BRUNACHE v. BUREAU OF PRISON (P.A.) et al

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER. Based on the face of the Amended Complaint, any claims which arose out of Plaintiff's confinement in the Western District of Pennsylvania are barred by the applicable two year statute of limitations. Signed by Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy on 12/18/2017. (bsc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
HARVENS BRUNACHE,
Plaintiff,
v.
BUREAU OF PRISON (PA); et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 2: 17-cv-1396
United States Magistrate Judge
Cynthia Reed Eddy

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Harvens Brunache, an inmate currently confined in Riker’s Island Correctional
Facility, East Elmhurst, New York, initiated this civil rights action by filing a civil rights
complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. On
October 26, 2017, the case was transferred to this Court from the Middle District of
Pennsylvania.
Because the Complaint was not in conformance with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the undersigned administratively closed the case and Plaintiff was instructed to file an
Amended Complaint which comports with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 11).
On December 12, 2017, the Court received and filed Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 12) and the case has been reopened.
This Court has a statutory responsibility to review complaints filed by prisoners and by
those who have been granted in forma pauperis to determine if the complaint states a valid claim
for relief. The Court is required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any
claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.
Moreover, not only is a court permitted to sua sponte dismiss a complaint which fails to
state a claim, but it is required to do so by the mandatory language of “the court shall dismiss”
utilized by Section 1915(e)(2).

In performing a court’s mandated function of sua sponte

reviewing complaints under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A to determine if they fail to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, a federal district court applies the same standard as
applied to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Powell
v. Hoover, 956 F. Supp. 565, 568 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (applying Rule 12(b)(6) standard to claim
dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
In reviewing complaints as mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and § 1915A and,
consequently, utilizing the standards for a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must be read
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all well-pleaded, material allegations of fact in the
complaint must be taken as true. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Because Plaintiff is
pro se, the court will accord him an even more liberal reading of the complaint, employing less
stringent standards than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519 (1972).
B.

Discussion

Although lacking in specifics, Plaintiff seems to allege that during the entire time he was
incarcerated in various PA Department of Corrections facilities (a period from 1999 - 2015),1 he

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Public dockets reflect that Plaintiff was convicted and sentenced in Philadelphia in 1999
on charges of rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of 8 - 16 years.
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experienced “numerous sufferings of all kinds mentally, physically, and emotionally.” During his
incarceration, he was housed at a number of DOC facilities (Graterford, Rockview, Huntington,
Somerset, Fayette, and Frackville), but according to the Amended Complaint the events giving
rise to this lawsuit specifically occurred at SCI-Somerset, SCI-Fayette, and SCI-Frackville. He
alleges that on or about June of 2003, he was transferred to SCI-Somerset, where “he suffered an
outbreak of some kind, while medical did nothing to find the origin of it”); in or about June of
2004 he was transferred to SCI-Fayette, where he “woke up one day with a frostbite like pain in
the lower middle right side of [his] body and a red spoted like scare”; after he complained about
his medical conditions being untreated, at some point he was “sent to an illegal incarceration
R.H.U. Mental Health punishment at SCI-Frackville and illegal held there for nothing
unaddressed, untreated, unreleased and all the way up till the day of my release from prison on 914-2015.” Further, Plaintiff alleges through the Amended Complaint that,
All the way till the day of my released medical department and mental
health dept Harrisburg officials there did nothing. The Parole and Probation
Official given direct knowledge of all these facts and claims never done anything
except went along with doing nothing like everyone else involved. So on
September 14, 2017 (sic) upon my release date from prison I went immediately to
see an emergency room doctor and still this very day and time nothing has been
done or said to me is the reason and or outcome of my damages claims.
From the Amended Complaint, it is difficult to discern who Plaintiff intends to name as
defendants in this lawsuit as the caption of the Amended Complaint reads as follows:
1. P.A.D.O.C. Bureau of Prison, Harrisburgh, P.A., etc.
2. P.A.D.O.C. Parole and Probation, Harrisburgh, P.A., EtA . . .
3. P.A.D.O.C. Medical and Mental Provider Officials EtA . . . Harrisburg, P.A., eta . . . .

