CAMERON v. PA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS S.C.I. GREENE

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION that Defendants' 19 MOTION TO DISMISS be granted and Plaintiff's Amended Complaint be dismissed, without prejudice. Signed by Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan on 03/29/2018. (jmb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DARYLE. CAMERON

v.
CARLA SWARTZ, et al.

)
)
) CV 17-816
)
)

Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan

OPINION
SYNOPSIS

In this civil action, Plaintiff is an inmate in custody of the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Plaintiff brings claims against
Defendants, who are personnel at State Correctional Institution ("SCI") Greene, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983; he also appears to assert a common law negligence claim. Plaintiffs
constitutional claims are premised on alleged violations of the 81h Amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment. His Amended Complaint describes a scenario in which he
was denied a lower bunk assignment, despite having a valid cane pass and lower bunk/lower tier
("LB/LT") status. He avers that he suffered injury as a result, when he fell from a top bunk.
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion will be granted, and
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint dismissed, without prejudice.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff initiated this action by Complaint against the PA Department of Corrections,
SCI Greene, on June 20, 2017. [ECF No. 7]. By Memorandum Order dated August 15, 2017

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("August 15 Order") [ECF No. 13], the Court sua sponte advised Plaintiff that the Complaint
failed to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and directed him to amend his pleading.
The August 15 Order specified, inter alia, as follows:
Plaintiff should clearly describe how each named defendant is involved in the alleged
constitutional violation(s) ... .It should explain to the Court what happened by specifically
describing each defendant's behavior or action and how that behavior or action - or lack
of action - resulted in the alleged violations ... Plaintiff should be specific about the
particulars of the event, each defendant's misconduct, and how such misconduct resulted
in a violation or denial of the civil right at issue.
August 15 Order, p. 3 (emphases in original).
Plaintiff then filed the now-pending Amended Complaint. [ECF No. 14]. The Amended
Complaint identifies the following Defendants, sued in their individual and official capacities:
Carla Swartz, E Unit Manager; Robert D. Gilmore, Facility Manager; Kyle Guth, Health Care
Administrator; and Mr. Christinni, Counselor.
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint avers that he has had a cane pass since May 26, 2014,
which was issued at SCI Camp Hill and never cancelled; Plaintiff never returned his cane. He
further avers that he has had lower bunk/lower tier ("LB/LT") status since August 21, 2014, due
to various medical conditions. He avers that "the unit management team," including Defendant
Swartz, Defendant Christinni, and non-party Sacks, were all aware of his lower bunk/lower tier
("LB/LT") status. Nonetheless, at SCI Greene, more than once and while housed in various
units, Plaintiff was assigned to a top bunk. Leading up to the incident giving rise to this
litigation, Plaintiff was released from self-lockup without his cane, although he still had a valid
cane pass. On June 30, 2016, Plaintiff was released to EA unit. While in the E unit, he told two
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non-parties to this action, Sgt. Bowlin and C/O Stickly, about his LB/LT status, and showed
them his cane pass; they returned him to H block. Then, on July 7, 2016, Plaintiff was moved
back to EA unit. Bowlin '.'supposedly" had called the medical department, and on July 7, 2016,
told Plaintiff that he did not have LB/LT status. Plaintiff was thereafter assigned to a top bunk,
and was told that he must comply or receive a misconduct. It appears that at that time, C/O
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Stickley attempted unsuccessfully to retrieve Plaintiffs cane from his prior unit.
On July 12, 2016, Defendant Swartz noted on her reply to Plaintiffs grievance that Dr.
Santos of the medical department had "reinstated" or "renewed" Plaintiffs LB/LT status. The
precise parameters of Plaintiffs grievance, to which Defendant Swartz's response related, are
unclear. Thereafter, Plaintiff remained in a top bunk. He asserts that on July 28, 2016, while in
the EA Unit, he fell from the top bunk, became unconscious, and sustained head and spinal
injuries. The structure of Plaintiffs allegations, while not clear, suggests that he filed a
grievance based on the incident.
In sum, the kernel of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint rests on his allegation that from July
12, 2016 to July 28, 2016, "everybody" was aware of his LB/LT status yet denied him
appropriate bunk placement. This circumstance, he alleges, violated his constitutional rights and
resulted in physical injury.
Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [ECF No. 19]. Plaintiff has filed a Brief in opposition to the
Motion. [ECF No. 22]. In the caption to Plaintiffs Brief in opposition, Sgt. Bowlin is listed as a
Defendant. Moreover, the Brief identifies a claim pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities
Act, and raises a claim of discrimination.

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II.

