EGGLESTON v. WAHL et al

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM OPINION - the Petition filed by LAWRENCE EGGLESTON was received without the filing fee or a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court may dismiss the petition prior to service if it plainly appears that Eggleston is not entitled to habeas relief. That is the case here because the instant petition is a second or successive petition and Eggleston does not assert that he has received from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit an order authorizing this Court to consider it, as required by 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A). Accordingly, the instant petition will be summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and a certificate of appealability will be denied. Signed by Judge Arthur J. Schwab on 3/20/2024. (bsc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PITTSBURGH
LAWRENCE EGGLESTON,

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Petitioner,
vs.
MARK WAHL, SCI-WAYMART
WARDEN; DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF
ALLEGHENY COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA, ATTORNEY
GENERAL, COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA,
Respondents.

2:24-cv-00306
ELECTRONICALLY FILED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner, Lawrence Eggleston (“Eggleston”), is a state prisoner. Currently before the
Court is his fourth petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which he
challenges the validity of his 1981 conviction that was obtained at Case No. CP-02-CR-000051251980 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. (ECF No. 1). The Petition was received
without the filing fee or a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court may dismiss
the petition prior to service if it plainly appears that Eggleston is not entitled to habeas relief. That
is the case here because the instant petition is a second or successive petition and Eggleston does
not assert that he has received from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit an
order authorizing this Court to consider it, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Accordingly,
the instant petition will be summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and a certificate of
appealability will be denied. 28 U.S.C. § 2243; Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases
In The United States District Courts.
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I.

Relevant Background
On September 9, 1981, a jury returned a verdict finding Eggleston guilty of Murder in the

First Degree. A penalty hearing was conducted on September 22, 1981, at which time the jury
returned a verdict of life imprisonment. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment of conviction
on December 14, 1984, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Eggleston’s Petition for
Allowance of Appeal on April 24, 1985.
On October 18, 1985, Eggleston filed pro se a Petition under Pennsylvania’s PostConviction Relief Act. His PCRA Petition was denied on October 6, 1995, and the Superior Court
affirmed the denial of the PCRA Petition on January 13, 1997. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
denied Eggleston’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal on May 31, 1997.
On June 19, 1987, Eggleston filed his first federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in
this Court, which was docketed at Civil Action No. 87-1388, claiming he was being denied due
process because of inordinate delay. On August 12, 1987, a Magistrate Judge filed a Report and
Recommendation recommending that the Petition be denied as Eggleston had not exhausted the
issue as it had not been presented to the state courts prior to proceeding in federal habeas corpus.
On September 18, 1987, the District Court dismissed the petition and adopted the Report and
Recommendation filed on August 12, 1987, as the opinion of the court. (See attached Exhibit 1 Report and Recommendation and Opinion; Civil Action No. 87-1388).
On March 30, 1998, Eggleston filed a second federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
in this Court, which was docketed at Civil Action No. 98-0596. On November 30, 1998, the
Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendation recommending that the Petition be
dismissed without prejudice because it contained both exhausted and unexhausted claims.

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Eggleston thereafter moved to withdraw his Petition without prejudice and on February 4, 1999,
the motion was granted. (See attached Exhibit 2 - Civ. Act. No. 98-0596, ECF No. 21).
On January 12, 2000, Eggleston filed a third Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this
Court, which was docketed at Civil Action No. 00-0102, raising an ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim (with five sub-parts), an after discovered evidence claim, and a due process claim
contending that the trial jury was never sworn in and consequently no valid judgment existed.
Eggleston’s judgment of conviction became final in 1984, long before the effective date of
AEDPA, April 24, 1996. In Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1999), the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that AEDPA’s one-year limitations period became effective on
the date of the AEDPA statute, i.e., April 24, 1996. Consequently, the Court of Appeals held that
“habeas petitions filed on or before April 23, 1997, may not be dismissed for failure to comply
with § 2244(d)(1)’s time limit.”
Eggleston’s third petition, however, was not filed until January 12, 2000. Both the
Magistrate Judge and the District Judge found that Eggleston’s petition was untimely. (See
attached Exhibit 3 - Civ. Act. No. 00-cv-102, ECF Nos. 13 and 14). The Report noted that it did
not appear from the record that Eggleston had attempted to present any of his unexhausted claims
to the Pennsylvania state courts after his motion to withdraw had been granted on February 4,
1999.
On March 5, 2013, Eggleston filed an application under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 for leave to file
a second or successive petition with the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. See Third Circuit
Court of Appeals Case No. 13-1578. On March 28, 2013, the Court of Appeals denied the
application, finding that
Eggleston does not seek to challenge his judgment of conviction or sentence in
reliance on a new rule of constitutional law. He also does not meet his burden to
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show that the factual predicate for his claims “could not have been discovered
previously through the exercise of due diligence,” and that the facts underlying his
claims, “if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be
sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional
error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the underlying
offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i-iii).
Order, March 28, 2013 (See attached Exhibit 4 - CTA3 Case No. 13-1578).
Now, almost eleven years after his application to file a second or successive petition was
denied, Eggleston has filed the instant fourth petition, again challenging his conviction at Case No.
CP-02-CR-00005125-1980. He now raises a new ground for relief:
Petitioner’s pre-trial proceedings were conducted by and held before a deputy
coroner, ten years after the 1968 Pennsylvania Constitutional Amendment stripped
coroners of their power to act as a committing magistrate.
Pet., at ¶ 12. 1
II.

Standard of Review
Federal district courts have a duty under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in

the United States District Courts, to screen and summarily dismiss a habeas petition prior to any
answer or other pleading when the petition “appears legally insufficient on its face.” McFarland
v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994); see also United States v. Thomas, 221 F.3d 430, 437 (3d Cir.
2000) (explaining that courts may dismiss petitions where “none of the grounds alleged in the
petition would entitle [the petitioner] to relief”).
III.

