THURSTON v. BERRYHILL

Filing 15

OPINION and ORDER granting 9 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 13 Motion for Summary Judgment. It is further ordered that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is hereby vacated and the case is remanded for further administrative proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 5/14/19. (slh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHARLES NEIL THURSTON,

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Plaintiff,
-vsNANCY A. BERRYHILL,1
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 18-390

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

OPINION
Pending before the Court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 9 and
13). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (ECF Nos. 10 and 14). After
careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth below,
I am granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 9) and denying Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 13).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security denying his applications for supplemental security income and disability insurance
benefits pursuant to the Social Security Act. Plaintiff filed his applications alleging he has been
disabled since December 31, 2013. (ECF No. 7-7, p. 2). Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”),
Christian Bareford, held a hearing on December 6, 2016. (ECF No. 7-3, pp. 19-46). On March
14, 2017, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act.

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Nancy A. Berryhill became acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, replacing
Carolyn W. Colvin.

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(ECF No. 7-3, pp. 5-14).
After exhausting all administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed the instant action with this court.
The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 9 and 13). The issues
are now ripe for review.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner’s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as “more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d
900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Additionally,
the Commissioner’s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. 42
U.S.C. §405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A district court
cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision or re-weigh the evidence of
record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's findings of
fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if the court
would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir.
1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however, the district
court must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. §706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).

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The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use when
evaluating the disabled status of each claimant.

20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a).

The ALJ must

determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,
whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) if the
impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant’s impairments
prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity.
20 C.F.R. §404.1520.

The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by medical

evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4). Dobrowolsky, 606
F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner
to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful activity (step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the decision
with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210,
221 (3d Cir. 1984).
B.

Weighing of Opinion Evidence in Determining a Residual Functional
Capacity (RFC)2

In this case, the ALJ determined Plaintiff has the RFC3 to perform light work with various

Plaintiff raises six arguments. (ECF No. 10, p. 3). I find Plaintiff’s argument regarding the weighing of
opinion evidence to be a threshold argument and, therefore, discuss that argument first.
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RFC refers to the most a claimant can still do despite his/her limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a),
416.945(a). The assessment must be based upon all of the relevant evidence, including the medical
records, medical source opinions, and the individual’s subjective allegations and description of his/her
own limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3). Additionally, a person’s RFC is an
administrative finding reserved for the ALJ, not a medical opinion to be rendered by a doctor. 20 C.F.R.
§§404.1527, 416.927; 20 C.F.R. §§404.1546(c), 416.946(c).

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physical limitations. (ECF No. 7-3, p. 8). Plaintiff submits that the ALJ improperly based his
RFC assessment on his own medical analysis of his impairment. (ECF No. 10, pp. 3, 12-13,15).
In support of the same, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ rejected all opinion evidence and then
proceeded to formulate an RFC based on his own interpretation of the medical evidence. Id.
As such, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence and
remand is appropriate. Id. After a review of the record, I agree.
In this case, the ALJ gave little weight to all of the opinion evidence. (ECF No. 7-3, pp.
11-12). After discounting all of the opinion evidence, there is no other opinion evidence of record
regarding Plaintiff’s functional abilities upon which the ALJ could have relied upon in forming the
RFC for Plaintiff. Id. Yet, the ALJ formulated an RFC with various limitations. (ECF No. 7-3, p.
8). “Rarely can a decision be made regarding a claimant’s [RFC] without an assessment from a
physician regarding the functional abilities of the claimant.” Gormont v. Astrue, No. 11-2145,
2013 WL 791455 at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2013), citing Doak v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1986).
Furthermore, “an administrative law judge lacks the expertise to ascertain a claimant's residual
functional capacity from raw medical data.” Moffatt v. Astrue, No. CIV.A. 10-226, 2010 WL
3896444, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2010) (citations omitted). Additionally, I note that the ALJ
found Plaintiff’s symptoms “are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence” and Plaintiff’s allegations are “out of proportion to and inconsistent with the evidence
of record.” (ECF No. 7-3, pp. 9, 11). Consequently, after a review of the record, I find the ALJ’s
opinion is not based on substantial evidence and remand is warranted.4
An appropriate order shall follow.

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Since I am remanding as set forth above, the other issues raised by Plaintiff will be reevaluated, de
novo, as well. Therefore, I need not consider the details of the argument it at this time. I do note for
clarity purposes, however, that on remand the ALJ should address Plaintiff’s alleged asthma.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHARLES NEIL THURSTON,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
-vsNANCY A. BERRYHILL,5
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 18-390

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

ORDER OF COURT
THEREFORE, this 14th day of, 2019, it is ordered that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 9) is granted and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 13)
is denied.
It is further ordered that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is hereby
vacated and the case is remanded for further administrative proceedings consistent with the
foregoing opinion.

BY THE COURT:
s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
United States Senior District Judge

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Nancy A. Berryhill became acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, replacing
Carolyn W. Colvin.

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