ALLSTATE PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY v. UHLMANN et al
Filing
26
ORDER granting 18 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; granting 20 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. This Matter will be stayed pending the conclusion of the underlying lawsuit. The Court directs the Clerk to ADMINISTRATIVELY C LOSE this matter. Upon conclusion or settlement of the underlying lawsuit, the Parties may petition this Court to lift the Stay and Reopen this case, should one or more of the Parties so desire. Signed by Judge Arthur J. Schwab on 11/23/2016. (lmt)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ALLSTATE PROPERTY & CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY,
16cv1404
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREW JAMES UHLMANN, ET AL.
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court are two Motions to Dismiss, one filed by Defendant, James Uhlmann,
(doc. no. 18), the other filed by Defendants, Lucille Anderson, and Susan and Jennifer Ianni.
Doc. no. 20. Both Motions were filed in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1). Plaintiff, Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Company (“Allstate”), has filed a
Response in Opposition to both Motions, making these matters ripe for adjudication. Doc no.
24.
I.
Standard of Review
A Motion to Dismiss filed in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) challenges this
Court’s “very power to hear the case.” See Judkins v. HT Window Fashions Corp., 514 F. Supp.
2d 753, 759 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (Lancaster, J.) (quoting Mortenson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). As the party asserting jurisdiction, Plaintiff “bears the burden
of showing that its claims are properly before the district court.” Dev. Fin. Corp. v. Alpha
Housing & Health Care, 54 F.3d 156, 158 (3d Cir. 1995). In reviewing a Motion to Dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), this Court must distinguish between facial attacks and factual attacks.
See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2006).
A facial attack challenges the sufficiency of the pleadings, and the Court must accept the
Plaintiff's allegations as true. Id. A Defendant who attacks a complaint on its face “[asserts] that
considering the allegations of the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of [plaintiff], the allegations of the complaint are insufficient to establish a federal cause of
action.” Mullen v. Thompson, 155 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451 (W.D. Pa. 2001). Dismissal is proper
under Rule 12(b)(1) only when “the claim clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for
the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or. . . is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” Kehr
Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S. 678, 682 (1946)).
When, as in this case, a Defendant launches a factual attack on subject matter
jurisdiction, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of
disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of
jurisdictional claims.” Petruska, 462 F.3d at 302 (quoting Mortenson, 549 F.2d at 891). In a
factual attack, this Court must weigh the evidence relating to jurisdiction, with discretion to
allow affidavits, documents, and even limited evidentiary hearings. See United States ex rel.
Atkinson v. Pa. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 514 (3d Cir. 2007).
II. Factual Background
In its Complaint, Allstate alleges federal diversity jurisdiction noting that it and
Defendants have complete diversity and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00.
Doc. no. 1. The declaration Allstate seeks, is for this Court to declare that it does not have a duty
to continue to defend nor a duty to indemnify Defendant Uhlmann in a civil lawsuit pending in a
Pennsylvania state court. See Anderson, et al. v. Excela Health, et al., case no. 1317 of 2016
filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County.
2
Allstate issued a renters’ insurance policy to Uhlmann, who, at the time of the incident in
question in the underlying lawsuit, was a patient in the behavioral health unit at Westmoreland
Hospital. On the day in question, Ulhmann allegedly assaulted another behavioral health unit
patient (Anderson) as well as her granddaughter, Jennifer Ianni. The assaults were witnessed by
Anderson’s daughter, Susan Ianni. Excela Health allegedly owns/operates Westmoreland
Hospital.
In the underlying lawsuit, the plaintiffs (Anderson and the Iannis) argue that the hospital
and its owner/operator (Excela) are liable for the injuries the three of them allegedly sustained.
In addition, the three plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuit also claim that Uhlmann was “negligent
or careless” when he assaulted Anderson and her granddaughter rendering him liable to all three
plaintiffs. Allstate agreed to defend Ulhmann in the underlying lawsuit, but now seeks the
aforementioned declaration absolving it of the duty to defend and/or indemnify Uhlmann.
III. Analysis
“[D]istrict courts possess discretion in determining whether and when to entertain an
action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, even when the suit otherwise satisfies subject matter
jurisdictional prerequisites.” Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282, (1995) citing
Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942). “Distinct features of the
Declaratory Judgment Act . . . justify a standard vesting district courts with greater discretion in
declaratory judgment actions than that permitted under the “exceptional circumstances” test of
Colorado River and Moses H. Cone. Wilton, at 286. The Supreme Court further explained:
By the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress sought to place a remedial
arrow in the district court’s quiver; it created an opportunity, rather than a
duty, to grant a new form of relief to qualifying litigants. Consistent with
the nonobligatory nature of the remedy, a district court is authorized, in
the sound exercise of its discretion, to stay or to dismiss an action seeking
a declaratory judgment before trial or after all arguments have drawn to a
3
close. In the declaratory judgment context, the normal principle that
federal courts should adjudicate claims within their jurisdiction yields to
considerations of practicality and wise judicial administration.
