SPERRING v. COLVIN

Filing 13

ORDER granting 9 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 11 Motion for Summary Judgment. This case is remanded as set forth in the Opinion. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 2/9/18. (cha)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BETH ANNE SPERRING,

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Plaintiff,
-vsNANCY A. BERRYHILL,1
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 16-1555

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge.
OPINION AND ORDER
Background
Plaintiff Beth Anne Sperring (“Sperring”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1383(c)(3) for review of the ALJ’s decision denying her claims under Titles II and XVI
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-34, 1381-1383f. Sperring previously filed
for, and was awarded, benefits for a closed period of disability from May 2, 2009
through April 25, 2011. (R. 80-87) Her condition improved and she returned to full-time
work with no restrictions. However, on June 6, 2013, Sperring filed an application for
DIB and SSI alleging disability beginning on May 13, 2013. (R. 11) Following a hearing
before an ALJ, during which both Sperring and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified, the
ALJ denied her claim. The ALJ concluded that Sperring had the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work, with some restrictions. (R. 18) Sperring
appealed. Pending are Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. See ECF Docket Nos.

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Nancy A. Berryhill became acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, replacing Carolyn W.
Colvin.

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[9] and [11]. After careful consideration, the case is reversed and remanded for further
consideration.
Legal Analysis
1. Standard of Review
The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence
exists in the record to support the Commissioner’s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d
37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as Amore than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate. Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Determining whether substantial evidence exists is
“not merely a quantitative exercise.” Gilliland v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 178, 183 (3d Cir.
1986) (citing Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983)). “A single piece of
evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if the secretary ignores, or fails to resolve,
a conflict created by countervailing evidence. Nor is evidence substantial if it is
overwhelmed by other evidence – particularly certain types of evidence (e.g., that
offered by treating physicians).” Id. The Commissioner’s findings of fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606
F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the
Commissioner’s decision or re-weigh the evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995
F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if the court would have
decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir.

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1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however,
the district court must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. §706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the claimant must demonstrate that he
cannot engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986). The
Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use when
evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The ALJ must
determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity;
(2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe
impairment, whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P,
appx. 1; (4) if the impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether
the claimant’s impairments prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5)
if the claimant is incapable of performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform
any other work which exists in the national economy, in light of his age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The claimant
carries the initial burden of demonstrating by medical evidence that he is unable to
return to his previous employment (steps 1-4). Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the
claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to show that
the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful activity (step 5). Id. A district
court, after reviewing the entire record, may affirm, modify, or reverse the decision with

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or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d
210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
2. Evidence from Prior Period
Although Sperring raises several issues, I need only address one. According to
Sperring, medical opinions relating to her condition prior to the onset date were made
part of the record.2 Yet, the ALJ failed to address these opinions in denying her claim.
Sperring does not argue that the medical opinions should have had been given
conclusive effect; instead she merely argues that such evidence was relevant to the
issue of disability and the ALJ should have considered them and articulated the weight
she gave them. After careful consideration, I agree with Sperring.
An ALJ is required to consider all medical opinions in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(2). The regulations do not carve out an exception for medical opinions
which predate the alleged onset of disability. Id. Evidence relating to a period prior to
the onset of disability may be “relevant to evaluate the longitudinal effectiveness of
treatment, or whether a period of improvement may, in fact, demonstrate a momentary
remission.” McKean v. Colvin, 150 F. Supp.3d 406, 414 (M.D. Pa. 2015).3 Indeed, the
regulations indicate that medical opinion evidence predating the claimant’s filing can be
relevant. See 20 C.F.R.§ 404.1512 (stating that “[b]efore we make a determination that

