ROBINSON v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Filing 15

OPINION and ORDER denying 11 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 13 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 4/11/18. (slh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MICHAEL L. ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,
-vsNANCY A. BERRYHILL,1
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 17-386

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

OPINION
Pending before the court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 11 and
13). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (ECF Nos. 12 and 14). After
careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth
below, I am denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 11) and granting
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 13).
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security denying his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income pursuant to the Social Security Act. Plaintiff filed his applications alleging disability
since January 1, 2010. (ECF No. 9-3, p. 19). Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), Douglas
Cohen, held a video hearing on January 15, 2015. (ECF No. 7-3). On March 25, 2015, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (ECF No. 9-2, 13-28).
After exhausting all administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed the instant action with this
court. The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 11 and 13).
The issues are now ripe for review.
1

Nancy A. Berryhill became acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, replacing
Carolyn W. Colvin.

II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.

Standard of Review

The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner’s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as “more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Ventura v. Shalala, 55
F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
Additionally, the Commissioner’s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive. 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A
district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision or re-weigh the
evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if
the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360
(3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however,
the district court must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. §706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use
when evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a). The ALJ must
determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,
whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) if the
impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant’s impairments

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prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional
capacity. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by
medical evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4).
Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful
activity (step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the
decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745
F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
B.

Weight of Opinion Evidence

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly weighed the opinion evidence. (ECF No. 12, pp.
3-12). The amount of weight accorded to medical opinions is well-established. Generally, the
ALJ will give more weight to the opinion of a source who has examined the claimant than to a
non-examining source. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(1). In addition, the ALJ generally will give more
weight to opinions from a treating physician, “since these sources are likely to be the medical
professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant’s] medical
impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be
obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations,
such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.” Id. §416.927(c)(2). The opinion of a
treating physician need not be viewed uncritically, however.

Rather, only where an ALJ finds

that “a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of [a claimant’s]
impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence [of] record,” must he give

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that opinion controlling weight. Id. “[T]he more consistent an opinion is with the record as a
whole, the more weight [the ALJ generally] will give to that opinion.” Id. § 416.927(c)(4).
If the ALJ finds that “a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and
severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence [of]
record,” he must give that opinion controlling weight. Id. Also, “the more consistent an opinion is
with the record as a whole, the more weight [the ALJ generally] will give to that opinion.” Id. §
416.927(c)(4).
In the event of conflicting medical evidence, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has explained:
“A cardinal principle guiding disability determinations is that the ALJ accord
treating physicians’ reports great weight, especially ‘when their opinions reflect
expert judgment based on continuing observation of the patient’s condition over a
prolonged period of time.’” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999)). However, “where .
. . the opinion of a treating physician conflicts with that of a non-treating, nonexamining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit” and may reject the
treating physician’s assessment if such rejection is based on contradictory
medical evidence. Id. Similarly, under 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2), the opinion of a
treating physician is to be given controlling weight only when it is well-supported
by medical evidence and is consistent with other evidence in the record.
Becker v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., No. 10-2517, 2010 WL 5078238, at *5 (3d Cir. Dec.
14, 2010). Although the ALJ may choose whom to credit when faced with a conflict, he “cannot
reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Security, 577
F.3d 500, 505 (3d Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff spends a significant portion of his brief suggesting the “medical evidence
supports the claim for disability” and that “a careful review of the Claimant’s testimony and the
medical evidence produced in this matter reveals that the Claimant’s condition precludes him
from securing gainful employment.” (ECF No. 12, pp. 3, 4). To be clear, the standard is not
whether there is evidence to establish Plaintiff’s position but, rather, is whether there is

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substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Thus, this argument is misplaced.
Plaintiff does submit that “there is insufficient foundation for the ALJ’s assigning little
weight to the opinion of Dr. Anderson.” (ECF No. 12, p. 9). After a careful review of the record,
I disagree. An ALJ is not required to accept the treating physician’s opinion uncritically. Rather,
the ALJ must weigh all of the evidence of the record as set forth above. In this case, that is
exactly what the ALJ did. (ECF No. 9-2, pp. 13-28). He reviewed in detail all of the evidence
and then properly assigned weight to the opinion evidence.

