LINGARD v. BERRYHILL
Filing
14
ORDER denying 10 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 12 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 4/20/20. (cha)
Case 2:19-cv-00471-DWA Document 14 Filed 04/20/20 Page 1 of 8
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
HOLLEN ADRIENNE LINGARD
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Plaintiff,
-vsANDREW M. SAUL,
Defendant.
Civil Action 19-471
AMBROSE, Senior District Judge.
OPINION AND ORDER
Synopsis
Hollen Adrienne Lingard (“Lingard”) seeks review of a decision denying her claim
for supplemental security income under Titles XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c. Lingard alleges an onset of disability of June 30, 2015. (R. 122) Her claim was
denied initially. Following a video hearing during which Lingard and a vocational expert
(“VE”) appeared and testified, the ALJ denied benefits. Ultimately this appeal followed.
The parties have filed Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. See ECF Docket Nos. 10
and 12. For the reasons set forth below, the ALJ’s decision is affirmed.
Opinion
1. Standard of Review
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decisions on disability claims is provided
by statute. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3)(7). Section 405(g) permits a district court
to review the transcripts and records on which a determination of the Commissioner is
based, and the court will review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. § 706. When
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reviewing a decision, the district court’s role is limited to determining whether the record
contains substantial evidence to support an ALJ’s findings of fact. Burns v. Barnhart,
312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence has been defined as “more than
a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate.” Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Determining whether substantial evidence exists is
“not merely a quantitative exercise.” Gilliland v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 178, 183 (3d Cir.
1986) (citing Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983)). “A single piece of
evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if the secretary ignores, or fails to resolve,
a conflict created by countervailing evidence. Nor is evidence substantial if it is
overwhelmed by other evidence – particularly certain types of evidence (e.g., that
offered by treating physicians).” Id. The Commissioner’s findings of fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606
F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979); Richardson, 402 U.S. at 390, 91 S. Ct. 1420.
A district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision, or
re-weigh the evidence; the court can only judge the propriety of the decision with
reference to the grounds invoked by the Commissioner when the decision was
rendered. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998); S.E.C. v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-7, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947). Otherwise stated, “I
may not weigh the evidence or substitute my own conclusion for that of the ALJ. I must
defer to the ALJ’s evaluation of evidence, assessment of the credibility of witnesses,
and reconciliation of conflicting expert opinions. If the ALJ’s findings of fact are
supported by substantial evidence, I am bound by those findings, even if I would have
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decided the factual inquiry differently.” Brunson v. Astrue, 2011 WL 2036692, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 55457 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2011) (citations omitted).
II. The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ denied benefits at the fifth step of the analysis. More specifically, at step
one, the ALJ found that Lingard has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the
alleged onset date. (R. 124) At step two, the ALJ concluded that Lingard suffers from
the following severe impairments: hypertension, cardiomyopathy, congestive heart
failure, asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), obesity, major
depressive disorder, and an anxiety disorder. (R. 124-125) At step three, the ALJ
determined that Lingard did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1. (R. 125-127) Between steps three and four, the ALJ decided that
Lingard had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with certain
restrictions. (R. 127-131) At the fourth step of the analysis, the ALJ concluded that
Lingard was unable to perform her past relevant work. (R. 131) Ultimately, at the fifth
step of the analysis, the ALJ concluded that, considering Lingard’s age, education, work
experience, and RFC, jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that she
could have performed. (R. 131-132)
III. Discussion
(1) Step Two – Severe Impairments
As stated above, at the second step of the analysis, the ALJ must assess whether
the claimant has a medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments
that is severe. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) “The severity test at step two is a ‘de
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minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims.’” McCrea v. Commissioner of
Social Security, 370 F.3d 357, 360-61 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). An impairment
is severe if it significantly limits a claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic
work activities. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(c); 20 C.F.R. § 1521(a). If a claimant is found to
have a severe impairment, the analysis proceeds to the next step. Here, Lingard
challenges the ALJ’s findings with regard to what were medically determinable
impairments and what impairments were “severe.”
Specifically, Lingard urges that the ALJ erred in finding that her bipolar disorder and
seizure disorder were not medically determinable impairments. After careful
consideration, I find that Lingard’s arguments amount to mere disagreement with the
ALJ’s decision. She points to medical records in support of her position but fails to
acknowledge the evidence that contradicts her position and which was relied upon by
the ALJ. My task here is not to re-weigh the evidence but to determine whether
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. See Perkins v. Barnhart, 79 Fed.
Appx. 512, 514-515 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Perkins’s argument here amounts to no more than
a disagreement with the ALJ’s decision, which is soundly supported by substantial
evidence.”) The ALJ cites to substantial record evidence indicating that Lingard was
diagnosed with major depressive disorder rather than bipolar disorder1 and that she had
no ongoing treatment for a seizure disorder.2 Nor am I convinced that the ALJ erred in
Lingard relies upon a record from a 2017 hospitalization which references “bipolar 2 disorder, major depressive
disorder.” (R. 1387-88) That notation is authored by Dr. Ryan Bierkortte. Yet, on the discharge paperwork from that
same hospitalization, the record indicates only major depressive disorder as noted by the ALJ. Significantly, Dr.
Bierkortte acknowledged, on this discharge, “I personally examined this patient and directed their care. I reviewed
this note and with my edits agree with it in its entirety.” (R. 1348)
2
References to a seizure disorder, or syncope, were simply included in Lingard’s medical records as “past medical
history.” (R. 713, 717, 725, 1007, 1040, 1044, 1048, 1052, 1337 and 1342) As the ALJ observed, Lingard “has not
subsequently been work up for, diagnosed with, or treated for a seizure disorder.” (R. 124-25)
1
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not finding that PTSD and / or adjustment disorder constitute medically determinable
impairments. The evidence to which Lingard cites all discuss “past medical history.”
