ENCOMPASS INSURANCE COMPANY v. STONE MANSION RESTAURANT, INCORPORATED

Filing 20

ORDER denying 18 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Arthur J. Schwab on 2/22/2017. (lmt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ENCOMPASS INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

17cv0125
ELECTRONICALLY FILED

v.
STONE MANSION RESTAURANT,
INCORPORATED,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of this Court’s Order Granting
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. See doc. no. 18.
I.

Standard of Review

The purpose of a Motion for Reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact
or to present newly discovered evidence. Howard Hess Dental Laboratories Inc. v. Dentsply
Intern., Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2010), citing Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906,
909 (3d Cir. 1985). Generally, a Motion for Reconsideration will only be granted on one of the
following three grounds: (1) if there has been an intervening change in controlling law; (2) if
new evidence, which was not previously available, has become available; or (3) if it is necessary
to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice. See, Howard Hess Dental, 602
F.3d at 251, citing Max’s Seafood Café by Lou Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir.
1999).
A Court may not grant a Motion for Reconsideration when the motion simply restyles or
rehashes issues previously presented. Pahler v. City of Wilkes Barre, 207 F.Supp.2d 341, 355

(M.D. Pa. 2001); see also Carroll v. Manning, 414 Fed. Appx. 396, 398 (3d Cir. 2011)
(affirming denial of “motion for reconsideration and ‘petition’ in support thereof appears to
merely reiterate the allegations made in the . . . petition and does not set forth any basis justifying
reconsideration.”); and Grigorian v. Attorney General of U.S., 282 Fed. Appx. 180, 182 (3d Cir.
2008) (affirming denial of Motion to Reconsider because it “does nothing more than reiterate the
arguments underlying his motion to reinstate the appeal.”).
A Motion for Reconsideration “addresses only factual and legal matters that the Court
may have overlooked . . . . It is improper on a motion for reconsideration to ask the Court to
rethink what [it] had already thought through rightly or wrongly.” Glendon Energy Co. v.
Borough of Glendon, 836 F. Supp. 1109, 1122 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (internal citation and quotes
omitted). Because federal courts have a strong interest in the finality of judgments, motions for
reconsideration should be granted sparingly. Rossi v. Schlarbaum, 600 F.Supp.2d 650, 670 (E.D.
Pa. 2009).
II.

Discussion

Returning to the three bases upon which a Motion for Reconsideration may be granted,
Plaintiff (“Encompass”) does not argue that there has been an intervening change in controlling
law, nor does it present any new evidence, not previously available, alleging new evidence has
become available. See doc. no. 18 and 19. Rather, Plaintiff argues that this Court should
reconsider its prior Order (doc. no. 17) dismissing this case in order to correct a clear error of law
or to prevent manifest injustice. Id. More specifically, Encompass claims that this Court
improperly considered a provision in Pennsylvania’s Dram Shop Act, arguing that the Court
should have instead relied upon Pennsylvania’s Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
(“UCATA”). Id. The Court’s reliance upon the Dram Shop Act provided the Court with its

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basis upon which Defendant’s (“Stone Mansion’s”) Motion to Dismiss (doc. no. 7) was granted.
See the Court’s Memorandum Opinion, doc. no. 16.
First and foremost, Encompass’ Motion for Reconsideration will be denied because none
of the three grounds established in Max’s Seafood exist. As noted above, Encompass did not
argue that there has been an intervening change in controlling law, nor did it present any new
evidence, not previously available. Moreover, the Court finds that no “clear error of law” nor
“manifest injustice” was created in its prior Opinion and Order (doc. nos. 16 and 17,
respectively), which now requires correction.
Encompass’ Brief in Support of its Motion for Reconsideration merely reargues that
which it previously argued: Pennsylvania’s UCATA renders Stone Mansion a joint tortfeasor,
because Section 4-497 of the Dram Shop Act renders Stone Mansion liable for Hoey’s injuries.
See doc. no. 19, p. 2. The Court disagreed with this position as stated in it its Memorandum
Opinion. See doc. no. 16.
Second, the Court’s position set forth in its original Opinion (doc. no. 16), which is selfexplanatory, acknowledged the existence and operation of Pennsylvania’s UCATA, unlike
Encompass’ claim in its current Motion for Reconsideration. Encompass filed its lawsuit
claiming it had a right to recover from its insured’s (Viviani’s) joint tortfeasor, namely Stone
Mansion. Encompass predicated (and continues to predicate) Stone Mansion’s liability upon the
Stone Mansion’s status as liquor licensee.1 Pennsylvania’s Dram Shop Act contains a provision
(Section 4-497) which outlines to whom, and what circumstances must exist, before a liquor
licensee will be held negligent per se for serving alcohol to a customer. This provision limits a
liquor licensee’s liability, whereas Encompass’ argument sought to expand a licensee’s liability.
“Encompass only cited to the Dram Shop Act to establish that the Stone Mansion is jointly or severally
liable in tort for the same injury to demonstrate Stone Mansion’s status as a joint tortfeasor.” Encompass
Brief in Support of its Motion for Reconsideration, doc. no. 19, p. 2.
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In its prior Memorandum Opinion, this Court granted Stone Mansion’s Motion to
Dismiss refusing to expand the Dram Shop Act’s Section 4-497 so as to render Stone Mansion
liable to Viviani/Encompass for Hoey’s injuries.
III.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing law and authority Encompass’ Motion for Reconsideration (doc.
no. 18) will be denied.

ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 22nd day of February, 2017, the Court DENIES Plaintiff-Encompass’
Motion for Reconsideration. Doc. no. 18.
s/Arthur J. Schwab
Arthur J. Schwab
United States District Judge

cc:

All Registered ECF Counsel and Parties

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