SOLOMON v. PARENTE et al

Filing 74

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 55 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by ANTHONY PARENTE. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Dodge on 5/9/2024. (mqe)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
HEATHER SOLOMON,
Plaintiff,
vs
ANTHONY PARENTE,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 2:21-1750
Magistrate Judge Dodge

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Heather Solomon brings this action against Defendant Anthony Parente
(“Trooper Parente”), a law enforcement officer employed by the Pennsylvania State Police
(“PSP”). She alleges that he denied her the equal protection of the law based on her gender when
he failed to respond to her repeated requests for help after her estranged husband, William
Solomon II (“Solomon”) violated a protection from abuse order (“PFA”).
Currently pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. For
the reasons that follow, the motion will be denied. 1
I.

Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action on December 1, 2021. Federal question jurisdiction is

based on the § 1983 civil rights claim in Count I, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3). Count I asserts a
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim.
The Complaint also named Solomon as a defendant and asserted claims against him for
intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count II), trespass (Count III) and assault and battery
(Count IV). By Memorandum Opinion and Order filed on July 26, 2022 (ECF Nos. 27, 28),
1

The parties have fully consented to jurisdiction by a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c)(1). (ECF Nos. 21, 25)

Solomon’s motion to dismiss was granted and he was dismissed as a defendant in the case.
Therefore, only Count I, the equal protection claim against Trooper Parente, remains to be
resolved.
On December 4, 2023, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 55),
which has been fully briefed (ECF Nos. 56, 67, 71).
II.

Relevant Factual Background 2
At the time of the events herein, Plaintiff was married to Solomon, the father of her infant

son. Plaintiff and Solomon were separated as of June 12, 2020, and their divorce was finalized in
November of 2022. Plaintiff was living in the marital residence in Brownsville, Pennsylvania.
(Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute (“DSMF”) ¶¶ 2-4; Plaintiff’s
Counterstatement of Material Facts (“PCSMF”) ¶¶ 2-4.) 3
A. Events Leading to Plaintiff’s First Encounter with Trooper Parente
On or about July 27, 2020, Judge Linda Cordaro of the Fayette County Court of Common
Pleas granted a final PFA that directed Solomon not to “abuse, harass, stalk, threaten, or attempt
or threaten to use physical force against Plaintiff” and ordered that he “shall not contact [her] . . .
by telephone or any other means, including third persons.” (DSMF ¶ 5; PCSMF ¶¶ 5, 54.) The
order further provided that in the event of a violation, an arrest can be made based solely on
probable cause without the necessity of a warrant and need not be in the presence of a law
enforcement officer. (PCSMF ¶¶ 13, 55.)
On November 28, 2020, Solomon sent Plaintiff an email which she reported to the PSP.
Trooper Zachary Casini was dispatched to Plaintiff’s home and viewed Plaintiff’s cell phone and
2

There are a number of disputed facts in the record, only some of which are relevant to the
Court’s analysis. For that reason, the Court will provide a detailed summary of the disputed facts
only as necessary.
3
ECF No. 57; ECF No. 65.
2

the email from Solomon. Trooper Casini informed Plaintiff that he “would attempt to make
contact and arrest” Solomon. Trooper Casini attempted to contact Solomon but was
unsuccessful. Trooper Casini then charged Solomon for violating the PFA and issued a warrant
for his arrest. Solomon was later found guilty at a trial in December 2022. (PCSMF ¶ 57.) 4
Plaintiff received another email from Solomon’s email address on December 1, 2020. It
stated: “Where is [Plaintiff’s minor child”]? The email attached three photographs taken from
across the street from her residence which showed her placing her children into her car. (PCSMF
¶ 58; DSMF ¶¶ 12, 14.) 5 Plaintiff attempted to report this incident to Brownsville Police, but no
one was available to take her report. As a result, Plaintiff went to the PSP barracks in Belle
Vernon, where she reported the email contact by Solomon to Trooper Parente. (DSMF ¶¶ 10-11;
PCSMF ¶ 58.) 6 Plaintiff also showed Trooper Parente a copy of the PFA and told him about
other incidents in which Solomon threatened and stalked her. (PCSMF ¶¶ 59, 61.)
Plaintiff states that Trooper Parente testified that he reviewed the relevant PFA and was
aware that Solomon was not permitted to contact her, either directly or indirectly. He stated,
however, that “I also have to prove that Mr. Solomon . . . was sending these emails himself
physically, and I have to take that case to court.” (PCSMF ¶¶ 79-80.) Trooper Parente claims that
he did not perceive the photographs attached to the email to as threatening. (PCSMF ¶ 60.)

