RAE v. BERRYHILL

Filing 16

OPINION and ORDER granting 9 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 13 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 7/30/18. (sps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KYLEE ELIZABETH RAE,

)
)
)
)
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Plaintiff,
vs.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security, 1
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 17-967

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge
OPINION
and
ORDER OF COURT
SYNOPSIS
Pending before the Court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. [ECF Nos. 9 and
13]. Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. [ECF Nos. 10 and 14]. After
careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth below,
I am granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 9] and denying Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. [ECF No. 13].
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff has brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”)
and under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”) and for Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act. Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI on or about September 17,

Nancy A. Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, and is
automatically substituted as the Defendant in this suit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).
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2013. [ECF No. 7-7 (Exs. B3D, B4D)]. In her applications, she alleged that since November 5,
2012, she had been disabled due to depression, anxiety disorder, sinus problems, back pain, pain
in both hips, sleep problems, fungus on toes, pollen/grass/weed allergies, vitamin d deficiency,
possible rheumatoid arthritis, and problem with left arm.

[ECF No. 7-8 (Ex. B3E)].

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Michael S. Kaczmarek held a hearing on November 19, 2015,
at which Plaintiff was represented by counsel. [ECF No. 7-3, at 43-74]. Plaintiff appeared at the
hearing and testified on her own behalf. Id. A vocational expert also was present at the hearing
and testified. Id. at 71-74. In a decision dated March 10, 2016, the ALJ found that jobs existed
in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform and, therefore, that
Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. [ECF No. 7-2, at 23-36]. Plaintiff requested review of
the ALJ’s determination by the Appeals Council, and, on May 23, 2017, the Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff’s request for review.

[ECF No. 7-2, at 2-4].

Having exhausted all of her

administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed this action.
The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. [ECF Nos. 9 and 13].
The issues are now ripe for my review.
II.
A.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner’s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as “more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d
900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Determining
whether substantial evidence exists is “not merely a quantitative exercise.” Gilliland v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983)).
“A single piece of evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if the secretary ignores, or fails
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to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence. Nor is evidence substantial if it is
overwhelmed by other evidence – particularly certain types of evidence (e.g., that offered by
treating physicians).”

Id.

The Commissioner’s findings of fact, if supported by substantial

evidence, are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d
Cir. 1979). A district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision or reweigh the evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F. Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where
the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those
findings, even if the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel,
181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial
evidence, the district court must review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that she cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(A); Brewster v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use when
evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The ALJ
must determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if
not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,
whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1; (4) if the
impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant’s impairments
prevent her from performing her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing her past relevant work, whether she can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of her age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by
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medical evidence that she is unable to return to her previous employment (steps 1-4).
Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful
activity (step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the decision
with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210,
221 (3d Cir. 1984).
B.

WHETHER THE ALJ IMPROPERLY DISREGARDED THE MEDICAL OPINIONS OF
PLAINTIFF’S TREATING AND EXAMINING PHYSICIANS
At Step Two of his analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe

