KIDD v. COLVIN

Filing 16

OPINION and ORDER denying 11 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 13 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 11/30/17. (sps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CYNTHIA I. KIDD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security, 1
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 2:16-1843

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AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

OPINION
and
ORDER OF COURT
SYNOPSIS
Pending before the Court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. [ECF Nos. 11 and
13]. Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. [ECF Nos. 12 and 14]. After
careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth below,
Defendant’s Motion [ECF No. 13] is granted, and Plaintiff’s Motion [ECF No. 11] is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff has brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”)
under Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”). On or about February 18, 2014, Plaintiff applied
for DIB. [ECF No. 7-4, at 60]. In her application, she alleged that since January 3, 2013, she
had been disabled due to depression, anxiety, OCD, headaches, and hives. Id. [ECF No. 7-4 at

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Nancy A. Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, and is
automatically substituted as the Defendant in this suit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).

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60-61; No. 7-7 at 115, 119.] Her date last insured is March 31, 2018. [ECF No 7-2, at 10]. The
state agency denied her claims initially, and she requested an administrative hearing. [ECF No.
7-5, Exs. 4B, 5B]. Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Daniel F. Cusick held a hearing on May 8,
2015, at which Plaintiff was represented by counsel. [ECF No. 7-3]. Plaintiff appeared at the
hearing and testified on her own behalf. Id. A vocational expert also was present at the hearing
and testified. Id. at 53-59. In a decision dated June 3, 2015, the ALJ found that jobs existed in
significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform and, therefore, that
Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. [ECF No. 7-2, at 8-19]. Plaintiff requested review of the
ALJ’s determination by the Appeals Council, and, on October 21, 2016, the Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff’s request for review. Id. at 1-4. Having exhausted all of her administrative
remedies, Plaintiff filed this action.
The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. [ECF Nos. 11 and 13].
The issues are now ripe for my review.
II.
A.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner’s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as “more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d
900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Additionally,
the Commissioner’s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. 42
U.S.C. § 405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A district court
cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision or re-weigh the evidence of
record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F. Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's findings of
fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if the court
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would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir.
1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however, the district
court must review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that she cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(A); Brewster v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use when
evaluating the disabled status of each claimant.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.

The ALJ must

determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,
whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1; (4) if the
impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant’s impairments
prevent him from performing her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing her past relevant work, whether she can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of her age, education, work experience and residual functional
capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by
medical evidence that she is unable to return to her previous employment (steps 1-4).
Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful
activity (step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the decision
with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210,
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221 (3d Cir. 1984).
B.

WHETHER THE ALJ ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PLAINTIFF’S HEADACHES
WERE NON-SEVERE
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step two of the sequential evaluation process in

determining that her headaches were a non-severe impairment. [ECF No. 12, at 9-14]. This
argument is without merit. The step-two inquiry into an impairment’s severity “is a de minimis
screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” Newell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d
541, 546 (3d Cir. 2003). As set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a), an impairment or combination
of impairments is not severe if it does not significantly limit a claimant’s physical or mental ability
to do basic work activities.

The regulations define basic work activities as the abilities or

aptitudes necessary to do most jobs, including mental activities such as understanding, carrying
out, and remembering simple instructions; use of judgment; responding appropriately to
supervision, co-workers, and usual work situations; and dealing with changes in a routine work
setting. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b). Thus, an impairment is not severe if the evidence establishes
only a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work.
Newell, 347 F.3d at 546; Mays v. Barnhart, 78 F. App’x 808, 811 (3d Cir. 2003); S.S.R. 85-28.
Any doubt as to whether the step-two showing has been made must be resolved in favor of the
claimant. Newell, 347 F.3d at 546-47. 2
In this case, I agree with Defendant that substantial record evidence supports the ALJ’s
finding that Plaintiff’s migraines are not severe. In his step two analysis, the ALJ noted that
although Plaintiff testified to experiencing frequent headaches, the evidence showed that those
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Although the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has commented that the Commissioner’s
determination to deny an applicant’s request for benefits at step two should be reviewed with close scrutiny,
it also has made clear that it does not suggest that a reviewing court apply a more stringent standard of
review in such cases. McCrea v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 370 F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2004). Rather, “[t]he
Commissioner’s denial at step two, like one made at any other step in the sequential analysis, is to be
upheld if supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Id. at 360-61.

