DOYLE v. CHESWICK FACILITY OPERATIONS, LLC et al

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM ORDER indicating that, for reasons more fully stated within, that Defendant Cheswick Facility Operations, LLC's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint 23 is denied, without prejudice to renewing said arguments in a motion for summary judgment filed after the completion of fact discovery in this case; that Defendant shall file its Answer to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint by 2/28/17. Signed by Judge Nora Barry Fischer on 2/14/17. (jg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CRYSTAL DOYLE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHESWICK FACILITY OPERATIONS,
LLC,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action No. 16-1322
Hon. Nora Barry Fischer

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Presently before the Court is Defendant Cheswick Facility Operations, LLC’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and supporting briefing, (Docket Nos. [23], [24]), and
Plaintiff’s response in opposition, (Docket No. [25]). After careful consideration of the parties’
submissions; the allegations contained in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, (Docket No. [21]); the
standards governing motions to dismiss set forth by the Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and as
articulated in Third Circuit precedent, see e.g., Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 790
(3d Cir. 2016); and for the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, (Docket No. [23]),
is DENIED, without prejudice.
In so holding, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII claim
at Count I, as it finds that Plaintiff has set forth sufficient allegations to state a plausible
discrimination claim. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that she worked as a dual employee of
Defendant and 360 Healthcare Staffing, LLC (“360 Staffing”), which placed Plaintiff in her
position with Defendant as a United manager. (Docket No. 21 at ¶ 7). On August 14, 2015,

Defendant accused Plaintiff of stealing a prescription opioid that was allegedly missing from a
medication cart’s inventory. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-14). Although several Caucasian employees had
access to the medication cart where the allegedly missing drug was stored, Plaintiff was the only
employee to be drug tested as a result of the incident. (Id. at ¶ 14). After Defendant contended
that she had failed the drug test, Plaintiff’s Physician’s Assistant faxed a note to 360 Staffing,
wherein she stated that Plaintiff had been prescribed phentermine, which can cause a positive
result for amphetamines on a drug test. (Id. at ¶¶ 15, 18-19). After receiving Ms. Kropa’s fax,
360 Staffing forwarded it to Defendant. (Id. at ¶ 19). Despite the documentation supplied by
Plaintiff, Defendant terminated her employment. (Id. at ¶ 20).
Plaintiff’s averments sufficiently allege a plausible claim of discrimination. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Lehigh Southwest Cement Co., No. 1:12-CV-633, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84572, 9-10
(E.D. Cal. June 12, 2013) (denying motion to dismiss where the plaintiff alleged that he was the
only employee subject to drug testing after a Caucasian employee caused damage to a truck); Lee
v. Aaron’s Sales & Leasing, No. 3:07-CV-418, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88385, at *12 (N.D. Ind.
Sept. 24, 2009) (denying motion to dismiss where the plaintiff alleged that “Defendant Aaron’s
Sales and Leasing only subjected African American employees, including Plaintiff, to drug
testing”). Cf. Butler v. Artic Glacier USA, No. 15-CV-3302, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134791, at
*13-14 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2016) (dismissing the plaintiff’s allegations that only AfricaAmerican and Hispanic employees were required to take drug tests because the defendant had
independent information that the plaintiff was selling and using drugs at work). The Court
further notes that Defendant relies upon facts not alleged in the Amended Complaint and sets
forth non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Plaintiff. (Docket No. 24 at 10). Such a
position does not warrant dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Fabian v. Allegheny Cnty., No. 15-CV2

292, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158700, at *14 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2015) (finding that the
defendant’s position “raises an affirmative defense, relying on matters outside the pleadings, that
cannot provide for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)”) (citting Morgan v. Covington Twp., 648 F.3d
172, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2011); Bohus v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 784 F.3d 918, 930, n.1 (3d Cir.
2015)); see also Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (“In deciding motions
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), courts generally consider only the allegations in the
complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form
the basis of a claim.”).
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s defamation claim at Count II is also denied, as
the Court finds that Plaintiff has set forth sufficient allegations to state a plausible claim.
Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant stated to 360 Staffing that [she] had stolen a prescription
narcotic, and had failed a drug test.” (Docket No. 21 at ¶ 21, 37). Plaintiff further avers that
several months passed before she was offered another position through 360 Staffing. (Id. at ¶
22).

The Court acknowledges Defendant’s argument that the face of Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint makes clear that she failed the drug test to which she submitted. (Docket No. 24 at
12-13). However, the Court must reject Defendant’s assertion that this case is akin to Morrison
v. Chatham University, No. 16-CV-476, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121227 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 8,
2016), wherein this Court dismissed the plaintiff’s defamation claim because the face of her
complaint made clear that she had, in fact, received a failing grade and was dismissed from a
doctoral program. Id. at *11-13. In the instant case, the face of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
makes clear only that she tested positive for some substance when she was drug tested. Indeed,
Plaintiff alleges that:

(1) she had been prescribed a drug called phentermine for weight

management; (2) her Physician’s Assistant faxed a note to 360 Staffing, wherein she stated that
3

phentermine can cause a positive result on a drug tested; and (3) 360 Staffing forwarded the fax
to Defendant. (Docket No. 21 at ¶¶ 17-19). Defendant’s alleged statements that Plaintiff had
stolen a prescription narcotic and failed a drug test, taken together, are defamatory.
Finally, the Court finds meritless Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s requests for
punitive damages and legal fees should be stricken from her Amended Complaint. (Docket No.
24 at 14-16). First, if Plaintiff’s allegations are proven at trial, a factfinder could reasonably
conclude that such actions and/or inactions were sufficiently malicious, wanton, and willful to
support an award of punitive damages. In any event, it is premature at this early stage to decide
whether Plaintiff will be able to support a claim of punitive damages. See, e.g., Bowman v.
Burroughs, No. 2:07-185, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36538, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 17, 2007)
(concluding that “at this early state of the proceedings . . . this Court cannot say that Plaintiff will
be able to state no set of facts in support of his claim for punitive damages”); Standen v.
Gertrude Hawk Chocolates, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-1988, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113004, at *34
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2012) (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for
punitive damages under Title VII). Second, because Plaintiff includes her request for legal fees
in a “wherefore” clause at the end of her Amended Complaint, the Court declines to address
Defendant’s arguments at this stage of the proceedings. See, e.g., Lane v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., No. 3:14-CV-1045, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60064, at *17 (M.D. Pa. May 7, 2015)
(explaining that “Count I does not contain its own demand for relief, thus implying that the
‘Wherefore’ clause at the end of the Complaint refers to all the Counts alleged” and holding that
“Defendant’s argument—which appears to ask the Court to construe the clause as only applying
to Count II, and then to strike the demands that would otherwise be appropriate in the absence of
such arbitrary narrowing—is both uncharitable and unduly formulaic”).
4

For these reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Cheswick Facility Operations, LLC’s Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, (Docket No. [23]), is DENIED, without prejudice to
renewing said arguments in a motion for summary judgment filed after the completion of fact
discovery in this case; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall file its Answer to Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint by February 28, 2017.

s/Nora Barry Fischer
Nora Barry Fischer
United States District Judge
Dated: February 14, 2017
cc/ecf: All counsel of record

5