CAMERON v. PA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS S.C.I. GREENE

Filing 44

MEMORANDUM ORDER - The R&R of the Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 42) is adopted as the Opinion of the Court. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 33) that has been converted into a Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of Plaintiffs exhaustion of administrative remedies (ECF No. 35) is granted. The Clerk of Court mark this case closed.Signed by Judge Arthur J. Schwab on 11/8/18. (lck)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DARYL EUGENE CAMERON,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
V.

CARLA SW ARTZ, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action No. 17 - 816
District Judge Arthur J. Schwab
Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Daryl Eugene Cameron ("Plaintiff') is a pro se inmate who is currently in the custody of
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. He initiated this action by the filing of a Motion
for Leave to Proceed in jorma pauper is (ECF No. 1) and his Complaint was docketed by the
Clerk on August l, 2017 (ECF No. 7). Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on August 28,
2017. (ECF No. 14.) On November 22, 2017, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 19) that was granted by Order of Court dated March 29, 2018
(ECF No. 23). Plaintiff was sua sponte granted permission to file a Second Amended Complaint
to cure the deficiencies identified in the Court's Order (ECF No. 24), and he did so on April 23,
2018 (ECF No. 25). On July 18, 2018, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 33) that was converted by the Court into a Motion for Summary
Judgment on the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies (ECF No. 35). Plaintiff filed a
response in opposition to Defendants' Motion on October 10, 2018. (ECF No. 41.) The Motion

was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan pursuant to the Magistrate
Judge's Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), and Rules 72.C and 72.D of the Local Rules of Court.
On October 25, 2018, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation
("R&R") wherein she recommended that Defendants' Motion be granted because Plaintiff failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA").
(ECF No. 42.) The R&R was served on the parties and Plaintiff filed timely written Objections
on October 25, 2018. (ECF No. 43.)
In resolving a party's objections, the Court conducts a de nova review of any part of the
R&R that has been properly objected to. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). The
Court may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition, as well as receive further
evidence or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Id.
Plaintiff objects to the R&R on the basis that the Magistrate Judge did not apply the
holding of Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016) when she stated that there was only "one,
narrowly defined exception" to the rule requiring exhaustion. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge
cited Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2000), a Third Circuit Court of Appeals case that
held that the PLRA only requires prisoners to exhaust such administrative remedies "as are
available." (ECF No. 42, p.5) (citing Camp). Plaintiff claims that the Magistrate Judge failed to
recognize the holding of Ross, a recent Supreme Court case, which Plaintiff claims set forth
three exceptions to the PLRA's mandatory exhaustion requirement. Plaintiff, however, is
mistaken. In Ross, the Supreme Court noted that the only limit to the PLRA's mandate "is the
one baked into its text: An inmate need exhaust only such administrative remedies as are
'available[,]"' and it held that courts may not create a "special circumstances" exception to the
PLRA's exhaustion requirement. 136 S. Ct. at 1862. Plaintiff is correct in one sense though,
2

there have been certain circumstances where courts have found the administrative process
"unavailable" to prisoners, but these are not "exceptions" to the PLRA' s mandatory exhaustion
requirement. For example, in Ross the Supreme Court identified three factual scenarios where
the administrative process was considered "unavailable" to prisoners: ( 1) "when (despite what
regulations or guidance materials may promise) it operates as a simple dead end - with officers
unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates[,]" id. at 1859 (citing
Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 736, 738 (2001)); (2) when it is "essentially 'unknowable' - so
that no ordinary prisoner can make sense of what it demands[,]" id. at 1860 (citing Goebert v.
Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1323 (11th Cir. 2007) and Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1084
(I Ith Cir. 2008)); and (3) "when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a

grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation[,]" id. (citing
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 102 (2006); Davis v. Hernandez, 798 F.3d 290,295 (5th Cir.
2015); Schultz v. Pugh, 728 F.3d 619,620 (7th Cir. 2013); Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899,906
(7th Cir. 2011); Tucke! v. Grover, 660 F.3d 1249, 1252-1253 (10th Cir. 2011); Goebert v. Lee
County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1323 (I Ith Cir. 2007)). These, however, are all instances when courts
have considered the administrative process "unavailable" to inmates, which is the only exception
to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement as correctly noted by the Magistrate Judge in her R&R
when she cited to Camp.
Relying on Ross, Plaintiff claimed that he was prevented from exhausting his
administrative remedies, but the Magistrate Judge addressed his arguments and found that he was
not. There is nothing in his Objections that would cause the Court to overrule the Magistrate
Judge. Furthermore, Plaintiff's alleged mental infirmity, hearing impairment and chronic leg and
back pain did not render the administrative process unavailable to him. These conditions
3

obviously did not prevent Plaintiff from filing grievances or appealing those grievances, so it is
not credible that they somehow prevented him from filing a proper final appeal.
After careful de nova review, the following Order is now entered.
AND NOW, this~ day of November, 2018;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the R&R of the Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 42) is
adopted as the Opinion of the Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim (ECF No. 33) that has been converted into a Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue
of Plaintiffs exhaustion of administrative remedies (ECF No. 35) is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court mark this case closed.
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 4(a)(l) of the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure, Plaintiff has thirty (30) days to file a notice of appeal as provided by
Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
By the Court:

Arthur J. Schwab
United States District Judge
cc: Daryl Eugene Cameron
LM 0524
SCI Greene
175 Progress Drive
Waynesburg, PA 15370
Counsel for Defendants
(Via CM/ECF electronic mail)

4