LEGAL STANDARDS
1. Rule 12(b)(6)

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it does
not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). When considering a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court does not assess whether a plaintiff might prevail on the merits;
instead, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations and view them in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Papurello v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 144 F. Supp. 3d 746, 760
(W.D. Pa. 2015).
Our Court of Appeals has explained the applicable standard as follows:
A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted" .... "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face." "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." Although the plausibility standard "does not impose a probability requirement,"
it does require a pleading to show "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully." ... The plausibility determination is "a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."
Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
In light of Supreme Court pronouncements in Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 679, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)), a court must determine the sufficiency of a
complaint as follows: "tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim";
second, " identify allegations that, 'because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to
the assumption of truth,'; and third, "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the]
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief." Id. at 787 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679). "Where the well-pleaded

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facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint
has alleged-but it has not 'show[n]'-'that the pleader is entitled to relief.' "Igbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
If a civil rights complaint is subject to a Rule 12(b)( 6) dismissal, a district court should allow the
plaintiff to amend his pleading, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Bosold v.
Warden, Sci-Somerset, No. 11-4292, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148774, at *29 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 28,
2011).

2. Pro Se Pleadings
A court must employ less stringent standards when considering pro se pleadings than
when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct.
594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe
the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is
alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). Even under liberal standards,
however, pro se litigants are not relieved of the obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a
valid legal claim. See, M·, Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002).
The Court has considered all of Plaintiff's submissions under these standards.

III.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to adequately allege each

Defendant's individual involvement in the identified violations, and fails to allege conduct that
rises to the level of an 81h Amendment violation. Defendants further argue that Plaintiff has
failed to state a claim for negligence, because negligence is not actionable in a Section 1983 suit.

a. Section 1983
Individual liability under Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the individual
defendant was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations. Victorious v. Lanigan,

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No. 15-6949, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67193, at *17 (D.N.J. May 23, 2016) (citing Rode v.
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). Generalized allegations that lump
defendants together have been deemed insufficient. Van Tassel v. Piccione, 608 F. App'x 66, 70
(3d Cir. 2015); Millinerv. DiGuglielmo, No. 08-4905, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62194, at *35
n.12 (E.D. Pa. June 7, 2011). "Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of
personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation or
actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity."
Swerdon v. Maiorana, No. 16-00677, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172093, at *12 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 12,
2016) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). "A defendant who
supervised the wrongdoer but did not personally participate in the wrongful act is not liable
under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior unless he personally directed or had actual
knowledge of and acquiesced in the deprivation." Beckett v. Department of Corr., No. 10-0050,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100890, at *39 (M.D. Pa. July 24, 2014).
The failure to afford adequate medical treatment is a violation of the Eighth Amendment
when it results from "deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury." Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251, 97 S. Ct. 285 (1976). Deliberate indifference
requires that a defendant knew of and disregarded the existence of the risk. Enlow v. Beard, No.
11 - 856, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63235, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2012). "Alleging a mere
hypothesis that an individual defendant had personal knowledge or involvement in depriving the
plaintiff of his rights is insufficient to establish personal involvement." Wallery v. Prison Health
Servs., No. 13-0002, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26168, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2014). "[A] prison
official who disregards without justification the instructions of a medical professional regarding
the care and treatment of an inmate, thereby ~ubjecting the inmate to an excessive risk of serious

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harm, may be liable under the Eighth Amendment." Doty v. City and County of Broomfield,
2013 U.S. Dist LEXIS 144255, at *8 (D. Colo. Oct. 4, 2013). Assigning an inmate to a top
bunk, under certain circumstances, can constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. See Cardona
v. Cook, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4567, 2014 WL 119436, at *3 (D. Utah Jan. 13, 2014).
Here, Plaintiffs Amended Complaint alleges facts that might give rise to a constitutional
violation, but his allegations regarding the personal involvement of Defendants Guth, Christinni,
and Gilmore are plainly insufficient. Defendant Guth is identified only as the signatory to the
medical department's response to Plaintiffs grievance; Plaintiff does not allege that Guth played
any role in or was aware of the bunk assignment, or disregard of Plaintiffs LB/LT status, that
caused Plaintiff injury. Similarly, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Christinni, a counselor, knew
of his LB/LT status prior to his injury, but there is no allegation that Defendant Christinni was
involved, whether by acquiescence or otherwise, in the bunk assignment. Indeed, Plaintiff does
not aver that Christinni directed, acquiesced in, or knew about the disregard of LB/LT status
after July 12, 2016. Finally, Defendant Gilmore is not alleged to have played any role in the
circumstances surrounding the violation. While Plaintiffs Amended Complaint does
specifically identify individuals who allegedly placed him in a top bunk despite being aware of
his restrictions, those individuals are not named as defendants to this action. The averment that
"everybody" was aware of Plaintiffs need for a bottom bunk, but disregarded that need, is too
general to satisfy applicable standards .
Plaintiffs averments regarding Defendant Swartz are closer to the mark, but still fail to
meet applicable pleading standards. He alleges that Defendant Swartz was the manager of unit
E; that she knew that he had LB/LT status on July 12, 2016; and that he remained in a top bunk
in unit E from July 12, 2016 until the time that he was injured as a result of top bunk placement.