impairments: depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder. [ECF No. 7-2, at 25-26]. The ALJ
found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as defined in
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except that Plaintiff must avoid concentrated exposure
to extremes of heat and cold and all hazards such as inherently dangerous moving machinery
and unprotected heights; she is limited to performing routine, repetitive tasks at the SVP 1 to 2
level; she must work in a static low stress environment involving only simple decisions and
infrequent changes, and those changes that did occur would be explained and/or demonstrated
and could be learned in 30 days or less; her work must be fast paced or have strict production or
time quotas; and she can have only occasional interaction with others. [ECF No. 7-2, at 28-34].
The ALJ concluded that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff
could perform, including retail marker, photocopy machine operator, and folding machine
operator. Id. at 34-35.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred when weighing the medical opinion evidence in
determining her mental RFC. [ECF No. 10, at 12-19]. The amount of weight accorded to
medical opinions is well-established. Generally, the opinions of a claimant’s treating physicians
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are entitled to substantial and, at times, even controlling weight. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c),
416.927(c). 2 To be entitled to controlling weight, however, the treating physician’s opinion must
be well supported by medical techniques and consistent with the other substantial evidence of
record. See Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 43 (3d Cir. 2001). To determine the weight of
a treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ may consider a number of factors, including consistency,
length of treatment, corroborating evidence, and supportability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927.
As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained:
“A cardinal principle guiding disability determinations is that the ALJ accord
treating physicians’ reports great weight, especially ‘when their opinions reflect
expert judgment based on continuing observation of the patient’s condition over
a prolonged period of time.’” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999)). However, “where
. . . the opinion of a treating physician conflicts with that of a non-treating, nonexamining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit” and may reject the
treating physician’s assessment if such rejection is based on contradictory
medical evidence. Id. Similarly, under 20 C.F.R. § 416.927[(c)](2), the opinion
of a treating physician is to be given controlling weight only when it is wellsupported by medical evidence and is consistent with other evidence in the
record.
Becker v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 403 F. App’x 679, 686 (3d Cir. 2010). Although the ALJ
may choose who to credit when faced with a conflict, he “cannot reject evidence for no reason or
for the wrong reason.” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 505 (3d Cir. 2009).
Here, Plaintiff first contends that the mental RFC finding is inconsistent with the ALJ’s
evaluation of the opinions of treating physician Max Lockward, M.D., who completed a
Psychiatric/Psychological Impairment Questionnaire on or about August 20, 2013, in which he
opined, inter alia, that Plaintiff was “moderately limited” 3 in her ability to: remember locations and
work-like procedures; understand and remember detailed instructions; carry out simple one or
2 Although the regulations governing the evaluation of medical evidence were recently amended, the
version effective March 27, 2017, does not apply to the present claim. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927
(2017); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c (2017).

The questionnaire defines “moderately limited” as “significantly affects but does not totally preclude the
individual’s ability to perform the activity.” [ECF No. 7-17 (Ex. B17F)].
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two-step instructions; maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; perform
activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within customary
tolerance; work in coordination with or proximity to others without being distracted by them; make
simple work-related decisions; complete a normal workweek without interruption from
psychologically based symptoms and perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable
number and length of rest periods; interact appropriately with the general public; accept
instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; get along with co-workers or
peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes; and respond appropriately to
changes in the work setting. [ECF No. 7-17 (Ex. B17F)]. Dr. Lockward also checked “yes” when
asked if Plaintiff experienced episodes of deterioration or decompensation in work or work-like
settings which caused her to withdraw from that situation and/or experience exacerbation of signs
or symptoms. Id. He further estimated that Plaintiff would likely be absent from work as a result
of her impairments more than three times a month on average. Id.
The ALJ gave Dr. Lockward’s opinion “partial weight” because the moderate limitations
described above were “generally consistent with the evidence of record.” [ECF No. 7-2, at 3233]. The only portions of Dr. Lockward’s opinion with which the ALJ expressly disagreed were
his separate assertions that Plaintiff experienced episodes of deterioration or decompensation in
work or work-like settings and/or would miss three days of work per month. Id. The ALJ found
that there was no evidence of episodes of decompensation/deterioration and no basis to support
the projected absences because Plaintiff was able to attend Narcotics Anonymous meetings most
nights of the week and reported improved symptoms with medications. Id. (citing exhibits).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s mental RFC finding is inconsistent with his acceptance of
Dr. Lockward’s moderate limitations. [ECF No. 10, at 13-14]. After careful consideration, I
agree that remand is necessary on this issue. As Plaintiff notes, while the ALJ appears to have
accepted all of Dr. Lockward’s moderate limitations, it is not apparent from the face of the opinion
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that he incorporated each of those limitations into the RFC. Although the RFC plainly accounts
for some of the moderate limitations such as those related to following detailed instructions and
interacting with others, it is unclear whether it incorporates other limitations, including those
concerning Plaintiff’s ability to carry out simple instructions, perform activities within a schedule
and maintain regular attendance, 4 make simple decisions, and/or complete a normal work week
without interruptions. Although the ALJ is entitled to reject limitations that are unsupported by
the record, he must provide the reasons for discounting that evidence.

