BLOUNT v. ACKROM et al

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER Denying 31 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by GEORGE LITTLE, ACKROM, M. ZAKEN. Signed by Chief Magistrate Judge Richard A. Lanzillo on 6/4/2024. (dlh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PITTSBURGH DIVISION

KAREEM BLOUNT,

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2:22-CV-001040-RAL

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Plaintiff
vs.
UNIT MANAGER ACKROM, et al. ,

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RICHARD A. LANZILLO
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

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Defendants

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ECFNO.31

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I.

Introduction
Plaintiff Kareem Blount, an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at

Greene (SCI-Greene), initiated this prose civil rights action by filing a complaint and a motion
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). ECF Nos. 1, 1-1. In his Amended Complaint - the
currently operative pleading - Blount claims that officials and employees of the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections (DOC) violated his constitutional rights as secured by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments by placing him in an unduly restrictive Intensive Management Unit
(IMU) program. ECF No. 30. As Defendants, Blount has named former DOC Secretary George
Little and two officials at SCI-Greene: Unit Manager Ackrom and Facility Manager M. Zaken.
Id. Blount seeks monetary and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.

Earlier in this litigation, Defendants moved to dismiss Blount's original complaint based
on his failure to plead facts demonstrating a plausible entitlement to relief. ECF No. 15. The

Court granted the motion after concluding that Blount "ha[ d] omitted such basic facts as the
duration of his confinement in the IMU, the restrictions applicable to inmates in that unit, the
privileges denied inmates in that unit, the physical conditions of his confinement, and whether he
has been able to successfully advance to less restrictive phases of the program through
compliance and good behavior." ECF No. 27 at p. 9. The Court further held that Blount had
failed to allege facts "from which the Court [could] determine whether he has a protected liberty
or property interest" for purposes of his due process claim. Id. at p. 10. Noting that Blount had
not yet "had the opportunity to file a curative amendment in response to specific deficiencies
identified in a motion to dismiss," the Court offered him the opportunity to file a curative
amendment. Id. Blount filed his Amended Complaint shortly thereafter.
Presently pending before the Court is Defendants' second motion to dismiss. See ECF
No. 31. Blount has filed a brief in opposition. See ECF No. 34. As such, the motion is ripe for
disposition. 1
II.

Background
Blount' s claims center on his placement in the IMU, a program implemented by the DOC

to help inmates struggling with anger management gain the "skills necessary to transition to a
Step-Down Unit (SDU) and subsequently to General Population (GP)." ECF No. 25 at p. 3. The
program consists of "a progressive six phase system" through which inmates advance based on
their behavior and ability to adjust under reduced levels of supervision. Id. at pp. 3-4. The first
phase, phase six, lasts a minimum of thirty days. Id. Phases five, four, and three last a minimum

1
The parties have con sented to the j uri sdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all
proceedings in this case, including th e entry of fin al judgment, as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 636.

2

of nine months each. Id. at 1-2. Phase two lasts a minimum of eighth months, and the final
phase, phase one, lasts a minimum of one year. Id. at 2.
Blount's placement in the IMU stemmed from a misconduct that he received for
assaulting an inmate while incarcerated at SCI-Mahoney. ECF No.3013. After Blount served
a 90-day disciplinary sentence in the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU), the prison' s Program
Review Committee (PRC) met with him on July 30, 2021 , and notified him that he had been
placed on the Restricted Release List (RRL ), a designation for incarcerated individuals with a
history of assaulting staff and other inmates. Id.

1 5.

Placement on the RRL allows the DOC to

hold an inmate "in indefinite solitary confinement in the RHU" under conditions of "severely
restricted movement, almost no educational or rehabilitative programming, no meaning[ful] or
constructive use of time," and "perpetual [confinement] in conditions that are debilitating and
inhumane." Id. 1 25. Blount unsuccessfully appealed his placement on the RRL to both the
facility manager of SCI-Mahoney and the Chief Hearing Examiner for the DOC. Id.

1 6.

