ROBINSON v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 14

OPINION AND ORDER granting 7 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 9 Motion for Summary Judgment; remanding matter for further proceedings. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 2/1/18. (ask)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MARK ROBINSON

)
) No. 16-1914
)

v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security

SYNOPSIS
Plaintiff filed an application for disability benefits Plaintiff alleged disability due, inter
alia, to macular degeneration. Plaintiff’s application was denied initially, and upon hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). The Appeals Council denied his request for
review. The parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment are before the Court. For the
following reasons, this matter will be remanded for further proceedings.

OPINION
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decisions on disability claims is provided by

statute. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) 6 and 1383(c)(3) 7. Section 405(g) permits a district court to review
the transcripts and records upon which a determination of the Commissioner is based, and the
court will review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. §706. When reviewing a decision, the
district court's role is limited to determining whether the record contains substantial evidence to
support an ALJ's findings of fact. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002).

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Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate" to support a conclusion. Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971)). If the ALJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Richardson, 402 U.S. at 390.
A district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner's decision, or reweigh the evidence of record; the court can only judge the propriety of the decision with
reference to the grounds invoked by the Commissioner when the decision was rendered. Palmer
v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998); S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 - 97,
67 S. Ct. 1575, 91 L. Ed. 1995 (1947).

Otherwise stated, “I may not weigh the evidence or

substitute my own conclusion for that of the ALJ. I must defer to the ALJ's evaluation of
evidence, assessment of the credibility of witnesses, and reconciliation of conflicting expert
opinions. If the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, I am bound by those
findings, even if I would have decided the factual inquiry differently.” Brunson v. Astrue, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55457 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2011) (citations omitted). Nonetheless, I am not
required to read the ALJ’s opinion “in a vacuum.” Knox v. Astrue, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
28978, at *22 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2010).
II.

THE PARTIES’ MOTIONS
Plaintiff objects to the ALJ’s decision on two grounds: 1) that the ALJ determined that

Plaintiff’s macular degeneration was a severe impairment, but did not include related limitations
in the residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and 2) that the ALJ’s credibility assessment was
defective, in part because she failed to consider Plaintiff’s work history. In this case, the two
issues are intertwined. The ALJ arrived at an RFC that, she said, included the following

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limitations related to Plaintiff’s vision: “he must avoid ordinary hazards in the workplace (e.g.,
boxes on the floor, doors ajar, etc.); he can never operate a motor vehicle.” Ultimately, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff was capable of performing past relevant work as a paralegal and
clerk/trial secretary.
Plaintiff’s medical records reveal diagnoses of macular degeneration and central serous
retinopathy. Dr. Sethi, a consulting examiner, noted that Plaintiff has been under the care of
Retina Health Center, “where his vision has been stabilized.” Dr. Sethi reported Snellen visual
acuity, with glasses, as 20/40 and 20/25, and noted that “[p]upils are equal, regular, and reactive
to light and accommodation.” Then, in response to the question, “Do any of the impairments
affect the claimant’s hearing or vision?”, Dr. Sethi checked a box marked “no.” Likewise, Dr.
Mari-Mayans, a non-examining consultant who considered only Dr. Sethi’s opinion, stated
conclusorily that Plaintiff had no visual impairment. The ALJ also considered treatment records
from UPMC eye center, reflecting a diagnosis of central serous retinopathy, and noted pinpoint
leakage in the eye. The treatment notes reflect Plaintiff’s complaints of occasional blurry vision
and fishbowl effect, as well as flashers and floaters. The ALJ noted that no doctor had placed
restrictions on driving, and that Plaintiff drives approximately twice a month, “suggesting that
the eye problem is not disabling.”
As Plaintiff points out, he testified that he has difficulty seeing a computer unless the
screen is magnified, and is limited in driving, reading, and doing paperwork. He stated that his
vision is “crappy.” Plaintiff has indicated that he cannot see written instructions unless they are
properly lit and magnified. At the hearing, Plaintiff stated that he uses a computer for about one
hour per day, and that he is able to watch television every day on a thirty-two inch screen. In

