RENDOS v. SSA (INTERESTED PARTY / NEF) et al

Filing 15

OPINION and ORDER denying 10 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 12 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 8/29/18. (slh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM JOHN RENDOS, JR.,
Plaintiff,
-vsNANCY A. BERRYHILL,1
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 17-803

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge
OPINION
Pending before the court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 10 and
12). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (ECF Nos. 11 and 13). After
careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth
below, I am denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 10) and granting
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 12).
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security denying his applications for supplemental security income and disability insurance
benefits pursuant to the Social Security Act. Plaintiff filed his applications alleging he has been
disabled since April 8, 2014. (ECF No. 8-6, pp. 3, 10).

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”),

Daniel F. Cusick, held a hearing on December 16, 2015. (ECF No. 8-3). On January 26, 2016,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (ECF No. 8-2, pp. 12-21).
After exhausting all administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed the instant action with this
court. The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 10 and 12).
The issues are now ripe for review.
1

Nancy A. Berryhill became acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, replacing
Carolyn W. Colvin.

II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.

Standard of Review

The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner’s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as “more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Ventura v. Shalala, 55
F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
Additionally, the Commissioner’s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive. 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A
district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision or re-weigh the
evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if
the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360
(3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however,
the district court must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. §706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use
when evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a). The ALJ must
determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,
whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) if the
impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant’s impairments

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prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional
capacity. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by
medical evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4).
Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful
activity (step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the
decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745
F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
B.

Weighing of Opinion Evidence

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in providing the appropriate weight to the medical
source statements in the record. (ECF No. 11, pp. 10-12). The amount of weight accorded to
medical opinions is well-established. Generally, the ALJ will give more weight to the opinion of a
source who has examined the claimant than to a non-examining source. 20 C.F.R. §
416.927(c)(1). In addition, the ALJ generally will give more weight to opinions from a treating
physician, “since these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a
detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique
perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings
alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief
hospitalizations.” Id. §416.927(c)(2). The opinion of a treating physician need not be viewed
uncritically, however.

Rather, only where an ALJ finds that “a treating source’s opinion on the

issue(s) of the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s) is well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence [of] record,” must he give that opinion controlling weight. Id. “[T]he more

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consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight [the ALJ generally] will give
to that opinion.” Id. § 416.927(c)(4).
If the ALJ finds that “a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and
severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence [of]
record,” he must give that opinion controlling weight. Id. Also, “the more consistent an opinion is
with the record as a whole, the more weight [the ALJ generally] will give to that opinion.” Id. §
416.927(c)(4).
In the event of conflicting medical evidence, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has explained:
“A cardinal principle guiding disability determinations is that the ALJ accord
treating physicians’ reports great weight, especially ‘when their opinions reflect
expert judgment based on continuing observation of the patient’s condition over a
prolonged period of time.’” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999)). However, “where .
. . the opinion of a treating physician conflicts with that of a non-treating, nonexamining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit” and may reject the
treating physician’s assessment if such rejection is based on contradictory
medical evidence. Id. Similarly, under 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2), the opinion of a
treating physician is to be given controlling weight only when it is well-supported
by medical evidence and is consistent with other evidence in the record.
Becker v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., No. 10-2517, 2010 WL 5078238, at *5 (3d Cir. Dec.
14, 2010). Although the ALJ may choose whom to credit when faced with a conflict, he “cannot
reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Security, 577
F.3d 500, 505 (3d Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff first suggests that the ALJ erred in assigning significant weight to the state
agency opinion of Dr. Fox because Dr. Fox did not personally examine Plaintiff and because he
did not review the entirety of Plaintiff’s medical records. (ECF No. 11, p. 11). Neither of the
reasons is compelling. A treating doctor’s opinion is not automatically entitled to greater weight
over that of a non-examining doctor’s opinion, as Plaintiff suggests. In accordance with the
Regulations, the ALJ is charged with the responsibility of weighing all of the medical opinion

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evidence in determining whom to credit and he must explain his rationale for doing so. See, 20
C.F.R. §§404.1527; 416.927 (Evaluating Opinion Evidence). Additionally, an ALJ is entitled to
rely upon the findings of an evaluator even if there is a lapse of time between the report and the
hearing. Chandler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2012) (“The Social
Security regulations impose no limit on how much time may pass between a report and the
ALJ's decision in reliance on it.”). Consequently, I find these suggestions are without merit.
With regard to the treating physician, Dr. Lilly, the ALJ afforded Dr. Lilly’s opinion some
weight but did not give weight to Dr. Lilly’s opinion that Plaintiff was required “to elevate his legs,
etc.” because it was not consistent with the medical evidence of record. (ECF No. 8-2, p. 19).
In suggesting that this was an error, Plaintiff argues that there is medical evidence to show
Plaintiff’s pain and the requirement to elevate his legs. (ECF No. 11, 11-12).
[The] question is not whether substantial evidence supports Plaintiff’s claims, or
whether there is evidence that is inconsistent with the ALJ’s finding….
Substantial evidence could support both Plaintiff’s claims and the ALJ’s findings
because substantial evidence is less than a preponderance. Jesurum v. Sec’y of
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). If substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s finding, it does not matter if substantial evidence also
supports Plaintiff’s claims. Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003).
Weidow v. Colvin, Civ. No. 15-765, 2016 WL 5871164 at *18 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2016). The
question before me is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings.

Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989).

Allen v.

Thus, Plaintiff’s argument in this regard is

misplaced.
Nonetheless, I have considered the ALJ’s weighing of the medical opinion evidence in
this case. As set forth above, an ALJ is not required to accept a doctor’s opinion uncritically.
Rather, the ALJ must weigh it in relation to all of the evidence of record. In this case, that is
exactly what the ALJ did. In so doing, the ALJ sufficiently set forth valid and acceptable reasons
for weighing the opinion evidence. See, 20 C.F.R. §§404.1527; 416.927 (Evaluating Opinion
Evidence). For example, the ALJ found Dr. Fox’s opinion to be consistent with the medical

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evidence of record and with the physical examination findings and diagnostic findings that he
discussed in detail in the opinion. (ECF No. 8-2, p. 19). Additionally, the ALJ found portions of
Dr. Lilly’s opinion to be inconsistent with the medical evidence as he discussed in the opinion.
Id. After a review of the record, I find that I am able to sufficiently discern the basis for the ALJ’s
opinion and find that it is based on substantial evidence. (ECF No. 8-2, p. 12-21). Therefore,
neither reversal, nor remand, is not warranted.
An appropriate order shall follow.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM JOHN RENDOS, JR.,

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Plaintiff,
-vsNANCY A. BERRYHILL,2
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 17-803

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge
ORDER OF COURT
THEREFORE, this 29th day of August, 2018, it is ordered that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 10) is denied and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 12) is granted.

BY THE COURT:
s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
United States Senior District Judge

2

Nancy A. Berryhill became acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, replacing
Carolyn W. Colvin.

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