4

In Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Additional Material Facts (ECF No. 72), he
“disputes” Plaintiff’s statement about this incident (DRPSAMF ¶ 57), but his reference is to his
own deposition testimony regarding the conflicting reports he claimed to have received about the
December 1, 2020 incident, as described herein. Defendant’s Concise Statements do not address
the November 28 incident. Thus, Plaintiff’s description of this incident is undisputed.
5
Defendant’s version of what Plaintiff reported about the contents of the email—namely that it
“asked questions concerning her infant son” (DSMF ¶ 14)—is not supported by the subsequently
issued investigative report and downplays the underlying threat expressed in the message.
6
Trooper Parente has been employed as a state trooper since 2019. During the times relevant to
this action, Trooper Parente was assigned to Troop B, working at the Belle Vernon Station in
Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania. (DSMF ¶¶ 6-7.)
3

Plaintiff also tried to show Trooper Parente a video she had taken on her cell phone of an
incident in August 2020, after the issuance of the PFA, during which Solomon arrived at the
house with a firearm, and barricaded himself in a room with her infant son. Trooper Parente
refused to look at the video because he deemed it to be “irrelevant” to his investigation. (PCSMF
¶¶ 65-66.) 7 According to Plaintiff, he told her: “You have to understand that this is an issue with
the PFA and women, not men. Women get PFAs all of the time and they abuse the power of it
because they use it as a way to try to get back at an ex.” (PCSMF ¶ 70.) Trooper Parente denies
making this statement. (DRPSAMF ¶ 70.)
Trooper Parente also utilized the computer-aided dispatch (“CAD”), PSP’s “documenting
system,” during his investigation. CAD identified previous PFA violations between the parties,
including the November 28, 2020 PFA violation against Solomon. Trooper Parente did not view
these past violations as relevant (PCSMF ¶ 71), and although it would be necessary to read the
underlying report to obtain anything other than basic information, he did not do so. In the portion
of his investigative report that asks about prior incidents of domestic violence or PFA violations,
he provided no detail and merely referred to CAD. (PCSMF ¶¶ 72-74.)
Trooper Parente acknowledges that he had the authority to file criminal charges related to
violations of PFA orders but he would sometimes contact the local district attorney’s office if he
needed guidance. (DSMF ¶¶ 8-9.) Plaintiff disputes that it was necessary for him to consult with
7

While Trooper Parente asserts that this is “not material” (DRPSAMF ¶ 66), among the issues in
this case is the nature of Trooper Parente’s response to Plaintiff’s reports of harassment by
Solomon. Notably, John Marshall, who was Fayette County’s Chief County Detective at the time
and had previously worked for the PSP for 23 years as a criminal investigator, met with Plaintiff
in July 2021 and watched the video from the August 2020 incident that Trooper Parente refused
to review. Although he did not rely on it for his investigation, he testified that he would never
refuse to review such evidence since it would be relevant in a subsequent PFA violation
investigation. Detective Marshall charged Solomon with terroristic threats and simple assault and
Solomon accepted a plea offer regarding these charges. (PCSMF ¶¶ 67-69.)
4

or obtain approval from the district attorney’s office before filing charges for a PFA violation.
(PCSMF ¶ 9.) 8
After meeting with Plaintiff, Trooper Parente opened an investigation and wrote that
Plaintiff “report[ed] an alleged PFA Violation between her and her Ex-Husband William
SOLOMON.” (DSMF ¶ 13; PCSMF ¶ 58.) 9 Trooper Parente then contacted Solomon, who
claimed that he did not send the emails. Although he admitted that it was his email address,
Solomon claimed that Plaintiff had multiple devices with access to his email address and accused
her of sending the emails to herself. (DSMF ¶ 15.) In response to Trooper Parente’s inquiry as to
why Solomon did not terminate this as his email address if Plaintiff was using it in this manner,
Solomon claimed that this was his contact with his employer. Trooper Parente did not conduct an
in-person interview of Solomon nor did he ask him to provide a statement. (PCSMF ¶¶ 62-64.)
Because he had what he characterized as conflicting reports, Trooper Parente did not
charge Solomon with a PFA violation with respect to the December 1, 2020 email. Rather, he
states that he contacted Assistant District Attorney Christina DeMarco for “further guidance” and
that she advised that he “should attempt to ascertain a search warrant for the IP address
origination source for the email in question.” (DSMF ¶¶ 15-17.) 10