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order for him to use the computer, Plaintiff stated, it has to be magnified 175%. Plaintiff’s
spouse and sister-in-law both submitted evidence regarding difficulties with his vision.
In terms of work history, the evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff worked for four and a
half years as an electronic court reporter; for six months as a paralegal for a private attorney; for
five and a half years at the State Attorney’s office in Fort Meyers, Florida, as an early
intervention docket reporter, a domestic violence trial secretary, and for the paralegal that
handled citizen complaints. Prior to that time, he worked full time at a radio station. Further,
Plaintiff testified that since July 5, 2013, and as recently as a year before the hearing, he had
applied for paralegal and other jobs. At the time that he applied, he guessed that he could meet
the physical demands of those jobs; at the time of the hearing, however, he was “not sure”
because he had a hard time seeing the computer. When asked for “the biggest reason” that he
thought that he “cannot work,” Plaintiff identified breathing problems, pain, and exhaustion.
At the hearing, the vocational expert (“VE”) testimony considered Plaintiff’s past work
as a paralegal, and as a docket and trial secretary. The ALJ asked him to assume an individual
with “difficulty reading large print, but retains sufficient visual acuity to read large print, and
work with large objects.” The VE opined that the individual would not be able to perform the
past work. When asked about a limitation including no reading or computer viewing as an
integral part of the job, but permitting large print reading, the VE said Plaintiff’s past work was
not possible. In fact, the VE testified that “none of these jobs could be done…without constant
computer work.” The ALJ also asked the VE about Plaintiff’s prior occupations as an electronic
court reporter, paralegal, clerk/trial secretary, and radio personality. The VE stated that all of
these jobs “required a lot of computer work,” and “would not be conducive to a work situation
that he could do.”

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In light of this record, Plaintiff’s credibility regarding his visual limitations takes on
central importance. It is axiomatic that a severe impairment does not necessarily entitle a
claimant to an RFC that accounts for that impairment, and that credibility assessments are
entitled to a high degree of deference. It is also true that work history alone is not dispositive of
credibility. Thompson v. Astrue, No. 09-519, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98112, at *11 (W.D. Pa.
Sep. 20, 2010). An ALJ, however, must explain why she does not find a claimant’s testimony
regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms credible. Zenka v. Astrue,
904 F. Supp. 2d 884, 895 (N.D. Ill. 2012 As our Court of Appeals has stated, in cases remanded
due to failure to consider a long and productive work history, the claimant “also showed
evidence of severe impairments or attempted to return to work.” Corley v. Barnhart, 102 F.
App'x 752, 755 (3d Cir. 2004). Under such circumstances, a mere statement acknowledging a
claimant’s work history is not sufficient. Gates v. Astrue, No. 07-202, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
64139, at *20 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2008). “The ALJ's short analysis does not demonstrate that she
came to grips with the severely limiting ways in which [Plaintiff] said [his] visions [sic]
problems prevented her from using a computer… Because the ALJ did not explain her reasoning
on this issue, the opinion fails to permit an informed review.” Hamilton v. Astrue, No. 07-cv0117, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52099, at *28 (S.D. Ind. June 24, 2008).
In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s macular degeneration was a severe
impairment, and noted Plaintiff’s attempts to return to work. There is no suggestion, however,
that the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s work history in connection with her credibility assessment.
Moreover, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s testimony “partially credible” and thus crafted an RFC with
the stated purpose of addressing Plaintiff’s vision impairments, but did not address why she
rejected his particular testimony regarding the impairments’ effect on computer use.

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Absent

further explication, meaningful review is not possible. In light of the fact that this issue would
be dispositive per the VE’s testimony, the objective medical evidence that might support
Plaintiff’s vision-related complaints, remand is warranted.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Motion will be granted, and Defendant’s denied. This matter will be remanded
so that the ALJ may further explain her assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility, specifically with
respect to Plaintiff’s complaints regarding computer use.

Dated:2/1/18

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

___________________________________
Donetta W. Ambrose
Senior Judge, U.S. District Court

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MARK ROBINSON

)
) No. 16-1914
)

v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security
ORDER
AND NOW, this 1st day of February, 2018, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED and Defendant’s DENIED, to the extent that
this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing Opinion.
BY THE COURT:

___________________________________
Donetta W. Ambrose
Senior Judge, U.S. District Court

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