GLASS v. ASTRUE

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 16 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 20 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 3/23/11. (gpr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KATHLEEN GLASS, Plaintiff,
)
)
)

)

v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE I COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
I

) Civil Action No. 10-73J
)
)
) )

Defendant.

)
)

MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER AND NOW, this of the parties
I

2.i ~. Marchi

2011 1 upon due consideration

cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to

plaintiff/s request for review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner
ll )

denying

plaintiff/s

applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security' income under Titles II and XVI, respectively, of the

Social Security Act ("Act"), IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 20) be, and the same

hereby iS I granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 16) be, and the same hereby iS I denied. As
~he

obligati~n

.

factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and or discount any evidence if the ALJ explains 186 F.3d 4221 429 the (3d

may reject
,

reasons for doing so. Cir.
~A072

Plummer v. AQfel,

19~)

:

.

ImportantlYI

where the ALJ's findings of fact are

(Rev, 8/82)

supported ,by substantial evidence, a reviewing court is bound by

those findings, even if it would have decided the factual inquiry differently. 2001). Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir.

These well-established principles preclude a reversal or

remand of the ALJ IS decis'ion here because the record contains substantial conclusions. Pla'l;ntiff protectively filed her pending applications for disability
i~surance

evidence

to

support

the

ALJ I s

findings

and

benefits and supplemental security income on

April 30, 2002, alleging a disability onset date of January 21, 2002, due to a variety of mental and physical impairments, Plaintiff's

including anxiety,

depression and back problems. 1

applicat10ns were denied initially.

Following a hearing held on

May 5, 2003, an ALJ issued a decision on March 4, 2004, finding that plaintiff is not disabled. The Appeals Council denied review By decision dated August

and plaintiff appealed to this court. 29, 2006,

this court remanded the case to the Commissioner for

further .administrative proceedings due to the ALJ's failure to specify whether plaintiff's impairments in combination meet or equal a

.

~isted

impairment.

~

'b..AOn
(Rev, 8/82)

1 The record shows that after the ALJ's original denial of the pendlng applications on March 4, 2004, plaintiff filed new applications for benefits on June 28, 2004, alleging an onset date of March 5, 2004.' In a decision dated December 29, 2005, an ALJ found plaintiff not disabled and plaintiff did not seek review of that decision. The ALJ found no basis to reopen the finding that plaintiff is not disabled for the period beginning March 5, 2004. Accordingly, the relevant time period at issue in this case is from plaintiff's alleged onset date of January 21, 2002, through March 4,2004. (R.373).

- 2

On remand, a new hearing was held before the ALJ on May 11, 2007, at which plaintiff, represented by counsel, and a vocational expert testified. On August 28, 2007, the ALJ issued a decision Plaintiff did not file

finding that plaintiff is not disabled.

exceptio~s to that decision and, on January 13, 2010, the Appeals

Council issued a notice stating that the ALJ's decision was the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff was 50-52 years old during the relevant time period at issue in this case and is age under classified as the a person closely 20 C.F.R.

.,

approacqing

advanced

regulations.

§§404 .1563 (d) and 416.963 (d).

She has a high school education and Plaintiff has past decorator and

one year of education at the collegiate level. relevant work experience as a cashier,

donut

personal care aid,

but she has not engaged in any substantial

gainful 'activity since her alleged onset date. After testimony reviewing from plaintiff's and a medical records and hearing the ALJ

plaintiff

vocational

expert,

concluded that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. that The ALJ found that although the medical evidence establishes plaintiff suffers right from a number of severe impairments
1

including obesitYI dysthymic disorder,

lumbar

radiculopathy and neuropathYI disorder,

attention

deficit/hyperactivity

borderline intellectual functioning and developmental arithmetic disorders
1

those impairments

1

alone or in combination

l

do not meet

or equal the criteria of any of the impairments listed at Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R., Part 404
OI\t.AOn
1

Subpart P.
- 3

(R.

374-76).

(Rev, 8/82)

The. ALJ

also

found

that

plaintiff

retains

the

residual

functional capacity to perform work at the light exertional level but with no more than occasional simple, mathematical

calculations, no more than simple, repetitive, routine, low stress tasks, no interaction with the public and no more than occasional interaction with co-workers. identified numerous perform based upon categories her age,
(R. 475).

A vocational expert which plaintiff work could and

of

jobs

education,

experience

residual functional capacity, including chemical fertilizer mixer, dryer operator,
.

embossing machine operator and hole puncher.