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The opinions were submitted in connection with the prior claim. They supported an award of benefits.
As the McKean court acknowledged, other circuits have held that “res judicata does not prevent evidence
introduced in support of the prior claim to prove disability at the later onset date.” McKean, 150 F. Supp.2d at 413,
citing, Hillier v. Social Security Administration, 486 F.3d 359, 365 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Especially in the context of a
progressive disease or degenerative condition, evidence that is offered as proof of a disability, and not found
persuasive by an ALJ in a prior proceeding, may be considered in a subsequent proceeding in combination with new
evidence for the purpose of determining if the claimant has become disabled since the ALJ’s decision.”) and Groves
v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 809, 810-11 (7th Cir. 1998) (although final judgment denying application for social security
disability benefits was res judicata, this did not render evidence submitted in support of that application inadmissible
on second application alleging later onset date, to establish, in combination with later evidence, that claimant
became disabled after period covered by first proceeding).
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you are not disabled, we will develop your complete medical history for at least the 12
months preceding the month in which you file your application unless there is reason to
believe that development of an earlier period is necessary or unless you say that your
disability began less than 12 months before you filed your application.”) “It is logical that
medical observations suggesting that a claimant suffered from limitations at one point
are relevant to the question of whether or not the claimant suffered from the same
limitations either before or after that point. Although opinions rendered
contemporaneously may have greater relevance, such fact does not render medical
opinions from a different period of time irrelevant.” McQueen v. Colvin, Civ. No. 155893, 2016 WL 4009850 at * 3 (W.D. Wash, July 27, 2015).
Certainly, an ALJ is not obligated “to find evidence prior to the onset date to be
relevant or probative.” See Giese v. Comm’r. of Soc. Sec., 251 Fed. Appx. 799, 804 (3d
Cir. 2007). However, where the record contains medical opinion evidence from the
period prior to the onset date the ALJ cannot simply ignore it. He or she must explain
the weight accorded to the evidence. “[A]s the Court in O’Donnell v. Astrue observed,
the mere fact that evidence exists prior to disability onset date does not automatically
mean that such evidence is not relevant, nor does it relieve an ALJ of the duty to explain
why evidence predating the onset date would not be afforded substantial weight.”
McKean v. Colvin, 150 F. Supp.3d 406, 414 (M.D. Pa. 2015), citing, O’Donnell v.
Astrue, Civ. No. 10-1478, 2011 WL 3444194 at *7 n. 7 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2011). Thus,
“[w]hile an ALJ is free to reject a medical source’s conclusions, Chandler v. Comm’r. of
Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2012), the ALJ must indicate why evidence was
rejected, so that a reviewing court can determine whether significant probative evidence

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was not credited or simply ignored.” McKean, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 414-15, citing, Cotter
v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981) and Mistick v. Colvin, Civ. No. 12-1031,
2013 WL 5288261 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2013)4. See also, Davidson v. Colvin, 164
F.Supp.3d 926, 941-42 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (finding persuasive decisions from other
circuits which “have found that an ALJ may not simply ignore medical opinions because
they pre-date the onset of disability or post-date the last insured date, since that
evidence can be relevant to a claim of disability.”); Carpenter v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 1264,
1266 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding that the ALJ erred by failing to acknowledge any of the
medical evidence before the year that the claimant’s disability allegedly began because
the regulations required him to consider all of the evidence in the record when
determining whether the claimant was disabled); Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208,
1215 (10th Cir. 2004) (“even if a doctor’s medical observations regarding a claimant’s
allegations of disability date from earlier, previously adjudicated periods, the doctor’s
observations are nevertheless relevant to the claimant’s medical history and should be
considered by the ALJ”); DeBoard v. Comm’r. of Soc. Sec., 211 Fed. Appx. 411, 414
(6th Cir. 2006) (“We do not endorse the position that all evidence or medical records
predating the alleged date of the onset of disability … are necessarily irrelevant …. We
recognize that evidence presented at an earlier hearing or predating the onset of
disability, when evaluated in combination with later evidence, may help establish