8

Plaintiff states that Fayette County District Attorney Bower told her that he would have acted
immediately upon the information she provided to Trooper Parente. Moreover, Trooper Thasic,
who is from the same barracks as Trooper Parente, told her that when a PFA violation is
reported, they are to file charges “immediately” and depending on the evidence, “they’ll drop it
or keep it for trial.” When she asked Trooper Thasic why the district attorney’s office would
need to be contacted before charges are filed, he responded “I don’t know.” (PCSMF ¶¶ 9, 25,
56.)
9
Plaintiff disputes that this was an “alleged” PFA violation given that the nature of Solomon’s
email. (PCSMF ¶ 13.)
10
Plaintiff denies that Trooper Parente had “conflicting reports,” citing to the PFA’s directive
against any contact by Solomon, her own statements, the email and photographs, and the CAD
information reflecting prior PFA violations. (PCSMF ¶ 16.)
5

B. Plaintiff’s Report to Trooper Parente on January 2, 2021
According to Plaintiff, she received another email from Solomon on January 2, 2021, in
which Solomon threatened to kill her and police officers. The email states: “I’m ending your life
sooner than later watch me[.] Oh and fuck officer brandt, I’m trained to kill him to[o] and all the
other corrupt cops that you involve in everything . . . die bitch [. . .] I’ll remove the brakes from
your car when you’re sleeping and shoot up your gas tank while you’re in it.” (PCSMF ¶ 81.)
Plaintiff first attempted to report receipt of this email to the Charleroi Police, her local
police agency, but was directed to the Belle Vernon Barracks of the PSP. Plaintiff provided PSP
with her name and phone number and indicated that she had to report a PFA violation. (PCSMF
¶ 18.)
Trooper Parente states that he took Plaintiff’s statement and opened a second
investigation, then contacted Solomon. (DSMF ¶¶ 18-20.) Plaintiff contends that Trooper
Parente first contacted Solomon, who denied sending the email and said that he believed Plaintiff
was sending them to herself. Trooper Parente then called Plaintiff and told her “I already talked
to your ex-husband before I called you just now, and he told me that you have a computer there
that is his and he believes that you are emailing yourself.” He asked her to bring Solomon’s
laptop to the PSP barracks. (PCSMF ¶¶ 18-20.) According to Trooper Parente, Plaintiff claimed
she didn’t have it. (DSMF ¶ 23.) Plaintiff states that she informed Trooper Parente that Solomon
left his desktop computer at her residence, not his laptop computer as Solomon had claimed, and
Trooper Parente instructed her to bring in his desktop computer. (PCSMF ¶¶ 18, 85.)
Plaintiff brought Trooper Parente the desktop computer per his instruction, but he refused
to look at it. Plaintiff testified that Trooper Parente said:
I am not doing anything about this.” He said, “I already contacted the district
attorney’s office.” And he made me do a statement, he is like, “Here, do another
6

