheld and he remains ineligible to enroll in any classes at the
University until Summer 2017. Id. at ¶ 40.
On or about May 27, 2016, Ruprecht contacted Plaintiff via email to schedule a meeting
to discuss his March 1, 2016 Judicial Referral against J.S. Id. at ¶ 41. Plaintiff’s referral against
J.S. remains unadjudicated. Tr. at 158.
II.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a
clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S. Ct. 365, 376, 172 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2008) (citations omitted). In determining
whether a preliminary injunction should be granted, a district court must consider:
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(1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the
merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of the relief;
(3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the
nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the
public interest
Iles v. de Jongh, 638 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). A plaintiff must produce
evidence sufficient to prove all four factors for a court to issue preliminary injunctive relief. The
Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354, 366 (3d Cir. 2000); N.J. Hosp. Ass'n v. Waldman, 73 F.3d
509, 512 (3d Cir.1995) (citation omitted). “A plaintiff’s failure to establish any element in its
favor renders a preliminary injunction inappropriate.” NutraSweet Co. v. Vit–Mar Enter., Inc.,
176 F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir.1999). Each factor will be considered in turn.
A. Success on the Merits3
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recently explained that the degree of
likelihood of success on the merits calls for “a sufficient degree of success for a strong showing
… if there is a reasonable chance, or probability, of winning.” In re Revel AC, Inc., 802 F.3d
558, 568-69 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (applying standard
for motion to stay under the Bankruptcy Code, but recognizing the obvious overlap with the
factors in considering preliminary injunctive relief). “Thus, while it is not enough that the
chance of success on the merits be better than negligible, the likelihood of winning . . . need not
be more likely than not.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Generally, Plaintiff alleges two causes of action: a deprivation of his procedural due
3
A district court is not bound by its findings and conclusions in deciding a motion for
preliminary injunction in deciding future dispositive motions or deciding whether to grant
permanent injunctive relief. “[A] decision on a preliminary injunction is, in effect, only a
prediction about the merits of the case.” Morris v. Hoffa, 361 F.3d 177, 189 (3d Cir. 2004)
(citations omitted). “[T]he trial court ‘is free to reconsider the merits of the case’” in
determining future dispositive motions or whether to grant permanent injunctive relief. Id.
(citations omitted).
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process rights and equal protection rights under both Title IX4 and the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.5
i.
Due Process
As for Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim, “[t]he fundamental requirement of due
process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976) (quoting
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). The
protections required under due process are not static; “due process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). Thus, “[d]ue process, unlike some legal rules,
is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.”
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Title IX provides that: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance....” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that Title IX includes an implied private right
of action. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560
(1979).
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Plaintiff brings his constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under Section 1983, “a plaintiff must demonstrate a
violation of a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States that was committed
by a person acting under color of state law.” Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir.2000).
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In the present context, the Supreme Court has assumed, without deciding, that students of
public institutions of higher learning have a constitutionally protected property interest in their
continued enrollment.6 See Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 222, 106 S. Ct.
507, 511, 88 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1985). A student charged with misconduct may not be suspended
from a public school without the minimum procedures required by the due process clause. Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574, 95 S. Ct. 729, 736, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1975) (recognizing that public
education implicates property and liberty interests protected by the due process clause and “may
not be taken away for misconduct without adherence to the minimum procedures required by that
Clause.”). Where a student is suspended for a time period greater than ten days, due process
requires more formal procedures. Id. at 584. The general procedural due process factors set forth
in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1975) should be considered in this context:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substantive procedural
requirement would entail.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
Plaintiff first alleges that his due process rights were violated because the University
limited the evidence he sought to present at the Judicial Board Hearing when Defendant
6
There is an open question under Pennsylvania law as to whether the University of
Pittsburgh is a “state-related institution” under the University of Pittsburgh – Commonwealth
Act, 24 P.S. §§ 2510-202(6), such that its student handbook does not form a contract with its
students, or such that it could avoid any constitutional obligation. See Gati, 91 A.3d 723, 730
n.12. Because Plaintiff did not bring a breach of contract cause of action, and neither parties
make the distinction of the University’s identity under Pennsylvania law, the Court will not draw
a distinction here. Further, the University “should not expect to use its unique state-related status
to avoid any obligation to its students under either due process or contract law.” Id. at 731. See
also Walsh v. Univ., 2015 WL 128104 at 7 (recognizing the University of Pittsburgh’s distinct
status under Pennsylvania law).