On November 23, 2021 , the DOC transferred Blount to SCI-Greene and placed him in the
IMU. Id. About a month later, Blount spoke with Ackrom "regarding the length of time that' s
needed to complete this [IMU] Program." ECF No.3018. Ackrom informed Blount that the
IMU "is a three year Program with six (6) phases and each phase is nine (9) months in duration."
Id. Citing an article written by a licensed psychologist, Christian Conte, Blount argued to

Ackrom that each phase of the IMU program should be only "3-6 months in duration" rather than
nine. Id.

19.

Ackrom responded: "9 months is what you will be doing in each phase. I don't

know what else to tell you. " Id.

1 10.

On December 27, 2021, Blount filed a grievance in which he argued that the "9 month
long duration in each phases that Plaintiff [was] being told he must complete [was] in stark

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contrast to the I.M.U. Policy." Id.

,r 11.

Blount's grievance was denied at each stage, with

Defendant Zaken upholding the denial at the facility level and Defendant Little affirming the
denial on final appeal. ECF No. 25 at p. 4.
Since being placed on the RRL, Blount' s custody status has been reviewed every 90 days
by the PRC - including Defendants Ackrom and Zaken - to determine whether continued
placement in restrictive custody is appropriate. Id.

,r,r 41-42.

Blount acknowledges that the PRC

can recommend his removal from the RRL, but alleges that the PRC meetings are perfunctory in
nature and "routinely decided without any real consideration of Plaintiffs circumstances." Id.

,r,r

41-43. He also states that he has "never attended a PRC review where he was permitted or
otherwise able to present his views, advocate on his own behalf or otherwise contest his RRL
status." Id.

,r 47.

In addition to quarterly PRC meetings, Blount' s placement on the RRL is reviewed
annually by a group of DOC administrators that includes his "Unit Manager, Majors, CCPM,
DSCS, DSFM, Superintendent, RDS, and the EDSI." Id.

,r 30.

A "vote sheet" is circulated

among those individuals so that each can indicate whether he or she believes that Blount should
be removed from the program. Id. ,r 27. The final decision on removal or continuation in the
program is then made by the DOC's Executive Deputy Secretary for Institutional Operations, a
non-Defendant. Id.

,r 28.

While in the IMU, Blount maintains that he has been subjected to "deprivations and
inhumane treatment and restrictions that are significantly more severe than those in general
population." ECF No. 30 ,r 54. Among other things, he contends that he is confined to a seven
by twelve-foot cell for 22 hours a day, served low quality food, restricted from making most
commissary purchases, and forced to take meals alone in his cell. Id. He is forbidden from

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talking to other inmates and denied "most normal human interactions" as well as "all sensory
input from external stimuli." Id. He is also unable to have any physical contact with his family.

Id. Finally, he claims that he is denied all educational, rehabilitative, vocational, and religious
services. Id. As a result, he states that he suffers from severe stress, anxiety, insomnia,
depression, migraine headaches, eyesight deterioration, post-traumatic stress disorder, confusion
and disorientation, muscle loss and joint deterioration, panic attacks, loss of concentration, back
and nerve pain, memory loss, hallucinations, and many other symptoms. Id.

1 57.

Based on the foregoing, Blount maintains that Defendants violated his constitutional right
to be free from crnel and unusual punishment by subjecting him to inhumane conditions of
confinement and displayed deliberate indifference to his mental and physical health. Id. 117784. He also alleges that his continued placement on the RRL and confinement in the IMU
without a meaningful opportunity to challenge those designations violates his right to due
process. Id. 1171-76. Blount seeks declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Id. at pp. 2122.
III.

Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, l F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a
motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will be likely to prevail on the
merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)
(citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed.
2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). A complaint should only be dismissed
pursuant to Rule 12 (b)( 6) if it fails to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

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plausible on its face. " Twombly, 550 U.S . at 570 (rejecting the traditional 12 (b)(6) standard
established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the court
must accept as true all well-pied factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff. U S Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins , 281 F.3d 383 , 388 (3d Cir.
2002).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
A "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (citing Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265,286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a

plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub.
Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp. , 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower
f

Merion Sch. Dist. , 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal

conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan, 478
U.S. at 286). See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania,. 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir.
2009) ("The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint
is inapplicable to legal conclusions.").
Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the
following three-step approach:

First, the court must ' tak[ e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a
claim. ' Second, the court should identify allegations that, 'because they are no more
than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, ' where there
are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief. '
Burtch v. Mi/berg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v.
Warminster Twp. , 629 F.3d 121 , 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is "a context-specific

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task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Finally, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the allegations in the complaint must be
held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a prose litigant's pleadings to
state a valid claim upon which relief could be granted, it should do so despite the litigant' s
failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence
construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements . Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364
(1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552,555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition
prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read "with a measure of
tolerance").
IV.

Analysis
Blount contends that the IMU program violates his constitutional rights under both the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Each claim will be addressed in turn.
A. Deliberate indifference/cruel and unusual punishment
Blount first contends that the conditions of confinement in the IMU violate the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The United States Supreme
Court has "interpreted this prohibition ... to impose affirmative duties on prison officials to
'provide humane conditions of confinement."' Young v. Martin, 801 F.3d 172, 177 (3d Cir.
2015) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). To succeed, Blount must satisfy
both an objective and a subjective element of the claim. First, he must establish that the
Defendants' conduct was "objectively harmful enough or sufficiently serious to violate the
Constitution." Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 473 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted). To

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meet the subjective component of this claim, Blount must show that the Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to those conditions by acting with a reckless disregard of a known risk of
harm. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-303 (1991); Watson v. Sec'y Penn. Dep 't of Corr. ,
567 Fed. Appx 75, 79 (3d Cir. 2014). In other words, "the [prison] official must both be aware
of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,
and he must also draw that inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
There is no question that unduly prolonged incarceration in solitary confinement "can
cause severe and traumatic psychological damage, including anxiety, panic, paranoia,
depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, psychosis, and even a disintegration of the basic sense
of self identity." Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 225-26 (3d Cir. 2017). See also Johnston v.
Wetzel, 431 F.Supp.3d 666,677 (W.D. Pa. 2019) ("The detrimental effects of prolonged solitary

confinement on prisoners have been well documented."). This is because prolonged solitary
confinement may deprive an inmate of such basic human needs as "exercise, sleep, social contact
and interaction, and environmental stimulation." Johnston, 431 F.Supp.3d at 678 (citing Wilson
v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,304 (1991)).

On the other hand, reasonable periods of isolation "may be a necessary tool of prison
discipline." Johnson v. Wetzel, 209 F.Supp.3d 766, 777 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (citing Yo ung v.
Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351 , 364 (3d Cir. 1992)). See also Johnston, 431 F.Supp.3d at 679 (noting

that "solitary confinement does not, in itself, violate the Constitution") (internal quotation
omitted). In determining whether a particular confinement violates the constitution, courts look
to both the duration of the solitary confinement and the unique conditions of that confinement.
See Wayne v. Clark, 2022 WL 179931 31, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2022) (evaluating the

"conditions of confinement taken together with the length of [the inmate's] placement"). This is

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a totality of the circumstances analysis. McClure v. Haste , 820 Fed. Appx. 125, 128 (3d Cir.
2020). Among the most common factors identified by courts in this Circuit are: the amount of
time the inmate is confined in his cell each day ; the size of the cell; the extent to which daily
activities are confined to the cell; how often the inmate can leave the cell for activities such as
exercise and showering; whether the inmate can entertain physical visitors or use a telephone or
tablet to contact friends and family; whether the inmate can move through program phases with
good behavior to earn more privileges; and the extent to which the inmate has access to adequate
medical and mental health care. See, e.g., Porter v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections,
974 F.3d 431,441 (3d Cir. 2020); Peterkin v. Jejfes , 855 F.2d 1021 , 1022 (3d Cir. 1988);
Batchelor v. Little, 2022 WL 16749039 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2022).