Relying on the vocational expert's testimony, the ALJ found that while plaintiff cannot perform her past relevant work, capable of making an adjustment to work which she is in

exists

significant numbers in the national economy. determined that plaintiff is not disabled.

Accordingly, the ALJ

The Act defines IIdisabilityll as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§423(d) (1) (A) and

1382c (a) (3) (A) .

The impairment or impairments must be so severe

that the claimant lIis not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education and work experience, engage in any pther kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy

"

42

U.S.C.

§§423 (d) (I) (B)

and

1382c (aY (3) (B) .
~A072

(Rev. 8/82)

4

The Commissioner has promulgated regulations incorporating a five step sequential evaluation process 2 for determining whether a claimant is under a disability. 20 C. F . R . § § 4 04 . 1520 and

416.920; Newell v. Commissioner of Social Security, 347 F.3d 541, 545 (3d Cir. 2003). If the claimant is found disabled or not the claim need not be reviewed further.

disabled at any step,

Id.; see Barnhart v. Thomas, 124 S.Ct. 376 (2003). Here, findings: plaintiff raises several challenges to the ALJ's

(1) the ALJ erred at step 3 by finding that plaintiff's

impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet the criteria of any of the listed impairments; (2) the ALJ improperly evaluated

the medical evidencei (3) the ALJ improperly assessed plaintiff's residual functional capacity. Upon review, the court finds that

the ALJ properly evaluated the evidence and that all of the ALJ's findings,are supported by substantial evidence . First, the court is satisfied that the ALJ's step 3 finding is supported by substantial evidence. At step 3, the ALJ must

..

2 The ALJ must determine in sequence: (1) whether the claimant currently is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether she has a severe impairmenti (3) if so, whether her impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404., Subpart P, Appendix 1 i (4) if not, whether the claimant I s impairment prevents her from performing her past relevant work; and, (5) if so, whether the claimant can perform any other work which exists in the national economy in light of her age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520 and 416.920. In addition, when there is evidence of a mental impairment that allegedly prevents a claimant from working, the Commissioner must follow the procedure for evaluating mental impairments set forth in the regulations. Plummer, 186 F.2d at 432; 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520a and 416.920a.

'Ilt.AOn

(Rev. 8/82)

- 5

determine equivalent

whether to, one

the of

claimant's the listed

impairment

matches,

or

is v.

impairments.

Burnett

Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000). The listings describe impairments that prevent

an adult, regardless of age, education, or work experience, from performing any gainful activity. (3d Cir .. 2000) impairment claimant] necessary. Here, impairments
II

Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 85 "If the [the is

j

20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(d) and 416.920(d). equivalent per se to a listed and no impairment further

is is

then

disabled

analysis

Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119. as required, that the ALJ identified the relevant listed with plaintiff's mental impairments (1.03) and

compare

(Listings 12.04 and 12.06) and physical impairments adequately explained why plaintiff's impairments,

alone or in

combination do not meet or equal the severity of those listed impairments. (R. 374-76) ; see Burnett, 220 F.3d at 120, n.2. In

particular, as to plaintiff's mental impairments, the ALJ found that plaintiff failed to meet either the "B" or the "C" criteria of Listing 12.04 and 12.06, explaining that the state agency

medical consultants who had reviewed the medical evidence had .'. reached the same conclusion and further noting that no treating or examining source had found that plaintiff meets the requisite criteria. when the (Id.). As the required level of severity is met only in both A and B of the listings are

requirements

satisfied, or when the "C" criteria of those listings are met, the ALJ correctly concluded that plaintiff does not meet any of those

'Aon
(Rev. 8/82)

- 6

listings.

The

ALJ

likewise

considered

the

medical

evidence

relating to plaintiff's physical impairments in concluding that plaintiff does not meet or equal any of the listings in 1.00 for musculoskeletal system disorders or in 11.00 for neurological disorders and the record likewise is clear that plaintiff's

physical impairments do not meet the criteria of any listing. Moreover, as noted by the ALJ, plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of presenting any medical findings to either the ALJ or to this court showing that any of her impairments, physical or mental, alone or in combination, meet or equal Listings 1.03, See Williams v. In fact, a finding the that

12.04, 12.06, or any other listed impairment.) Sullivan, medical 970 F.2d 1178, of 1186 (3d Cir. not 1992).

evidence

record

does

support

plaintiff meets or equals any listing.

