MARTINEZ v. LONG

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 12 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM re 11 Amended Complaint filed by CASEY LONG. Details more fully stated in the opinion. An appropriate order of court shall follow. Signed by Judge Robert J. Colville on 2/5/24. (cjo)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JUSTIN MARTINEZ,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
CASEY LONG,
Defendant.

No. 23-cv-813
Judge Robert J. Colville

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Robert J. Colville, United States District Judge
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12) filed by Defendant Casey Long in
this matter. Defendant moves to dismiss the claim set forth against him in the Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 11) filed by Plaintiff in the above-captioned action. This case represents one of thirteen
cases filed by Plaintiff that are currently pending before the undersigned. Several of those cases,
including this one, arise out of or involve Plaintiff’s attempts to protest against “bullying” on or
near Derry Area School District (the “District”) property on November 7, 2019 and a subsequent
criminal case that resulted from Plaintiff’s conduct on that date. The Court has jurisdiction in this
matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
1

I.

Background
Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint after now-retired Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo

Lenihan, to whom this case was originally assigned, 1 entered a Memorandum Order granting
Defendant’s Motion for More Definite Statement (ECF No. 3) on June 21, 2023. 2 Defendant filed
his Motion to Dismiss, along with a Brief in Support (ECF No. 13), on July 17, 2023. Plaintiff
filed a Response (ECF No. 15) to the Motion to Dismiss on August 7, 2023. No reply was filed,
and the Court considers the Motion to Dismiss to be fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
While the Court is required to liberally construe Plaintiff’s pleadings, the Court notes, as it
has in all of Plaintiff’s cases, that Plaintiff’s manner of pleading results in a complaint that is,
respectfully, difficult to follow at times, if not unintelligible. That said, the Court outlines the
relevant allegations in the Complaint as follows:
Defendant is the principal of the District. ECF No. 11 at ¶ B.2. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant conspired with both local and state police, the District, at least one attorney, one
assistant district attorney, and one judge within the judicial system to deprive Plaintiff of his rights
under the United States Constitution. Id. at ¶¶ B.3-13. On November 7, 2019, Plaintiff conducted
what he characterizes as a “peaceful” and “lawful” protest at Defendant’s place of employment,
i.e. the District. Id. at ¶ D.1. In response to Plaintiff’s protest, Defendant made multiple phone
calls to report Plaintiff’s conduct to the police, alleging that Plaintiff had trespassed on District
property. ECF No. 11 at ¶ D.1. The police eventually reported to the District following these
phone calls. When police arrived at the scene, certain Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”), Derry

1
Judge Lenihan recused from all of the cases filed by Mr. Martinez following his filing of a complaint against Judge
Lenihan at Civil Action No. 23-1405.

The Amended Complaint was docketed twice, once at ECF No. 11 and once at ECF No. 18. Because the documents
are identical, the Court will refer only to the document at ECF No. 11.

2

2

Police Department, and District employees were audio and video recorded by PSP during the
course of a conversation wherein a member of the education/school board allegedly “conspired”
with police. Id. at ¶ D.2. As a result of Defendant’s phone calls to the police, Plaintiff was told
that he would be arrested if he did not leave the location where he was protesting. Id. at ¶ D.3.
On November 19, 2019, Plaintiff attempted to lodge a criminal complaint to PSP respecting
Defendant’s phone calls on November 7, 2019. ECF No. 11 at ¶ D.4. While trying to lodge his
complaint, Plaintiff was “attacked” by PSP Corporal Judson Shephard and placed in jail. Id.
Approximately two weeks after Plaintiff’s protest, he was arrested and charged by PSP for criminal
trespassing and disorderly conduct in relation to the November 7, 2019 protest. Id. at ¶ D.5. The
Westmoreland County District Attorney ultimately pursued criminal charges against Plaintiff. Id.
at ¶ D.6. As a result of Defendant’s phone calls, the District obtained a restraining order preventing
Plaintiff from being within 200 feet of the District’s property. Id. at ¶ D.7. Plaintiff was terminated
from his employment following the publishing of a newspaper article discussing the November 7,
2019 incident. Id. at ¶ D.9.
During the course of Plaintiff’s criminal case, Plaintiff avers that Defendant testified that
his reports to law enforcement that Plaintiff had trespassed on District property were false. ECF
No. 11 at ¶ D.8. Plaintiff further asserts that Defendant falsely testified during Plaintiff’s criminal
trial that he believed District students were not safe due to Plaintiff’s presence on November 7,
2019 because nobody at the District knew Plaintiff’s identity on that date. Id. at ¶ D.10. Plaintiff
believes that this statement was false because Defendant identified Plaintiff to police during
Defendant’s phone calls and because Defendant participated in a meeting respecting Plaintiff’s
protest prior to Plaintiff’s arrival on November 7, 2019. Id. at ¶ D.11. Plaintiff avers that the
actions of Defendant have resulted in a criminal prosecution that involved Plaintiff being placed

3

on house arrest for 300 days and being subjected to mental health evaluations, the loss of Plaintiff’s
employment, his retirement from street protesting, legal costs, mental anguish, and undiagnosed
post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. at ¶ E.1-6.
II.

