WHITEFIELD v. GREENWALT et al
Filing
107
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER adopting Magistrate Judge's 101 Report and Recommendation, as supplemented, and granting Defendants' 95 Motion to Dismiss. Alfred Whitefield's First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims, asserte d against Defendants Strechly, Rehonic, and Traux, are dismissed with prejudice. All claims asserted against Defendant John Doe are dismissed with prejudice. Leave to amend is denied and Mr. Whitefield's 106 Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint is denied. Signed by Judge Marilyn J. Horan on 3/6/2025. (rtw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ALFRED WHITEFIELD,
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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STRECHLY, RHU Sergeant, JOHN DOE)
Captain, C/O I REHONIC, and
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C/O I TRAUX
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Defendants.
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Civil No. 22-cv-154
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
This case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly for pretrial
proceedings in accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), and
Local Rule of Civil Procedure 72. On November 6, 2024, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report
and Recommendation, recommending that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be granted and that all
claims against the three named Defendants (Strechly, Rehonic, and Traux) be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ECF No. 101. The Magistrate Judge
also recommended that all claims asserted against the John Doe Defendant be dismissed for
failure to state a claim. Id. The parties were informed that objections to the Report and
Recommendation were due by November 20, 2024, for the electronically registered Defendants,
and by November 27, 2024, for the non-electronically registered party Plaintiff. After obtaining
an extension of time, on January 31, 2025, Alfred Whitefield filed his “Objections to
Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation.” ECF No. 105. That same day, Mr. Whitefield filed
a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint. ECF No. 106.
The filing of timely objections requires the district judge to “make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1); Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1106 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
In doing so, the district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.”
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(3).
Mr. Whitefield objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation that his
First Amendment Access to Courts claim and his Procedural Due process claim be dismissed.
ECF No. 105. Briefly, Mr. Whitefield’s alleges that, in September 2021, his legal materials were
confiscated by two of the Defendants at the direction of a Third Defendant. Mr. Whitefield
requested an exemption for his legal materials. That request was denied. Mr. Whitefield
pursued his request for an exemption through the prison’s grievance system. His appeals were
denied. On April 19, 2022, however, he was granted an exemption. Instead of receiving his
legal material, he was given an empty box. He alleges that his legal materials were destroyed by
Defendants.
Also relevant to the present case, Mr. Whitefield had filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus on January 26, 2021, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Whitefield v. Krasner, Civil
No. 21-330 (ED Pa). Mr. Whitefield was represented by counsel in said habeas case. Id. Mr.
Whitefield’s petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied on September 29, 2022. Id. at ECF
No. 18. Mr. Whitefield did not file an appeal. Mr. Whitefield claims that, because the
Defendants destroyed his legal materials, he was unable to file a timely notice of appeal.
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I.
First Amendment Claim
In his Objections, Mr. Whitefield recites the factual allegations of his complaint that
support his First Amendment Access to Courts claim. ECF No. 105, at 3. He then argues that
the Magistrate Judge improperly engaged in a merits analysis of his claim. Id. He further asserts
that the Magistrate Judge improperly concluded that his factual allegations were not true, which
is contrary to established law on reviewing motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief cannot be granted. 1 Id. In support of his objection, Mr. Whitefield asserts that his
factual allegations, taken as true, support the reasonable inference that Defendants destroyed his
legal materials, which prevented him from filing a timely notice of appeal of the denial of his
habeas case. Id. Mr. Whitefield argues that the inference to be drawn from the allegations is that
Defendants’ actions denied Mr. Whitefield his First Amendment right to access the courts.
Initially, the Court overrules Mr. Whitefield’s objection, insofar as he argues that the
Magistrate Judge determined that his allegations were not true. The Magistrate Judge clearly
accepted that Mr. Whitefield did not have access to his legal materials as a result of Defendants’
actions.
Next, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge properly conducted an analysis of whether
Mr. Whitefield had stated a First Amendment access to courts claim. The standard of review for
such claims is: “Where prisoners assert that defendants' actions have inhibited their opportunity
to present a past legal claim, they must show (1) that they suffered an “actual injury”—that they
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Mr. Whitefield also argues that the Magistrate Judge erred, because his complaint had already survived the
screening process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). ECF No. 105, at 3-4. However, screening a complaint
pursuant to § 1915 is not equivalent to resolving a contested motion to dismiss. At the screening process stage, the
court may dismiss the complaint, “only where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has
alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend.” Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th
Cir.2001). In resolving a motion to dismiss, the court considers both the defendant’s arguments and the plaintiff’s
response to said arguments on the merits.
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lost a chance to pursue a “nonfrivolous” or “arguable” underlying claim; and (2) that they have
no other “remedy that may be awarded as recompense” for the lost claim other than in the
present denial of access suit.” Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). A plaintiff
also “must describe the underlying arguable claim well enough to show that it is “more than
mere hope.” Id. at 205-06 (quoting Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)).
The Magistrate Judge concluded that Mr. Whitefield had “not plead facts suggesting that
he lost or was unable to present any nonfrivolous or arguable legal claim, because he did not
have access to his legal materials.” ECF No. 101, at 8. With respect to his allegation that he lost
the opportunity to appeal his habeas case, the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Mr.