Because the ALJ’s

opinion is unclear as to whether he accounted for all of Dr. Lockward’s moderate limitations in his
mental RFC finding or rejected some of those limitations in whole or in part, remand is necessary
on this issue.

On remand, the ALJ must clarify his findings with respect to the limitations

contained in Dr. Lockward’s opinion and explain how, if at all, his RFC finding accounts for such
limitations. 5
Plaintiff also takes issue with the ALJ’s evaluation of the opinion of SSA consultative
examiner Lanny Detore, Ed. D. who conducted a psychological examination of Plaintiff on or
about November 20, 2013. [ECF No. 7-14 (Ex. B8F)]. Dr. Detore opined, inter alia, that Plaintiff
was “moderately” limited in her ability to carry out simple instructions and make judgments on
I recognize that the ALJ tangentially discusses Plaintiff’s attendance when he rejects Dr. Lockward’s
estimate that Plaintiff would miss more than three days of work per month on the grounds that Plaintiff is
able to attend Narcotics Anonymous meetings most nights of the week and reported improved symptoms
with medication. [ECF No. 7-2, at 33]. This statement, however, addresses Dr. Lockward’s answer to a
separate questionnaire item, and not the section discussing the various moderate limitations. See ECF
No. 7-17 (Ex. B17F). In any event, I find it difficult to see how Plaintiff’s attendance at Narcotics
Anonymous meetings on some weeknights corresponds with an ability to maintain regular attendance at
work eight hours per day, five days a week. Again, the ALJ must clarify his position in this regard on
remand.
4

In opposition, Defendant argues, inter alia, that Dr. Lockward’s opinion does not support a claim for
disability because Dr. Lockward stated that he did not expect Plaintiff’s impairments to last at least twelve
months, a threshold requirement for a disability finding. [ECF No. 14, at 11-12 (citing Ex. B17F, question
15)]. I take no position on this issue, however, because the ALJ did not expressly rely on it in his decision.
The review of an administrative order must be judged upon those bases set forth and disclosed in that
order. Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 44 n. 7 (3d Cir.2001). Thus, to consider post hoc rationalizations
not listed by the ALJ runs contrary to the law. Id.
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simple work-related decisions; “moderately” to “markedly” limited in her ability to make judgments
on complex work-related decisions and carry out complex instructions; and “markedly” limited in
her ability to interact appropriately with the public, supervisors, and co-workers, and to respond
appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting. Id. 6 The ALJ
gave Dr. Detore’s opinion “little weight” because it appeared to be based on Plaintiff’s “subjective
complaints that were reported to be significantly greater at the consultative examination than
during her regular outpatient treatment” and because Dr. Detore’s limitations were inconsistent
with her reported activities, including caring for her son, maintaining her home, attending NA
meetings, organizing an NA softball game, working on crafts, and being a caregiver for an elderly
woman. [ECF No. 7-2 (citing hearing testimony and Exhibits)].
Arguing that the ALJ erred in assigning little weight to Dr. Detore’s opinion, Plaintiff
disagrees with the ALJ’s suggestion that Dr. Detore based his opinions solely on Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints. [ECF No. 10, at 17-19]. After careful review, I concur that the ALJ
mischaracterizes Dr. Detore’s report in this regard. As plainly set forth in the report, Dr. Detore
also relied on, inter alia, treatment records from Mon Yough Community Mental Health Services;
background information provided by the Bureau of Disability Determination, including a
psychological evaluation by consultative examiner Dr. Mrus; Plaintiff’s medication history; and his
objective observations of Plaintiff, including her appearance, dress, mannerisms, and personal
hygiene. [ECF No. 7-14 (Ex. 8F)]. Because the ALJ did not acknowledge these additional
bases in his opinion, I have no way of knowing whether he considered and rejected them, or, if
not, whether his conclusions regarding Dr. Detore’s opinions would have changed had he
considered this additional support. Accordingly, remand is necessary. On remand, the ALJ also

