MIHALLIK v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
15
OPINION AND ORDER granting 7 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 9 Motion for Summary Judgment. Remanding matter for further proceedings. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 5/17/18. (ask)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANDREA SUE MIHALIK
)
) No. 17-1039
)
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY
OPINION AND ORDER
SYNOPSIS
Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance pursuant to Title II of the Social
Security Act, alleging disability due to physical impairments, including osteoarthritis of the
knees, and back and shoulder pain. Her application was denied initially, and upon hearing by an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”). The Appeals Council denied her request for review. Before
the Court are the parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons,
Plaintiff’s Motion will be granted, and Defendant’s denied, and this matter remanded for further
proceedings.
OPINION
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decisions on disability claims is provided by
statute. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) 6 and 1383(c)(3) 7. Section 405(g) permits a district court to review
the transcripts and records upon which a determination of the Commissioner is based, and the
court will review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. §706. When reviewing a decision, the
district court's role is limited to determining whether the record contains substantial evidence to
support an ALJ's findings of fact. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002).
Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate" to support a conclusion. Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971)). If the ALJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Richardson, 402 U.S. at 390.
A district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner's decision, or reweigh the evidence of record; the court can only judge the propriety of the decision with
reference to the grounds invoked by the Commissioner when the decision was rendered. Palmer
v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998); S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 - 97,
67 S. Ct. 1575, 91 L. Ed. 1995 (1947).
Otherwise stated, “I may not weigh the evidence or
substitute my own conclusion for that of the ALJ. I must defer to the ALJ's evaluation of
evidence, assessment of the credibility of witnesses, and reconciliation of conflicting expert
opinions. If the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, I am bound by those
findings, even if I would have decided the factual inquiry differently.” Brunson v. Astrue, No.
No. 10-6540, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55457 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2011) (citations omitted).
Nonetheless, I am not required to read the ALJ’s opinion “in a vacuum.” Knox v. Astrue, No.
No. 9-1075, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28978, at *22 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2010).
II.
THE PARTIES’ MOTIONS
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in her treatment of the sole medical opinion of
record, that of an examining consultant.
Thus, the ALJ must give indication of the evidence he rejects and explain the reasons for
discounting pertinent evidence. Oakes v. Colvin, No. 15-507, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117952, at
*27 (W.D. Pa. Sep. 1, 2016). Moreover, “rarely can a decision be made regarding a claimant's
residual functional capacity without an assessment from a physician regarding the functional
abilities of the claimant.” Hawk v. Colvin, No. 14-00337, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32756, at *30
(M.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2015) (citing cases).
Dr. Assefa performed a consultative exam on February 19, 2014. He concluded that
Plaintiff had several limitations. For example, he opined that Plaintiff could occasionally lift up
to 20 pounds and carry up to 10; sit for two hours at a time and for three total; stand for 15
minutes at a time and for one hour total; walk for 15-20 minutes at a time and for one hour total.
It appears that these limitations were based on Plaintiff’s knee pain and stiffness, and the
condition of her shoulders and fingers. She could occasionally reach, handle, finger, feel, and
push/pull. The ALJ found that Dr. Assefa’s opinion was entitled to “some weight,” and that it
was not “fully consistent with objective medical evidence of record, after this assessment was
made.” The RFC omitted many of the limitations opined to by Dr. Assafa.
It is unclear which evidence following Dr. Assefa’s assessment caused the ALJ to
discount his opinion. The only evidence that postdates Dr. Assefa’s opinion, and to which the
ALJ refers, are treatment notes from Dr. Bisignani, a treating source. Those records show that
Plaintiff had advanced arthritis of the knees and received bilateral knee injections. The ALJ
notes that a September, 2015 visit to Dr. Bisignani showed “no instability to varus or valgus
stress.”1 The ALJ also refers to “additional routine visits” to PLaintiff’s primary care physician,
1
Varus and valgus stress refer to tests of ligament health. Perry v. Colvin, No. 11-1865, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
71983, at *36 n. 26 (M.D. Pa. May 21, 2013).
Dr. Chalfant, after June, 2014. The ALJ briefly notes that in his records of those visits, Dr.
Chalfant referred to Plaintiff’s weight, diabetes, hypothyroidism, and foot pain. Again, it is
unclear what bearing these post-2014 records have on the weight to be afforded Dr. Assefa’s
opinions. The ALJ is entitled to assign little weight to Dr. Assefa’s opinion, but must explain
why she is doing so. The ALJ’s cursory discussion of the weight afforded Dr. Assefa’s
functional assessment renders assessment problematic -- for example, of the decision not to
include any sit/stand/walk or lift/carry limitations in the RFC, despite findings that her knee and
shoulder conditions were severe impairments. It appears that the ALJ accepted portions of Dr.
Assefa’s opinion and rejected others, without explanation. As a result, the basis for some of the
limitations included in the RFC – such as that Plaintiff must be afforded the opportunity for brief
one or two minute position changes at intervals not to exceed 30 minutes – is also unclear.
Absent such an explanation, this Court is unable to properly assess whether the RFC, and the
ALJ’s decision, are supported by substantial evidence. Remand is warranted for further
explanation. On remand, the ALJ may further develop the record, should she deem it necessary.
Although I remand on other grounds, Plaintiff’s remaining arguments merit mention.
Plaintiff contends that the RFC of Douglas Kleman, a single decision maker (“SDM”), is entitled
to no evidentiary weight. There is “significant case law” supporting the position that an SDM’s
RFC is entitled to no evidentiary weight. Yorkus v. Astrue, No. 10-2197, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
154471, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2011). Here, the ALJ assigned “some weight” to the opinion
of the SDM.2 The ALJ gave “some weight” to both opinions of record – one of an examining
physician and one of an SDM, and the ALJ’s RFC did not adequately explain the weight
afforded. On remand, the ALJ should reassess her reliance on the SDM’s opinion. Lastly,
2
The SDM stated that Plaintiff could occasionally lift/carry 20 pounds; frequently carry 10 pounds; stand and/or
walk for 2 hours; and sit for a total of 6 hours; and was unlimited in pushing/pulling.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s credibility determination did not take into account her stellar
work record. “It is well-established that the testimony of a claimant with a long, productive
work history will be given ‘substantial credibility’ concerning his work limitations, assuming
those limitations are also supported by competent medical evidence,” although it is but one
factor for the ALJ to consider. Christl v. Astrue, No. 08-290, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76271, at
*38 (W.D. Pa. Sep. 30, 2008). When reevaluating Plaintiff’s claim on remand, the ALJ should
consider Plaintiff’s work history in her credibility assessment.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this Court is unable to conclude that the ALJ’s decision is based on
substantial evidence, and the matter will be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion. An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
________________________________
Donetta W. Ambrose
Senior Judge, U.S. District Court
Dated: May 17, 2018
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANDREA SUE MIHALIK
)
) No. 17-1039
)
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY
ORDER
AND NOW, this 17th day of May, 2018, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED, and Defendant’s DENIED. This matter is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing Opinion.
BY THE COURT:
________________________________
Donetta W. Ambrose
Senior Judge, U.S. District Court
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