Legal Standard
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the

legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In
deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will likely prevail
on the merits; rather, when considering a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all well-pled
factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S.
Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). While a complaint does not need
detailed factual allegations to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide
more than labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A
“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007)). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Supreme Court of the United States has explained:
The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a
complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it
“stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to
relief.’”

4

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (internal citations omitted).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit instructs that “a court reviewing
the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps.” Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d
780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016). The court explained:
First, it must “tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675. Second, it should identify allegations that, “because they
are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at
679; see also Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011)
(“Mere restatements of the elements of a claim are not entitled to the assumption of
truth.” (citation and editorial marks omitted)). Finally, “[w]hen there are wellpleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679.
Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief
will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citations omitted).
In addition to reviewing the facts contained in the complaint, a court may consider “matters
of public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and items appearing in the record of
the case.” Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994).
When a document integral to or relied upon in the complaint is included, the court may also
consider that document. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir.
1997).
“If a plaintiff requests leave to amend a complaint vulnerable to dismissal before a
responsive pleading is filed” in a civil rights case, a court must permit amendment unless it would
be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). This
is also true where a plaintiff does not request leave to amend. See Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108
(“When a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend a deficient complaint after a defendant moves to

5

dismiss it, the court must inform the plaintiff that he has leave to amend within a set period of
time, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.”).
The Court again notes that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and, as such, he is entitled to liberal
construction of his submissions in federal court. This means that the Court must liberally construe
the factual allegations of the complaint because pro se pleadings, “however inartfully pleaded,
must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erikson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation omitted); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). In addition, the court should “‘apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se
litigant has mentioned it by name.’” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting
Holley v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). However, “pro se
litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v Crown
Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). Further, pro se litigants are not free to ignore
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Pruden v. Long, Civ. A. No. 3:CV-06-2007, 2006 WL
3325439, *1 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2006).
III.

Discussion
Defendant first argues that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim should be dismissed because,

under the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, the statute of limitations for such a claim
expired prior to Plaintiff filing the instant action. The running of the statute of limitations is an
affirmative defense, and “[a] complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim on statute
of limitations grounds only when the statute of limitations defense is apparent on the face of the
complaint.” Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2017 (citing Schmidt v. Skolas, 770
F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014)).

“The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in

Pennsylvania is two years.” Montanez v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480

6

(3d Cir. 2014) (citing Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir.2009)). “The date of accrual in a
§ 1983 action is determined by federal law.” Id. A cause of action accrues under federal law
“when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the action is based.” Id.
With respect to accrual, the Third Circuit has explained:
The determination of the time at which a claim accrues is an objective inquiry; we
ask not what the plaintiff actually knew but what a reasonable person should have
known. Barren v. United States, 839 F.2d 987, 990 (3d Cir.1988). As a general
matter, a cause of action accrues at the time of the last event necessary to complete
the tort, usually at the time the plaintiff suffers an injury. See United States v.
Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979). “The cause of
action accrues even though the full extent of the injury is not then known or
predictable. Were it otherwise, the statute would begin to run only after a plaintiff
became satisfied that he had been harmed enough, placing the supposed statute of
repose in the sole hands of the party seeking relief.” [Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S.
384, 391 (2007)].
Kach, 589 F.3d at 634–35.
The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against Defendant is time-barred.
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant arise from a protest that led to Plaintiff’s arrest on November
7, 2019. Defendant allegedly made two false reports to police on that date and conspired with the
police to have Plaintiff arrested. While Plaintiff alleges that Defendant testified at his trial in
August of 2022, the Court agrees that Plaintiff fails to allege a new or additional injury with respect
to that allegation. 3 Rather, the appropriate date for purposes of determining when Plaintiff’s cause
of action accrued is the date of the alleged false reports to police which set Plaintiff’s criminal
prosecution in motion. A reasonable person would or should have known of the injury at issue on
November 7, 2019. Plaintiff filed his original complaint on May 4, 2023, more than three (3) years
after the alleged incident. It is thus apparent from the face of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint that

Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant testified truthfully at the trial that he did not personally observe Plaintiff
criminally trespassing on school property. Resp. 9, ECF No. 15. Further, “[w]itnesses, including public officials and
private citizens, are immune from civil damages based upon their testimony.” Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 125
(3d Cir. 2001) (citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 341, 345–46 (1983)).
3