Discussion
As discussed, this is Eggleston’s fourth habeas petition filed in this Court. The first petition

was voluntarily withdrawn, the second petition was dismissed without prejudice as it contained

Prior to filing this federal petition, Eggleston filed pro se a PCRA petition in January 2023
raising this same issue. The PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely on February 15, 2023,
and on January 18, 2024, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the dismissal of the PCRA
court’s dismissal of the petition. See ECF No. 1-1.
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both exhausted and unexhausted claims, and the third petition was dismissed with prejudice as it
was found to be untimely. Consequently, the Court must first address whether it has jurisdiction
over the instant fourth Petition.
AEDPA limits a district court's jurisdiction over second or successive § 2254 petitions.
Specifically, § 2244(b)(3)(A) provides that, “[b]efore a second or successive application permitted
by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of
appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.” 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)(3)(A). Rule 9 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases similarly provides that,
“[b]efore presenting a second or successive petition, the petitioner must obtain an order from the
appropriate court of appeals authorizing the district court to consider the petition as required by 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) and (4).”
The term “second or successive” under § 2254 has a specific definition. See Magwood v.
Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 332 (2010). A petition is not second or successive simply because it
follows a prior petition. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 944 (2007); Benchoff v.
Colleran, 404 F.3d 812, 817 (3d Cir. 2005). Subject to exceptions not relevant here, a petition is
second or successive if: (1) a court decided an earlier petition on the merits; (2) the prior and new
petitions challenge the same conviction; and (3) the petitioner could have raised the new claims in
the earlier petition. See United States v. Irizarry, No. 00-333, 2014 WL 7331940, at *3 (D.N.J.
Dec. 18, 2014); Candelaria v. Hastings, No. 12-3846, 2014 WL 2624766, at *3 (D.N.J. June 12,
2014) (listing exceptions); see also Benchoff, 404 F.3d at 817.
If a § 2254 petition is second or successive, the filing of such a petition is only permissible
under narrow circumstances, specifically:

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(2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under
section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed
unless—
(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by
the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in the light
of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear
and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no
reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant guilty of the
underlying offense.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).
The Court denied Eggleston’s third § 2254 petition as untimely under AEDPA’s one year
limitation period. Courts have held “that the dismissal of a first federal petition as untimely
constitutes an adjudication on the merits, rendering any later-filed petition ‘second or successive.’”
Taylor v. Bonds, No. 17-7270, 2017 WL 6514603, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2017) (listing cases); see
also Rohn v. Horton, 508 F. App'x 170, 171 (3d Cir. 2013). Next, both the third petition and the
instant petition challenge Eggleston’s conviction at Case No. CP-02-CR-00005125-1980. Finally,
Eggleston could have raised the issue he raises in the instant petition well before he filed his third
§ 2254 petition in 2000.
Accordingly, the instant Petition is second or successive, and Eggleston does not allege,
nor does it appear, that he has received permission from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
to file a second or successive habeas petition. As a result, the petition will be dismissed as this
Court does not have jurisdiction over the instant case. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).
In such a situation, this Court may “if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action . .
. to any other such court . . . in which the action . . . could have been brought at the time it was

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filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 1631. The Court finds that it is not in the interest of justice to transfer this case
to the Court of Appeals as it does not appear that Eggleston’s claim falls within the narrow grounds
for filing a second or successive petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). Consequently, the Petition will
be dismissed for lack jurisdiction. 2 The dismissal of this case does not prevent Eggleston from
seeking authorization directly from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
IV.

Certificate of Appealability
Reasonable jurists would agree that Eggleston has not shown that he obtained leave from

the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to file a second or successive habeas
corpus petition. Reasonable jurists would also agree that this Court lacks jurisdiction and authority
to consider the second or successive habeas petition without proof of such leave. Accordingly, a
certificate of appealability will be denied.
V.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the instant petition will be summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

and a certificate of appealability will be denied.
An appropriate Order will issue.
s/Arthur J. Schwab
United States District Judge
Dated: March 20, 2024
cc:

LAWRENCE EGGLESTON
AP-6355
SCI WAYMART
P.O. Box 256
Waymart, PA 18472
(via U.S. First Class Mail)

This Report and Recommendation should not be read as a comment upon the merits of any
claim that Eggleston could raise in a second or successive habeas petition challenging his judgment
of sentence, or whether such a petition would be subject to dismissal on other grounds.
2

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EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 2

EXHIBIT 3

EXHIBIT 4

Case: 13-1578

Document: 003111211132

Page: 1

Date Filed: 03/28/2013

DLD-161
March 14, 2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
C.A. No. 13-1578
In re: LAWRENCE EGGLESTON, Petitioner
Present:

AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
Submitted is Petitioner=s application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 2244 to file a
second or successive habeas corpus petition
in the above-captioned case.
Respectfully,
Clerk

MMW/TRA/mb
________________________________ORDER_________________________________
The application under 28 U.S.C. ' 2244 for an order authorizing the District Court to
consider a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. ' 2254 is denied. A second or
successive petition must be certified by a court of appeals to contain newly discovered
evidence or “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).
Eggleston does not seek to challenge his judgment of conviction or sentence in reliance
on a new rule of constitutional law. He also does not meet his burden to show that the
factual predicate for his claims “could not have been discovered previously through the
exercise of due diligence,” and that the facts underlying his claims, “if proven and viewed
in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would
have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i-ii).
By the Court,
/s/D. Brooks Smith
Circuit Judge
Dated:
MB/cc:

March 28, 2013
Lawrence Eggleston
District Attorney Allegheny County
A True Copy
Marcia M. Waldron, Clerk
Certified order issued in lieu of mandate.