BARRASSO v. CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF PITTSBURGH OF UPMC et al

Filing 49

ORDER re 46 Motion for Reconsideration filed by ASHLEY BARRASSO. Signed by Magistrate Judge Robert C. Mitchell on 5/29/2018. (lamc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ASHLEY BARRASSO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF PITTSBURGH
OF UPMC, et al.
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 17-0267

ORDER
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 46) of the
order entered May 10, 2018, which denied her motion to compel written discovery responses. The
arguments raised in Plaintiff’s motion were previously considered by this Court in deciding the
motion to compel. It is well-settled that
[t]he purpose of a motion for reconsideration ... is to correct manifest errors of law
or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. … Accordingly, a judgment may
be altered or amended if the party seeking reconsideration shows at least one of the
following grounds: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the
availability of new evidence that was not available when the court granted the
motion for summary judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact
or to prevent manifest injustice.
U.S. ex rel. Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 848–49 (3d Cir. 2014), quoting
Max's Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). To demonstrate clear error
or manifest injustice, the Supreme Court mandates a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed.” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (citing United States v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). However, [a] motion for reconsideration “is not a proper
vehicle to merely attempt to convince the court to rethink a decision it has already made[,]” Colon
v. Colonial Intermediate Unit 20, 443 F.Supp.2d 659, 667 (M.D.Pa. 2006) (citations omitted) and

“parties are not free to relitigate issues that the Court has already decided.” Jasin, 292 F.Supp.2d
at 676 (citations omitted). As such, a motion for reconsideration may not be used by an
“unsuccessful party to rehash” arguments previously disposed of by the Court. Keyes v. Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp., 766 F.Supp. 277, 280 (E.D.Pa. 1991).
Here, Plaintiff argues that this Court’s May 10, 2018 order should be reversed to “prevent
[the] manifest injustice” of the case being able to proceed without discovery related to alleged
comparators’ discipline. (ECF No. 47, at pg. 5).
Court found the Plaintiff’s April 27, 2018 motion to compel untimely because (1) it relied,
in large part on testimony taken during depositions that occurred on March 1, 2018 and March 19,
2018, the last of which took place a week prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s March 26, 2018, motion
for extension of time to complete limited discovery; (2) Plaintiff’s March 26, 2018 request for an
extension of time to complete limited discovery did not mention the written discovery at issue
here, but sought additional time to conduct two unrelated depositions; and (3) Plaintiff’s motion
to compel was filed three days after an April 24, 2018 status conference before this Court
addressing various outstanding issues, including discovery, and three days before the extended
April 30, 2018 discovery deadline.
Additionally, this Court was unconvinced that the persons identified in Dr. Ambrose’s
testimony are viable comparators because (1) they did not work in the same department as Plaintiff;
(2) were subject to different “call-off” standards; and (3) were not under the direct supervision of
Dr. Ambrose. (ECF No. 43, pg. 3); See Opsatnik v. Norfolk S. Corp., 335 F.App'x 220, 222–23
(3d Cir. 2009) (holding that comparators must be “similarly situated” but cautioning that “[w]hile
‘similarly situated’ does not mean identically situated, the plaintiff must nevertheless be similar in
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‘all relevant respects,’” and explaining that significant factors in making this determination include
“showing that the two employees dealt with the same supervisor, were subject to the same
standards, and had engaged in similar conduct without such differentiating or mitigating
circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them.”) (citations
omitted).
Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider asks this Court to relitigate those issues, and fails to
demonstrate that this Court’s May 10, 2018 order denying her motion to compel constituted a clear
error or resulted in manifest injustice.
Accordingly, this 29th day of May, 2018, upon consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration of her motion to compel, and accompanying brief (ECF No. 46, 47), and
Defendant’s response thereto (ECF No. 48), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion is
DENIED.
s/Robert C. Mitchell
ROBERT C. MITCHELL
United States Magistrate Judge

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