LAYMAN v. COLVIN

Filing 16

OPINION and ORDER denying 10 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 14 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 1/9/18. (slh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GILBERT R. LAYMAN,

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Plaintiff,
-vsNANCY A. BERRYHILL,1
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 16-1851

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge.
OPINION
and
ORDER OF COURT
Pending before the Court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 10 and
14). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (ECF Nos. 11 and 15). After
careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth below,
I am denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 10) and granting Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 14).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security denying his applications for social security income (“SSI”) and disability insurance
benefits (“DIB”) pursuant to the Social Security Act. Plaintiff alleges he has been disabled since
February 26, 2013. (ECF No. 8-8, p. 11). Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), Jeffery P. La
Vicka, held a hearing on July 10, 2015. (ECF No. 8-3, pp. 2-43). On July 27, 2014, the ALJ
issued a decision finding Plaintiff is not disabled. (ECF No. 8-2, pp. 15-31). After exhausting all
administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed this action.
1Nancy

A. Berryhill became acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, replacing Carolyn
W. Colvin.

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The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 10 and 15).
The issues are now ripe for review.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner’s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as “more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d
900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Additionally,
the Commissioner’s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. 42
U.S.C. §405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A district court
cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision or re-weigh the evidence of
record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's findings of fact
are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if the court would
have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).
To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however, the district court
must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. §706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use when
evaluating the disabled status of each claimant.

20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a).

The ALJ must

determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,

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whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,
whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) if the
impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant’s impairments
prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity.
20 C.F.R. §404.1520.

The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by medical

evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4). Dobrowolsky, 606
F.2d at 406.

Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts to the

Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful activity
(step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the decision
with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210,
221 (3d Cir. 1984).
B.

Medical Opinion Evidence2

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ “erred in not affording controlling weight to the medical
evidence records and opinions of [his] physicians in favor of the non-examining state agency
consultant’s physical assessment.” (ECF No. 11, p. 9). The amount of weight accorded to
medical opinions is well-established. Generally, the ALJ will give more weight to the opinion of a
source who has examined the claimant than to a non-examining source. 20 C.F.R. §
416.927(c)(1). In addition, the ALJ generally will give more weight to opinions from a treating
physician, “since these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a
detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique
In his brief, Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s assessment of the evidence related to his physical abilities
only. (ECF No. 11, p. 9). He does not take issue with the ALJ’s assessment of the mental treatment
records/evidence. Id. As a result, I will limit my review accordingly.
2

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perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings
alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief
hospitalizations.” Id. § 416.927(c)(2). If the ALJ finds that “a treating source’s opinion on the
issue(s) of the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s) is well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence [of] record,” he must give that opinion controlling weight. Id. Also, “the more
consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight [the ALJ generally] will give to
that opinion.” Id. § 416.927(c)(4).
In the event of conflicting medical evidence, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
explained:
“A cardinal principle guiding disability determinations is that the ALJ accord
treating physicians’ reports great weight, especially ‘when their opinions reflect
expert judgment based on continuing observation of the patient’s condition over a
prolonged period of time.’” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999)). However, “where ...
the opinion of a treating physician conflicts with that of a non-treating,
non-examining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit” and may reject the
treating physician’s assessment if such rejection is based on contradictory medical
evidence. Id. Similarly, under 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2), the opinion of a treating
physician is to be given controlling weight only when it is well-supported by medical
evidence and is consistent with other evidence in the record.
Becker v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., No. 10-2517, 2010 WL 5078238, at *5 (3d Cir. Dec. 14,
2010). Although the ALJ may choose whom to credit when faced with a conflict, he “cannot reject
evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Security, 577 F.3d 500,
505 (3d Cir. 2009).
Additionally, state agency opinions merit significant consideration. See SSR 96–6p
(“Because State agency medical and psychological consultants ... are experts in the Social
Security disability programs, ... 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(f) and 416.927(f) require [ALJs] ... to
consider their findings of fact about the nature and severity of an individual's impairment(s)....”).
An ALJ is entitled to rely upon the findings of an agency evaluator even if there is a lapse of time