In dismissing Blount's original pleading, the Court noted that he had failed to allege such
basic facts as "the duration of his stay in the IMU, the restrictions applicable to inmates in that
unit, the privileges denied inmates in that unit, the physical conditions of his confinement, and
whether he has been able to successfully advance to less restrictive phases of the program
through compliance and good behavior." ECF No. 27. His latest pleading fills in many of these
gaps. Blount entered the IMU program on November 23, 2021, and has remained there ever
since. While in the IMU, he spends approximately 22 hours per day alone in his cell. His cell is
artificially illuminated 24 hours per day and contains nothing but a bed, desk, and toilet. He eats
meals alone in his cell and is generally denied most normal human interactions, including the
ability to talk to other inmates. He cannot participate in educational, vocational, rehabilitative, or
religious programming, and is generally deprived of mental or physical stimulation. He is not
permitted in-person physical visitations, although he is able to socialize with his family through
video calls. It does not appear that he has been denied access to medical or mental health care.

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Finally, while it is not clear which phase of the program he is currently in, Blount acknowledges
that the IMU program has six progressive phases through which he can advance by
demonstrating program compliance and good behavior.
Viewing these allegations in the light most favorable to Blount, the Court finds that he
has pleaded "a combination of conditions that taken as a whole, may represent an Eighth
Amendment claim." Bertolette v. Little, 2023 WL 9100642, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2023).
Several courts have recently held that similar conditions, taken together, "are equivalent to
solitary confinement." Williams v. Stickney, 2023 WL 5351950, at *6 (citing Wayne v. Clark,
2022 WL 17993131 , at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2022)); Bertolette, 2023 WL 9100642, at *8
(finding that nearly identical allegations to those in the instant case were sufficient, at least at the
motion to dismiss stage, to plead an objectively serious constitutional deprivation). While
placement in solitary confinement or the RRL "alone does not violate the Eighth Amendment,"

Williams v. Armstrong, 566 Fed. Appx. 106, 109 (3d Cir. 2014), Blount alleges that he has been
in the IMU for almost three years with no end in sight under conditions that cause him serious
mental and physical harm. Whether the conditions in the IMU are indeed as severe as described
by Blount - and whether specific conduct by the Defendants amounted to deliberate indifference
to that harm2 - are questions best explored on a fully developed record. Defendants' motion to
dismiss as to Blount's Eighth Amendment claim will be denied.
B. Due process
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that " [n]o State
shall .. . deprive any person oflife, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The United

2

Construing Blount' s all egations liberally, it appears that each of the Defendants is involved in the ongoing reviews
of Blount's placement and has been made aware of hi s all egations of mental and physical harm. At this stage in the
proceedings, thi s is suffici ent to allege personal involvement.

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States Supreme Court has mandated a two-part analysis of Fourteenth Amendment procedural
due process claims. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 , 672 (1977). First, the reviewing court
must determine "whether the asserted individual interests are encompassed within the ...
protection of ' life, liberty or property. "' Id. If a protected interest is implicated, the court must
"decide what procedures constitute 'due process of law. " ' Id. If no protected interest is
implicated, however, then "it is unnecessary to analyze what procedures were followed when an
alleged deprivation of an interest occurred." Harris v. Hines, 2017 WL 4119743 , at *5 (M.D.
Pa. Sept. 18, 2017).
In Bowen v. Ryan, 248 Fed. Appx. 302 (3d Cir. 2007), the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit considered and rejected a due process challenge to the precise same procedures at issue
here. After noting that the plaintiffs placement in administrative custody for twenty years
clearly implicated a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that
"the procedures provided by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" in the context ofRRL
placement "satisfy the minimal constitutional standards for due process." Id. at 304. As in the
instant case, those procedures included assessment by the PRC every 90 days and an annual
review of the plaintiffs status. Id. Noting that "the PRC [had] the power to recommend release
to an official with the power to order it," the Court concluded that the "initial opportunity to be
heard" and "periodic review" afforded to the inmate satisfied due process. Id.
The precise same RRL procedures are at issue here. Thus, to the extent that Blount
alleges that those procedures are unconstitutional on their face, Bowen forecloses his claim. See
Harris v. Little, 2023 WL 4669024, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2023) (noting that courts in the Third

Circuit have upheld "the exact same RRL policy" on several occasions) (citing Bowen, 248 Fed.
Appx. at 304).

