RHJ MEDICAL CENTER, INC. v. CITY OF DUBOIS

Filing 83

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 56 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; denying 62 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and as more fully stated in said Memorandum Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge Kim R. Gibson on 1/5/2012. (dlg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RHJ MEDICAL CENTER, INC., on its
own behalf and on behalf of its patients,
Plaintiff,
V.

CITY OF DUBOIS,
Defendant.

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) CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-131
) JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GIBSON,J.
I. SYNOPSIS
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(Doc. No. 56) and Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 62), both
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. For reasons set forth herein, both Plaintiffs and Defendant's
motions are hereby DENIED.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, and 1343. Venue is proper
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This suit arises from a dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant regarding the placement
of a methadone treatment facility within the boundaries of the City of Dubois, Pennsylvania.
The history between the parties has been controversial and rancorous, with no obvious resolution
in sight after five years of disagreement on a variety of issues, including whether Plaintiff should

be permitted to open its methadone treatment facility in the City of Dubois, where that facility
should be placed, and what rights and obligations Plaintiff and Defendant have under local, state,
and federal law in making those decisions. This Court has already discussed the lengthy history
of the dispute in its previous Memorandum denying Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (Doc. No. 39), and will not revisit that factual background in depth here.
The legal controversy revolves around the legitimacy of Defendant's actions m
preventing the establishment of the methadone facility at Plaintiffs chosen site, first under
Pennsylvania law, and later, pursuant to a local ordinance passed by Defendant's City Council.
In denying a permit to Plaintiff to operate at its chosen location in downtown Dubois, Defendant
first invoked a Pennsylvania statute, 53 P.S. § 10621, that purportedly gave it the authority to
prevent the establishment of the facility within a certain distance of a public park, and later
enabled it to obtain a temporary injunction in the Clearfield County Court of Common Pleas in
October 2006 preventing Plaintiff from operating its facility. However, when the Third Circuit
ruled in New Directions Treatment Services v. City of Reading, 490 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2007) that
the aforementioned statute violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et
seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq., the injunction was dissolved.
Accordingly, the Dubois City Council passed Ordinance Number 1720 in November 2007,
which amended Defendant's zoning laws in a number of ways, including prohibiting the
establishment of methadone or drug treatment clinics or centers in certain areas of the city. In
the aftermath of this new obstacle to the facility, Plaintiff terminated its lease on the facility's
originally chosen site in July 2008.
Plaintiff filed a six-count complaint against Defendant in this Court on May 14, 2009.
Count I asserts a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection
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Clauses for Defendant's actions under 53 P.S. § 10621. Count II asserts a claim under the
Rehabilitation Act for Defendant's actions under 53 P.S. § 10621. Count III asserts a claim under
Title II of the ADA for Defendant's actions under 53 P.S. § 10621. Count IV asserts a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses for Defendant's
actions under Ordinance Number 1720. Count V asserts a claim under the Rehabilitation Act for
Defendant's actions under Ordinance Number 1720. Finally, Count VI asserts a claim under Title
II of the ADA for Defendant's actions under Ordinance Number 1720. On December 7, 2010,
this Court denied in full Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. No. 39).
Plaintiff filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 56) as to liability for
all six causes of action on October 27, 2011, accompanied by its Brief in Support (Doc. No. 65),
Concise Statement of Material Facts (Doc. No. 58), and Appendix to Concise Statement of
Material Facts (Doc. No. 59). In response, Defendant filed on November 16, 2011 a Brief in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion (Doc. No. 70), along with a Response and Counterstatement of
Material Disputed Facts (Doc. No. 71) and an Appendix (Doc. No. 72). On December 5, 2011,
Plaintiff filed its Reply to Defendant's Brief in Opposition (Doc. No. 75) and a Reply to
Defendant's Counterstatement of Facts (Doc. No. 74).
Defendant filed its own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on October 28, 2011
(Doc. No. 62) as to counts 1, 2, 4, and 5, along with a Brief in Support (Doc. No. 63), Concise
Statement of Material Facts (Doc. No. 60), and Appendix to Concise Statement of Material Facts
(Doc. No. 61). In response, Plaintiff filed its Brief in Opposition (Doc. No. 69), Response and
Counterstatement of Material Facts (Doc. No. 67), and an Appendix (Doc. No. 68). This Court
later granted Defendant's Motion to Incorporate as a Reply in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment, Defendant's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
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Judgment (Doc. No. 76).

