RUCKMAN v. LAKAS et al

Filing 36

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 28 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's claims brought under the Fifth Amendment are dismissed. The motion is denied in all other respects. Signed by Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy on 12/15/2017. (bsc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN RUCKMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
C/O JOHN LAKAS, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-0384

United States Magistrate Judge
Cynthia Reed Eddy

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1
Presently pending is Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint, with brief in support. (ECF Nos. 28 and 29). Plaintiff has filed a response and brief
in opposition. (ECF Nos. 31 and 32). For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted in
part and denied in part.
The events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred while Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee
incarcerated at the Beaver County Jail; specifically during the time Plaintiff was housed in the
RHU section of the Beaver County Jail from May - August, 2016.
In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff details a series of alleged ongoing acts of
misconduct by the defendant correctional officers, which conduct seems to have commenced
after Plaintiff filed grievances against C/O Hunter and C/O Simpson, neither of whom are named
defendants in this lawsuit. According to the Second Amended Complaint, after filing these two
grievances, the defendant correctional officers began almost daily harassing and threatening

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The parties have consented to jurisdiction before a United States Magistrate Judge;
therefore, the Court has the authority to decide dispositive motions, and to eventually enter final
judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636, et seq. See ECF Nos. 23, 25.
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Plaintiff with bodily harm, which culminated in an incident on July 10, 2016, when Plaintiff was
assaulted by a number of the defendants, including being punched in the back of the head, and
tasered approximately six or seven times. Plaintiff also alleges, inter alia, that the correctional
officers tampered with his breakfast tray, searched his cell daily for about 25 days in a row,
subjected him to strip searches (which he alleges were done for the sole purpose of humiliating
and degrading him), misappropriated his property, denied his requests for medical attention,
inappropriately placed him in a “medical restraint chair” for two hours, and did not permit him to
attend his disciplinary hearing in which he was found guilty in absentia.
During his time in the RHU, Plaintiff filed 12 grievances and 20 requests slips concerning
the violations of his rights. He alleges that he sent requests slips to both the Warden and Deputy
Warden to inform them “of what [he] was experiencing,” but that the only request which the
Deputy Warden responded to pertained to Plaintiff’s food tampering allegations.
Pro se pleadings, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 420-21 (1972). If
the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail,
it should do so despite failure to proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax
and sentence construction, or the litigant’s unfamiliarity with pleadings requirements. Boag v.
MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982). Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, this Court may consider
facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
Plaintiff brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his First, Fourth,
Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth rights. The claims will be discussed seriatim.