The Medical Source Statement that Dr. Detore completed defines “moderate” as “’more than a slight
limitation in [an] area, but the individual is still able to function satisfactorily.” It defines “marked” as a
“serious limitation in [an] area” with “a substantial loss in the ability to effectively function.” [ECF No. 7-14
(Ex. 8F)].
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should re-examine his reliance on Plaintiff’s activities of daily living in discounting Dr. Detore’s
conclusion to ensure that he accurately characterizes those activities and that he considers
whether they truly are inconsistent with Dr. Detore’s opined work-related limitations. 7
Plaintiff also criticizes the ALJ’s partial reliance on the opinions of state agency nonexamining psychologists, Douglas Schiller and Valorie Rings.

[ECF No. 7-2, at 33-34].

Plaintiff’s arguments in this regard, however, primarily center on the contention that the ALJ
should have given greater weight to Plaintiff’s treating specialists than to non-treating sources.
[ECF No. 10, at 14-15]. In light of my findings above, the ALJ must re-evaluate all of the medical
evidence on remand. On this issue, I note that Plaintiff is incorrect to the extent she argues that
the ALJ erred simply because he gave greater weight to a non-treating physician than a treating
provider. As set forth above, where there is a conflict between the opinion of a treating physician
and a non-treating, non-examining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit and may reject
the treating physician’s assessment if such rejection is based on contradictory medical evidence.
Moreover, it is well-established that State agency opinions merit significant consideration. See
S.S.R. 96-6p (“Because State agency medical and psychological consultants ... are experts in the
Social Security disability programs, ... 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527([e]) and 416.927([e]) require [ALJs]
... to consider their findings of fact about the nature and severity of an individual's
impairment(s)....”).

Thus, on remand, the ALJ shall re-consider all of the medical opinion

evidence and assign weight as appropriate in accordance with all applicable guidelines and

Although it is not improper for an ALJ to consider reported activities of daily living in assessing credibility,
it likewise is well-established that the ability to perform activities of daily living does not always correspond
with the ability to carry out sustained work-related mental activities in a work setting on a regular and
continuing basis. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Colvin, 191 F. Supp. 3d 401, 423-24 (M.D. Pa. 2015); see also
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572; 416.972 (“Generally, we do not consider activities like taking care of yourself,
household tasks, hobbies, therapy, school attendance, club activities, or social programs to be substantial
gainful activity.”). In this regard, I note that Dr. Detore expressly acknowledged in his report that Plaintiff
lives independently and appears “to manage her ADLs fairly well.” [ECF No. 7-14 (Ex. B8F)]. This
suggests that Dr. Detore neither ignored Plaintiff’s ADLs nor found them to be inconsistent with his opinions
regarding her work-related limitations.
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regulations. 8
C. WHETHER THE ALJ PROPERLY EVALUATED PLAINTIFF’S CREDIBILITY
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s credibility determination is not supported by substantial
evidence. [ECF No. 10, at 19-21]. To be clear, it is well-established that the ALJ is charged
with the responsibility of determining a claimant’s credibility. See Baerga v. Richardson, 500
F.2d 309, 312 (3d Cir. 1974). The ALJ’s decision “must contain specific reasons for the finding
on credibility, supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to
make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to
the individual’s statements and the reason for that weight.” S.S.R. 96-7p. 9 Ordinarily, an ALJ's
credibility determination is entitled to great deference. See Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 612
(3d Cir. 2014); Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 380 (3d Cir.2003).
In determining the limits on a claimant’s capacity for work, the ALJ will consider the entire
case record, including evidence from the treating, examining, and consulting physicians;
observations from agency employees; and other factors such as the claimant’s daily activities,
descriptions of pain, precipitating and aggravating factors, type, dosage, effectiveness and side
effects of medications, treatment other than medication, and other measures used to relieve pain.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c); S.S.R. 96-7p. The ALJ also will look at inconsistencies
between the claimant’s statements and the evidence presented. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4),

