WILSON v. COLVIN

Filing 17

OPINION and ORDER denying 10 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 14 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 2/26/18. (slh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ERNEST THEODORE WILSON,
Plaintiff,
-vsNANCY A. BERRYHILL,1
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action No. 17-33

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

OPINION
Pending before the court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 10 and
14). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (ECF Nos. 11 and 15). After
careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth
below, I am denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 10) and granting
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 14).
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security denying his application for supplemental security income pursuant to the Social
Security Act. Plaintiff filed his application alleging disability since December 1, 2002. (ECF No.
8-5, p. 2). Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), Kathleen McDade, held a hearing on May 13,
2015. (ECF No. 8-2, pp. 57-88). On July 24, 2015, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled
under the Act. (ECF No. 8-2, pp. 38-53).
After exhausting all administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed the instant action with this
court. The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 10 and 14).
The issues are now ripe for review.
1

Nancy A. Berryhill became acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, replacing
Carolyn W. Colvin.

II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.

Standard of Review

The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner’s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as “more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Ventura v. Shalala, 55
F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
Additionally, the Commissioner’s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive. 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A
district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision or re-weigh the
evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if
the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360
(3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however,
the district court must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. §706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use
when evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a). The ALJ must
determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,
whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) if the
impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant’s impairments

2

prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional
capacity. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by
medical evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4).
Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful
activity (step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the
decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745
F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
B.

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) 2 and Vocational Expert Testimony

Virtually all of Plaintiff’s brief maintains that “there is substantial evidence that Plaintiff is
unable to perform any work.” (ECF No. 11, p. 7).

To be clear, the standard is not whether

there is evidence to establish Plaintiff’s position but, rather, is whether there is substantial
evidence to support the ALJ’s finding. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989). Thus,
this argument is entirely misplaced.
In one sentence, Plaintiff suggests that “there is no substantial evidence that show[s] the
Plaintiff is available to work in a sedentary position as testified by the VE.” (ECF No. 11, p. 7).
This “suggestion” falls woefully short.

Plaintiff provides no further argument and does not

address the reason given by the ALJ. Id., at pp. 6-9. Nevertheless, I will consider the same. An
ALJ is required to accept only that testimony from the vocational expert which accurately

2

RFC refers to the most a claimant can still do despite his/her limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a),
416.945(a). The assessment must be based upon all of the relevant evidence, including the medical
records, medical source opinions, and the individual’s subjective allegations and description of his own
limitations. 20 C.F.R. §416.945(a). In this case, the ALJ found Plaintiff has the RFC to perform sedentary
work with certain exceptions. (ECF No. 8-2, pp. 43-52).

3

reflects a plaintiff’s impairments. See, Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1984);
Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987). Based on my review of the record,
there is substantial evidence that the ALJ accepted the hypothetical questions and VE testimony
that accurately reflected Plaintiff’s impairments. (ECF No. 8-2, pp. 38-53; No. 8-2, pp. 84-85).
For example, throughout his opinion the ALJ properly considered all of the evidence of record
while weighing the opinion evidence. See, ECF No. 8-2, pp. 38-53. The reasons given for the
weight assessed as to each opinion were valid and appropriate. In short, I find substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC that Plaintiff could perform sedentary work with certain
limitations. Id. Therefore, the ALJ was only required to accept the VE’s testimony that reflected
the same. Consequently, remand is not warranted on this basis.
An appropriate order shall follow.

4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ERNEST THEODORE WILSON,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
-vsNANCY A. BERRYHILL,3
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 17-33

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

ORDER OF COURT
THEREFORE, this 26th day of February, 2018, it is ordered that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 10) is denied and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Docket No. 14) is granted.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
United States Senior District Judge

3

Nancy A. Berryhill became acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, replacing
Carolyn W. Colvin.

5