STARNES v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF BUTLER COUNTY PA. et al

Filing 56

ORDER. Defendant THOMAS DOERR'S Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 49 ) is DENIED. Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges Defendant THOMAS DOERR participated in discrete discriminatory acts to allow Plaintiff's Fourteenth Ame ndment sex discrimination claim to proceed. Pursuant to the stipulation at Doc. 48 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(4), all Defendants in this action must Answer within 14 days of this Order. Signed by Judge Cathy Bissoon on 10/4/18. (wss)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CRYSTAL STARNES,
Plaintiff,
v.
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF BUTLER COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 17-1304
Judge Cathy Bissoon

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant Thomas Doerr’s (“Judge Doerr’s” or “Defendant
Doerr’s”) Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint of Plaintiff Crystal Starnes (“Ms.
Starnes” or “Plaintiff”) (Doc. 49). For the following reasons, Defendant Doerr’s Motion to
Dismiss is DENIED. Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (hereinafter “TAC,” Doc. 44)
sufficiently alleges Defendant Doerr participated in discrete discriminatory acts to allow
Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment sex discrimination claim to proceed.
BACKGROUND
As this Court previously performed a detailed summary of the facts in its Memorandum
and Order addressing Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
(Doc. 42), it will not repeat such summary here. On July 26, 2018, this Court denied all grounds
for dismissal offered by Defendants, but one. 1 (Doc. 42.) Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment sex
discrimination claim was dismissed without prejudice, and she was granted leave to amend her

1

Plaintiff withdrew her procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc.
42 at 15.)
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Complaint with allegations that Defendant Doerr participated in discrete acts of discrimination
within the two-year statute of limitations. (Id. at 12, 21.) After Plaintiff filed her TAC, and
Defendant Doerr again moved to dismiss. (Doc. 49.)
ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the majority of Defendant
Doerr’s Brief in Support of his Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 50) addresses arguments previously
made to—and rejected by—this Court. (See Doc. 42.) 2 Plaintiff was given narrow leave to
amend her allegations with additional facts demonstrating that Defendant Doerr performed
discrete discriminatory acts during the limitations period, and she did so. (See generally TAC
¶¶ 58, 61, 63 and 105.) Defendant Doerr’s arguments in support of his Motion were properly
directed only to those issues raised by Plaintiff’s amendments.
After careful review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s TAC states a claim for sex
discrimination based on Defendant Doerr’s discrete acts. Specifically, Plaintiff’s TAC alleges
that, during the limitations period and because of Plaintiff’s prior relationship with Defendant
Doerr:

2

Defendant seems to misunderstand the Court’s Order, which denied Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. In particular, Defendant Doerr’s Motion to
Dismiss first states that the Court “recognized” that Plaintiff did not allege a First Amendment
right to maintain a relationship with her husband free from interference by Defendant Doerr.
(Doc. 50 at 7.) The Court came to the opposite conclusion and held Plaintiff stated a claim on
these grounds. Second, and troublingly, Defendant Doerr’s renewed immunity arguments
related to Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim appear to take the position that because the
Third Circuit is split on whether sexual assault constitutes a discrete act or whether it can be
aggregated under a continuous violations theory, it is not “clearly established” that Judge Doerr
was on notice that sexually assaulting a female subordinate is a constitutional violation (Doc. 50
at 4). Defendant Doerr’s argument is improperly raised and legally unsound. It has been settled
law since 1979 that the sexual assault can form the basis of a hostile work environment claim.
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1979) (“Respondent’s allegations in this
case—which include not only pervasive harassment but also criminal conduct of a most serious
nature—are plainly sufficient to state a claim for ‘hostile environment’ sexual harassment.”).
2

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Defendant Doerr denied Plaintiff opportunities available to male probation
officers, including placing limitations and restrictions place on when and how
Plaintiff could conduct field visits (TAC ¶¶ 56–59);

•

Defendant Doerr, using both his capacity as a decision-maker and his influence on
other decision-makers, deprived Plaintiff of the ability to work as a standby
and/or on-call probation officer (TAC ¶¶ 61–63); and

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As a result of these acts by Defendant Doerr, “Plaintiff lost the opportunity to
acquire overtime and comp time” (TAC ¶ 105).

These amendments make clear that Plaintiff alleges she suffered adverse employment
actions and that Defendant Doerr was responsible for those adverse employment actions. No
more is required at this stage. Boykins v. Ambridge Area School Dist., 621 F.2d 75, 80 (3d Cir.
1980) (stating § 1983 complaint must allege the conduct which violated a civil right, the time
and place of the conduct, and the official responsible); see also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia,
895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir. 1990) (advising liability for sex discrimination under § 1983 may
be imposed where plaintiff alleges either “allegations of personal direction” or “direct
discrimination” by a supervisor). Therefore, the Court will deny Defendant Doerr’s Motion to
Dismiss.
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Accordingly, Defendant Doerr’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 49) is DENIED. Pursuant to
the Stipulation at Doc. 48 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(4), all Defendants in this
action must Answer within 14 days of this Order.

October 4, 2018

s\Cathy Bissoon
Cathy Bissoon
United States District Judge

cc (via ECF email notification):
All Counsel of Record

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