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headaches do not have more than a de minimis effect on her ability to perform basic work
activities. [ECF No. 7-2, at 11]. In particular, the ALJ noted that, although Plaintiff complained
to her therapist of headaches in December 2013, the medical record does not contain subsequent
references to frequent headaches. Id. (citing Ex. 2F). 3 The ALJ also remarked that Plaintiff had
not treated with a physician for headaches or any other physical impairment since her alleged
onset date and had not been prescribed any medication for headaches. Id. Further, Plaintiff’s
then-attorney did not argue limitations from headaches in a May 2015 brief and stated at the
hearing that he did not think Plaintiff had any physical problems that were disabling. Id. (citing
Ex. 9E); see also ECF No. 7-3 at 29. 4
Plaintiff’s suggestion that the ALJ should have ordered a consultative examination to
evaluate Plaintiff’s alleged headaches is without merit. The decision to order a consultative
examination is within the sound discretion of the ALJ. See Thompson v. Halter, 45 F. App’x 146,
149 (3d Cir. 2002); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1517. An “ALJ’s duty to develop the record does not require
a consultative examination unless the claimant establishes that such an examination is necessary
to enable the ALJ to make the disability decision.” Thompson, 45 F. App’x at 149. Other
circumstances necessitating a consultative examination include situations where a claimant’s
medical records do not contain needed additional evidence, or when the ALJ needs to resolve a

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Plaintiff disagrees that the record is devoid of subsequent references to frequent headaches, arguing that
her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Humphreys, noted in her January 23, 2014 Psychiatric Evaluation and in a
number of subsequent medication evaluations that Plaintiff has a history of headaches. [ECF No. 12 at
11-12]. This argument does not change my analysis. The January 2014 evaluation to which Plaintiff
points states, in the “past medical history” section, only that Plaintiff reported having “a history of low blood
pressure and headaches.” [ECF No. 7-9 (Ex. 2F) at 234]. The subsequent “references” merely repeat this
information (i.e., “history of headaches”) on the Axis III line of the DSM IV diagnosis. [ECF Nos. 7-9, Ex.
2F; 7-10 (Ex. 4F)]. None of these conclusory notations, or the medical records that contain them, mention
the frequency or severity of Plaintiff’s alleged headaches or reflect any history of treatment for, or limitations
caused by, headaches.
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Specifically, Plaintiff’s then-attorney, John Morgan, by way of opening, stated that “I don’t think she has
any physical problems that are disabling. It’s her mental problems that she has.” [ECF No. 7-3, at 28].