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Ruprecht did not allow Dr. Edwards to testify on the issue of J.S.’s credibility at the March 17,
2016 Judicial Board Hearing. Due process does not require that a student be permitted to enter
all favorable evidence and Plaintiff cites to no legal authority for the proposition that a nontreating physician be permitted to provide expert testimony as to the mental faculties and
credibility of an accuser at the disciplinary hearing. See e.g., Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d
655, 665 (11th Cir. 1987) (disciplinary proceedings need not follow formal rules of evidence);
Murakowski v. Univ. of Delaware, 575 F. Supp. 2d 571, 586 (D. Del. 2008) (“a full-scale
adversarial proceeding similar to those afforded to criminal defendants, nor an investigation,
which would withstand such a proceeding, is required to meet due process. . . . Although a
university must treat students fairly, it is not required to convert its classrooms into
courtrooms.”). Likewise, the Code explicitly provides that no technical legal rules apply to a
Judicial Board Hearing and provided Ruprecht with the discretion to disallow witnesses if their
proffered testimony was irrelevant to the alleged Code violations.
Plaintiff next alleges that his due process rights were violated because the University’s
policies and procedures established a practice that forbids a contemporaneous record being made
of the Judicial Board Hearing and no record of Plaintiff’s hearing exists outside of what is
written in the Judicial Board Panel’s recommendation, thus rendering any subsequent review of
the hearing factually impossible.
While the Court does take pause with the fact that the
University does not create a contemporaneous record of the only fact finding proceeding in its
disciplinary process, ostensibly rendering a de novo review impossible, again, Plaintiff points to
no legal authority, nor does he make a legal argument, which would require that the University to
maintain a complete record of Plaintiff’s disciplinary proceeding. Therefore, without legal
justification, the Court cannot make a determination of whether he is likely to succeed on the
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merits of this claim.
Plaintiff next alleges that his due process rights were violated because the University’s
policies and procedures forbids a licensed attorney to act in that capacity, and Plaintiff’s attorney
could not act in that capacity at the Judicial Board Hearing by questioning any witnesses or
presenting Plaintiff’s case. It is possible that the policy of not allowing a licensed attorney to act
on behalf of the accused during the hearing, and only be present, may implicate due process
violations, as Plaintiff faced a two-semester suspension and thus required more formal
procedures to take away his liberty and property interests in his continued education. See Goss,
419 U.S. 581-83 (recognizing no right to counsel for a student facing suspension of ten days or
less, but silent as to the right to counsel for suspensions greater than ten days); Gabrilowitz v.
Newman, 582 F.2d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 1978) (requiring assistance of counsel due to potential
compromise of the student’s rights due to pending criminal proceeding arising from the same
events); but see Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 640 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding no right
to counsel in disciplinary hearing where the proceeding was not procedurally complex, there
were no rules of evidence, the student was permitted to present his defense to the committee and
to rebut any adverse testimony while addressing his version of the events). However, because
Plaintiff points to no legal authority on this point, and makes no legal argument, the Court will
not assume that he is likely succeed on the merits of this claim.
Plaintiff next alleges that the Judicial Board Hearing Panel failed to consider and include
in its recommendation exculpatory evidence presented by Plaintiff at the hearing, including
testimony from Dylan regarding J.S.’s proclivity for untrustworthiness. As explained supra, due
process does not impose any requirement of what evidence a review board must consider in
making its determination. It simply provides that the student be provided the opportunity to
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present evidence and make arguments in his favor. It is undisputed that Plaintiff was permitted
to enter any exculpatory evidence he deemed worthy of submission, other than the testimony of
Dr. Edwards, and was permitted to make any argument at the hearing that his conduct did not
violate the Code.
The Judicial Board omitting this alleged exculpatory evidence from its
recommendation does not offend Plaintiff’s due process rights to be heard in a meaningful
manner.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the URB conducted evidentiary fact finding not permitted
under the Code and dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal without a hearing. As to the latter argument, the
URB has discretion to determine the appeal based on the submission of the documents from the
parties alone, with or without oral argument under the Code. The Code does not permit a rehearing or submission of additional evidence as part of the appeals process, and the Court does
not otherwise find that this violates Plaintiff’s due process rights. As to Plaintiff’s former
argument that the URB conducted impermissible fact finding under the Code, it is unclear from
the record what alleged fact-finding occurred and what, if any, departures from the Code
occurred. While “[s]ignificant and unfair departures from an institution’s own procedures can
amount to a violation of due process[,]” Plaintiff does not develop this argument, therefore this
Court cannot determine whether he is likely to be successful on the merits of any such claim.
