RUSSMAN v. BERRYHILL

Filing 15

OPINION AND ORDER denying 9 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 13 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 2/23/18. (ask)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANDREA RUSSMAN

)
) No. 17-319
)

v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security

OPINION AND ORDER
SYNOPSIS
Plaintiff seeks review of the decision denying her supplemental social security income
benefits. Plaintiff claims disability due to physical and mental impairments. Plaintiff’s claim
was denied initially, and following hearing by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). The
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. The parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary
Judgment are now before the Court. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion will be denied,
and Defendant’s granted.

OPINION
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decisions on disability claims is provided by

statute. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) 6 and 1383(c)(3) 7. Section 405(g) permits a district court to review
the transcripts and records upon which a determination of the Commissioner is based, and the
court will review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. §706. When reviewing a decision, the
district court's role is limited to determining whether the record contains substantial evidence to
support an ALJ's findings of fact. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002).

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Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate" to support a conclusion. Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971)). If the ALJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Richardson, 402 U.S. at 390.
A district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner's decision, or reweigh the evidence of record; the court can only judge the propriety of the decision with
reference to the grounds invoked by the Commissioner when the decision was rendered. Palmer
v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998); S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 - 97,
67 S. Ct. 1575, 91 L. Ed. 1995 (1947).

Otherwise stated, “I may not weigh the evidence or

substitute my own conclusion for that of the ALJ. I must defer to the ALJ's evaluation of
evidence, assessment of the credibility of witnesses, and reconciliation of conflicting expert
opinions. If the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, I am bound by those
findings, even if I would have decided the factual inquiry differently.” Brunson v. Astrue, No.
10-6540, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55457 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2011) (citations omitted).
Nonetheless, I am not required to read the ALJ’s opinion “in a vacuum.” Knox v. Astrue, No. 91075, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28978, at *22 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2010).
II.

THE PARTIES’ MOTIONS

Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ erred by failing to acknowledge or discuss her low global
assessment of functioning scores (“GAF”), ranging from 35 to 50.
[A] GAF score does not trigger any unique requirements for the ALJ to fulfill; the
failure to invoke the number itself does not require remand. Rather, the question is
whether the ALJ "conduct[ed] a thorough analysis of the medical evidence regarding
plaintiff's mental impairments," … such that the ALJ properly "addressed the issues on
which plaintiff's GAF scores were based," … In other words, even if the ALJ did not
specifically mention an actual GAF number, she has provided "good reasons" for
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discounting the GAF score if she adequately explained why she discounted the whole
of the source's opinion.
Nixon v. Colvin, 190 F. Supp. 3d 444 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (citations omitted).
While it remains that the ALJ must consider all record evidence, the Court notes that the
American Psychiatric Association has eliminated GAF scores from the Diagnostic and
Stattistical Manual of Mental Disorders, due to the GAF scale’s “conceptual lack of clarity.”
Rubendall v. Colvin, No. 15-1266, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119985, at *38 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 15,
2016). Nonetheless, of course, an ALJ is not permitted to “cherry pick” GAF scores, or ignore
any medical evidence that contradicts his findings. Rios v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 444 F. App'x
532, 535 (3d Cir. 2011) (not precedential). “An ALJ's failure to include a GAF score in his or
her discussion is considered to be harmless error where a claimant has not explained how the
GAF score would have itself satisfied the requirements for disability in light of potentially
contradictory evidence on record." Bracciodieta-Nelson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 782 F.Supp.2d
152, 165 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (citations omitted).
Here, the ALJ considered the parts of the record to which Plaintiff points as containing
her low GAF scores.

He considered and discussed the Jefferson Regional Medical Center

records that contained a GAF score of 35, as well as the records from Dr. Mukhajee and Mercy
Behavioral Health that reflected GAF scores of 40 and 45. The ALJ, therefore, has conducted a
thorough review of the medical evidence regarding Plaintiff’s impairments. Plaintiff has not
explained how the three low GAF scores would have themselves satisfied the disability
requirement, in light of the evidence of record as a whole. The ALJ’s reference to Plaintiff’s
GAF scores would have eased this Court’s review, but his failure to do so does not constitute
grounds for remand.

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Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s reliance on the opinion of agency non-examiner Dr.
Vigna, arguing that the substantial weight afforded Dr. Vigna’s opinion is unsupported by the
evidence. In so doing, Plaintiff complains that the ALJ focused on Plaintiff’s substance abuse
and noncompliance with treatment, and did not fully discuss her treatment at Mercy Behavioral
Health.
The ALJ’s specific discussion of Dr. Vigna, Psy. D., was fairly cursory. He indicated
that Dr. Vigna is highly experienced in the social security context, and had thoroughly reviewed
the then-available documentary evidence. Further, the ALJ found that Dr. Vigna’s opinion was
“consistent with the documentary evidence.” Again, this Court’s role on review is made more
difficult when specific explanation is lacking; it would have been helpful, here, if the ALJ had
specifically identified the consistencies relied on. Nonetheless, the entirety of the decision
makes clear that the ALJ reviewed all of the documentary evidence, and rested his decisions
thereon. Courts within this Circuit have found similar explanations by an ALJ to be sufficient.
See, e.g., Palmer v. Colvin, No. 15-00704, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137760, at *41 (M.D. Pa.
Aug. 25, 2016). I note, too, that Plaintiff points to no medical opinion of record that assigns
work-preclusive limitations, or offers an opinion inconsistent with those of Dr. Vigna.
With respect to the ALJ’s interest in Plaintiff’s substance abuse and lack of compliance, I
find nothing improper. The ALJ did not focus on these concepts to the exclusion of other
evidence; nor did he assert that her hospitalization failed to support a claim for disability.
Instead, the ALJ considered the entire record, and I find no error in his decision.

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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I cannot conclude that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial
evidence. Plaintiff’s Motion will be denied, and Defendant’s granted. An appropriate Order
follows.
Dated: 2/23/18

BY THE COURT:

_________________________
Donetta W. Ambrose
Senior Judge, U.S. District Court

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANDREA RUSSMAN

)
) No. 17-319
)

v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security

ORDER
AND NOW, this 23rd day of February, 2018, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that Plaintiff’s Motion is denied, and Defendant’s granted.
BY THE COURT:

_________________________
Donetta W. Ambrose
Senior Judge, U.S. District Court

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