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conflict, inconsistency, or ambiguity in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519a. Based on the
existing record evidence in this case, I find that the ALJ was not required to order a consultative
examination. Other than Plaintiff’s subjective testimony, which the ALJ properly discounted,
nothing in the record evidence raises the suspicion of a severe impairment sufficient to require a
consultative examination. As the ALJ accurately notes, Plaintiff did not seek treatment with a
physician for her headaches and was not prescribed medication for headaches. Moreover,
Plaintiff’s attorney did not mention limitations from headaches in a May 2015 brief and
affirmatively represented to the ALJ that Plaintiff did not have any physical limitations that were
disabling, only mental impairments. Accordingly, the ALJ did not abuse his discretion in failing to
order a consultative examination here. See Jones v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 1987).
Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to consider her lack of health insurance as a reason
for the dearth of medical evidence regarding headaches also is unpersuasive. Viewing the
opinion as a whole, it is clear that the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s lack of insurance and
considered it in his decision. See, e.g., ECF No. 7-2 at 14-16. Moreover, Plaintiff’s course of
treatment was not the only evidence the ALJ considered. The ALJ also looked at Plaintiff’s
activities of daily living, lack of other record evidence of headaches, her attorney’s
representations, and other factors in assessing Plaintiff’s headaches and the credibility of her
testimony regarding the same. Accordingly, I find no error in the ALJ’s approach.
In addition, and in any event, the ALJ did not deny Plaintiff’s application for benefits at step
two of the analysis. Rather, the ALJ found in Plaintiff’s favor at step two when he concluded that
Plaintiff’s major depressive disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and panic disorder without
agoraphobia were severe impairments. [ECF No. 7-2 at 10-11]. The ALJ ruled against Plaintiff
at steps four and/or five of the sequential evaluation process, after concluding that her residual
functional capacity was sufficient to enable her to perform certain work existing in the economy.
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Id. at 13-19. Moreover, the ALJ considered all of Plaintiff’s impairments, including her alleged
headaches, in making his residual functional capacity determination. Id. at 14. Because the
ALJ found in Plaintiff’s favor at step two and proceeded with the sequential analysis, even if he
had erroneously concluded that her headaches were not severe, any such error was harmless.
See Salles v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 229 F. App’x 140, 144-45 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing
Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 2005)).
In short, the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s headaches were not severe is supported by
substantial evidence and/or any error in this regard was harmless. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion
for Summary Judgment on this issue is denied.
C.

WHETHER THE ALJ IMPROPERLY DISREGARDED THE MEDICAL OPINION OF
PLAINTIFF’S TREATING PHYSICIAN
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously disregarded the opinion of her treating

psychiatrist, Linda Humphreys, MD, regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairments. [ECF No. 12 at
14-18]. In particular, Plaintiff faults the ALJ for rejecting Dr. Humphreys’ opinion in a Medical
Source Statement she completed on April 2, 2015, that Plaintiff had “marked” impairments in her
ability to respond appropriately to work pressures and in her ability to respond appropriately to
changes in a routine work setting due to panic attacks and OCD. See id. (citing Ex. 5F). Plaintiff
also contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the GAF scores of 40 that Dr. Humphreys
assigned Plaintiff during Plaintiff’s course of treatment with her. Id. This argument is without
merit.
The amount of weight accorded to medical opinions is well-established. Generally, the
ALJ will give more weight to the opinion of a source who has examined the claimant than to a
non-examining source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1). 5 In addition, the ALJ generally will give

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Although the regulations governing the evaluation of medical evidence were recently amended, the

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more weight to opinions from a treating physician, “since these sources are likely to be the
medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant’s]
medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot
be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations,
such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.” Id. § 404.1527(c)(2). If the ALJ
finds that “a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of [a claimant’s]
impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence [of] record,” he must give
that opinion controlling weight. Id. Unless a treating physician’s opinion is given controlling
weight, the ALJ must consider all relevant factors that tend to support or contradict any medical
opinions of record, including the patient/physician relationship; the supportability of the opinion;
the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; and the specialization of the provider at
issue. Id. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6). “[T]he more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole,
the more weight [the ALJ generally] will give to that opinion.” Id. § 404.1527(c)(4).
In the event of conflicting medical evidence, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
explained:
“A cardinal principle guiding disability determinations is that the ALJ accord
treating physicians’ reports great weight, especially ‘when their opinions reflect
expert judgment based on continuing observation of the patient’s condition over a
prolonged period of time.’” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999)). However, “where
. . . the opinion of a treating physician conflicts with that of a non-treating,
non-examining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit” and may reject the
treating physician’s assessment if such rejection is based on contradictory
medical evidence. Id. Similarly, under 20 C.F.R. § [404.1527]([c])(2), the
opinion of a treating physician is to be given controlling weight only when it is
well-supported by medical evidence and is consistent with other evidence in the
record.
version effective March 27, 2017, does not apply to the present claim. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527,
404.1520c (2017).

