LITTLETON v. COLVIN

Filing 25

OPINION and ORDER denying as moot 21 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 23 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 8/9/18. (slh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BRENDA MARIE LITTLETON,
Plaintiff,
-vsNANCY A. BERRYHILL,1
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 16-1650

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

OPINION
Pending before the court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 21 and
23). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (ECF Nos. 22 and 24). After
careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth
below, I am denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 21) and granting
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 23).
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security denying her applications for disability insurance benefits and widow’s insurance
benefits pursuant to the Social Security Act. Plaintiff filed her applications alleging disability
since August 31, 2012. (ECF No. 16-5, pp. 3, 16). Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), Lawrence
J. Neary, held a hearing on October 2, 2014. (ECF No. 16-2, pp. 39-68). On February 5, 2015,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (ECF No. 16-2, pp. 11-24).
After exhausting all administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed the instant action with this
court. The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 21 and 23).
The issues are now ripe for review.
1

Nancy A. Berryhill became acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, replacing
Carolyn W. Colvin.

II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.

Standard of Review

The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner’s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as “more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Ventura v. Shalala, 55
F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
Additionally, the Commissioner’s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive. 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A
district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision or re-weigh the
evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if
the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360
(3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however,
the district court must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. §706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use
when evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a). The ALJ must
determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,
whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) if the
impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant’s impairments

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prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional
capacity. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by
medical evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4).
Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful
activity (step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the
decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745
F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
B.

Credibility and Mischaracterization

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in “overstating” her allegations that she is “totally
disabled.” (ECF No. 22, p. 8). In support of the same, Plaintiff submits that “the ALJ states that
the Claimant asserts that she is totally disabled…[but Plaintiff] has never suggested that she is
‘totally disabled.’” Id., at pp. 8, 10. Rather, Plaintiff submits that she cannot function in a normal
workplace due to her anxiety. Id. Based on the same, Plaintiff submits that the ALJ’s decision
is not supported by substantial evidence and reversal is warranted.
As set forth above, to be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that he cannot engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. This is what
it means to be disabled under the Act. By filing an application, it is axiomatic that a plaintiff is
asserting that he/she is disabled within the meaning of the Act. Thus, if a plaintiff does not
assert that he is unable to engage in substantial gainful employment, he/she is not entitled to
benefits under the Act.

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In this case, when assessing Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ stated, inter alia, “the clinical
and objective findings and the treatment history and activities of daily living rebut the claimant’s
contention that she is totally disabled from all forms of gainful employment.

While her

discomfort may restrict very strenuous physical exertion, it does not preclude all work activity.”
(ECF No. 16-2, p. 21). Thus, contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, the ALJ did not state that she
was “totally disabled.” He stated that she was not “totally disabled from all forms of gainful
employment.” (ECF No. 16-2, p. 21). This in no way is an overstatement of her allegations or a
mischaracterization of the evidence. Therefore, I find no merit to this argument.
It may be inferred that Plaintiff also is arguing that the ALJ improperly relied on Plaintiff’s
activities of daily living in assessing her credibility. (ECF No. 22, p. 9). An ALJ is required to
consider, inter alia, a plaintiff’s activities of daily living. See, Social Security Ruling 96-7p and
20 C.F.R. §§404.1529, 416.929. In this case, the ALJ did exactly that. (ECF No. 16-2, pp. 1124. 20). Specifically, the ALJ noted the following:
Following the sudden death of her husband in February 2013, the claimant
reported in April 2013 that she was living alone and that she had no problem with
personal care (Exhibit 5E). She reported that she prepared her own meals, did
laundry with carrying assistance on stairs, mowed with a riding lawn mower,
dusted, used a dishwasher, and cleaned floors (Exhibit 5E). She reported that
she watched television, read, and knitted on a daily basis and that she did these
things well (Id.). She reported that she went to church every Sunday (Id.). She
subsequently lost her house and began living with a woman, who was a friend of
her mother’s. It is noted that in September 2014 a treating source reported that
the claimant was caring for a woman who was actively dying (Exhibit 22F).
Also, at the hearing in October 2014, the claimant reported that she continued to
live with the woman, who was a friend of her mother’s (Testimony). The claimant
also testified that she drove once or twice a week and that she went to one
grocery store to shop (Id.). She reported that she got breakfast for the woman
with who she lived on a daily basis because the woman was ill (Id.). She testified
that the woman had a life expectancy of 48 hours (Id.) She further reported that
she took care of two little dogs (Id.). She testified that she went to church every
other Sunday because of the ill health of the woman with whom she lived (Id.).
(ECF No. 16-2, p. 20). I find this statement to be supported by substantial evidence. Id.
Consequently, I find no error in this regard.

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C.

GAF2 Scores

Plaintiff’s only other argument is that the ALJ chose to credit one GAF score over
another without discussing the meaning and effect of that determination. (ECF No. 22, p. 8).
“In other words, he does not explain the difference in a functional sense between a GAF of 50
and 57, and what the functional relevance of a score of 57 is in and of itself.” Id. Contrary to
Plaintiff’s assertion, there is no formulaic outline an ALJ must follow when weighing GAF scores.
Rather, an ALJ must simply weigh the GAF scores and discuss reasons for the weight
sufficiently for this court to conduct a meaningful review. In addressing Plaintiff’s GAF scores,
the ALJ stated:
As for the opinion evidence, examining and treating sources have given the
claimant Global Assessment of Functioning Scale (GAF) scores of 50 and 57 at
various times throughout the record (Exhibits 15, 21F). Greater weight has been
given to the GAF score of 57. This is because it is more consistent with the
evidence as a whole, such as the good overall mental status examination
findings and the claimant’s relative conservative course of treatment, which has
consisted only of psychotherapy, a controlled grieving process, psychiatric
medication management, and some recent case management services to
support the claimant in obtaining alternate housing upon the expected death of
the woman with whom she currently lives, who has been given a short life
expectancy, as discussed above in this decision.
(ECF No. 16-2, p 21). I find the ALJ’s discussion above regarding the weight assigned to his
GAF scores to be valid and proper and supported by substantial evidence. (ECF No. 16-2, pp.
11-24). Consequently, remand is not warranted on this basis.
An appropriate order shall follow.

2GAF

is an acronym which refers to an individual's score on the Global Assessment of Functioning Scale.
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 32 (4th ed. Text
Revision 2000). The scale is used to report the “clinician's judgment of the individual's overall level of
functioning” in light of his psychological, social, and occupational limitations. Id. The GAF ratings range
from 1 to 100. GAF scores are arrived at by a clinician based on his or her assessment of a patient’s selfreporting. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 32
(4th ed. Text Revision 2000). GAF scores do not have a direct correlation to the disability requirements
and standards of the Act. See, 65 Fed. Reg. 50746, at 50764-65 (2000). In fact, as of May 18, 2013, the
American Psychiatric Association no longer endorses the GAF scale as a measurement tool. See,
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DMS-V) (5th ed. 2013). Nonetheless, GAF scores
are still medical evidence that informs a Commissioner's judgment in assessing whether an individual is
disabled.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BRENDA MARIE LITTLETON,

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Plaintiff,
-vsNANCY A. BERRYHILL,3
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 16-1650

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge
ORDER OF COURT
THEREFORE, this 9th day of August, 2018, it is ordered that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 21) is denied and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Docket No. 23) is granted.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
United States Senior District Judge

3

Nancy A. Berryhill became acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, replacing
Carolyn W. Colvin.

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