RAYBURG v. COLVIN

Filing 18

SOCIAL SECURITY OPINION AND ORDER denying 14 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 16 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 6/1/17. (cha)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PAUL RAYBURG,

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Plaintiff,
-vsNANCY A. BERRYHILL,1
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 16-1214

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge.
OPINION AND ORDER
Synopsis
Plaintiff Paul Rayburg (“Rayburg”) brings this action seeking judicial review of the
ALJ’s decision denying a claim for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits
(“DIB”). Rayburg filed an application in January of 2013, alleging a disability beginning
on March of 2007 due to both physical and mental symptoms.2 He appeared and
testified at a July 3, 22014 hearing, as did a vocational expert. The ALJ denied
Rayburg’s claim, finding him capable of performing a significant number of jobs in the
national economy. Rayburg has appealed. Pending are Cross Motions for Summary
Judgment. Docket no. 14 and Docket no. 16. After careful consideration, I find
Rayburg’s arguments to be unpersuasive. Consequently, the ALJ’s decision is affirmed.
Legal Analysis

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Nancy A. Berryhill because acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, replacing Carolyn W.
Colvin.
2
Although Rayburg also complained of depression (R. 25), the ALJ did not find his depression to constitute a
“severe impairment.” (R.25) Rayburg does not challenge this finding upon appeal.

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1. Standard of Review
The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner=s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d
Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as Amore than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.@
Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Determining whether substantial evidence exists is “not merely a
quantitative exercise.” Gilliland v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Kent
v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983)). “A single piece of evidence will not
satisfy the substantiality test if the secretary ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict
created by countervailing evidence. Nor is evidence substantial if it is overwhelmed by
other evidence – particularly certain types of evidence (e.g., that offered by treating
physicians).” Id. The Commissioner=s findings of fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. '405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403,
406 (3d Cir. 1979). A district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the
Commissioner=s decision or re-weigh the evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995
F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if the court would have
decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir.
1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however,
the district court must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. '706.
2. The ALJ’s RFC Assessment is Supported By Substantial Evidence

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Rayburg urges that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment (“RFC”)
contradicts Social Security Ruling 96-6p and is not supported by substantial evidence of
record. As to the first contention, Rayburg does not cite to any specific portion of SSR
96-6p, nor does he cite to any case law in support of his proposition. He seems to
reason that because the ALJ relied upon the opinion issued by Dr. Wyszomierski, who
issued her opinion before receiving and reviewing all the medical records, that opinion is
invalid. I disagree. SSR 96-6p3 sets forth the policy guiding the weight to accord to
competing medical opinions. Here, the ALJ had only one medical opinion – that
provided by the state agency physician Dr. Wyszomierski. Rayburg’s physicians did not
provide any opinions regarding his residual functional capacity or any limiting effects of
his impairments. The ALJ adequately explained why he gave weight to Dr.
Wyszomierski’s opinion:
Dr. Wyszomierski provided a persuasive and detailed assessment of the
claimant’s functional capacity. Her opinions regarding the claimant’s right
shoulder limitations are supported by the two surgical interventions discussed
above in conjunction with the claimant’s ongoing complaints of pain. Her opinions
pertaining to the claimant’s left shoulder restrictions are supported by Dr.
Anderson’s medical assessment. Unlike the medical sources of record, Dr.
Wyszomierski had the opportunity to review the claimant’s longitudinal medical
history for the entire relevant period under consideration.

(R. 29) Further, although Dr. Wyszomierski may have issued her opinion prior to receipt
of some of the records from Rayburg’s treating pain specialist, case law supports the
proposition that the ALJ is entitled to rely upon the findings of an agency evaluator even
if there is a lapse of time between the report and the hearing. See Chandler v. Comm’r.
of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2012). Thus, there is nothing inherently wrong
with relying upon a state agency evaluator’s opinion rendered prior to receipt of the
3

SSR 96-6p was rescinded and replaced by SSR 17-2p effective March 27, 2017.

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entirety of the medical records. Rather, the cogent issue is whether records issued or
received after the state agency physician prepared his/her report are at odds with that
report. My review of the record does not reveal anything compelling in Dr. Trachtman's
records. He did not issue an opinion regarding Rayburg’s functional abilities. Further,
the ALJ had the entire longitudinal history of Rayburg’s treatment in formulating the
RFC. He acknowledged Dr. Trachtman’s prescription of pain medication and the record
notations over the course of treatment that Rayburg was “stable” and that the
medications had improved his pain. (R. 29) As such, I find no violation of Rule 96-6p.
As to Rayburg’s contention that the ALJ’s RFC analysis is without substantial
evidentiary support, I again reject his contention. Specifically, Rayburg faults the ALJ for
citing to only portions of some of Dr. Trachtman’s office notes and records. However, it
is clear from the ALJ’s decision that he reviewed Dr. Trachtman’s records. (R. 29,
referencing Dr. Trachtman’s records) Further, the Third Circuit Court has stated that
“[t]here is no requirement that the ALJ discuss in its opinion every tidbit of evidence
included in the record.” Hur v. Barnhart, 94 Fed. App’x. 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2004). There is
no expectation that the ALJ “make reference to every relevant treatment note.” Fargnoli
v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 42 (3d Cir. 2001). The ALJ was not required to reference
each of Dr. Trachtman’s notations in the record and I find no evidence that the ALJ
mischaracterized the notes.
Additionally, I find that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC finding.
Again, as stated above, Dr. Trachtman did not offer any expert opinion regarding
Rayburg’s limitations. Dr. Wyszomierski did. She opined that Rayburg was capable of
occasionally lifting / carrying up to 20 pounds and of frequently lifting / carrying up to 10.

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(R. 82) She found that Rayburg could stand / walk about 6 hours and sit about 6 hours
in an 8-hour workday. (R. 82-84) She further found that Rayburg was limited in his
upper extremities with respect to his ability to push and / or pull. (R. 83) She ascribed
certain postural limitations and manipulative limitations to him, again referencing his
shoulder injuries. (R. 83) The ALJ inquired of the vocational expert whether an
individual with the functional limitations identified by Dr. Wyszomierski could perform
any occupations. The VE responded that a person with such limitations could perform
certain unskilled jobs such as an office helper, a mail clerk and a photocopying machine
operator. (R. 31) The ALJ in turn relied upon this testimony in formulating the RFC,
taking into account the medication prescribed by Dr. Trachtman. (R. 29 stating, “[h]is
narcotic pain medicine precludes him from occupations requiring exposure to workplace
hazards.”) Simply stated, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC analysis and
there is no basis for remand.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PAUL RAYBURG,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
-vsNANCY A. BERRYHILL,4
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 16-1214

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge.

ORDER OF COURT
Therefore, this 1st day of June, 2017, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket no. 14) is denied and Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket no. 16) is granted. It is further ORDERED that the
decision of the ALJ is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
United States Senior District Judge

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Nancy A. Berryhill became acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017.

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