written statement.” And then he said to me that as soon as he hears something
from the district attorney, he will let me know, but he was currently trying to get
in touch with I believe Google. He told me, he looked right at me and said, “If I
find out that you did this, I am going to arrest you for lying to law enforcement.”
And that was it. And then he left me sitting there and made me take the computer
and left with my 10 month old infant.
(PCSMF ¶¶ 87-89.)
Trooper Parente denies Plaintiff’s version of events. (DRPSAMF ¶¶ 87-88.) He states
that he refused to take the desktop computer because it did not match Solomon’s description of
the laptop computer. (DSMF ¶¶ 23-24; PCSMF ¶ 90.)
Trooper Parente did not ask Solomon to attend an in-person interview or to provide a
written or recorded statement. He asserts that he does not take written statements from parties if
someone refuses to provide a statement, they are “not there,” or if there is evidence of physical
injury in a domestic violence situation. (PCSMF ¶¶ 20-21.) Further, he did not interpret the
January 2, 2021 email as a “direct threat to me or law enforcement,” because, “I listen to it every
day, all day long at work people say things like that, of that such nature.” He admitted, however,
that threatening to kill someone can be illegal. (PCSMF ¶¶ 81-82.)
Trooper Parente stated in an attachment to his investigative report regarding the January
2, 2021, email that no weapons were threatened to be used in the incident, which testified was a
“clerical mistake.” His report also stated that Solomon was not arrested for a PFA violation with
respect to either email “pending search warrant for email address.” (PCSMF ¶¶ 83-84.)
After January 2, 2021, Plaintiff had no further contact with Trooper Parente. (PCSMF
¶ 115.)
C. Search Warrants
On February 18, 2021, Trooper Parente applied for a warrant to search Plaintiff’s
residence for an Apple laptop computer belonging to Solomon in order to investigate whether,
7

based on Solomon’s allegations, she was making false reports to law enforcement. According to
Trooper Parente, he “didn’t believe either of the parties involved . . . so I was trying to find the
truth.” (DRPSAMF ¶ 93.) Requesting a search warrant for a PFA violation was not “normal” or
“common practice.” (PCSMF ¶ 16.) In the Affidavit of Probable Cause submitted to support the
issuance of a search warrant, he wrote, “[Plaintiff] related that [Solomon] has a laptop from their
previous marriage in her residence but has not turned it on. When questioned who took the
[December 1, 2020 photos], she related that she did not see anyone. The images were taken with
no obstructions and was directly across the street from her residence.” (PCSMF ¶¶ 93-94.) 11
Trooper Parente found no evidence that Plaintiff had Solomon’s laptop. However,
Solomon called him at an unspecified time after the investigation had concluded and said that he
went to Plaintiff’s house with a constable and collected his laptop computer, which had been
“wiped.” Trooper Parente did not charge Solomon for going to Plaintiff’s residence, which
would be a violation of the PFA, because Plaintiff did not report it. (PCSMF ¶¶ 100-01.)
With respect to the issuer of the emails, Trooper Parente sought guidance from ADA
DeMarco and was advised to obtain a search warrant to prove who was sending them. (DSMF
¶¶ 25-26, 102; PCSMF ¶ 102.) The first search warrant served on Google expired. A second
search warrant was served on Google, and Google responded on March 25, 2021. Trooper
Parente states that he could not determine from the information obtained from Google who sent
the emails. Therefore, he contacted the D.A.’s office and they recommended that he close the
case as there was not enough evidence to proceed to court. (DSMF ¶¶ 27-31.)

11

Trooper Parente did not go to Plaintiff’s house to see if there were no obstructions but believed
that there were none because he could not see any in the photographs. However, he admitted that
he could not tell what was behind the photograph, nor whether the individual taking the
photograph was standing behind something. (PCSMF ¶ 96.)
8

Plaintiff notes that Google responded to the search warrant as follows:
Pursuant to the Search Warrant in the above-referenced matter, we have
conducted a diligent search for documents and information accessible on
Google’s systems that are responsive to your request…Accompanying this letter
is responsive information to the extent reasonably accessible from our system
associated with the Google account(s) [e-mail], as specified
in the Search Warrant. We have also included a signed Certificate of Authenticity
which includes a list of hash values that correspond to each file contained in the
production.
(PCSMF ¶¶ 30, 103.) On April 27, 2021, Trooper Parente reported that, “A report was received
from Google corp detailing the IP address associated with the email account.” He testified that he
did not know what this information meant but took no steps to obtain any understanding.
(PCSMF ¶ 105.) When asked why he did nothing to find the identity of the IP addresses in
Google report, he testified, “I was going investigative step by investigative step that I deemed
appropriate and then I would talk to the D.A.’s office for further guidance.” (PCSMF ¶ 107.) He
states that he provided the information received from Google to ADA DeMarco (DSMF ¶ 32)
and recommended that the case stay open pending further investigation. (PCSMF ¶ 108.)
Trooper Parente states that he spoke to Fayette County Assistant District Attorney Travis
Rhodes on October 22, 2021 and concluded that “[u]nder his advisement, this case will be closed
based on the lack of solvability factors present.” (DSMF ¶ 33.) According to Plaintiff, this
statement is at odds with Trooper Parente’s admission that evidentiary information was received
from Google. (PCSMF ¶¶ 109-10.) Trooper Parente asserts that he did not pursue criminal
charges against Solomon because he could not determine who had sent the emails. (DRPSAMF
¶ 110.)
Trooper Parente acknowledges that normally a PFA violation is filed the day it is
reported but described his investigation in this matter as an “outlier” because he had never had a
“prolonged PFA violation” like the matter involving the Plaintiff. (PCSMF ¶¶ 113-14.)
9

