PRISTINE POOLS, LLC et al v. HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY et al

Filing 32

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. Hartford owes no duty of defense. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 23 ) is DENIED, and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 19 ) is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Cathy Bissoon on 3/11/2025. (dcd)

Case 2:24-cv-00269-CB

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PRISTINE POOLS, LLC, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.

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2:24-cv-00269-CB
Judge Cathy Bissoon

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. MEMORANDUM
In this insurance coverage case, Defendants (collectively, “Hartford”) owe no duty of
defense in the state action against Plaintiffs (“the Insureds”). Summary judgment for Hartford is
warranted.
The facts do not establish the existence of an “occurrence,” as defined in the policies.1
Hartford is correct that the four-corners rule applies. Sapa Extrusions, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 939 F.3d 243, 251-52 (3d Cir. 2019) (citations here, and later, omitted). The claims flow
from allegations of faulty work/workmanship. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
made clear that, in Pennsylvania, such claims do not qualify as an “occurrence.” Specialty
Surfaces Int’l, Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 609 F.3d 223, 239 (3d Cir. 2010); accord Sapa Extrusions,
939 F.3d at 256 (such allegations “do not amount to an ‘occurrence’—that is, an unforeseeable,
‘fortuitous event’”); Amer. Home Assurance Co. v. Superior Well Servs., Inc., 75 F.4th 184,

An “Occurrence” means “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
substantially the same general harmful conditions.” Doc. 1-2 at ECF-header pg. 81 of 227.
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189-90 (3d Cir. 2023) (“‘faulty workmanship’ and ‘failure to perform in a workman like
manner’” did not qualify as an “occurrence” when the term was defined as “an ‘accident’”).
The Insureds argue the rule should not apply because some of the claims are for property
damage beyond the contracted work. Doc. 30 at 4 (highlighting claims for “consequential
damage” to “surrounding property”). This argument has been rejected in published, binding
decisions. Sapa Extrusions, 939 F.3d at 256 (“any distinction between damage to the work
product alone versus damage to other property is irrelevant”); accord Superior Well Services,
75 F.4th at 188, 190 (the same reasoning applied to a claim for “property damage caused by a
failure to perform a contract in a workman like manner”) (internal quotations omitted). It is
made even clearer in a recent unpublished decision, which rejects arguments and case citations
identical to the ones presented here. See Berkley Specialty Ins. Co. v. Masterforce Constr. Corp.,
2023 WL 3378003, *2 (3d Cir. May 11, 2023) (the insured sought “to distinguish between
damage to the agreed-upon contractual work product . . . and damage to other property,” but,
this was “a distinction without a difference”); see also id. at n.14 (rejecting invitation to find
coverage under Indalex and Pottstown,2 given “the absence of any decision from the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court” in support).
In terms of persuasive authority, none could be stronger than Berkley Specialty.
The Court need not rely on it alone, however, as binding authority abounds. Regarding Indalex,
the policy definition of “occurrence” contained “subjective language” allowing a broader
interpretation. Sapa Extrusions, 939 F.3d at 258 & n.9. The Circuit Court found the distinction
to be material, and so too must this Court.

Indalex Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pgh., 83 A.3d 418 (Pa. Super. 2013);
Pa. Mfr. Indem. Co. v. Pottstown Indus. Complex LP, 215 A.3d 1010 (Pa. Super. 2019).
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The Superior Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in Pottstown predated the binding Circuit
Court decisions in Sapa Extrusions and Superior Well. To the extent they conflict, this Court is
bound by the latter. Of course, reliance on Pottstown fails for the same reason stated in Berkley
Specialty, at footnote 14. See discussion supra, quoting the same. The case also is plainly
distinguishable on its facts. See Pottstown, 215 A.3d at 1017 (covered damage was “caused by a
distinct event, flooding”).
The expansion in Pottstown was made under the auspices of an intervening cause
(flooding). For this reason ? the Pottstown Court opined ? its decision did not offend the
underlying rationale for the majority rule: that “occurrence” should not be interpreted so broadly
as to convert a standard CGL policy into a performance bond. Id. at 1017. Here, the Insureds
can offer no basis for distinction.
Hartford owes no duty of defense, and the Court enters the following:

II. ORDER
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 23) is DENIED, and Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 19) is GRANTED. The Court will enter judgment
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58, and the case will be marked closed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

March 11, 2025

s/Cathy Bissoon
Cathy Bissoon
United States District Judge

cc (via ECF email notification):
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