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He does not, however, allege that Defendant Swartz knew that Plaintiffs LB/LT status was
disregarded after July 12, 2016, and failed to rectify or acquiesced the situation. Likewise, he
does not allege that she directed or otherwise was involved in in his bunk assignment. Defendant
Swartz's mere knowledge that Plaintiff had LB/LT status on July 12, 2016, taken as true, would
not establish that she was personally involved in the constitutional violation at issue. In other
words, Plaintiff has alleged, but has not "shown," that he is entitled to relief against Defendant
Swartz.
For these reasons, Plaintiffs Section 1983 claims will be dismissed for failure to state a
claim. 1 The deficiencies in the Amended Complaint, however, are patently amenable to cure.
The pleading already bears a kernel of sufficiency, and Plaintiff has made substantial efforts to
comply with this Court's August 15 Order. Therefore, Plaintiff will be afforded an opportunity
to amend his pleading.
b. Negligence

Defendants argue that negligence is not cognizable in a Section 1983 action. In so doing,
Defendants point to the principle that negligent conduct does not give rise to a constitutional
violation; instead, a higher degree of mental culpability is required. Cf. Bates v. Morris, No. 15780, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40835, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2016). The Court agrees that
Plaintiff cannot premise his Section 1983 claims on allegedly negligent conduct. Under the
liberal standards applicable to pro se pleadings, however, it is plausible that Plaintiff intends to
plead an alternative, supplemental state law claim for negligence.

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Although Defendants do not separately challenge Plaintiff's official capacity claims, the Court may address the
claims sua sponte. Shipley v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 619 F. Supp. 421, 434 (D. Del. 1985). As stated in
this Court's August 15 Order, state agencies are immune from suits for damages by virtue of the Eleventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution. August 15 Order, p. 2 n. 2. Official capacity suits are merely
another way of pleading an action against the officer's agency. Mathias v. York County, No. 16-01338, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 27409, at *18 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2017). If Plaintiff elects to file a second amended complaint, he
should not bring claims against Defendants in their official capacities.

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However, subject matter jurisdiction in this action is predicated on the presence of a
federal question, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; this Court's authority over state law negligence
claims would be predicated on supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. A
district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if it "has dismissed
all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367; Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d
109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000). Because Plaintiffs .section 1983 claims will be dismissed, there remain
no claims over which this Court has original jurisdiction. There exist no affirmative
justifications for retaining jurisdiction over supplemental claims. Accordingly, to the extent that
Plaintiff intended to aver standalone state law negligence claims, the Court declines to exercise
jurisdiction over those claims. Plaintiffs negligence claims will be dismissed, without prejudice
to Plaintiff to assert such claims in an amended pleading.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Plaintiffs deliberate indifference claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 shall
be dismissed as to all Defendants for failure to state a claim, because Plaintiff has not adequately
identified how each named Defendant was involved in the alleged violation. Further, because his
federal claims will be dismissed, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs
supplemental state law negligence claims. Plaintiff, however, may file an amended pleading
within thirty days from the date of this Opinion, in an effort to cure the deficiencies identified in
today's Opinion. Should he elect to amend his pleading, Plaintiff is advised that attaching all
relevant grievance documents to his amended pleading is likely to aid the Court, and Defendants,
in the assessment of that pleading.
The Court's consideration, at this juncture, is limited to the claims set forth in his
Amended Complaint; the Court does not consider the propriety of any causes of action that are

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not set forth in the Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the Court has not considered any claims
or defendants that were first identified or named in Plaintiffs Brief in opposition to Defendants'
Motion. If Plaintiff amends his pleading, he shall include all of his claims in the amended
pleading. The caption to the amended pleading shall name each and every defendant against
whom Plaintiff wishes to proceed, but shall name only those persons who are responsible for the
alleged violations. If filed, a second amended complaint should stand on its own, and should not
refer back to a prior pleading. Moreover, Plaintiff should separately state and identify each
federal and/or state claim or cause of action that he intends to pursue. Plaintiff should not bring
official capacity claims against any of the Defendants.
An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

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::::::::::=:.._

Lisa Pupo Lenihan
United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: -

cc:

Daryl E. Cameron
LM054
S.C.I. Greene
Waynesburg, PA 15370

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