There is no indication that either condition is ongoing or that she is being treated for
either PTSD or an adjustment disorder as a current condition. Consequently, I find no
error in the ALJ’s decision not to include them as medically determinable impairments.
I also reject Lingard’s contention that the ALJ erred in discounting the severity of her
major depression and anxiety. In fact, the ALJ found that each condition constituted a
severe medically determinable impairment. (R. 124) Lingard faults the ALJ for
disregarding certain evidence concerning her conditions but acknowledges that “some
of the Mercy Behavioral Health records were not available to the ALJ….” See ECF
Docket No. 11, p. 11 n. 2.3 Lingard does not ask this Court to remand based upon the
“new” evidence. Rather, she insists that the ALJ ignored evidence in the record at that
time regarding her depression and anxiety. As set forth below, I reject Lingard’s
argument and find that substantial evidence of record supports the ALJ’s finding.
(2) Step Three – Listings
Lingard contends that the ALJ erred in finding that her mental conditions do not meet
or equal the severity of listings 12.04 and 12.06. Lingard’s argument is unpersuasive for
several reasons. First, she does not identify specifically what part of the ALJ’s analysis
was erroneous. The ALJ made numerous findings under both paragraphs B and C of
Listing 12.04 and 12.06. Yet Lingard does not explain how the ALJ’s findings regarding
3
Indeed, these records were first submitted to the Appeals Council. The Appeals Council reviewed the additional
110 pages from mercy Behavioral Health dated February 1, 2017 through November 14, 2017 but concluded that the
evidence did not show a reasonable probability that it would change the outcome of the decision. (R. 1-2) My review
of an ALJ’s decision is limited to the evidence that was before him. I cannot look at the post-decision evidence. 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
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the ability to understand, remember, or apply information; to interact with others; to
concentrate, persist or maintain pace; to adapt or manage oneself was not supported by
substantial evidence of record. Nor does she describe how the ALJ’s findings regarding
her alleged “marginal adjustment” were erroneous. Nor does she identify precisely how
her mental impairments satisfied the requirements of either paragraphs B or C. Second,
she focuses upon records which she insists supports her claim.4 The question before
me is not whether substantial evidence of record supports Lingard’s contentions. This is
not a de novo review of evidence. “Substantial evidence could support both Plaintiff’s
claims and the ALJ’s finding because substantial evidence is less than a
preponderance.” Jesurum v. Sec’y. of U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d
114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) … If substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding, it does not
matter if substantial evidence also supports Plaintiff’s claims.” Hundley v. Colvin, 2016
WL 6647913, * 2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2016) (citations omitted). I find that substantial
evidence of record supports the ALJ’s findings regarding Listings 12.04 and 12.06. As
the ALJ noted, Lingard has only mild and moderate limitations with respect to the
paragraph B criteria and, with respect to the paragraph C criteria, the record does not
include any indication that she has a “marginal adjustment” as a result of her mental
impairments. (R. 126, 637-39, 660-62, 681-90, 706-10, 1341-56) Consequently, I find
no basis for remand.
(3) Residual Functional Capacity
4
As set forth elsewhere in this Opinion, Lingard urges that records from Mercy Behavioral Health support her
contention that her major depression and anxiety were severe. Yet, as Lingard concedes, the ALJ did not have access
to the vast majority of these documents. They were only supplied to the Appeals Council, which determined that the
new evidence did not show a reasonable probability of changing the outcome of the ALJ’s decision.
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Next Lingard urges that the RFC analysis was not supported by substantial evidence
of record. Again, Lingard’s contentions are unpersuasive. Her argument is premised
upon the success of her assertions at Step Two. That is, in formulating an RFC, an ALJ
must consider all of a claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including any
non-severe impairments identified by the ALJ at step two of his analysis. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(2). According to Lingard, the ALJ should have included the conditions of
bipolar disorder, seizure disorder, PTSD and adjustment disorder in formulating the
RFC. Yet, as set forth above, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that
those conditions do not constitute medically determinable impairments. As such, the
ALJ was not required to consider them in formulating the RFC.5
(4) Hypothetical
Finally, Lingard contends that the ALJ relied upon an inaccurate hypothetical. She
reasons that the hypothetical was premised upon the formulation of a faulty RFC. It is
well-established that a hypothetical question must include all of a claimant’s “credibly
established limitations.” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005). Here,
the ALJ posed a hypothetical to the VE which accurately reflected the limitations set
forth in the RFC. As stated above, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s formulation
of the RFC. Consequently, the ALJ did not err in posing the hypothetical or in relying
upon the VE’s response that an individual with such limitations could perform the
representative unskilled, light jobs such as a garment sorter, shirt folder, and marker.
(R. 132, 151). As such, remand is unwarranted.
5
Lingard also urges that the ALJ erred in his assessment of opinion evidence. This argument consists of 6 sentences
and is bereft of citation to case law or the record. It is wholly undeveloped and I decline to consider it for this
reason. See Pennsylvania v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 101 F.3d 939, 945 (3d Cir. 1996) (conclusory
assertions are not enough and arguments presented in such a fashion are waived).
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
HOLLEN ADRIENNE LINGARD
Plaintiff,
-vs-
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
ANDREW M. SAUL,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 19-471
AMBROSE, Senior District Judge.
ORDER OF COURT
Therefore, this 20th day of April, 2020, it is hereby ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 10) is DENIED and the Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 12) is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that the
Clerk of Courts mark this case “Closed” forthwith.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
United States Senior District Judge
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