Id. For example, the ALJ went

through the opinions explaining how Dr. Anderson’s opinions were inconsistent with treatment
records

and

the

level

of

Plaintiff’s

daily

activities.

(ECF

No.

9-2,

p.

26).

Consistency/inconsistency is a valid and acceptable reason for weighing opinion evidence. See,
20 C.F.R. §§404.1527; 416.927 (Evaluating Opinion Evidence). While there may be evidence
that supports the position of Plaintiff, which he points out, the standard of review is not whether
there is evidence to support Plaintiff’s position. The standard is whether there is substantial
evidence to support the ALJ’s finding. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989).
The ALJ also discounted Dr. Anderson’s checkbox medical source statement because it
was based upon Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (ECF No. 9-2, p. 26).

This is also a valid

reason for discounting opinion evidence. Hatton v. Comm'r, 131 F. App'x 877, 879 (3d Cir.
2005) (“a medical source does not transform the claimant's subjective complaints into objective
findings simply by recording them....”).
I find there is substantial evidence of record to support the ALJ’s weighing of said
opinion evidence. (ECF No. 9-2, pp. 13-28). Consequently, I find no error in this regard and
remand is not warranted on this basis.
C.

Credibility

Plaintiff additionally argues that the ALJ erred by failing to adequately explain why
Plaintiff was found to be less than fully credible.

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(ECF No. 12, pp. 12-18).

In evaluating

whether a plaintiff’s statements are credible, the ALJ will consider all evidence including that
from treating, examining and consulting physicians, observations from agency employees, and
other factors such as the claimant's daily activities, descriptions of the pain, precipitating and
aggravating factors, type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medications, treatment
other than medication, and other measures used to relieve the pain. 20 C.F.R. §§416.929(c),
404.1529; SSR 96-7p. The ALJ will also look at inconsistencies between the claimant's
statements and the evidence presented. Id. I must defer to the ALJ’s credibility determinations,
unless they are not supported by substantial evidence. Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 972
(3d Cir. 1981); Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
931 (1975).
After a review of the record, I find that the ALJ followed the proper method to determine
the Plaintiff’s credibility. As laid out in his decision, the ALJ considered the factors set forth
above at length. (ECF No. 9-2, pp. 13-28). For example, while assessing Plaintiff’s credibility,
the ALJ compared the medical evidence and other evidence of record to his complaints and
found them to be contradictory. Id. In particular, the ALJ thoroughly explained how there “was
very little in the way of objective evidence to support the level of limitation alleged by the
claimant.” (ECF No. 9-2, p. 20). The ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff's credibility in detail as
required by 20 C.F.R. §§416.929, 404.1529 and SSR 96-7p. Based on the entire record as a
whole, I find there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision to find Plaintiff not
entirely credible. (ECF No 9-2, pp. 13-28). Therefore, I find no error in this regard and remand
is not warranted. 2
An appropriate order shall follow.

Plaintiff asserts in this section of his brief that his testimony “clearly demonstrates [his] inability to
sustain work-related functions on a substantial gainful activity level.” (ECF No. 12, p. 15). Again, the
standard is not whether there is evidence to establish Plaintiff’s position but, rather, is whether there is
substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989). Thus,
this argument is misplaced.
2

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MICHAEL L. ROBINSON,

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)
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
-vsNANCY A. BERRYHILL,3
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 17-386

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

ORDER OF COURT
THEREFORE, this 11th day of April, 2018, it is ordered that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 11) is denied and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Docket No. 13) is granted.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
United States Senior District Judge

3

Nancy A. Berryhill became acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, replacing
Carolyn W. Colvin.

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