BUCHANAN v. BRYNER

Filing 53

ORDER OF COURT denying 37 Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions, overruling 43 Plaintiff's Objections to Magistrate Judge Dodge's November 26, 2024 Report and Recommendation, and adopting Magistrate Judge Dodge's November 26, 2024 41 Report and Recommendations as the Opinion of the Court. Signed by Judge Arthur J. Schwab on 1/7/25. (bfm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JAMES BUCHANAN,
Plaintiff,

24cv0027
ELECTRONICALLY FILED

v.
Instructor/Officer BRYNER,
Defendant.
ORDER OF COURT
This matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Patricia Dodge for
proceedings in accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636, and Local Civil Rule 72.
The Magistrate Judge filed a thorough, well-reasoned Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) on November 26, 2024, recommending that Plaintiff James Buchanan’s Motion for
Sanctions against Defendant Bryner (Doc. 37) be denied. (Doc. 41).
As required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties were notified
that they had until December 10, 2024, to file written objections to the R&R, and until December
24, 2024, to file any responses to any objections filed (Id. at 4).
On December 9, 2024, Plaintiff timely filed his Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s
Report and Recommendation, wherein he raised 2 objections to Magistrate Judge Dodge’s R&R.
(Doc. 43).
Plaintiff summarizes his 2 objections as follows: “The Magistrate Judge’s R&R applied
the standard under Rules 8, and 12, which was not appropriate for analysis of a Motion for
Sanctions under Rule 11. The Magistrate Judge’s R&R was completely devoid of any analysis