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The Commissioner cites to one of my prior decisions, Greenwald v. Berryhill, Civ. No. 16-500, 2017 WL 1022580
(W.D. Pa. March 16, 2017) in support of the proposition that an ALJ’s failure to even mention a medical opinion
supporting the plaintiff’s claim can be excused where that opinion is from a period prior to the onset of disability.
Admittedly, in “some circumstances, a piece of evidence can be so lacking in probative value, or so overwhelmed by
countervailing evidence, that it can be implicitly rejected without explanation.” McConnell v. Astrue, Civ. No. 9-44,
2010 WL 2925053 at * 9 (W.D. Pa. July 20, 2010), citing, Johnson v. Comm’r. of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 203-05
(3d Cir. 2008). This case does not present such circumstances. The medical opinions rendered by Dr. Prybock (R.
414-420) and Dr. Boettcher (R. 457-460) in the prior proceedings are supportive of Sperring’s contentions. Indeed,
the ALJ in the prior proceeding cited to Dr. Prybock’s opinion in support of the award of benefits.

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disability. This is particularly true when the disabling condition is progressive.”)
(emphasis in original); Burles-Marshall v. Shalala, 7 F.3d 1346, 1348 n. 6 (6th Cir. 1993)
(“Evidence from the record of a prior claim may be relevant to a claim of disability with a
later onset date.”); Frustaglia v. Sec’y. of Health & Human Servs., 829 F.2d 192, 193
(1st Cir. 1987) (noting that “the ALJ is entitled to consider evidence from a prior denial
for the limited purpose of reviewing the preliminary facts or cumulative medical history
necessary to determine whether the claimant was disabled at the time of his second
application”); Halvorsen v. Heckler, 743 F.2d 1221, 1225-26 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding “no
doubt that medical evidence from a time subsequent to a certain period is relevant to a
determination of a claimant’s condition during that period” and that the ALJ’s “little, if
any, consideration” of medical records post-dating the claimant’s date last insured
mandated reversal.); McQueen v. Colvin, Civ. No. 15-5893, 2016 WL 4009850 at * 3
(W.D. Wash. July 27, 2016) (stating that “[t]he Court finds persuasive the Ninth Circuit’s
conclusion in Williams, and the similar conclusion by other circuits that an ALJ errs by
failing to consider medical opinion evidence from shortly before the period of alleged
disability if that evidence is significant and probative.”); citing, Williams v. Astrue, 493
Fed. Appx. 866, 868 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding that an ALJ erred in failing to consider
medical opinions predating the claimant’s alleged onset of disability); and Martin v.
Astrue, Civ. No. 8-1013, 2010 WL 1038484 at * 5 (M.D. Fla. March 19, 2010) (rejecting
the Commissioner’s argument that the ALJ was not required to consider medical
opinions submitted in connection with a previously adjudicated application, noting that
“the ALJ must weight all the evidence presented in accordance with the Regulations”).

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Because the reports from Dr. Prybock and Dr. Boettcher were part of the record
and because the ALJ’s decision is silent as to the weight she accorded them, this case
must be remanded for further discussion. As observed by the Martin court, “the Court is
left to wonder how this evidence was weighed and if the opinions stated therein were
discounted or disregarded, why the ALJ made such a determination.” Martin, 2010 WL
1038484 at * 5. Because proper consideration of these opinions might make a
difference in assessing Sperring’s residual functional capacity, on remand the ALJ
should state with specificity the weight she gives this evidence. However, Sperring “is
cautioned that this opinion does not suggest she is entitled to disability benefits. Rather
it speaks only to the process the ALJ must engage in and the findings and analysis the
ALJ must make before determining whether Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of
the Social Security Act.” Id., at * 7.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BETH ANNE SPERRING
Plaintiff,

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)
)
)
)
)
)
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-vsNANCY A. BERRYHILL,5
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 16-1555

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge.

ORDER OF COURT

Therefore, this 9th day of February, 2018, it is hereby ORDERED that the
decision of the ALJ is reversed. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 9) is granted and Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Docket No. 11) is denied. This case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with the Opinion issued in conjunction with this Order.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
United States Senior District Judge

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Nancy A. Berryhill became acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, replacing Carolyn W.
Colvin.

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