Furey v. Temple Univ., 730 F. Supp. 2d 380, 396–97 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
ii.
Equal Protection
Plaintiff claims that his equal protection rights were violated because the University
timely accepted J.S.’s first and second judicial referrals against him, while it waited eighty-six
days to accept Plaintiff’s judicial referral against J.S. Further, Plaintiff claims that the University
immediately placed restrictions on Plaintiff after J.S.’s judicial referrals against him were
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received, while no restrictions were placed on J.S. after Plaintiff filed his judicial referral against
her.
In order for a Plaintiff to bring a successful equal protection claim, he must “prove the
existence of purposeful discrimination. [He] must demonstrate that [he] ‘receiv[ed] different
treatment from that received by other individuals similarly situated[.]” Andrews v. City of
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir.1990) (quoting Kuhar v. Greensburg–Salem Sch.
Dist., 616 F.2d 676, 677 n. 1 (3d Cir.1980)). To prove discrimination based upon gender, “a
plaintiff must show that any disparate treatment was based upon his gender.” Similarly, under
Title IX, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he was subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
Here, Plaintiff has made at least a prima facie showing that his equal rights were violated
when the University took eighty-six days to accept his judicial referral against Plaintiff, while
immediately accepting the judicial referrals made by J.S, a female student. Likewise, as soon as
the judicial referral was levied against Plaintiff, he was placed on restricted access on campus,
whereas J.S. was placed on no such restriction when Plaintiff levied the judicial referrals against
her. In their brief, Defendants merely argue that the University’s deferral of Plaintiff’s judicial
referral against J.S. has no bearing on whether the University should be enjoined from enforcing
its two-term suspension against Plaintiff because the allegations levied against each student are
separate and distinct. Defendants’ argument misses the point; the University’s enforcement of
Plaintiff’s suspension has no bearing on Plaintiff’s claim that he was treated differently than a
female student under the same underlying events.
However, at the hearing, Ruprecht testified
that she did not place J.S. on an interim suspension after Plaintiff filed a referral against J.S.
because the referral was filed by a student, and not the police, as was the referral against
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Plaintiff, there was no arrest, the incidents alleged in Plaintiff’s referral against J.S. were past
incidents and not contemporary, and the actual allegations were not as serious as those levied
against Plaintiff. Tr. at 87. Taking this testimony into consideration, it is unlikely that Plaintiff
can succeed on his equal protection claim for failing to place J.S. on interim suspension, as the
two are not similarly situated. As to Plaintiff’s claim that his equal protection rights were
violated because the University failed to immediately accept and commence the adjudicatory
process of his referral against J.S., a prima facie showing is not enough to find a likelihood of
success on the merits, and Plaintiff has not otherwise proven he is likely to succeed on this claim.
Accordingly, the Court cannot find this factor in Plaintiff’s favor.
B. Irreparable Harm
The second factor in deciding a motion for preliminary injunction requires that a plaintiff
demonstrate a “clear showing of immediate irreparable injury.” Cont'l Grp., Inc. v. Amoco
Chemicals Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 358 (3d Cir. 1980).
An injury that is merely serious or
substantial alone does not demonstrate an irreparable injury; the injury must be of a peculiar
injury, such that monetary compensation alone cannot atone for it. Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179,
181 (3d Cir. 1977). A plaintiff must demonstrate a potential harm which cannot be redressed by
a legal or equitable remedy following trial; the preliminary injunctive relief must be the only
way of protecting the Plaintiff from harm. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that he needs to complete fourteen credits to fulfill his degree
requirement and without being permitted to register and attend class in the Fall 2016 semester, he
will not be able to earn his degree until December 2017. He alleges that his suspension will
cause him to suffer loss of income, loss of career experience and professional reputation and loss
of continuity of education.