Id. at 288. In a foot note, the Court further added:
We note that where the basis for declining to proceed is the pendency of a
state proceeding, a stay will often be the preferable course, because it
assures that the federal action can proceed without risk of a time bar if the
state case, for any reason, fails to resolve the matter in controversy. See,
e.g., P. Bator, D. Meltzer, P. Mishkin, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's
The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1451, n. 9 (3d ed. 1988).
Id., n. 2.
Following the Supreme Court’s rationale, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit has held that “federal courts should hesitate to entertain a declaratory
judgment action where the action is restricted to issues of state law.” Atlantic Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Gula, 84 Fed. Appx. 173, 174 (3d Cir., Dec.17, 2003) (citing State Auto Ins. Co. v.
Summy, 234 F.3d 131, 133 (3d Cir. 2000), 234 F.3d at 134-35). In Summy, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that District Courts do “not have open-ended
discretion to decline jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action when the issues
include[ ] federal statutory interpretation, the government’s choice of a federal forum, an
issue of sovereign immunity, or inadequacy of the state proceedings.” Summy, 234 F.3d
at 134.
Turning to the instant matter, the Court begins by noting that the insurance policy
at issue is a renter’s insurance policy issued by Plaintiff, Allstate, to Defendant,
Uhlmann, which provides “family liability protection” up to $100,000.00 per occurrence.
The policy defines an “occurrence” as “an accident” and further indicates:
Each person who sustains bodily injury is entitled to this protection when
that person is:
4
1. on the insured premises with the permission of an insured
person; or
2. off the insured premises, if the bodily injury:
a) arises out of a condition on the insured premises or
immediately adjoining ways;
b) is caused by the activities of an insured person or a
residence employee;
c) is caused by an animal owned by, or in the care of, an
insured person; or
d) is sustained by a residence employee.
*
*
*
Losses We Do Not Cover Under Coverage X:
1.
We do not cover any bodily injury or property
damage intended by, or which may reasonably
be expected to result from the intentional or
criminal acts or omissions of, any insured
person. This exclusion applies even if:
a)
such insured person lacks the mental
capacity to govern his or her own
conduct;
b)
such bodily injury or property damage is
of a different kind or degree than intended
or reasonably expected; or
c)
such bodily injury or property damage is
sustained by a different person than
intended or reasonably expected.
This exclusion applies regardless of whether or
not such insured person is actually charged
with, or convicted of a crime.
Doc. no. 1-2, p. 6, 19, 39.
5
Allstate filed the instant declaratory judgment action, and in its Complaint alleged that no
coverage or further defense to Defendant Uhlmann is due because the alleged injuries inflicted
upon Defendants Anderson and the two Ianni Defendants were intentionally, not negligently,
inflicted. Allstate posits that no “occurrence” took place as the policy defines that term, and
thus, it is not obligated to provide coverage or any further defense. Allstate’s Complaint also
alleges that because the alleged injuries inflicted upon Defendants Anderson and the two Ianni
Defendants were intentionally inflicted, any bodily injury sustained by these three women is a
loss Allstate does not cover. Finally, Allstate’s Complaint alleges that no bodily injuries were
sustained by any of the Defendants.
As noted above, the underlying case filed by Defendant Anderson and the two Ianni
Defendants against Westmoreland Hospital, Excela Health, and Ulhmann is currently pending in
the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania. None of the issues raised
in the underlying lawsuit nor any of the claims set forth in Allstate’s declaratory judgment
Complaint filed with this Court concern federal statutory interpretation, the government’s choice
of a federal forum, an issue of sovereign immunity, or inadequacy of the state proceedings.
Moreover, all of Allstate’s arguments as to why coverage should be denied and why it
should no longer have to defend Ulhmann, are predicated on facts which are currently being
litigated in the underlying state court action, filed in Westmoreland County. The fact-finder in
the underlying lawsuit will determine whether Defendant Anderson and the two Ianni
Defendants sustained damages and if so, the fact-finder will also determine where liability
resides, i.e. with Defendant Ulhmann and/or Westmoreland Hospital and/or Excela Health.
6
For these reasons, this action will be stayed pending the outcome of the underlying civil
lawsuit, Anderson, et al. v. Excela Health, et al., case no. 1317 of 2016 filed in the Court of
Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW this 23rd day of November, 2016, the Court hereby STAYS this proceeding
pending the conclusion of the underlying lawsuit, Anderson, et al. v. Excela Health, et al., case
no. 1317 of 2016 filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania.
The Court directs the Clerk to ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE this matter. Upon conclusion
or settlement of the underlying lawsuit, the Parties may petition this Court to lift the Stay and
Reopen this case, should one or more of the Parties so desire.
s/Arthur J. Schwab
Arthur J. Schwab
United States District Judge
cc:
All Registered ECF Counsel and Parties
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?