or application of Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 11, and the Magistrate Judge’s R&R is inconsistent with
holdings of other District Courts on the same subject.” (Id. at 3).
For the following reasons, the Court finds that both of Plaintiff’s objections to the
Magistrate Judge’s R&R lack merit.
First, Plaintiff is incorrect that Magistrate Judge Dodge’s R&R analyzed Plaintiff’s
Motion for Sanctions under the applicable standard of review for a Motion brought pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12, and did not review and analyze Plaintiff’s Motion for
Sanctions under the standard of review for a Motion brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (“Rule”) 11(b)(3).
Rule 11(b)(3) provides:
(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a pleading, written
motion, or other paper--whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating
it--an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances:
...
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified,
will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery[.]
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3).
As recently explained in CT Install Am., LLC v. Boryszewski, Civ. No. 22-4557, 2024
WL 4582885 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2024):
In deciding whether to impose Rule 11 sanctions, a court must assess whether the
conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic
Commc'ns Ents., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 551 (1991); see also Ario v. Underwriting
Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for 1998 Year of Account, 618 F.3d 277, 297
(3d Cir. 2010), as amended (Dec. 7, 2010). The Third Circuit defines
reasonableness as “‘objective knowledge or belief at the time of the filing of the
challenged paper’ that the claim was well-grounded in law and fact.” Ford Motor
Co. v. Summit Motor Prod., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 289 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Jones
v. Pittsburgh Nat. Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1357 (3d Cir. 1990)).
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CT Install Am., LLC, 2024 WL 4582885, at *2.
In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge properly discussed the interplay of Rules 8(c), 11 and
Rule 12(f). (See Doc. 41 at 2-3). The Magistrate Judge then determined correctly that any
motion to strike pursuant to Rule 12(f) filed in this case would be denied and that Plaintiff’s
argument that Defendant’s Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh affirmative defenses contradict one
another was unavailing:
Here, the three affirmative defenses that Plaintiff moves to strike provided him with
“fair notice” as to the defenses that Defendant is raising: the complained-of conduct
was caused by third parties; Plaintiff’s damages were caused by superseding,
intervening causes; and Defendant acted in self-defense. Plaintiff challenges the
factual basis for these defenses, but “[m]otions to strike should not be granted when
the sufficiency of the defense depends upon disputed or undeveloped issues of
fact.” Klaus v. Jonestown Bank & Tr. Co., 2014 WL 1024591, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar.
14, 2014) (citations omitted). Moreover, Plaintiff’s argument that these defenses
contradict one another is unavailing. As Rule 8(d)(3) provides, a party may state
inconsistent defenses.
(Id. at 3-4).
Finally, the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions
should be denied under Rule 11 for the following reasons:
Thus, if the pleaded affirmative defenses would survive a Rule 12(f) motion to
strike, then counsel cannot have acted unreasonably in asserting them. See Medina,
2022 WL 2307098, at *4 (denying Rule 11 motion when many of the defendant’s
affirmative defenses—including the defense that the incident was caused by the
acts of third parties over whom the defendant had no control—could survive a Rule
12(f) motion). Moreover, “Rule 11 sanctions, the Third Circuit has stressed, should
be imposed to penalize irresponsible lawyering, not to address the strength or merits
of a claim.” StrikeForce Techs., Inc. v. WhiteSky, Inc., 2013 WL 5574643, at *4
(D.N.J. Oct. 9, 2013) (citing Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 94-95
(3d Cir. 1988)).
(Doc. 41 at 4).
Second, Plaintiff is incorrect in his assertion that the Magistrate Judge’s R&R is
inconsistent with the holdings of other District Courts on the same subject, citing in support
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thereof, the District Court decisions in Desandies v. Encore Grp (USA), LLC., Civ. No. 24-1044,
2024 WL 1704982 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2024) and Greenspan v. Platinum Healthcare Grp., LLC,
Civ. No. 20-5874, 2021 WL 978899 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2021), two decisions which, as fellow
District Court cases, are not binding on this Court. (Doc. 43 at 2).
In DeSandies, supra., in response to a Court Order “directing Encore Group either to
(a) file an amended Answer, asserting only those defenses for which it had a good faith basis, or
(b) file a Memorandum explaining why I should not strike its Answer for violating Fed. R. Civ.
P. 11(b),” the defendant admitted that it had asserted a prophylactic affirmative defense, in the
form of a statute of limitations defense, which the District Court concluded was not permitted
under Rule 11, and thus, as a sanction, the District Court struck all of the defendant’s affirmative
defenses with the caveat that if the defendant “has a good faith basis to assert any affirmative
defense (including one that I've struck), it can seek leave to amend its answer to assert that
defense.” DeSandies, 2024 WL 1704982 at *1-3.
Similarly, in Greenspan, supra., after ordering the defendant “either to (a) file an
amended Answer, asserting only those defenses for which it had a good faith basis, or (b) file a
Memorandum explaining why the District Court should not strike its Answer for violating
Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b),” and the defendant filed a Memorandum in response, explaining why the
District Court should not strike its Answer for violating Rule 11(b), the District Court concluded
that the defendant “did not assert its affirmative defenses because it had a good faith basis to
claim that they have evidentiary support. To the contrary, it asserts many of its affirmative
defenses conditionally,” i.e., prophylactically. Greenspan, 2021 WL 978899, at *2. The District
Court then struck all of the defendant’s affirmative defenses without prejudice to file a motion to
amend its answer to assert any affirmative defenses that it has a good faith basis to assert. Id.

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at *3.
The DeSandies, supra., and Greenspan, supra., decisions, however, are inapposite to
Plaintiff’s case, where the affirmative defenses at issue (the complained-of conduct was caused
by third parties, Plaintiff’s damages were caused by superseding, intervening causes, and
Defendant acted in self-defense), are not prophylactic in nature. Rather, they were reasonably
asserted in direct response to Plaintiff’s factual allegation that on July 9, 2023, “Plaintiff was
punched in the face by the Defendant” (Doc. 5 at 5) after defense counsel consulted with
Defendant and was told Defendant’s version of the events (Doc. 39 at 3-4). Therefore, the
Magistrate Judge’s R&R, recommending that Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions, brought pursuant
to Rule 11, be denied, is not inconsistent with the DeSandies, supra., or Greenspan, supra.,
decisions.
Accordingly, after de novo review of the record in this matter, the thorough,
well-reasoned Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Dodge, and Plaintiff’s
Objections to the Report and Recommendation, the following Order is entered:
AND NOW, this 7th day of January, 2025, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Objections to
the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 43) are OVERRULED.
It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff ‘s Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 37) is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Dodge’s November 26, 2024 Report and
Recommendation (Doc. 41), is adopted as the Opinion of the Court.

BY THE COURT:
s/Arthur J. Schwab
ARTHUR J. SCHWAB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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cc:

All ECF Registered Counsel of Record
James Buchanan
ET4089
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169 PROGRESS DRIVE
WAYNESBURG, PA 15370

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