Plaintiff also complains that the ALJ gave weight to consultative examiner Frank Mrus, Ed.D. [ECF No.
7-2, at 32 (citing Ex. B3F)]. Again, on remand, the ALJ must re-evaluate all of the medical evidence and
explain the weight given to each opinion in accordance with applicable regulations. With respect to Dr.
Mrus, however, I note that the ALJ’s evaluation appears favorable to Plaintiff. Specifically, the ALJ gave
Dr. Mrus’s opinion only partial weight and seems to have credited only the portion opining that Plaintiff
should not perform detailed work and should not be subject to frequent work pressures and change due
to her anxiety, stress, and distractibility. Id. at 32. Aside from those areas, however, the ALJ indicated
that Dr. Mrus’s restrictions were inadequate and found that Plaintiff was even more limited than Dr. Mrus
opined in her ability to interact with others taking into account her anxiety, irritability, anger, and difficulty
getting along with family and coworkers. Id.
8

As Plaintiff notes, SSR 96-7p was rescinded by the Commissioner on March 16, 2016. See S.S.R. 163p. SSR 96-7p, however, was still in effect at the time of the decision in this case.
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416.929(c)(4). Inconsistencies in a claimant's testimony or daily activities permit an ALJ to
conclude that some or all of the claimant's testimony about her limitations or symptoms is less
than fully credible. See Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129–30 (3d Cir. 2002).
In general, I find that the ALJ here considered the factors set forth above and adequately
explained the reasoning behind his credibility determinations. [ECF No. 7-2, at 29-32].

A

claimant’s course of treatment and activities of daily living as well as inconsistencies in the record
are appropriate bases on which to evaluate credibility. Moreover, the ALJ here did not reject
Plaintiff’s allegations entirely. Rather, he incorporated numerous limitations related to Plaintiff’s
mental health complaints in his RFC finding. The ALJ’s credibility findings, however, also rest
on his analysis of the medical records and opinion evidence. Because I have found that the ALJ
inadequately assessed the medical evidence in this case, the ALJ must reevaluate Plaintiff’s
credibility accordingly on remand.
III.

CONCLUSION

Under the Social Security regulations, a federal district court reviewing the decision of the
Commissioner denying benefits has three options.

It may affirm the decision, reverse the

decision and award benefits directly to a claimant, or remand the matter to the Commissioner for
further consideration. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (sentence four). In light of an objective review of all
evidence contained in the record, I find that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence because, in discussing his RFC and credibility findings, the ALJ failed to address
adequately the opinion evidence regarding Plaintiff’s mental health.

The case therefore is

remanded for further consideration in light of this Opinion. In remanding on the points herein, I
make no findings as to whether Plaintiff is or is not disabled. I simply find that I cannot properly
evaluate the ALJ’s opinion on the record before me. For these and all of the above reasons,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted to the extent set forth herein, and Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment is denied to that same extent. An appropriate Order follows.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KYLEE ELIZABETH RAE,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security, 1
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 17-967

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 30th day of July, 2018, after careful consideration of the submissions of
the parties and for the reasons set forth in the Opinion accompanying this Order, it is ordered that
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 9] is GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiff
seeks remand for further consideration and the matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner for
further proceedings consistent with the Opinion attached hereto.

Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment [ECF No. 13] is DENIED.

BY THE COURT:
/s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
U.S. Senior District Judge

Nancy A. Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, and is
automatically substituted as the Defendant in this suit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).
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