STRADER v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION et al

Filing 138

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 117 & 119 ) are GRANTED. Signed by Judge Cathy Bissoon on 11/17/23. (tgl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
VANCE STRADER,
Plaintiff,
v.
U.S. BANK NAT’L ASSOC. et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 17-684
Judge Cathy Bissoon

MEMORANDUM ORDER
For the reasons that follow, the respective Motions for Summary Judgment submitted by
Defendant Nationstar (Doc. 117) and Defendants Matthew Eyet, Alina Eyet, William
Sandelands, Cara Ann Murphy, Mitchell E. Zipkin and Sandelands Eyet, LLP (collectively,
“Firm”) (Doc. 119) will be granted.
A. Nationstar’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff argues Nationstar’s actions that took place on May 30, 2016, violated
15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d and 1692f of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and
amounted to trespass of the real property (the “Property”) owned by his late mother, Sandra
Strader, which allegedly caused damage to the Property and emotional harm to Plaintiff. See
generally Amend. Compl. (Doc. 32). The Court’s review of the record, however, indicates
Plaintiff failed to respond at all, see Case Mgmt. Order (Doc. 112); Nationstar Reply (Doc. 124),
or put forward any evidence supporting his claims. Plaintiff failed to establish how Nationstar’s
conduct amounted to harassment under § 1692d or was unfair under §1692f. Nor does Plaintiff
offer any evidence showing Nationstar’s actions were unauthorized under the Mortgage or
contest Ms. Strader’s Mortgage Loan was in default in May 2016. Indeed, the terms of the
Mortgage permit Nationstar to inspect and secure the Property “to protect Lender’s interest in the

Property and rights under this Security Instrument” when a “Borrower . . . is in default on the
Mortgage Loan,” see Mortgage (Doc. 121-1) at ECF banner p. 8, ¶ 9, as was the case here. The
Court finds the record is devoid of any evidence supporting Plaintiff’s FDCPA or trespass claims
against Nationstar. Thus, Nationstar’s Motion will be granted.
B. The Firm’s Motion for Summary Judgment
The record establishes that Plaintiff was not a debtor, formalized executor or
administrator or personal representative of the Property or his mother’s estate. See Pl.’s Resps.
to Discovery Requests (Doc. 121-2) at p. 6, ¶¶ 1, 2; Order (Doc. 111) at p. 2 (holding the same).
Nevertheless, Plaintiff advances several arguments alleging that the actions taken by the Firm
during the Property’s foreclosure proceedings violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g and 1692e(11) of the
FDCPA. See Amend. Compl. As an initial matter, it is difficult for the Court to understand how
Plaintiff has satisfied the FDCPA’s definition of “consumer” to bring an action under either
§ 1692g or § 1692e(11) of the FDCPA. See Firm Br. (Doc. 120) (listing cases). Putting the
issue of standing aside, however, Plaintiff’s claims against the Firm are unsupported by the
record as discussed below, and as evidenced by Plaintiff’s failure to file a Response. See Case
Mgmt. Order; Firm Reply (Doc. 123).
First, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint can be liberally construed as arguing that the Firm
failed to provide a separate and new “Dunning letter.” See generally Amend. Compl. The Court
is not surprised that the Firm does not dispute this, see Firm Br. at p. 5, ¶ 16, given that the initial
debt collector issued a § 1692g-compliant notice, thereby negating the need for the Firm or its
attorneys to issue separate and new Dunning letters as successor counsel. See id. at pp. 11-13
(listing cases). Thus, the Firm’s Motion with respect to the Dunning letter will be granted.

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Next, Plaintiff claims the Firm failed to provide notice of validation of debts pursuant to
§ 1692g(a) and/or (b) following an alleged initial communication on or around August 25, 2016.
The Court, however, agrees that the Firm’s formal pleadings, including Mitchell Zipkin’s Notice
of Appearance, fell within the 1692g(d) exception and did not amount to an initial
communication. See id. at p. 13. To the extent Plaintiff construes Zipkin’s appearance as
requiring counsel to identify himself as a debt collector pursuant to § 1692e(11) or the Firm’s
defense against Plaintiff’s counter-claims against the Bank amounted to debt collection, the
Court disagrees for the reasons provided by the Firm. See id. at pp. 12-16. As such, the Firm’s
Motion regarding an alleged initial communication in violation of the FDCPA on or around
August 25, 2016, will be granted.
Next, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Matthew Eyet and Sandelands Eyet LLP violated
§ 1692g related to a September 20, 2016 letter sent by Matthew Eyet on behalf of Sandelands
Eyet LLP. For the reasons above, Defendants were not required to validate the debt given the
predecessor counsel satisfied this requirement. To the extent Plaintiff complains that the
September 2016 letter violated § 1692e, Plaintiff once again failed to demonstrate any violation
of the FDCPA—and could not—as there were no false or misleading representations in the
September 20, 2016 letter. See generally Firm September 20, 2016 Letter (Doc. 121-16). Thus,
the Firm’s Motion involving the September 20, 2016 letter will be granted.
Lastly, the record indicates Defendants Alina Eyet and William Sandelands were not
involved in this case, and William Sandelands has since passed. See Firm Br. at p. 16; Notice of
Death (Doc. 136, as amended in Doc. 137). Plaintiff also failed to provide any evidence to
support his claims against these Defendants. Accordingly, the Firm’s Motion as to Alina Eyet
and William Sandelands will be granted.

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For these reasons, Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 117 & 119) are
GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
November 17, 2023

s/Cathy Bissoon
Cathy Bissoon
United States District Judge

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