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between the report and the hearing. Chandler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir.
2012) (“The Social Security regulations impose no limit on how much time may pass between a
report and the ALJ's decision in reliance on it. Only where ‘additional medical evidence is received
that in the opinion of the [ALJ] ... may change the State agency medical ... consultant's finding that
the impairment(s) is not equivalent in severity to any impairment in the Listing,’ is an update to the
report required. SSR 96–6p.).
Contrary to Plaintiff’s position, there is no medical opinion evidence from Plaintiff’s treating
physicians. See, ECF No. 11, p. 9. The only physical medical opinion evidence is from the
state agency consultant, Dr. Fox. (ECF No. 8-4, pp. 34-45; No. 8-5, pp. 2-13). Therefore,
Plaintiff, in essence, is arguing that the ALJ should have afforded controlling weight to the medical
records over the opinion evidence of Dr. Fox. (ECF No. 11, p. 9). I disagree.
The ALJ gave Dr. Fox’s opinion significant weight because Dr. Fox had access to the
longitudinal medical records on file, Plaintiff’s treatment history suggests that his conditions are
not as severe as he alleges, and Plaintiff reports little physical limitations in his activities of daily
living. (ECF No. 8-2, p. 25). Giving the Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, however, the ALJ then
“reduced the claimant to a more restrictive residual functional capacity of light exertional work.”
Id. His rationale for doing so was properly laid out in his determination wherein he specifically
stated that: “This does not reflect any fallacy with the State agency consultants’ reasoning, but
rather, is a function of according the claimant the utmost benefit of the doubt and accommodating
additional limitations the claimant may experience as result of the diagnostic testing results
finding peripheral sensorimotor polyneuropathy, which was performed subsequent to the
assessment of Dr. Fox.” Id. These are valid reasons for accepting and/or discounting opinion
evidence. See, 20 C.F.R. §§404.1527; 416.927 (Evaluating Opinion Evidence). After a review of
the record, I find the reasons given by the ALJ in weighing the opinion of Dr. Fox in conjunction
with the other evidence of record to be sufficiently explained and supported by substantial

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evidence of record. (ECF No. 8-2, pp. 15-27). Therefore, I find no error in this regard on the part
of the ALJ. Consequently, remand is not warranted on this basis.
C.

Residual Functional Capacity (RFC)3

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in determining his RFC because he did not account for
his fatigue or time off task due to his digestive issues, because he misstated the record as it
relates to his blurry vision, and because the evidence contradicts his assessment that Plaintiff’s
neuropathy condition improved with medication. (ECF No. 11, pp. 10-11). After a review of the
evidence and for the reasons set forth below, I disagree.
To begin with, an ALJ is charged with the responsibility of assessing Plaintiff’s credibility.
In evaluating whether a plaintiff’s statements are credible, the ALJ will consider evidence from
treating, examining and consulting physicians, observations from agency employees, and other
factors such as the claimant's daily activities, descriptions of the pain, precipitating and
aggravating factors, type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medications, treatment other
than medication, and other measures used to relieve the pain. 20 C.F.R. §416.929(c); SSR 96-7p.
The ALJ will also look at inconsistencies between the claimant's statements and the evidence
presented. Id. I must defer to the ALJ’s credibility determinations, unless they are not supported
by substantial evidence.

Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 1981); Baerga v.

Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975). Here, the ALJ
did exactly that and found Plaintiff’s statements regarding his fatigue and time off task due to
digestive issues to be not entirely credible. (ECF No. 8-2, pp. 20-22). Based on the entire
record as a whole, I find the ALJ appropriately considered Plaintiff’s fatigue and digestive issues

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RFC refers to the most a claimant can still do despite his/her limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a),
416.945(a). The assessment must be based upon all of the relevant evidence, including the medical
records, medical source opinions, and the individual’s subjective allegations and description of his own
limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a).

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and I further find there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision to find Plaintiff not
entirely credible. Id. at pp. 20-25. Thus, I find no merit to Plaintiff’s argument.
With regard to Plaintiff’s blurry vision, Plaintiff submits the ALJ erred when he stated that
the “medical record evidence reflects no reports of blurry vision by Plaintiff to his medical
providers. (ECF No. 11, p. 10). After a review of the evidence, I find Plaintiff misconstrues the
decision of the ALJ. Throughout the opinion, the ALJ references Plaintiff’s reports of and/or
non-reports of blurry vision. (ECF No. 8-2, p. 20-22). In fact, the ALJ specifically references the
evidence that Plaintiff cites to indicating Plaintiff reported blurry vision. (ECF No. 8-2, p. 21,
citing, ECF No. 8-12, p. 20). When the ALJ states that “the medical evidence of record reflects
no reports of blurry vision to his medical providers” (ECF No. 8-2, p. 22), he is specifically referring
to two more recent medical records in May of 2015. See, ECF No. 8-2, p. 22, citing ECF No.
8-15, pp. 23-30).

In fact, those records indicate that blurred vision is not present.

Id.

Consequently, I find remand is not warranted on this basis.
Finally, Plaintiff suggests that there is evidence to contradict the statement that Plaintiff
reported improvement in his neuropathy condition with medication. (ECF No. 11, pp. 10-11).
To be clear, the standard is not whether there is evidence to establish Plaintiff’s position but,
rather, is whether there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding. Allen v. Bowen, 881
F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989). Thus, this argument is misplaced. Upon review of the evidence, I
find there is substantial evidence of record to support the ALJ’s statement that Plaintiff “reported
improvement in his neuropathy condition with medication.” (ECF No. 8-2, p. 22; No. 8-15, p. 24).
Therefore, I find no merit to this argument.
An appropriate order shall follow.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GILBERT R. LAYMAN,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
-vsNANCY A. BERRYHILL,4
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 16-1851

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge.

ORDER OF COURT
THEREFORE, this 9th day of January, 2018, it is ordered that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 10) is denied and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 14) is granted.

BY THE COURT:
s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
United States Senior District Judge

4Nancy

A. Berryhill became acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, replacing Carolyn
W. Colvin.

8