Whitefield did not cite facts to demonstrate that the habeas claims he wanted to appeal were
nonfrivolous or based upon more than mere hope. Mr. Whitefield only alleged that he was
unable to appeal, because he did not have his legal materials. He does not explain the basis upon
which an appeal of the denial of his habeas case would have been arguably successful; that is,
nonfrivolous. Moreover, when the District Court denied Mr. Whitefield’s habeas petition, it also
denied him a certificate of appealability, finding that he had not made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right. Whitefield, 21-340, ECF No. 18, at 2. Mr. Whitefield does
not specifically present facts to explain why any appeal he could have filed, would have
overcome the District Court’s denial of a certificate of appealability.
Furthermore, Mr. Whitefield does not explain how his legal materials were necessary to
the filing of a notice of appeal pursuant to the applicable Federal Rules. See Fed. Rule App.
Proc. 4(a) (thirty days to file a “notice of appeal”), Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(c) (inmate confined in
an institution procedures for filing and mailing a “notice of appeal”), and Rule 11(b) of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 cases. Pursuant to the applicable Rules, there is no requirement that a
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litigant include substantive “legal materials” in order to successfully appeal an adverse decision.
Thus, in addition to Mr. Whitefield not showing that he had a nonfrivolous claim to pursue upon
appeal, Mr. Whitefield also does not show that the lack of his legal materials actually prevented
him from filing his notice of appeal.
Finally, Mr. Whitefield was represented by counsel throughout his habeas case, until
approximately one month after his habeas petition was denied. Letter from Z. Goldstein to A.
Whitefield, July 12, 2023, attached as Ex. A, to the Complaint, ECF No. 92-1. Therefore, during
the pendency of his habeas case, Mr. Whitefield was not denied access to the courts, because he
was represented by counsel. Moreover, the docket sheet for Mr. Whitefield’s habeas case shows
that Mr. Whitefield’s counsel filed an Application for Extension of Appeal Deadlines on October
24, 2022, approximately five days before the time to file an appeal was to expire. Whitefield, 21330, ECF No. 19. In that Application, Mr. Whitefield’s counsel asserted that “Petitioner and
counsel are still in the process of discussing whether to file a notice of appeal and whether
Petitioner wishes to retain the undersigned counsel for that purpose.” Id. at ¶ 5. The Application
was granted the next day, and the time for filing an appeal was extended to November 28, 2022.
Id. ECF No. 20. Even though Mr. Whitefield had engaged in discussions with his counsel about
whether to file an appeal, and even though he received an extension of time within which to file
an appeal, Mr. Whitefield did not file an appeal. Such circumstances support the conclusion that
the missing legal materials were unrelated to Mr. Whitefield’s ability to file a notice of appeal.
Finally, in a letter to Mr. Whitefield, dated approximately nine months after the adverse habeas
decision, his former counsel confirmed that his representation of Mr. Whitefield ceased on or
about October 25, 2022, “when [Mr. Whitefield’s] federal habeas petition was denied and you
chose not to appeal.” Letter from Goldstein to Whitefield, ECF No. 92-1 (emphasis added).
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All of the above considerations support the conclusion that Mr. Whitefield has failed to
state a First Amendment access to courts claim upon which relieve can be granted. Mr.
Whitefield’s Objection is overruled.
II.
Procedural Due Process Claim
The Magistrate Judge recommends dismissal of Mr. Whitefield’s Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process claim, Mr. Whitefield alleges that he was denied due process in connection with the
deprivation of his legal materials. The Magistrate Judge found that, although Mr. Whitefield’s
legal materials were confiscated (and later destroyed), he always had a meaningful postdeprivation remedy. ECF No. 101, at 9-10. “‘[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of
property’ by prison officials does not violate the Due Process Clause ‘if a meaningful
postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.’” Monroe, 536 F.3d at 210 (quoting Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)).
Generally, Mr. Whitefield’s Objections to this claim do not undermine the decision of the
Magistrate Judge. Specifically, he argues that the Magistrate Judge used the wrong legal
standard, because, in his case, the Defendants did not receive authorization to destroy his legal
materials. Additionally, he argues that, if Defendants were given authorization to destroy the
material, Mr. Whitefield was not given a right to be heard, either before or after the destruction.
However, in a case like this, “prisons are constitutionally required to afford inmates only a postdeprivation remedy,” not a pre-deprivation remedy. Monroe, 536 F.3d at 210 (emphasis added).
Mr. Whitefield claims he was not provided a post-deprivation remedy; but, as explained by the
Magistrate Judge, Mr. Whitefield did have meaningful post-deprivation remedies available. The
Magistrate Judge cites the prison grievance process and the right of an inmate, who has been
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allegedly wronged, to bring a lawsuit against Defendants under state law. Mr. Whitefield’s
Objection is overruled.
Accordingly, the following Order is hereby entered.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 6th day of March, IT IS ORDERED that the Report and
Recommendation, ECF No.101, filed on November 6, 2024, is adopted as the Opinion of this
Court, as supplemented herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 95, is
GRANTED. Alfred Whitefield’s First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims, asserted
against Defendants Strechly, Rehonic, and Traux, are dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), Mr.
Whitefield’s First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims, asserted against
Defendant John Doe, are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, for the same underlying reasons that the claims against the named
Defendants were dismissed.
Leave to file an amended complaint is denied, as explained in the Magistrate’s
Report. Accordingly, it is FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Whitefield’s Motion for
Leave to Amend Complaint, ECF No. 106, filed at the same time has his Objections, is
DENIED.
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The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Whitefield’s
remaining state constitutional claim. Said claim is hereby dismissed, without prejudice to
his right to pursue the claim in state court.
__s/Marilyn J. Horan__________
Marilyn J. Horan
United States District Court Judge
Alfred Whitefield
QK-5562
SCI GREENE
169 PROGRESS DRIVE
WAYNESBURG, PA 15370
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