PECORARO v. BERRYHILL

Filing 18

ORDER denying 14 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 16 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Alan N. Bloch on 9/11/2018. (dpo)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LORI A. PECORARO,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, COMMISSIONER, )
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
)
)
Defendant.
)

Civil Action No. 17-912

ORDER

AND NOW, this 11th day of September, 2018, upon consideration of the
parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, upon review of the Commissioner
of Social Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for Disability Insurance
Benefits under Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq., finds that
the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly,
affirms.

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Department of Health &

Human Services, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995); Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178,
1182 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom., 507 U.S. 924 (1993); Brown v. Bowen, 845
F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988).

See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D.

Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be
affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because
it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d

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Cir. 1981)). See also Monsour Medical Center v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (3d
Cir. 1986).1

Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by
failing to afford proper weight to the opinions of her treating medical professionals in
formulating her residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and in ultimately finding her to be not
disabled under the Social Security Act. The Court disagrees and instead finds that
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s treatment of the medical opinions at issue, his
formulation of Plaintiff’s RFC, and his decision that Plaintiff is not disabled.
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Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ should have given more weight to the opinions
of her treating psychologist, Daniel Marston, Ph.D. (R. 552, 568-71), and to that of her
treating psychiatrist, Allison Barnett, M.D. (R. 286-88). She further contends that the
medical “opinion” upon which the ALJ’s RFC assessment was based, that of state reviewing
agent Douglas Schiller, Ph.D., was not an opinion at all and therefore entitled to no weight.
While Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ gave little weight to the opinions of Drs. Marston and
Barnett, the Court finds that the record supported this finding and that the ALJ adequately
explained his rationale for doing so.
It is axiomatic that, when assessing a claimant’s application for benefits, the
opinion of the claimant’s treating physician generally is to be afforded significant weight.
See Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 43 (3d Cir. 2001); Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422,
429 (3d Cir. 1999). In fact, the regulations provide that for claims, such as this one, filed
before March 27, 2017, a treating physician’s opinion is to be given “controlling weight” so
long as the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 43; Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429. As a result,
the ALJ may reject a treating physician’s opinion outright only on the basis of contradictory
medical evidence, and not on the basis of the ALJ’s own judgment or speculation, although
he may afford a treating physician’s opinion more or less weight depending upon the extent
to which supporting explanations are provided. See Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429.
However, it is also important to remember that:
The ALJ -- not treating or examining physicians or State
agency consultants -- must make the ultimate disability and
RFC determinations.
Although treating and examining
physician opinions often deserve more weight than the
opinions of doctors who review records, “[t]he law is clear . .
. that the opinion of a treating physician does not bind the ALJ
on the issue of functional capacity[.]” Brown v. Astrue, 649
F.3d 193, 197 n. 2 (3d Cir.2011).
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Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal citations
omitted in part). See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 404.1546(c); SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL
374183 (S.S.A.), at **4-5. Therefore, while the ALJ must, of course, consider and weigh
the opinions of treating physicians, ultimately it is up to him to make a final determination
of Plaintiff’s RFC.
Here, the ALJ thoroughly considered Dr. Marston’s and Dr. Barnett’s
opinions and explained why he found that the record did not support giving them any
significant weight. He pointed out, for instance, that Dr. Marston’s opinions were not
consistent with his own treatment notes, which did not document serious limitations, the fact
that his opinions were not supported by clinical findings, and the fact that the treatment he
prescribed was inconsistent with the serious limitations to which he opined. (R. 22-23).
The ALJ also explained, in affording little weight to Dr. Barnett’s opinion, that it was based
on a relatively limited treatment record which reflected improvement of Plaintiff’s
symptoms and that it appeared to be based primarily on Plaintiff’s self-reported symptoms.
(R. 23). This explanation was adequate and supported by substantial evidence.
Although Plaintiff contests the weight given to the state reviewing agent’s
assessment, the ALJ did not, in fact, incorporate any part of that assessment, to which he
gave partial weight, into Plaintiff’s RFC. (R. 24). Indeed, as Plaintiff points out, Dr.
Schiller did not actually offer any opinion as to her functional limitations, but rather
indicated that there was insufficient evidence to assess Plaintiff’s allegations. (R. 87-88).
However, merely because there was not another medical opinion in the record does not mean
that the ALJ was forced to base his RFC determination on the opinions to which he gave
limited weight by default. As stated above, the ALJ must make the final RFC and disability
determinations. In discharging this duty, “[t]here is no legal requirement that a physician
have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts in the course of determining an RFC.”
Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 Fed. Appx. 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006). See also Chandler, 667 F.3d
at 362 (holding that each fact incorporated into the RFC need not have been found by a
medical expert). As the Circuit Court explained in Titterington, “[s]urveying the medical
evidence to craft an RFC is part of the ALJ’s duties.” 174 Fed. Appx. at 11. Therefore, an
ALJ is not precluded from making an RFC assessment even if no doctor has specifically
made the same findings. See Hayes v. Astrue, 2007 WL 4456119, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17,
2007).
Of course, in any event, substantial evidence must support an ALJ’s findings
as to the claimant’s RFC, and the ALJ must provide an adequate explanation as to how he
formulated the RFC. See SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (S.S.A.), at *7 (“The RFC
assessment must include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each
conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence
(e.g., daily activities, observations).”). Here, however, substantial evidence does support
the ALJ’s findings. The ALJ specifically incorporated numerous restrictions pertaining to
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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (document No. 14) is DENIED, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(document No. 16) is GRANTED.
s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge

ecf:

Counsel of record

Plaintiff’s mental impairments and explained that, in doing so, he was considering the
evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff. (R. 24).
Accordingly, the ALJ adequately explained the basis for his findings, and
substantial evidence supports his decision. The Court therefore affirms.
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