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Summary judgment is appropriate only where, drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact ... and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Melrose, Inc. v. Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d
380, 387 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 380 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007));
see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (a). 1 Issues of
fact are genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also McGreevy v.
Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005). Material facts are those which will affect the outcome
of the trial under governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of stating the basis for its motion and
identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets this burden, the party opposing
summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the ... pleading," but
"must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Saldana v. Kmart
Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); see also Podobnik v. US. Postal Serv., 409
F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that a party opposing summary judgment "must present
more than just bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions to show the existence of a
genuine issue" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Rule 56 was revised in 2010. The standard previously set forth in subsection (c) is now codified as subsection (a).
The language ofthis subsection is unchanged, except for "one word-genuine 'issue' bec[ame] genuine 'dispute."'
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note, 2010 amend.
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V. DISCUSSION
The Court first notes that both Plaintiff and Defendant have submitted thorough and
detailed pleadings, both as to their respective motions for summary judgment, as well as their
responses to those motions. A careful consideration of this voluminous record reveals that there
are countless issues of disputed material fact that cannot be resolved prior to trial, and which are
pertinent to every one of Plaintiffs claims. Indeed, a review of the briefs and statements of
material fact provides almost two completely different versions of the dispute regarding
placement of Plaintiffs methadone facility. 2 Documenting all of these factual conflicts would be
an exhausting task, but a brief discussion of some of the more exemplary - and critical - disputes
will illustrate why summary judgment is not appropriate in this case.
Regarding the city's initial denial of a permit for the facility under 53 P.S. § 10621, and
whether it violated the Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, Rehabilitation Act, and
Americans with Disabilities Act, it remains an open question as to what Defendant's actual
justifications were. Defendant presents a number of potentially rational reasons as to why it
denied the permit, including traffic concerns, RHJ's ability to operate the facility, and its
relationship with the community. Doc. No. 70 at 26-7. Plaintiff contrasts this with what it
describes as a campaign of "irrational concerns, unjustified fears, and blatant stereotypes about
methadone treatment centers", highlighted by comments made by the city mayor and purportedly
encouraged by city officials at a town hall meeting about the facility

Doc. No. 65 at 14.

Defendant further argues that its enforcement of 53 P.S. § 10621 was not motivated by a desire
to harm those seeking methadone treatment, which Plaintiff disputes. Doc. No. 63 at 5-6.

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To provide one example, while not a factual dispute, the parties cannot even agree on the meaning of the language
of Ordinance 1720. Doc. No. 70 at 5-6; Doc. No. 65 at 8-9.
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Similarly, there are numerous material facts pertaining to Defendant's passmg of
Ordinance 1720 which prevent this Court from granting summary judgment for either party.
Plaintiff argues that the ordinance was drafted "to ensure that [Defendant] would be unable to
locate at the Site" whether or not the then-ongoing injunction was upheld, and that the ordinance
"specifically singled out methadone facilities for different treatment." Doc. No. 65 at 16. For its
part, Defendant counters that the ordinance's purpose was to facilitate the creation a medical
services campus near the regional medical center. Doc. No. 70 at 18. The parties' version of
events further conflict with regard to the mayor's comments and whether he had any influence
on decisions taken by the City Council. Doc. No. 70 at 21-22; Doc. No. 65 at 12-13. And they
present two different versions of the process whereby the city denied Plaintiffs permit and what
documents were relevant to that determination. Doc. No. 65 at 13-14; Doc. No. 70 at 23-24.
The existence of these and many other significant factual disputes, well-developed in the
record by both sides, significantly weighs against any premature determinations as to Plaintiffs
claims in this matter. The Court notes that this case will presumptively be called for bench trial
on February 21, 2012, which will place the Court in the position of factfinder. At that point,
counsel will be given full opportunity to test their respective theories of the case, thus enabling
this Court to reconcile the vast discrepancies in the factual record.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is
DENIED IN FULL. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is also DENIED IN
FULL. This case will presumptively be called for bench trial on February 21, 2012, to continue

on each successive weekday through February 24, 2012. An Order follows this Memorandum.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RHJ MEDICAL CENTER, INC., on its
own behalf and on behalf of its patients,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

) CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-cv-131
) JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON
)

v.

CITY OF DUBOIS,
Defendant.

)
)
)

ORDER
AND NOW, this 5th day of January 2012, this matter coming before the Court on

Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 56) and Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 62), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motions are DENIED in all
respects.

BY THE COURT:

~lC

KIM R. GIBSON,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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