On or about January 4, 2021, Plaintiff obtained an “Email Audit Report” from Steel City
Developers, LLC, which detailed that the January 2, 2021 email was sent from a device at
Solomon’s address. (PCSMF ¶¶ 116-17.) Plaintiff attempted to give this report to Trooper Casini
at the hearing for the November 28, 2020, PFA Violation. However, he indicated that after
speaking to “another trooper,” he didn’t feel it was necessary to see her report. (PCSMF ¶ 118.)
In June, 2021, Plaintiff provided this email report to Fayette County District Attorney
Bower, who asked Plaintiff why charges were not filed by the PSP regarding the relevant emails.
Plaintiff informed him that Trooper Parente had told her that his investigation had to go through
DA Bower’s office. DA Bower then told Plaintiff, “No. I can tell you right now I never in a
million years would have looked at an email like this or heard a description of an email like this
and told somebody not to do something about it . . . Nobody in my office would have said that
without it going through me.” (PCSMF ¶ 119.)
Solomon was subsequently arrested and confined in the Washington County Jail based on
reports Plaintiff had made regarding other alleged PFA violations. Solomon was eventually
convicted of these other PFA violations in Washington County. (DSMF ¶¶ 35-36.)
III.

Standard of Review
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that: “The court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment
may be granted against a party who fails to adduce facts sufficient to establish the existence of
any element essential to that party’s case, and for which that party will bear the burden of proof
at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the initial
burden of identifying evidence which demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material

10

fact. Once that burden has been met, the non-moving party must set forth “specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial” or the factual record will be taken as presented by the
moving party and judgment will be entered as a matter of law. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). An issue is genuine only if the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court of Appeals has held that “where the movant bears the
burden of proof at trial and the motion does not establish the absence of a genuine factual issue,
the district court should deny summary judgment even if no opposing evidentiary matter is
presented.” National State Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 979 F.2d 1579, 1582 (3d Cir. 1992).
In following this directive, a court must take the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, and must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all doubts in that party’s
favor. Hugh v. Butler County Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 266 (3d Cir. 2005); Doe v. County of
Centre, Pa., 242 F.3d 437, 446 (3d Cir. 2001).
IV.

Discussion
A. Equal Protection Claim 12
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause states that “[n]o State shall . . .

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 1. As recently summarized by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit:
The Supreme Court has said that “the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of
the protection of equal laws.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 6 S.Ct.
1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). At bottom, the Equal Protection Clause requires equal
12

Defendant argues that there is no constitutional right to the investigation or prosecution of
another, see Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973), and that there is no
“independent due process right to be free from a reckless investigation,” Harvard v. Cesnalis,
973 F.3d 190, 207 (3d Cir. 2020). The Court agrees. However, Plaintiff does not raise due
process claims, but rather an equal protection claim, which is viable for the reasons explained in
the text.
11