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Critically, however, Blount' s claims extend beyond the face of the policy. While he
concedes that his status is reviewed by the PRC every 90 days, he maintains that those reviews
are "perfunctory in nature" and that he "has never attended a PRC review where he was
permitted or otherwise able to present his views, advocate on his own behalf, or otherwise
contest his RRL status." ECF No. 30 ,r,r 41 , 46-47. Among other things, he alleges that that the
PRC "does not consider any mental health concerns that plaintiff has raised on multiple
occasions during the reviews," refuses to document his concerns in writing, "does not consider
the duration of confinement" or "address the mental and physical harm that plaintiff has suffered
due to the duration of his confinement," and ultimately evaluates Blount' s continued placement
"without any real consideration of [his] circumstances." ECF No. 30 ,r,r 41-43 . He also contends
that the PRC ' s reports "are routinely filed with incorrect, incomplete, and non-relevant remarks"
and leave some sections "totally blank." Id.

,r 43 .

Finally, he avers that the PRC "never

documents" his mental and physical health concerns and issues generic recommendations such as
"continue status" without providing him with a meaningful explanation for the decision. Id.

,r

45.
The plaintiff in Bowen presented a similar argument, arguing that his PRC reviews were
"rote or meaningless." Bowen, 248 Fed. Appx. at 304. The Court of Appeals rejected that
argument based on the "conclusory" nature of his allegations. Id. at 304-05. See also Reaves v.
Rossman, 2022 WL 18539772, at *7 (recommending dismissal where plaintiff alleged "in

conclusory fashion only" that he had been denied meaningful review). In contrast, courts have
permitted due process claims based on a failure to follow RRL procedures to proceed when
supported by detailed and specific factual allegations. In Harris, for example, the plaintiffs
alleged that the PRC " [did] not follow the proper guidelines or perform the required reviews

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under the [RRL] policy" and "ignore[ d] the procedural safeguards and manipulate[d] the system
in order to keep Plaintiffs in solitary confinement indefinitely and without reason. " Harris , 2023
WL 4669024, at *3. The court pe1mitted plaintiffs' claims to proceed to discovery "to the extent
that they allege Defendants administer the RRL policy in an 'unofficial' way that violates their
constitutional rights." Id. at *4 (noting that " [w]hether the policy was followed as it should be
[was an] issue of fact"). Other courts have reached the san1e conclusion. See , e.g. , Roten v.
Little, 2024 WL 1514182, at* 13 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2024) (allegation that plaintiff was placed in

the IMU "with no advance notice or any ability to be heard or challenge, and that his 'periodic
reviews are perfunctory and meaningless "' was sufficient to proceed to discovery); Wayne v.
Clark, 2022 WL 17993131, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2022) (allegation that PRC conducted

irregular and perfunctory reviews without notice and failed to provide specific reasoning or
grounds for decisions was sufficient to survive motion to dismiss); Johnston v. Wetzel, 43 l
F.Supp.3d 666, 684 (denying summary judgment because "the record [fell] short of establishing
as a matter of law that [plaintiffs] protracted solitary confinement received meaningful review"
and, consequently, "a jury could reasonably find that the reviews that occurred were proforma
and meaningless.")
On balance, the Court finds Blount's allegations more akin to those in Harris, Roten,
Wayne , and Johnston. Rather than simply labeling the PRC reviews as perfunctory, Blount has

alleged specific facts suggesting that the PRC rarely discussed his RRL status during reviews,
disregarded his mental and health concerns, failed to provide him with an opportunity to
challenge his status or advocate on his own behalf, and issued generic and conclusory
explanations in support of its decisions. These allegations are sufficient to survive dismissal at
the Rule 12(b)( 6) stage.

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V.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss [ECF No. 31] is denied.

DATED this 4th day of June, 2024.

RIC ARD A. LANZILLO
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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