IMMEL et al v. AMORE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP et al

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION, indicating that, for reasons stated within, the Court denies Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction 5 . An appropriate Order follows. Signed by Judge Nora Barry Fischer on 1/13/17. (jg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
VICTORIA IMMEL et al.,

)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
AMORE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP d/b/a )
AMORE MANAGEMENT COMPANY
)
et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Civil Action No. 16-1465
Hon. Nora Barry Fischer

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.

Introduction

Pending before the Court in this matter is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction.

(Docket No. 5).

Having considered Plaintiffs’ Complaint, (Docket No. 1);

Defendants’ motion to dismiss and supporting briefing, (Docket Nos. 5, 7); Plaintiff’s response
in opposition, (Docket No. 8); and Defendants’ reply, wherein Defendants rest upon their initial
brief, (Docket No. 13), Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED.
II.

Background

This matter arises from Plaintiff’s residence at Fifth Neville Apartments (“Fifth
Neville”). The following pertinent facts are alleged in the Complaint, which the Court will
accept as true for the sole purpose of deciding the pending motion.
Plaintiff, who is twenty-two years old, has been diagnosed with a general anxiety
disorder. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 3). As a result, Plaintiff experiences excessive anxiety and
difficulty regulating her emotions. (Id.). In 2012, Plaintiff relocated to Pittsburgh from Ohio
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and resided with her fiancé at Fifth Neville, which has a no-pet policy and is managed by
Defendant Amore Limited Partnership d/b/a Amore Management Company (“Amore”). (Id. at
¶¶ 9-10). After moving to Pittsburgh, Plaintiff received treatment from Antoinette Montgomery,
a Licensed Marriage and Family Therapist. (Id. at ¶ 11). In December 2015, Ms. Montgomery
prepared a letter verifying that Plaintiff qualified as a person with a disability under the Fair
Housing Act and stating that “an emotional support animal will significantly help in alleviating
[her] symptoms and will enhance her ability to live independently.” (Id. at ¶ 12). Plaintiff
provided Amore with Ms. Montgomery’s letter and requested permission for an emotional
support dog to live with her at Fifth Neville. (Id. at ¶ 13). In a letter dated January 4, 2016,
Amore requested that Ms. Montgomery provide additional information by completing an
enclosed form. (Id. at ¶ 14). Ms. Montgomery completed the form and attached a letter further
detailing the nature of Plaintiff’s disability. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-17).
In a letter dated February 10, 2016, Amore denied Plaintiff’s request, stating that she had
failed to demonstrate that the “emotional impediments and environmental stressors impacting on
[her] are not or cannot be adequately addressed based upon the existence of [her] relationship
with her significant other with whom [she is] living.” (Id. at ¶ 18). Plaintiff forwarded an e-mail
from Ms. Montgomery to Amore in which Ms. Montgomery stated that Plaintiff’s living
arrangement with her fiancé was irrelevant to her need for an emotional support animal. (Id. at ¶
19). On March 21, 2016, a second medical professional, Jennifer Melegari, CNP of Union
Physician Services, sent a letter to Amore in which she verified Plaintiff’s disability and stated
that she had prescribed an emotional support animal. (Id. at ¶ 20). On April 7, 2016 and May
25, 2016, Ms. Melegari responded to Amore’s requests for additional information. (Id. at ¶¶ 2123). As a result of Amore’s denial of Plaintiff’s request, the emotional support dog lived with
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Plaintiff’s mother in Ohio from December 2015 to June 2016. (Id. at ¶ 25). In June 2016,
Plaintiff moved to Lindenbrooke, a different property managed by Amore, which permits pets.
(Id. at ¶ 27). Because Amore has not approved Plaintiff’s request, her emotional support dog is
considered an ordinary pet and is prohibited from accompanying Plaintiff in the common areas at
Lindenbrooke. (Id. at ¶ 28).
Plaintiff further alleges that through an audit test conducted in November 2014, the Fair
Housing Partnership (“FHP”) was made aware of Amore’s discriminatory policies regarding
requests for emotional support animals. (Id. at ¶ 32). FHP conducted a series of controlled tests
through which testers contacted Amore’s properties seeking to rent a unit as a person with an
emotional support dog and as a person without one. (Id. at ¶ 33). FHP found that when testers
requested an emotional support dog, the property manager contacted Amore’s corporate office,
which would decline the request. (Id. at ¶ 34). In July 2015, FHP conducted additional audit
testing which showed that Amore masked its practice of denying emotional support dogs by
initially granting reasonable accommodation requests but requiring approval by the corporate
office. (Id. at ¶ 35). On February 13, 2016, Plaintiff contacted FHP regarding Amore’s denial of
her request for an emotional support dog. (Id. at ¶ 36). FHP’s testing of Fifth Neville revealed
that Amore’s policy is for a housing application to be approved by its corporate office before a
reasonable accommodation can be requested. (Id. at ¶ 37).
Plaintiff filed this action on September 23, 2016, alleging a claim against Defendants
under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 for the violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(2) and 3604(f)(3)(B). (Id. at ¶¶ 41-42). Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Jurisdiction and supporting brief on November 16, 2016. (Docket Nos. 5, 7).
Plaintiff filed her Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion on December 7, 2016. (Docket No.
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8). Defendants filed a Reply Brief, wherein they rest upon their initial brief, on January 4, 2017.
(Docket No. 13). This matter is now ripe for disposition.
III.