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It is difficult to discern from the Second Amended Complaint what conduct by the
Defendants is being alleged to have violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. However, the
Second Amended Complaint seems to indicate that the correctional officers’ actions were, at
least in part, retaliatory based on Plaintiff’s filing of two grievances. See Second Amended
Complaint, at 11 (“Upon arrival I did file 2 grievances. One on C/O Hunter and one on C/O
Simpson. I then began to be harassed by C/O Laskas and C/O Rosenstill.”) For this reason,
Defendants’ request to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims will be denied. Defendants
will have the ability to flush out in discovery the details of Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims.
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s claims under the Fourth Amendment should be
dismiss. At this early stage of the litigation, the Court disagrees with Defendants and finds that
the claims should proceed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held
that the Fourth Amendment applies to strip searches in the prison setting. Parkell v. Danberg,
833 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that the Fourth Amendment “grants inmates a limited
right of bodily privacy, subject to reason intrusions necessitated by the prison setting”). An
excessive force claim arising from a strip search may also implicate the Eighth Amendment. See
Jordan v. Cicci, 428 F. App’x 195, 199-200 (3d Cir. 2011). To recover under either amendment,
the prisoner must establish that the strip search was unreasonable. Payton v. Vaughn, 798 F.
Supp. 258, 261-62 (E.D. Pa. 1992). The test for ascertaining the reasonableness of a search
“requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights
that the search entails.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). In applying this balancing
test, the Court “must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is
conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” Id. See also
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Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296, 309-11 (3d Cir.
2010), aff’d, -- U.S., 132 S.Ct. 1510, 1516-17 (2012).
As to Plaintiff’s claims about the impropriety of the searches of his cell, the Supreme
Court has held that prisoners do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their prison cells,
and therefore, the Fourth Amendment’s protections are unavailable to prisoners, Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 539 (1984). However, the Court in Hudson emphasized that a prisoner
may nonetheless have other remedies, including the Eighth Amendment’s protection against
“cruel and unusual punishments,” if a prison guard in searching the prisoner’s cell amounts to
“calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs.” Id. (prison officials cannot “ride roughshod
over inmates’ property rights with impunity”).
Defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims will be denied because these claims cannot be
resolved on the pleadings, but rather must await a summary judgment motion. Both claims focus
on factual matters relating to the Defendants’ actions and intent. The Court is bound by the wellpleaded facts of the Second Amended Complaint at this stage of the proceedings. Therefore, the
procedural posture of this case, which comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss, simply
does not permit definitive judgments on the legal and factual inquiry which lies at the heart of
Plaintiff’s claims regarding the searches of his body and cell.
Next, in his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff mentions the Fifth Amendment. The
Fifth Amendment provides in full that:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject to the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
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witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
None of the provisions of the Fifth Amendment appears to be implicated by Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint, except for the due process provision. However, the Fifth Amendment’s
due process clause only protects against federal government action. All the defendants in this
matter are alleged to be employees of Beaver County / Beaver County Jail. As such, the
defendants are not federal actors and the Fifth Amendment is not applicable. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
As to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims, because he was a pretrial detainee, his claims
must be premised on the Fourteenth Amendment as “his Eighth Amendment protection from
cruel and unusual punishment [had] not attached.” Vargo ex rel. Vargo v. Plum Borough, 376 F.
App’x 212, 215 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 668 (3d Cir.
1988)). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the United States has instructed that “the Fourteenth
Amendment affords pretrial detainees protections ‘at least as great as the Eighth Amendment
protections available to a convicted prisoner[.]’” Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318
F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244
(1983)). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims will be evaluated under the Eighth Amendment standard. King
v. Cnty. of Gloucester, 302 F. App’x 92, 97 (3d Cir. 2008).
And last, Defendants seek to have Plaintiff’s claims against the Warden and the Deputy
Warden dismissed for lack of personal involvement. They assert that their only involvement
stems from reviewing and responding to Plaintiff’s grievances. Plaintiff responds that he filed
numerous grievances and requests slips indicating that he was being subjected to ongoing
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constitutional violations, and Defendants failed to adequately investigate his complaints. These
allegations are sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. See Whitehead v. Rozum, 2012 WL
4378193, at *2 (W.D.Pa. Aug. 7, 2012) (“In the prison setting, where a grievance alleges an
ongoing constitutional violation, a supervisory defendant who reviews it is personally involved in
that violation because he is confronted with a situation he can remedy directed.”), report and
recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 4370929 (W.D.Pa. Sept. 24, 2012). Of course, discovery
will likely reveal the extent to which Defendants had actual knowledge of Plaintiff’s alleged
constitutional violations.

At this stage, however, the Court must assume that Plaintiff’s

grievances and requests to staff were sufficient to make the Warden and Deputy Warden aware of
his allegations that he was being subjected to ongoing constitutional violations.
In conclusion, Defendants’ motion will be granted in part and Plaintiff’s claims under the
Fifth Amendment will be dismissed. In all other respects, the motion is denied. An appropriate
order follows.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 15th day of December, 2017, Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss
(ECF No. 28) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff’s claims brought
under the Fifth Amendment are dismissed. The motion is denied in all other respects.
In accordance with F.R.Civ.P. 12(a)(4)(A), Defendants shall file a responsive pleading by
January 5, 2018.
BY THE COURT:
s/Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
United States Magistrate Judge
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cc:

JOHN RUCKMAN
MR1912
SCI-Greene
175 Progress Drive
Waynesburg, PA 15370
(via U.S. First Class mail)
All counsel of record via ECF electronic notification

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