treatment of “all persons similarly situated.” Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs,
Inc. v. Att’y Gen. N.J., 910 F.3d 106, 125 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Shuman ex rel.
Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2005)). “The Equal
Protection Clause does not forbid classifications.” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S.
1, 10, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992). But the distinctions between classes
“must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.” City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d
313 (1985).
Stradford v. Secretary Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 53 F.4th 67, 73 (3d Cir. 2022).
Plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated against and treated differently than Solomon,
who is not a member of her protected class, by Trooper Parente. In order to bring a successful
§ 1983 claim for the denial of equal protection, she must show that any disparate treatment was
based upon her gender. Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 151 (3d
Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). “Generally, the question of whether a plaintiff was treated
differently from others similarly situated is a fact question for the jury, but summary judgment is
appropriate where it is clear that no reasonable jury could find the similarly situated prong met.”
Balcom v. Figueroa, 2022 WL 1126051, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2022) (citation omitted),
report and recommendation adopted as modified, 2022 WL 950039 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2022).
For purposes of equal protection, “similarly situated” does not mean “identically situated.”
Rather, persons are similarly situated when they are alike “in all relevant respects.” Nordlinger,
505 U.S. at 10. See also Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 205 (3d Cir. 2020) (“courts
conducting the ‘similarly situated’ inquiry ‘should not demand exact correlation, but should
instead seek relevant similarity.’”) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff cites Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2020), in support of her
position that Plaintiff and Solomon were similarly situated for purposes of evaluating her claim.
In Harvard, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that two men involved in an altercation, one
white (Sutton) and one Black (Harvard), were similarly situated. The Third Circuit noted that
12

because their actions occurred during the same incident, they could be “easily compared side-byside.” Id. at 206. Thus, it concluded, the appropriate manner by which to evaluate the comparator
issue was not to look at their individual actions but to consider whether a juror looking
objectively at the incident would “think them roughly equivalent and protagonists similarly
situated.” Id. (internal citation omitted.)
Trooper Parente argues that the Harvard case is inapposite because it involved a matter
of selective enforcement, that is, Harvard was investigated differently and arrested in a disparate
manner from Sutton, the similarly situated party. Certainly, neither Plaintiff nor Solomon was
subject to arrest or a citation, and Plaintiff does not contend that this is a case of selective
enforcement. Notably, however, the Harvard opinion contains no limitation based on the nature
of the equal protection claim at issue and Trooper Parente has not cited any authority that
supports a conclusion that Harvard’s analysis of the issue of similarly situated individuals is
limited to a selective enforcement case.
The Court concludes that Plaintiff and Solomon, as ex-spouses who were subject to the
same PFA, were similarly situated. Both were parties to a PFA in which one alleged violations
by the other. Both were subject to an investigation of events related to possible PFA violations
and both reported their version of the same events. Thus, because their actions occurred during
the same incidents, they can be compared side-by-side.
It then becomes necessary to determine whether Plaintiff was subjected to disparate
treatment based upon her gender. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the
non-moving party, the Court concludes that there are sufficient facts of record to support
Plaintiff’s claim that she was subject to discriminatory and unequal treatment by Trooper Parente
based on her gender. She reported on two occasions to Trooper Parente that Solomon was

13

contacting her and threatening her in violation of the PFA. In addition to her own statements, she
presented evidence in the form of emails and photos and the history of previous PFA violations
by Solomon, including a threatening email that she received only three days before her first
contact with Trooper Parente. During their first meeting, Trooper Parente declined to view a
video of a prior incident involving Solomon after the PFA was entered and failed to obtain the
details of any of the prior PFA violations. While disputed, according to Plaintiff, he told her:
“You have to understand that this is an issue with the PFA and women, not men. Women get
PFAs all of the time and they abuse the power of it because they use it as a way to try to get back
at an ex.” (PCSMF ¶ 70.)
After Plaintiff’s first interaction with Trooper Parente, he contacted Solomon, who
claimed that he did not send the emails and accused Plaintiff of sending them to herself. Trooper
Parente made no effort to arrange for an interview of Solomon or further investigate how or why
Plaintiff, who had obtained a PFA and had evidence of prior violations by Solomon, would send
herself an email that included photos of herself from a distance. Instead, Trooper Parente took no
action at all based on “conflicting” reports.
After Plaintiff reported to the PSP another email from Solomon in which he threatened to
kill her, Trooper Parente first contacted Solomon rather than Plaintiff. Solomon again alleged
that Plaintiff was sending these emails. Based solely on Solomon’s claim, Trooper Parente
demanded that Plaintiff bring him Solomon’s computer. After he took her statement, he told her
that he would not do anything to enforce the PFA, but if she was lying, he would arrest her for
lying to law enforcement. Again, while claiming he didn’t believe either one of them, he took no
statement from Solomon, did not accuse him of lying or seek to obtain by warrant any electronic
device in Solomon’s possession. Instead, he obtained a search warrant for Plaintiff’s home and a