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Becker v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 403 F. App’x 679, 686 (3d Cir. 2010). The ultimate
issue of whether an individual is disabled within the meaning of the Act is for the Commissioner to
decide. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1), (3). Likewise, the final responsibility for determining a
claimant's RFC is reserved to the Commissioner, who will not give any special significance to the
source of another opinion on this issue. Id. § 404.1527(d)(2), (d)(3).
In this case, the ALJ did not reject Dr. Humphreys’ April 2015 opinion completely, but,
rather, gave it “some weight.” [ECF No. 7-2 at 16-17]. Specifically, he credited Dr. Humphreys’
indication that Plaintiff had only slight difficulty understanding, remembering, and carrying out
short, simple instructions; slight problems interacting appropriately with coworkers; and no more
than moderate difficulty interacting appropriately with the public. Id. (citing Ex. 5F). The ALJ
concluded that these statements were consistent with Dr. Humphreys’ own treatment notes as
well as therapy notes and Plaintiff’s treatment history. Id. The ALJ, however, assigned little
weight to Dr. Humphreys’ findings of marked limitations in responding appropriately to pressure in
the work setting and to changes in a routine work setting because those assessments were
inconsistent with Dr. Humphreys’ earlier assertions that Plaintiff could work; with Plaintiff’s
treatment history since her alleged onset date; and with the treatment notes showing that
Plaintiff’s symptoms generally were well-controlled with medication. Id. (citing Exs. 2F, 4F, 5F).
Dr. Humphreys’ opinion also was inconsistent with the March 21, 2014 opinion of state agency
reviewing psychologist, Timothy Ostrich, D. Psy., who concluded that Plaintiff had no more than
moderate limitations in any work related function. Id. at 16 (citing Ex. 1A). The ALJ gave Dr.
Ostrich’s opinion great weight because it was consistent with Plaintiff’s treatment history during
the period at issue, which included no emergency room visits or inpatient care; with Dr.
Humphreys’ psychiatric progress notes, which showed improvement with medication; and with

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Dr. Humphreys’ and Plaintiff’s statements in 2014 that Plaintiff was ready and able to go back to
work. Id. (citing Exs. 1A, 2F, 4F). The ALJ did not discount Plaintiff’s mental health symptoms
entirely and included restrictions in his RFC finding related to Plaintiff’s credibly-established
mental health impairments, including a limitation to work with a specific vocational preparation
(SVP) of 1 or 2; to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, involving only simple work-related
decisions with few, if any, work place changes; and to occasional interaction with the public and
coworkers, with no tandem tasks, and occasional supervision. Id. at 13-17.
The ALJ’s reasons regarding the weight assigned to Dr. Humphreys’ April 2015 opinion
are acceptable reasons for discounting opinion evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. Based on
the same, I am able to conduct a proper and meaningful review. I find the reasons the ALJ
provided in weighing Dr. Humphreys’ opinion and Dr. Ostrich’s opinion were explained sufficiently
and well-supported by substantial evidence of record. [ECF No. 7-2 at 16-17]. Therefore, I
conclude that the ALJ did not err in this regard, and remand is not warranted on this basis. 6
To the extent Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated her Global Assessment of
Functioning (“GAF”) scores in evaluating the medical opinion evidence, that argument is without
merit. Plaintiff highlights that Dr. Humphreys consistently assigned her a GAF score of around
40 during the course of her treatment, indicating some impairment in reality testing or a major
impairment in several areas.
dispositive.

[ECF No. 12 at 16].

These GAF scores, however, are not

The GAF scale is used by clinicians to report an individual’s overall level of

functioning. See Cainglit v. Barnhart, 85 F. App’x 71, 74-75 (10th Cir. 2003). 7 As courts have

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To the extent Plaintiff supports her argument by suggesting that Dr. Humphreys’ opinion is consistent with
other medical evidence, the standard is not whether there is evidence to establish Plaintiff’s position but,
rather, is whether there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39
(3d Cir. 1989). Thus, such support is misplaced.
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A GAF of 21-30 indicates behavior that “is considerably influenced by delusions or hallucinations OR
serious impairment in communication or judgment . . . OR inability to function in almost all areas (e.g., stays