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4. P.A.D.O.C. Commissioners Office Eta . . . .2
As relief, Plaintiff “would like to be given an court appointed lawyer and or legal advisor and
then given an jury trial, so that I could be awarded millions of dollars in damages and
compensation of all kind on my person.”
There is a significant problem with Plaintiff’s amended complaint, which can not be
cured by amendment. Although the amended complaint does not state that Plaintiff is bringing
his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it appears that he is alleging violations of his federal
constitutional rights; thus, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would be the proper federal statute under which to
bring his claims. Claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year
statute of limitations. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d
626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2). A claim accrues “when the plaintiff knew
or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based.” Kach, 589 F.3d at 634
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The only connection Plaintiff’s claims have to the Western District of Pennsylvania are
those which arose while Plaintiff was incarcerated at SCI-Somerset and SCI-Fayette. According
to the face of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff, while incarcerated in SCI Somerset in 2003,
experienced a skin “break out of some sort” and while incarcerated in SCI Fayette in 2004
experienced “frost-bike like pain,” both incidents clearly occurring more than two years before
the filing of this complaint in 2017.3 “When screening a complaint under § 1915, a district court

In the original complaint, Plaintiff also named “P.A.D.O.C. State Facility Fayette/
Frackville, ETA” as a defendant. (See ECF No. 1). The state facilities are not named in the
Amended Complaint.
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Based on the original complaint filed in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, that court
found that the majority of the named Defendants and incidents complained of emanated from
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may sua sponte dismiss the complaint as untimely under the statute of limitations where the
defense is obvious from the complaint and no development of the factual record is required.”
Whitenight v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania State Police, 674 F. App’x 142, 144 (3d Cir. Jan.
4, 2017) (per curiam) (citing Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006); Eriline Co.
S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 656-57 (4th Cir. 2006); Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d
508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001); Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995)). Plaintiff alleges no facts
supporting a conclusion that the statute of limitations should be tolled.
Further, assuming that Plaintiff’s remaining claims are timely, the Court finds that
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is improper in this district. It appears that Plaintiff’s
remaining claims arose from his incarceration at SCI-Frackville, which is located in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, and all of the named defendants are located in Harrisburg, which lies
within the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
Having determined venue is improper in this district, the Court must decide whether to
dismiss the case or transfer the case to a district where venue is properly laid pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1406(a). A court retains the power to transfer a case from an improper venue to a
proper venue even where it lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Goldlawr, Inc. v.
Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 465 (1962). “In most cases of improper venue, the courts conclude that it
is in the interest of justice to transfer to a proper forum rather than to dismiss the litigation.” 14D
Wright & Miller § 3827 at 540 (4th Ed. 2013); see also Holiday v. Bally’s Park Place, Inc., No.
06-4588, 2007 WL 2600877, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 10, 2007) (“Generally, transfer to a proper

Plaintiff’s confinement in SCI-Fayette, which is located in the Western District of Pennsylvania.
The Amended Complaint, however, clearly states that Plaintiff was transferred to SCI-Somerset
in 2003 (W.D.Pa.); transferred to SCI-Fayette (W.D.Pa.) in 2004.
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forum is preferable to outright dismissal because it prevents repetitive motion practice and
unnecessary costs.”).
However, the Court faces a dilemma in this regard, as it is not clear from Plaintiff’s
allegations whether the Eastern District or the Middle District is the proper venue. As stated
above, some of the remaining claims arise from incidents which allegedly occurred in the Eastern
District (SCI-Frackville), but those claims appear to be untimely, and all the named defendants
seem to be located in the Middle District (Harrisburg). Because Plaintiff has not incurred
expenses associated with filing this lawsuit, other than any postage and copying expenses he may
have incurred, the Court finds that Plaintiff will not be prejudiced by dismissing this case
outright. Plaintiff, if he so chooses, may file a complaint alleging timely claims in the proper
venue.
An appropriate Order follows.

ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 18th day of December, 2017, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is
closed. Based on the allegations of the Amended Complaint, any claims which arose out of
incidents in the Western District of Pennsylvania are barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. Leave to amend is not granted as same would be futile.
s/Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
United States Magistrate Judge

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cc:

HARVENS BRUNACHE
1411703656
Robert N. Davoren Complex
SPECIAL MAIL - OPEN ONLY IN PRESENCE OF INMATE
11-11 Hazen Street
East Elmhurst, NY 11370

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