SNYDER v. BERRYHILL

Filing 20

OPINION and ORDER granting 16 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 18 Motion for Summary Judgment. It is further ordered that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is hereby vacated and the case is remanded for further administrative proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 3/13/19. (slh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JENNIFER L. SNYDER,
Plaintiff,
-vsNANCY A. BERRYHILL,1
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 18-77

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

OPINION
Pending before the court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 16 and
18). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (ECF Nos. 17 and 19). After
careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth
below, I am granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 16) and denying
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 18).
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security denying her application for disability insurance benefits pursuant to the Social Security
Act. Plaintiff filed her application alleging she has been disabled since June 16, 2014. (ECF
No. 8-7, p. 2).

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), Sarah Ehasz, held a hearing on August 15,

2016. (ECF No. 8-3). On November 15, 2016, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled
under the Act. (ECF No. 8-2, pp. 16-30).
After exhausting all administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed the instant action with this
court. The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 16 and 18).
The issues are now ripe for review.
1

Nancy A. Berryhill became acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, replacing
Carolyn W. Colvin.

II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.

Standard of Review

The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner’s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as “more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Ventura v. Shalala, 55
F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
Additionally, the Commissioner’s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive. 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A
district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision or re-weigh the
evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if
the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360
(3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however,
the district court must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. §706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use
when evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a). The ALJ must
determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,
whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) if the
impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant’s impairments

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prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional
capacity (“RFC”).

20 C.F.R. §404.1520.

The claimant carries the initial burden of

demonstrating by medical evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment
(steps 1-4). Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of
proof shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial
gainful activity (step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the
decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745
F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
B.

Failure to Discuss Opinion Evidence in the form of a Functional Capacity
Evaluation (“FCE”)

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred by failing to mention or discuss Dr. Rodgers’
opinion set forth in a FCE performed on June 27, 2016. (ECF No. 17, p. 10-12). The amount
of weight accorded to medical opinions is well-established. Generally, the ALJ will give more
weight to the opinion of a source who has examined the claimant than to a non-examining
source. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(1). In addition, the ALJ generally will give more weight to
opinions from a treating physician, “since these sources are likely to be the medical
professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant’s] medical
impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be
obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations,
such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.” Id. § 416.927(c)(2). If the ALJ finds
that “a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of [a claimant’s]
impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence [of] record,” he must give

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that opinion controlling weight. Id. Also, “the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a
whole, the more weight [the ALJ generally] will give to that opinion.” Id. § 416.927(c)(4).
In the event of conflicting medical evidence, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has explained:
“A cardinal principle guiding disability determinations is that the ALJ accord
treating physicians’ reports great weight, especially ‘when their opinions reflect
expert judgment based on continuing observation of the patient’s condition over a
prolonged period of time.’” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999)). However, “where. .
. the opinion of a treating physician conflicts with that of a non-treating, nonexamining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit” and may reject the
treating physician’s assessment if such rejection is based on contradictory
medical evidence. Id. Similarly, under 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2), the opinion of a
treating physician is to be given controlling weight only when it is well-supported
by medical evidence and is consistent with other evidence in the record.
Becker v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., No. 10-2517, 2010 WL 5078238, at *5 (3d Cir. Dec.
14, 2010). Although the ALJ may choose whom to credit when faced with a conflict, he “cannot
reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Security, 577
F.3d 500, 505 (3d Cir. 2009).
In this case, Plaintiff submits that the ALJ completely failed to weigh the opinions of Dr.
Rodgers set forth in the FCE. (ECF No. 10, p. 2). As a result, Plaintiff submits that remand is
warranted. Id. After a review of the evidence, I agree.
While the ALJ need only discuss the most pertinent, relevant evidence bearing upon a
claimant’s disability status, he/she must provide sufficient discussion to allow the court to
determine whether any rejection of potentially pertinent, relevant evidence was proper. Johnson
v. Comm’r of SS, 529 F.3d 198, 203-04 (3d Cir. 2008). To that end, an ALJ must provide
sufficient explanation of his/her final determination to provide a reviewing court with the benefit
of the factual basis underlying the ultimate disability finding. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705
(3d Cir. 1981).

“’In the absence of such an indication, the reviewing court cannot tell if

significant probative evidence was not credited or simply ignored.’” Burnett v. Comm’r of SS,

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220 F.3d 112, 121-22 (3d Cir. 2000), quoting Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981);
Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 44 (3d Cir. 2001).

An ALJ’s findings should be as

“comprehensive and analytical as feasible,” so that the reviewing court may properly exercise its
duties under 42 U.S.C. §405(g). Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705.
In the present case, I find the ALJ failed to meet this standard. As Defendant
acknowledges, the ALJ did not recognize or weigh the opinions of Dr. Rodgers set forth in the
FCE. See, ECF No. 19, p. 10 and ECF No. 8-7, p. 2-9.

As a result, I am unable to tell if the

ALJ considered and rejected and/or accepted the opinion or if she failed to consider the same.
The doctor’s opinions, as part of the record, should have been discussed.
404.1527; 416.927.

20 C.F.R. §§

“Although the ALJ ‘may properly accept some parts of the medical

evidence and reject other parts ... he must consider all of the evidence and give some reason
for discounting the evidence he rejects.’” See Lanza v. Astrue, No. 08-301, 2009 WL 1147911,
at *7 (W.D. Pa. April 28, 2009), quoting Colon v. Barnhart, 424 F.Supp.2d 805, 812 (E.D. Pa
2006). The ALJ’s failure to discuss the opinion of Dr. Rodgers prohibits me from conducting a
proper and meaningful review.
In opposition, Defendant suggests that the error is harmless because Dr. Rodgers’
opinions would not have changed the opinion of the ALJ such that remand is not warranted.
(ECF No. 19, p. 10).

A simple comparison of the RFC and Dr. Rodgers’ opinions reveals that

they are not the same. Compare, ECF No. 8-2, pp. 21-22 with ECF No. 8-27, pp. 2-9. For
example, the sit/stand option is different. Id. It is not for me to guess why the ALJ rejected said
evidence. Rather, it is for the ALJ, in the first instance, to review and explain the rejection of
medical opinion evidence in relation to all of the other evidence. Therefore, I am prohibited from
conducting a meaningful and proper review. Consequently, remand is warranted.2
An appropriate order shall follow.
2

Plaintiff raises various other arguments in his brief regarding the weighing of medical opinion evidence.
(ECF No. 17, pp. 12-17). Since I am remanding as set forth above, these issues will be reevaluated, de
novo, as well. Therefore, I need not consider the details of the arguments it at this time.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JENNIFER L. SNYDER,

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Plaintiff,
-vsNANCY A. BERRYHILL,3
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 18-77

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

ORDER OF COURT
THEREFORE, this 13th day of March, 2019, it is ordered that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 16) is granted and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Docket No. 18) is denied.
It is further ordered that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is hereby
vacated and the case is remanded for further administrative proceedings consistent with the
foregoing opinion.

BY THE COURT:
s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
United States Senior District Judge

3

Nancy A. Berryhill became acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, replacing
Carolyn W. Colvin.

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