LUDROSKY v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 18

ORDER denying 11 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 13 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 2/2/18. (ask) (Main Document 18 replaced on 2/2/2018) (ask).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CARRIE ANN LUDROSKY

)
) No. 16-1895
)

v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security

SYNOPSIS
Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental social security income on May 2, 2013.
Plaintiff alleged disability due to mental and physical impairments, including obesity, bipolar
disorder, and anxiety disorder. Plaintiff’s application was denied initially, and then denied
following hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). The Appeals Council denied
her request for review. The parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment are before the Court.
For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion will be denied and Defendant’s granted.

OPINION
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decisions on disability claims is provided by

statute. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) 6 and 1383(c)(3) 7. Section 405(g) permits a district court to review
the transcripts and records upon which a determination of the Commissioner is based, and the
court will review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. §706. When reviewing a decision, the
district court's role is limited to determining whether the record contains substantial evidence to
support an ALJ's findings of fact. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002).

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Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate" to support a conclusion. Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971)). If the ALJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Richardson, 402 U.S. at 390.
A district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner's decision, or reweigh the evidence of record; the court can only judge the propriety of the decision with
reference to the grounds invoked by the Commissioner when the decision was rendered. Palmer
v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998); S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 - 97,
67 S. Ct. 1575, 91 L. Ed. 1995 (1947).

Otherwise stated, “I may not weigh the evidence or

substitute my own conclusion for that of the ALJ. I must defer to the ALJ's evaluation of
evidence, assessment of the credibility of witnesses, and reconciliation of conflicting expert
opinions. If the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, I am bound by those
findings, even if I would have decided the factual inquiry differently.” Brunson v. Astrue, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55457 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2011) (citations omitted). Nonetheless, I am not
required to read the ALJ’s opinion “in a vacuum.” Knox v. Astrue, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
28978, at *22 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2010).
II.

THE PARTIES’ MOTIONS

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by substituting her lay opinion for that of the consulting
examiner, Dr. Corasso, to which she assigned little weight. Defendant responds that a nonexamining consultant, Dr. Rohar, reviewed Plaintiff’s records. Dr. Rohar opined, inter alia, that
Dr. Carosso’s opinion was inconsistent with the evidence, and overestimated the severity of
Plaintiff’s functional restrictions.

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The ALJ rejected Dr. Corasso’s opinion, on several grounds: the great disparity between
Plaintiff’s performance at consultative examinations done in connection with the disability claim,
and mental statute examinations done in the treatment setting; the fact that Dr. Corasso
“obviously [relied] primarily on the claimant’s long treatment history rather than on the rather
minor abnormal findings on mental status examination”; the fact that Dr. Corasso’s examination
did not reflect knowledge of his examination of Plaintiff two years earlier. The ALJ’s treatment
of Dr. Corasso’s opinion accompanied other findings by the ALJ, which are not challenged at
present: that it would be unreasonable for the ALJ to presume that Plaintiff has remained
unemployed solely for medical reasons, because she said she stopped working due to lack of
energy and “gumption”; that many of Plaintiff’s medical allegations were “simply not credible,”
because they were inconsistent with other evidence; and that the clinical findings reported over
time at Cornerstone Care, where Plaintiff sought mental health treatment, tend to show “a higher
level of functioning, and they do not reflect the days-long periods of isolation that she described
at the consultative examinations.” The ALJ also noted Plaintiff’s GAF ratings, which were all
over 50, and the fact that several of Plaintiff’s statements regarding her activities of daily living
were not credible or were directly contradicted by other statements by Plaintiff.
Dr. Carosso, a consulting psychologist, listed the following assessment procedures: a
review of Plaintiff’s records, a clinical interview, a Mini Mental State Exam-2, and the Sheehan
Work Disability Scale. He opined that Plaintiff “struggles with sustaining attention and
performing simple and repetitive tasks, given her obesity,” and “has a long-standing history with
difficulty relating to others without becoming combative, argumentative, or hostile,” based on
Plaintiff’s reports. When asked to supply the medical/clinical findings that supported his

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assessment that Plaintiff had moderate, marked, and extreme limitations in several areas of
function, Dr. Carosso wrote “confused and frazzled” and “long history of becoming combative.”
"Although opinions from a consultative examiner must be considered, the ALJ is free to
reject some of those opinions or to reject them outright as long as he sufficiently explains his
decision, and does not reject the opinions for no reason or for the wrong reason." Scott v.
Colvin, No. 13-cv-00671, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105212, at *21 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2014).
When assessing the weight to be assigned to a non-treating source, an ALJ is not required to
discuss every factor listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1). E.g., Campbell v. Berryhill, No. 15551, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36710, at *12 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 15, 2017). "[A]n ALJ can consider
every piece of evidence without addressing [all the evidence] in his opinion." Kornecky v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App'x 496, 507-08 (6th Cir. 2006).
In this case, the ALJ did not substitute her lay opinion for that of Dr. Carosso. Instead,
she weighed Dr. Carosso’s opinion, and also explicitly considered factors such as the clinical
findings in Plaintiff’s longitudinal treatment records, and Plaintiff’s credibility and activities.
The ALJ also noted that Dr. Carosso was a consultative examiner. In other words, in compliance
with Section 404.1527(c)(1), it is apparent that the ALJ considered the opinion’s consistency and
supportability, and the pertinent examining and treatment relationships.
Contrary to Plaintiff’s suggestion, the ALJ did not deny the claim solely because Dr.
Carosso’s opinion was discounted, but instead due to the ALJ’s assessment of the record as a
whole. The mere existence of treatment records tending to support Plaintiff’s claim does not
undermine the ALJ’s conclusions; the ALJ considered and weighed the entire record, and this
Court is not permitted to reweigh the evidence. Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff suggests that

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the ALJ was obligated to supplement the record, I reject that suggestion. Mere inconsistencies in
medical evidence do not trigger that obligation.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff’s
Motion will be denied, and Defendant’s granted. An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: 2/2/18

BY THE COURT:

___________________________________
Donetta W. Ambrose
Senior Judge, U.S. District Court

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CARRIE ANN LUDROSKY

)
) No. 16-1895
)

v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security
ORDER
AND NOW, this 2nd day of February, 2018, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED and Defendant’s GRANTED.
BY THE COURT:

___________________________________
Donetta W. Ambrose
Senior Judge, U.S. District Court

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