CAMPBELL v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Mark R. Hornak on 7/18/18. (jad)

.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SARAH CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

V.

)
)

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY
COMPANY,
Defendant.

2: l 8-cv-00292

)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Mark R. Hornak, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Sarah Campbell filed suit against State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. ("State
Farm") for Breach of Contract (Count I) for failure to pay for fire damage to Plaintiffs home and
for Bad Faith (Count II) for denying the claim for coverage without a legal basis to do so. (Am.
Compl., ECF No. 11.) Now before the Court is State Farm's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12).
For the reasons that follow, State Farm's Motion is granted.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows dismissal of a claim for "failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When reviewing a Rule
12(b)( 6) motion, the Court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of
the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764
F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d
Cir. 2008)). Plaintiffs factual allegations must "raise a right to relief above the speculative level"
and state a "plausible claim for relief' to survive a motion to dismiss. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The Court need not accept as true any unsupported conclusions,

.-

.

unsupported inferences, and "threadbare recitals of elements of a cause of action." Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Count I of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint for Breach of Contract fails to state a claim
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The relevant insurance policy, attached to the Amended
Complaint 1 provides coverage, as relevant to Count I, for the dwelling in question. See Ex. 1Policy, ECF No. 11-1. However, the insurance policy defines a dwelling as one "used principally
as a private residence on the residence premises shown in the Declarations." (See ECF No. 111, at 5.) "Residence Premises" is then defined as "where [the insured] reside[s] and which is
shown in the Declaration." (Id.) The Court concludes this language is not ambiguous. In order
for the Plaintiff to have coverage for the physical structure in question, the Plaintiff must
"reside" at the covered property for the policy to provide coverage for the loss.
Pennsylvania's Supreme Court defines "resides" under the "classic definition of
'residence"': "a factual place of abode evidenced by a person's physical presence in a particular
place." In re Residence Hearing Before the Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 744 A.2d 1272, 1275 (Pa. 2000)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Plaintiffs reliance on her intention to return to the
dwelling at a future date after the fire loss in this case, accepted as true at this procedural
juncture, does not establish "residence" at the premises and, thus, does not entitle Plaintiff to
coverage under the insurance policy for the loss at issue in this case. Plaintiffs factual
allegations surrounding her relationship to the dwelling-keeping up with insurance premiums,
tending to the lawn, periodic visits, and keeping several items of furniture on the premise2-are

1

"A copy ofa written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes." Fed. R.
Civ. P. I0(c). "Generally, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, a district court relies on the complaint, attached exhibits,
and matters of public record." Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263,268 (3d Cir. 2007).
2

Am. Comp!., ECF No. 111110, 20.

.

.

insufficient to establish a plausible claim of residency given that it is undisputed that she had not
lived there for two (2) years. See Ex. 3-Swom Statement by Sarah Campbell, ECF No. 11-3, at
8, 10, 25. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to show that Defendant breached its duty to pay for the
alleged fire damage.
The Court also concludes that further leave to amend would be futile. The pleadings
show that Plaintiff did not keep up utilities on the premises, she changed her mailing address to a
different premise, she was behind on her property taxes, and she stated that she had "moved out"
two years prior to the date of the loss. Ex. 3-Swom Statement by Sarah Campbell, ECF No. 113, at 8, 10, 25. At Oral Argument, Plaintiff's counsel was unable to articulate any additional facts
beyond what is in the Amended Complaint and attached exhibits that would suggest leave to
amend would result in a plausible claim for breach of contract.
Count II of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, ECF No. 11, for Insurance Bad Faith is
hereby dismissed. In light of the dismissal of the Breach of Contract claim, the Bad Faith claim
cannot survive. Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 742, 751 n.9 (3d Cir.
1999) ("[W]here there was no duty to defend, there was good cause to refuse to defend against a
suit.").
The Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice in its entirety. An appropriate Order
will follow.

The Hon. Mark R. Hornak
United States District Judge
cc: All Counsel of record