STADTERMAN v. BERRYHILL

Filing 13

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 8 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying 10 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and the case is remanded for further evaluation in light of this Order. Signed by Judge Alan N. Bloch on 3/26/2019. (lwp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARK A. STADTERMAN,

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) Civil Action No. 18-20
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Plaintiff,
v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

ORDER
AND NOW, this 26th day of March, 2019, upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 10), filed in the above-captioned matter on May 29, 2018,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said Motion is DENIED.
AND, further, upon consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No.
8), filed in the above-captioned matter on April 16, 2018,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART. Specifically, Plaintiff’s Motion is granted to the extent that it seeks remand to the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) for further evaluation as set forth below, and
denied in all other respects. Accordingly, this matter is hereby remanded to the Commissioner
for further evaluation under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) in light of this Order.
I.

Background
On October 10, 2014, Plaintiff Mark A. Stadterman protectively filed a claim for

disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.

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Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that he became disabled on April 15, 2014, due to a right torn
rotator cuff, bone degeneration in his right shoulder, and Meniere’s Disease. (R. 202).
After being denied initially on December 23, 2014, Plaintiff sought, and obtained, a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on September 22, 2016. (R. 45-82). In a
decision dated January 11, 2017, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s request for benefits. (R. 20-39). The
Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s decision on November 13, 2017. (R. 3-8).
Plaintiff filed a timely appeal with this Court, and the parties have filed cross-motions for
summary judgment.
II.

Standard of Review
Judicial review of a social security case is based upon the pleadings and the transcript of

the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review is limited to determining whether the
Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the record, as a whole, contains
substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's findings of fact. See Matthews v. Apfel, 239
F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that “‘[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security
as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive’” (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g))); Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating
that the court has plenary review of all legal issues, and reviews the ALJ's findings of fact to
determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence).
“Substantial evidence” is defined as “‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate’” to support a conclusion. Plummer v.
Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir.
1995)). However, a “‘single piece of evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if the
[Commissioner] ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence.’”

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Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110,
114 (3d Cir. 1983)). “‘Nor is evidence substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence—
particularly certain types of evidence (e.g., that offered by treating physicians)—or if it really
constitutes not evidence but mere conclusion.’” Id.
A disability is established when the claimant can demonstrate some medically
determinable basis for an impairment that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial
gainful activity for a statutory twelve-month period. See Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 3839 (3d Cir. 2001). “A claimant is considered unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity
‘only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only
unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy . . . .’”
Id. at 39 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)).
The Social Security Administration has promulgated regulations incorporating a five-step
sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is under a disability as defined
by the Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. In Step One, the Commissioner must determine whether
the claimant is currently engaging in substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the disability claim will be denied. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S.
137, 140 (1987). If not, the second step of the process is to determine whether the claimant is
suffering from a severe impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). “An impairment or
combination of impairments is not severe if it does not significantly limit [the claimant’s]
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522. If the claimant
fails to show that his or her impairments are “severe," he or she is ineligible for disability
benefits. If the claimant does have a severe impairment, however, the Commissioner must

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proceed to Step Three and determine whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals the
criteria for a listed impairment (“Listing”). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If a claimant
meets a Listing, a finding of disability is automatically directed. If the claimant does not meet a
Listing, the analysis proceeds to Steps Four and Five.
Step Four requires the ALJ to consider whether the claimant retains the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform his or her past relevant work, see 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), and the claimant bears the burden of demonstrating an inability to return to
this past relevant work, see Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1994). If the claimant is
unable to resume his or her former occupation, the evaluation then moves to the fifth and final
step.
At this stage, the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner, who must demonstrate
that the claimant is capable of performing other available work in the national economy in order
to deny a claim of disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). In making this determination,
the ALJ should consider the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and past work experience. See id.
The ALJ must further analyze the cumulative effect of all the claimant’s impairments in
determining whether he or she is capable of performing work and is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1523.
III.

The ALJ's Decision
In the present case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been engaged in substantial

gainful activity since April 15, 2014. (R. 22). The ALJ also found that Plaintiff met the second
requirement of the process insofar as he had certain severe impairments, specifically, dysfunction
of joints (right shoulder rotator cuff injury and bone degeneration) and vestibular disorder

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(Meniere’s Disease). (R. 22). The ALJ further concluded that Plaintiff’s impairments did not
meet any of the Listings that would satisfy Step Three. (R. 23).
The ALJ next found that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform the full range of medium
work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c). (R. 24). At Step Four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
was capable of performing past relevant work as a carpenter foreman as it is generally
performed, noting that such work does not require the performance of work-related activities
precluded by Plaintiff’s RFC. (R. 38). In the alternative, the ALJ moved on to Step Five and,
applying Medical-Vocational Guideline Rules 203.22 and 203.15, found that Plaintiff was not
disabled. (R. 38-39).
Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in
the Social Security Act, from April 15, 2014 through the date of his decision. (R. 39).
IV.

