GEIGER v. ASCENT AUTOMOTIVE GROUP-TM, L.L.C. et al

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. For the reasons stated in the Memorandum & Order filed herewith, Ascent's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11 ) is DENIED. Ascent shall file its Answer to the Complaint on or before January 9, 2018. Signed by Judge Cathy Bissoon on 12/19/17. (kg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BRIAN GEIGER,
Plaintiff,
v.
ASCENT AUTOMATIVE GROUP-TM,
LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 17-265
Judge Cathy Bissoon

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I.

MEMORANDUM

Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Ascent Automotive
Group-TM LLC (“Ascent”) (Doc. 11), pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. For the reasons that follow, Ascent’s Motion will be DENIED.
A.

BACKGROUND1
On February 28, 2017, Plaintiff Brian Geiger (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint asserting sex

discrimination, sexual harassment, hostile work environment and retaliation claims under Title
VII against Defendants Ascent and TM-Greensburg, LLC (“TM-Greensburg”). Plaintiff alleges
that Ascent and TM-Greensburg are his “joint employers.” Doc. 1 ¶ 5. Plaintiff specifically
alleges that he was “hired in or around November 2007 at Toyota of Greensburg for Sales,” and

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The following background facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1). Because the
case is presently before this Court on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), the Court accepts as true all allegations in the Complaint and all reasonable inferences
that can be drawn therefrom. See Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir.
1989). In addition, the Court views all well pleaded factual averments and reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.
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that “in or around October 2011, Toyota [] of Greensburg w[as] . . . sold and acquired by Ascent
Automotive Group LLC.” Id. ¶¶ 22, 24. Following that acquisition, “Plaintiff was subsequently
rehired by Defendant for sales.” Id. ¶ 26. Thereafter, between October 2014 to December 2015,
Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to unwanted touching by his supervisor, William
Berardino. Id. ¶¶ 38-74. Plaintiff further alleges that, between December 2015 to February
2016. he communicated with Paige Larrabee, “lead counsel for Friedkin and Ascent,” about the
alleged harassment but that Larrabee was either non-responsive or did nothing to correct the
behavior. Id. ¶¶ 78-105. Plaintiff claims that he was “forced to resign” on or about June 25,
2016. Id. ¶ 119.
B.

ANALYSIS
On May 8, 2017, Ascent filed the pending Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff’s

Title VII claims against Ascent should be dismissed because Plaintiff does not allege facts
showing that Ascent was his employer. See generally Doc. 12. Ascent argues that “Plaintiff’s
lone allegation in the Complaint” relating to Ascent is a “legal conclusion” that Ascent and TMGreensburg were his joint employers but that “Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to support a
joint employer theory.” Doc. 12 at pp. 4-6. Ascent further argues that Plaintiff’s claims against
Ascent should be dismissed because he “admitted that he was employed by Toyota of
Greensburg.” Doc. 12 at p. 5 (citing Doc. 1 ¶ 25).
Despite Ascent’s characterization of Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff
has alleged more than enough facts to demonstrate that Ascent employed him during the relevant
time period. Although Plaintiff states that “he was employed by Toyota of Greensburg,” he also
explains that Ascent acquired Toyota of Greensburg in or around October 2011, well before the
events giving rise to his Title VII claims arose. Furthermore, Plaintiff specifically alleges that

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Ascent’s legal counsel communicated with him about Mr. Berardino’s conduct over the course of
several months. These facts are more than sufficient to show that Ascent was his employer and
thus can be held liable for the harassment and retaliation alleged in the Complaint.2
II.

ORDER

For the reasons stated above, Ascent’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11) is DENIED. Ascent
shall file its Answer to the Complaint on or before January 9, 2018.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
December 19, 2017

s/Cathy Bissoon
Cathy Bissoon
United States District Judge

cc (via ECF email notification):

All counsel of record

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The Court notes that, in addition to the Complaint, Ascent attaches two documents to its
Motion to Dismiss: (1) a document titled “Fictitious Name Amendment,” purportedly filed with
the Pennsylvania Department of State Corporation Bureau on October 3, 2011, stating that, as of
that date, TM-Greensburg LLC would operate under the fictitious name “Toyota of Greensburg,”
Doc. 12-2; and (2) an Offer of Employment Letter, purportedly signed by Plaintiff on October 2,
2011, with the heading TM-Greensburg, LLC, which states that TM-Greensburg, LLC soon
would purchase “certain assets of” Toyota of Greensburg, Doc. 12-3. The Court will not
consider these documents, which are neither authenticated nor integral to Plaintiff’s Complaint,
in resolving Ascent’s Motion to Dismiss. However, even if the Court were to consider these
documents, it would not change the Court’s analysis. If anything, these documents merely
demonstrate that there is a question of fact as to which entity (Ascent or TM-Greensburg or both)
owned Toyota of Greensburg at the time of the events in question, a factual dispute that can only
be resolved following discovery. See Anderson v. Finley Catering Co., 218 F. Supp. 3d 417,
422–23 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (stating that “‘the precise contours of an employment relationship can
only be established by a careful factual inquiry’ and, thus, discovery is often necessary before a
plaintiff can reliably define the contours of the employment relationship.”) (citation omitted).

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