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The Court finds that these injuries are not irreparable. Primarily, any loss of income
Plaintiff will suffer by not timely entering the workforce because of his suspension can
undeniably be compensated by monetary damages and does not qualify as irreparable harm. See
Howe v. Pennsylvania State Univ. - Harrisburg, No. CV 1:16-0102, 2016 WL 393717, at *6
(M.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2016) appeal dismissed (Mar. 29, 2016). Likewise, other courts have found
that interruption of a student’s education, while a genuine injury, is not irreparable. See
Schulman v. Franklin & Marshall Coll., 371 Pa. Super. 345, 349, 538 A.2d 49, 51-52 (1988)
(finding no irreparable harm to suspended student who suffers “a delay in his educational process
but will not lose the opportunity, by virtue of a suspension to complete his college training[.]”);
Howe, 2016 WL 393717 at *6 (a student suspended for one semester could not show irreparable
harm for the loss of continuity of his education where the classes he needed to take to complete
his education were only offered in the spring semester, such that his suspension would
effectively run for two semesters and he could not show that he would have graduated on time
regardless of the suspension).
The Court finds that while Plaintiff will suffer injury by not timely graduating because of
his suspension, this injury is not irreparable. Plaintiff has only offered mere speculation that he
would be unable to enter the workforce due to his suspension and any interruption of his
education and delay in entering the workforce can adequately be compensated by monetary
damages should he be successful on the merits of his claims. He offered no evidence that he has
been rejected for any employment position because of his suspension. It is also speculative that
he would lose any professional connections by virtue of his suspension, as he has not alleged that
his suspension would prevent him from continuing to foster any networking connections he has
through the University in the engineering field. Likewise, any record of his suspension can be
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ordered removed from University records should he succeed on his claims.
Defendants also urge this Court to consider Plaintiff’s delay in filing for his preliminary
injunctive relief as a reason to find he will suffer no irreparable injury. Plaintiff filed his Motion
for Preliminary Injunction on July 11, 2016, thirteen days after he filed his complaint and two
months after Provost Beeson accepted the URB’s recommendation May 12, 2016 and the
adjudication process ended. Plaintiff provides no excuse for failing to file his motion for
preliminary injunction until two months after he was put on final notice of his suspension, and
approximately a month and a half before the commencement of the Fall 2016 semester. While
his delay is not determinative, as Plaintiff has failed to otherwise show irreparable harm, his
delay in seeking preliminary injunctive relief tends to negate the immediacy of his alleged
irreparable harm.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown that he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction
does not issue.
C. Harm to Non-moving Party
In considering this factor, and particularly where the parties “present competing claims of
injury,” the court “balances the conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to them
according as they may be affected by the granting or withholding of the injunction.” Weinberger
v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312, 102 S. Ct. 1798, 1803, 72 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1982) (quoting
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440, 64 S.Ct. 660, 675, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944)). In other
words, the court “must undertake to balance the hardships to the respective parties.” Pappan
Enterprises, Inc. v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d 800, 805 (3d Cir. 1998).
This factor appears to tilt slightly in favor of the University.
While Plaintiff’s
reinstatement at the University for the Fall 2016 semester would benefit Plaintiff by permitting
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him to continue his education uninterrupted, Plaintiff’s reinstatement would cause greater harm
to the University’s ability to discipline its students accused of misconduct without resorting to
judicial intervention and its ability to protect its students from harmful conduct and maintain
order on campus.
D. Public Interest
The final factor considers “whether there are policy considerations that bear on whether
the order should issue.” Trefelner ex rel. Trefelner v. Burrell Sch. Dist., 655 F. Supp. 2d 581, 598
(W.D. Pa. 2009) (quoting 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY
KAY KANE § 2948.4 at 200–01 (2d ed. 1995)).
In the present case, this factor is neutral.
While the public’s interest in pursuing
education free of constitutional violations is undeniable, see Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka,
Shawnee Cty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S. Ct. 686, 691, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954), supplemented
sub nom. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294, 75 S. Ct. 753, 99 L. Ed. 1083
(1955), an educational institution’s authority to make disciplinary decisions without having to
resort to court intervention is a substantial public interest. Requiring so would substantially
weaken the institution’s legitimate disciplinary authority among its students and be detrimental
to the public interest, as educational institutions encourage their students to conduct themselves
as model citizens in adhering to any applicable code of conduct. See Bleicker v. Bd. of Trustees
of Ohio State Univ., Coll. of Veterinary Med., 485 F. Supp. 1381, 1389 (S.D. Ohio 1980)
(finding that an educational institution has a considerable interest in protecting the integrity of its
disciplinary regulations and a court’s intervention into the affairs of the college would
“substantially weaken its legitimate authority among its own students” and members of the
profession, causing a public disservice).
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III.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction is
DENIED. An appropriate Order follows.
DATED this 31st day of August, 2016.
BY THE COURT:
s/Cynthia Reed Eddy
United States Magistrate Judge
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