14

second one to see if she was sending emails to herself. He has admitted that his investigation was
an “outlier” as he had never had a “prolonged PFA violation.”
Thus, the trier of fact could conclude that Trooper Parente rejected Plaintiff’s
submissions out of hand, did not investigate Solomon’s history of PFA violations, downplayed
her concerns (for example, indicating her that he did not view the photos as threatening and
leaving Solomon’s threats to kill her and to use a weapon out of his report) and falsely implied
that he had to receive permission from the DA’s Office to proceed with charging Solomon with
multiple alleged PFA violations. Moreover, even when Solomon admitted to Trooper Parente
that he entered Plaintiff’s home to take his computer—in what could be a clear violation of the
PFA—Trooper Parente took no action. And despite obtaining records from Google in response to
the search warrant that was issued based on his assertion that Plaintiff, rather than Solomon, may
have been lying, he took no steps to investigate this any further.
By contrast, Trooper Parente accepted Solomon’s account at face value. He claimed that
he had to “prove” that emails sent from Solomon’s email address were sent by Solomon in order
to arrest him, but this represents an application of the wrong standard. The evidentiary standard
for probable cause “is significantly lower than the standard which is required for conviction.”
Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Indeed, as
Trooper Parente acknowledged, arrests for PFA violations are normally made the same day as
they are reported and without input from the District Attorney. And as explicitly stated in the
PFA, an arrest for its violation can be made solely on the basis of probable cause.
Further, Trooper Parente applied for a search warrant to search Plaintiff’s home for
Solomon’s laptop computer based solely upon Solomon’s unsubstantiated claim that she had
access to and used his computer. He never subjected Solomon to an in-person interview or asked

15

him to provide a written or recorded statement at any time. He spoke to Solomon, the accused,
before speaking to Plaintiff, the alleged victim, about the January 2, 2021 email. He stated that
the past PFA violations by Solomon were “not relevant” to his investigation.
Interestingly, Trooper Parente’s subsequent actions were largely based on the unverified
statements of the alleged perpetrator, Solomon. As Plaintiff notes, the application for a search
warrant stated that it was based on a “false report to a law enforcement officer” and the affidavit
of probable cause questioned how she was unable to see who took the photographs that were
attached to the email allegedly sent by Solomon. The same affidavit omitted important facts,
including Solomon’s threat to kill her and to use a weapon to do so. This evidence further
supports Plaintiff’s claim of gender bias on the part of Trooper Parente. See Harvard, 973 F.3d at
206 (noting support for claim of racial bias when the defendant officer consistently referred to
Sutton—the white comparator—as “the victim” and falsely suggested that Harvard had a prior
criminal history). Notably, Trooper Parente also attempts to place responsibility for the delays
and eventual decision not to arrest Solomon on the district attorney’s office, even though he
admitted that he did not need permission from that office to file charges against Solomon.
Simply put, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
after telling Plaintiff that women abuse the power of PFAs to get back at their ex-spouses,
Trooper Parente denigrated and ignored Plaintiff’s evidence and concerns, took no action to
investigate the alleged perpetrator while accepting his claims at face value and accused Plaintiff
of making false statements. Thus, based on the evidence of record, a fact finder could conclude
that Trooper Parente deliberately dismissed or declined to assess Plaintiff’s evidence and charge
Solomon based upon his alleged view that women abuse the power of the PFA to get back at
their ex-spouses. In short, he treated two similarly situated individuals in a FPA dispute in a

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disparate manner, and there is sufficient evidence to support a claim that it was based upon
Plaintiff’s gender. Thus, a jury will have to determine whether the actions of Trooper Parente
denied Plaintiff equal protection in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights.
V.

Conclusion
For these reasons, the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant will be denied.

An appropriate order will be entered.

Dated: May 9, 2024

/s/ Patricia L Dodge
Patricia L. Dodge
United States Magistrate Judge

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