Legal Standard

When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), the court must “‘accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the
complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.’” Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 122 (3d Cir.
2014) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). To survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, the plaintiff’s “‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). “Thus, ‘only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to
dismiss.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)).
Although the Court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true, “‘[it is] not
compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.’” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting
Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Instead, the plaintiff must plead facts which permit the
court to make a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57;
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Consistent with these principles, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has prescribed a
three-step analysis for purposes of determining whether a claim is plausible. First, the court
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should “outline the elements a plaintiff must plead to a state a claim for relief.” Bistrian v. Levi,
696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012). Second, the court should “peel away” legal conclusions that
are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.”). Third, the court should assume the veracity of all well-pled factual allegations
and then “‘determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’” Bistrian, 696
F.3d at 365 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). This third step of the analysis is “‘a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
IV.

Discussion

In their Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s
action must be dismissed because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies prior to filing
her Complaint. (Docket No. 7 at 6-11). Specifically, Defendants assert that Plaintiff did not file
a complaint with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) or with the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (“PHRC”). (Id. at 7). After noting that “[t]here are
no reported cases in the Third Circuit or decisions from the district courts in Pennsylvania as to
whether one must exhaust their administrative remedies,” Defendants state that they “are of the
position” that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. (Id. at 7-8). In response, Plaintiff
argues that the plain language of the Fair Housing Act and the supporting case law provide that
an individual may file an action without pursuing administrative remedies. (Docket No. 8 at 34). In their reply, Defendants rest upon their initial brief. (Docket No. 13 at 2).

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Defendants’ argument is meritless. Other than stating that they “are of the position” that
the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Defendants identify no support for their argument.
Indeed, as Plaintiff notes, the case law to which Defendants cite relates to the exhaustion of
administrative remedies in Title VII employment cases. (See Docket No. 7 at 8). Plaintiff’s
claim arises under the Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which
prohibits housing discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). It also prohibits housing discrimination based upon the handicap
of a buyer or renter. Id. § 3604(f). In pertinent part, prohibited practices under the Fair Housing
Act include discriminating against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or
rental of a dwelling. Id. § 3604(f)(2). The statute also makes it unlawful, in the case of disabled
persons, to refuse “to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services,
when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and
enjoy a dwelling.” Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
Pursuant to the plain language of the Fair Housing Act and the well-settled law of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, an aggrieved person is not required to
exhaust his or her administrative remedies before filing a civil action. As the Third Circuit has
stated, “[e]nforcement [of the Fair Housing Act] is accomplished in two ways that are relevant
here: administrative enforcement under 42 U.S.C. § 3610, and private enforcement under section
3613.” Mitchell v. Cellone, 389 F.3d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 2004). After determining that the plain
language of §§ 3610 and 3613 needed no interpretation, the Third Circuit explained that “[u]nder
section 3610, an aggrieved person may file a complaint with the Secretary of HUD alleging a
discriminatory housing practice,” while “section 3613 allows for a civil cause of action in either
State or Federal court within two years after any alleged housing discrimination, whether or not
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an administrative complaint has been filed under section 3610.” Id. at 89-90 (footnote omitted).
Thus, the Third Circuit held that “the plain language of sections 3610 and 3613 state that a dual
enforcement scheme exists that allows an aggrieved party to pursue both private and
administrative enforcement until such time as either avenue has achieved resolution of the
claim.” Id. at 90. After examining the Fair Housing Act’s legislative history, the Third Circuit
further stated that “Congress envisioned that a complainant could sue through HUD and its state
commission counterparts or initiate litigation privately: the choice of one alternative would not
foreclose the other avenue of redress.” Id. at 91 (emphasis in original).
The Third Circuit’s well-reasoned decision in Mitchell makes clear that Plaintiff was not
required to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing this action. Indeed, District Courts
applying Mitchell have concluded that “the Fair Housing Act does not require that an aggrieved
person exhaust his or her administrative remedies before filing a civil action, nor does it require
that Plaintiff select one avenue to the exclusion of the other.” Mitchell v. Walters, No. 10-CV1061, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93265, at *17 (D.N.J. Sept. 8, 2010); see also Turner v. Crawford
Square Apts. III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 550 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that the appellant had correctly
stated “that the state court has concurrent jurisdiction over her [FHA] claims and that she is not
required to exhaust her administrative remedy before proceeding in state (or federal) court”);
Cohen v. Twp. of Cheltenham, 174 F. Supp. 2d 307, 320 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (“It is well settled
that plaintiffs are not required to exhaust FHAA claims.”); Sokoya v. 4343 Clarendon Condo
Ass’n & John Polacek, No. 96-CV-5278, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17879, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
19, 1996) (“Under the FHA, a plaintiff does not need to pursue any administrative remedies
before filing suit. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1). The opposite is true of Title VII and the ADEA, a

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factor the Supreme Court considers particularly important.”). As such, Defendants’ argument is
wholly without merit.
To the extent that Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to file a complaint with the
PHRC, (see Docket No. 7 at 8-9), Plaintiff has not alleged any violations of the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act. Rather, Plaintiff has only alleged a claim against Defendants under the
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(2) and 3604(f)(3)(B). (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 41-42). As
discussed above, Plaintiff was not required to exhaust her administrative remedies before
asserting a claim under the Fair Housing Act. Thus, the Court must also reject Defendants’
alternative argument that Plaintiff’s claim is not ripe because she has not filed for an
administrative review of the facts. (See Docket No. 7 at 9-11). Accordingly, Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction will be denied.
V.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction. An appropriate Order follows.
s/Nora Barry Fischer
Nora Barry Fischer
United States District Judge
cc/ecf: All counsel of record

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