7

his Section 1983 claim is time-barred, and, accordingly, that claim will be dismissed with
prejudice. The Court also agrees that this action is duplicative of Plaintiff’s case at 2:23-cv-610.
The Court further notes that Plaintiff fails in any regard to allege concrete, non-conclusory
facts that could possibly support his allegations of a conspiracy to violate his rights under the
Constitution. To state a Section 1983 claims for conspiracy:
[A] plaintiff cannot rely on broad or conclusory allegations. D.R. by L.R. v. Middle
Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1377 (3d Cir. 1992); Rose
v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 366 (3d Cir.1989). The Third Circuit has noted that a civil
rights conspiracy claim is sufficiently alleged if the complaint details the following:
(1) the conduct that violated the plaintiff’s rights; (2) the time and the place of the
conduct; and (3) the identity of the officials responsible for the conduct. Oatess v.
Sobolevitch, 914 F.2d 428, 432 n. 8 (3d Cir.1990).
The essence of a conspiracy is an agreement or concerted action between
individuals. See D.R. by L.R., 972 F.2d at 1377. A plaintiff must therefore allege
with particularity and present material facts which show that the purported
conspirators reached some understanding or agreement or plotted, planned and
conspired together to deprive plaintiff of a protected federal right. See D .R. by L.R.,
972 F.2d at 1377; Rose, 871 F.2d at 366. Where a civil rights conspiracy is alleged,
there must be specific facts in the complaint which tend to show a meeting of the
minds and some type of concerted activity. Deck v. Leftridge, 771 F.2d 1168, 1170
(8th Cir. 1985). A plaintiff cannot rely on subjective suspicions and unsupported
speculation. Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1405, n. 16 (3d Cir. 1991).
Matthews v. Beard, No. CIV.A. 11-221J, 2012 WL 2192225, at *6 (W.D. Pa. June 14, 2012).
While Plaintiff makes consistent reference to a “conspiracy,” it is clear that his allegations rely on
the assumption that any adverse action taken against him during the course of his arrest and
criminal proceedings was the result of conspiracy. “[A] court need not credit a complaint’s ‘bald
assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions’ when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion
Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities
Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1429–30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Plaintiff fails to allege facts that plausibly
suggest a meeting of the minds, an agreement, or concerted activity by co-conspirators. Rather,
he summarily points to aspects of his arrest and criminal prosecution that he takes issue with while
8

labeling every participant as a co-conspirator. Such conclusory averments are far from sufficient
to state a claim for conspiracy.
To the extent Plaintiff attempts to assert additional claims under the federal criminal code
by way of his Response to the Motion to Dismiss, the Court notes that there is no private right of
action under Section 241 or 242. See Walthour v. Herron, No. CIV.A.10-01495, 2010 WL
1877704, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 2010) (“In this case, Plaintiff asserts a violation of his rights under
the following federal criminal statutes: 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245, 247, 371 and 1951. These
statutes do not provide a private right of action under which Plaintiff may sue.” (citation omitted)).
Further, any claims under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709 (Harassment); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4953 (Retaliation
against witness, victim or party); and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304 (Endangering the welfare of children)
are based upon sections of the Pennsylvania criminal code under which no private right of action
exists. See Matthews, 2012 WL 2192225, at *7 (finding no private right of action for harassment
and explaining that “these are criminal statutes which do not create a private right of action, and
‘a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of
another.’” (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973))); see also Dooley v. City
of Philadelphia, 153 F. Supp. 2d 628, 664 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (no private right of action under 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 4953); Doe 203 v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, September Term, 2012 No. 1935,
2013 WL 8338870, at *8 (Pa. Com. Pl. June 13, 2013) (no private right of action under 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 4304). Any claim for discrimination would be required to be brought pursuant to
Section 1983, and not 16 Pa. Code §49.101, which requires that any contract entered into by the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania contain a nondiscrimination clause. Finally, 204 Pa. Code Rule
8.4 is a section of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Pennsylvania attorneys. Plaintiff has not
stated a claim under any of these various theories in his Amended Complaint.

9

Amendment as to any of Plaintiff’s claims would be futile for the reasons stated herein. It
further bears noting Plaintiff has filed thirteen cases in this District, and has failed to state a claim
in any of his actions. In certain of those actions, including this one, he was permitted to file an
amended complaint, and still failed to set forth allegations to support a single cause of action. The
same further suggests to this Court that permitting amendment would be futile, and Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint in this matter will thus be dismissed with prejudice.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate Order of Court follows.
BY THE COURT:
/s/Robert J. Colville_____
Robert J. Colville
United States District Judge
DATED: February 5, 2024
cc:

All counsel of record
Justin Juan De La Cruz Martinez
502 N 12th Ave
Albany, IL 61230

10