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explained, however, a particular GAF score does not necessarily correlate to one’s ability to work.
See, e.g., id. at 75. Moreover, the ALJ did not ignore these GAF scores in his analysis. Rather,
he acknowledged the scores and explained his decision to assign them little weight. [ECF No.
7-2, at 17]. Among other things, the ALJ noted that the low GAF scores were inconsistent with
the treatment notes and Plaintiff’s own statements regarding her readiness to work. The ALJ
also highlighted that the GAF scores remained constant even when corresponding records
showed improvement with medication, further indicating that the scores were not accurate
measurements of Plaintiff’s overall functioning. Id. (citing Exs. 2F, 4F). For these reasons, the
ALJ properly refused to give significant weight to the GAF scores at issue.
In short, I find the ALJ appropriately weighed Dr. Humphreys’ opinion and the other
medical evidence of record in evaluating Plaintiff’s mental health impairments and that he
supported his findings with substantial evidence. Accordingly, I find no error in this regard
requiring remand on this issue.
D.

WHETHER THE ALJ IMPROPERLY DETERMINED PLAINTIFF’S RFC
The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full

range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: she was
limited to work with a specific vocational preparation (SVP) of 1 or 2; was limited to simple,
routine, and repetitive tasks, involving only simple work-related decisions with few, if any, work
place changes; and was limited to occasional interaction with the public and coworkers, with no
in bed all day, no job, home, or friends).” See American Psychiatric Assoc. Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., Text Rev. 2000) (“DSM-IV-TR”). A GAF of 31-40 indicates “some
impairment in reality testing or communication . . . OR major impairment in several areas such as work or
school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood.” Id. A GAF of 41-50 denotes “serious symptoms
(e.g., suicidal ideation . . . ) . . . OR any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning.”
Id. A GAF from 51-60 indicates “moderate symptoms . . . OR moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or
school functioning.” Id. A GAF from 61-70 reflects “some mild symptoms . . . OR some difficulty in social,
occupational, or school functioning . . . , but generally functioning pretty well, has some meaningful
relationships.” Id.

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tandem tasks, and occasional supervision.

[ECF No. 7-2 at 13-17].

The ALJ ultimately

concluded that considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs
that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform and,
therefore, that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Id. at 18-19. The
responsibility for deciding a claimant’s RFC rests with the ALJ and is based on the entire record.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 404.1546.
In primary part, Plaintiff bases her argument that the ALJ’s RFC finding is deficient on her
contentions that the ALJ failed to adequately address her headaches and/or gave insufficient
weight to the opinions of her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Humphreys.

[ECF No. 12 at 18-20]. For

the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s arguments in this regard are without merit, and I need not
re-address them here. Plaintiff’s remaining argument is that her height (5ft. 4in.) and her weight
(96 lbs.) would preclude her from meeting the lifting requirements of medium or greater work.
Id. at 19-20.

This argument is directly contrary to agency policy.

As explained in Social

Security Ruling 96-8p:
[I]n assessing RFC, the adjudicator must consider only limitations and restrictions
attributable to medically determinable impairments. It is incorrect to find that
an individual has limitations or restrictions beyond those caused by his or
her medical impairment(s) including any related symptoms, such as pain,
due to factors such as age or height, or whether the individual had ever
engaged in certain activities in his or her past relevant work (e.g., lifting
heavy weights). Age and body habitus (i.e., natural body build, physique,
constitution, size, and weight, insofar as they are unrelated to the individual’s
medically determinable impairment(s) and related symptoms) are not factors in
assessing RFC. . . .
S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996) (emphasis in original).
Because the RFC adequately accounts for Plaintiff’s limitations related to her medically
determinable impairments and supported by the record, I find no error on this issue.

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III. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted
and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. An appropriate Order follows.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CYNTHIA I. KIDD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security, 1
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 2:16-1843

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AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 30th day of November, 2017, after careful consideration of the
submissions of the parties and for the reasons set forth in the Opinion accompanying this Order, it
is ordered the decision of the ALJ is affirmed and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF
No. 11] is DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 13] is GRANTED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
U.S. Senior District Judge

1 Nancy A. Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, and is
automatically substituted as the Defendant in this suit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).