Legal Analysis
Plaintiff raises several arguments as to why he believes that the ALJ erred in finding him

to be not disabled. While the Court does not fully agree with the arguments set forth by Plaintiff,
it does agree that remand is warranted in this case. Specifically, because the Court finds that the
ALJ did not properly explain the basis for his determination that Plaintiff did not meet or
medically equal the severity of one of Listings at Step Three of the sequential evaluation process,
the Court cannot find that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly,
the Court will remand the case for further consideration.
The Listings operate as a regulatory device used to streamline the decision-making
process by identifying claimants whose impairments are so severe that they may be presumed to
be disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a). A claimant has the burden of proving a
presumptively disabling impairment by presenting medical evidence that meets all of the criteria

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of a listed impairment or is equal in severity to all of the criteria for the most similar listed
impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526.
In the present case, Plaintiff claims that he meets the requirements of Listing 2.07,
Disturbance of labyrinthine-vestibular function (including Meniere’s disease), which is
“characterized by a history of frequent attacks of balance disturbance, tinnitus, and progressive
loss of hearing,” plus both:
A. Disturbed function of vestibular labyrinth demonstrated by caloric or other
vestibular tests; and
B. Hearing loss established by audiometry.
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 2.07.
At Step Three of his analysis, the ALJ stated that, although he had considered whether
Plaintiff met the criteria for Meniere’s disease under Listing 2.07, “the objective medical
evidence does not document history of balance disturbance, tinnitus, or progressive hearing loss,
or the severity of hearing loss and other requirements of those Listings.” (R. 24). Without
further addressing the evidence upon which he relied or the specific requirements of Listing 2.07,
the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment that met any Listing and moved on
to the next step in his disability analysis.
Plaintiff argues, however, that evidence of the specific testing required is in fact present
in the record, along with evidence to support the other criteria. The government, on the other
hand, contends that Plaintiff has put forth no evidence that he met any of these requirements, that
he cites to no record of progressive hearing loss, and that the record does not contain any caloric
or vestibular testing as required by paragraph A or audiometric testing as required by paragraph
B. (Doc. No. 11, at 4).

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Upon review of the evidence of record, the Court finds that it does in fact contain
evidence supportive of the Listing 2.07 criteria, including documentation of both vestibular
testing and testing establishing hearing loss. (R. 391-404). Moreover, later in his decision, the
ALJ actually notes that Plaintiff’s diagnosis of Meniere’s disease “was supported by the
abnormal findings of vestibular testing and progressive hearing loss was supported by the
audiologic findings.” (R. 31). Additionally, the ALJ explained that “vestibular testing showed
abnormalities consistent with right-sided endolymphatic hydrops” and that “audiological
evaluation showed profound rising to severe mixes hearing loss in the right ear” and “a moderate
sensorineural hearing loss” in the left ear at certain frequencies. (R. 31). Such findings by the
ALJ are clearly in opposition to his finding at Step Three that the objective medical evidence
does not document any of the requirements of Listing 2.07. (R. 24).
Thus, the Court finds that the ALJ’s analysis indicates some confusion—and
contradiction at different steps in the sequential evaluation—as to whether evidence of the
Listing 2.07 criteria exists or not. It is therefore also unclear whether all the relevant evidence of
record was considered at Step Three. Because consideration of all relevant evidence is critical in
determining whether or not Plaintiff meets Listing 2.07, the Court finds that remand is required
to more thoroughly, and accurately, discuss whether Plaintiff meets that Listing.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ’s discussion and evaluation of whether
Plaintiff’s Meniere’s disease meets or medically equals Listing 2.07 are insufficient in this case.
Therefore, the Court also finds that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
While the ALJ is certainly permitted to find that Plaintiff does not meet any of the Listings, the
Court finds that the ALJ’s justification for such conclusion, which includes minimal discussion
and incorrect assertions, is simply insufficient here. Thus, remand is required to allow for further

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discussion as to the ALJ’s evaluation of the evidence in this regard, along with his ultimate
decision in Plaintiff’s case.
Additionally, although the Court takes no position as to Plaintiff’s remaining issues, the
ALJ should, of course, ensure that proper weight be accorded to the various opinion and medical
evidence presented in the record. Further, the ALJ should verify that his conclusions concerning
Plaintiff’s RFC—as well as his findings regarding the credibility of all of Plaintiff’s symptoms—
are fully explained, in order to eliminate the need for any future remand.
V.

Conclusion
In short, because the ALJ failed to properly discuss the evidence of record concerning

whether Plaintiff met or medically equaled the criteria for the Listings, the Court finds that
substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s determination in that regard or his ultimate
decision in this case. The Court hereby remands this case to the ALJ for reconsideration
consistent with this Order.

s/ Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf:

Counsel of record

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