The court is satisfied

that the ALJ's step 3 analysis conforms with this court's remand order and is supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff's remaining arguments relate to the ALJ's finding

of not disabled at step 5 of the sequential evaluation process. At that step, the ALJ must show that there are other jobs existing in
signi~icant

numbers in the national economy which the claimant

'IlhA072

) Plaintiff also argues before this court that her impairments meet or equal Listing 12.05 for mental retardation. This argument is frivolous. There is no evidence in the record that plaintiff is dependent on others for personal needs or is unable to follow directions as required under 12.05 (A). Moreover, 'the B, C, and D criteria all require IQ scores of 70 or below and plaintiff's IQ scores as set forth in the record are 81 verbal, 76 full-scale and 74 performance. Plaintiff fails to satisfy any of the criteria of Listing 12.05.
7

(Rev. 8/82)

can

perform

consistent

with

her

medical

impairments/

age/

education, past work experience and residual functional capacity. 20 C . F . R. § § 404 . 1520 (f ) and 416. 920 ( f) . Residual functional

capacity is defined as that which an individual still is able to do despite the limitations caused by her impairments. §§404.1545(a) and 416.945(a) Here, functional the ALJ found capacity to
i

20 C.F.R.

Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 40. retains work the residual numerous
(R.

that plaintiff perform light

with

restrictions accommodating her mental impairments. Although plaintiff disputes this finding,

380).

it is clear from the

record that the ALJ adequately considered all of the relevant medical evidence, as well as plaintiff's reported activities, in assessing plaintiff's residual functional capacity, and that he incorporated into his finding all of the limitations that

reasonably could be supported by the medical and other relevant evidence. (R. 374-78). In addition, the ALJ specifically noted

in his decision that he considered all of plaintiff's impairments in combination and his residual functional capacity finding

demonstrates that he did just that.

The court is satisfied that

the ALJ took into consideration all of the medically supportable limitations arising from all of plaintiff's impairments, severe and not severe, in combination, and that the both ALJ's

assessment is supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff also alleges that the ALJ improperly evaluated the medical evidence in assessing plaintiff's residual functional

capacity~

In particular, she alleges that the ALJ erred in not
- 8

'Aon
(Rev. 8182)

giving appropriate weight the opinion of Dr. SheedYI her primary care physician, who reported in a number public welfare assistance forms that plaintiff was disabled due to depression. 301) . (R. 292

The court finds no error in the ALJ/s evaluation of the

medical evidence. 4 The ALJ expressly addressed in his decision Dr. Sheedy s
I

opinion and sufficiently explained why he gave that opinion little weight. (R. 378). In particular l the ALJ noted that Dr. Sheedy

is not a psychiatrist or specialist in mental health disorders; that plaintiff/s only treatment was an anti-depressant medication and that Dr. treatment i Sheedy reported that she responded well to that Sheedyl s opinion is not supported by any

that Dr.

specific objective findings and do not contain any functional restrictions; and that plaintiff never was referred to mental Sheedy and, in facti stopped formal

health counseling by Dr.

counseling when she began treating with him.
I

(Id. ) .

The ALJI s assessment of Dr. Sheedy s report is well-supported by the evidence in the record. First l the opinion of a physician l

Under the Social Security Regulations and the law of this circuit l opinions of treating physicians are entitled to substantial and at times even controlling weight. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1527(d) (2) and 416.927(d) (2) i Fargnoli 247 F.3d at 33. Where a treating physician/s opinion on the nature and severity of an impairment is well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record l it will be given controlling weight. Id. However when a treating source IS opinion is not entitled to controlling weightl it is evaluated and weighed under the same standards applied to all other medical opinions taking into account numerous factors including the opinion's supportability consistency and specialization. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1527(d) and 416.927(d).
4
I I I I

I

I

'A072
(Rev. 8/82)

- 9 -

treating or otherwise,

on the

issue

of

what

an individual's

residual functional capacity is or on the ultimate determination of disability never is entitled to special significance. C.F.R. §404.1527(e)
i

20

SSR 96-5p.

In addition, Dr. Sheedy rendered his opinions of disability on state welfare employability forms. However, the Commissioner

is to make disability determinations based on social security law and therefore an opinion from a treating source that an individual is disabled based on state welfare rules is not binding on the issue of disability under different social security regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1504. The ALJ thoroughly and exhaustively addressed the relevant medical evidence in his decision and adequately explained his reasons for the weight he accorded to all of the medical reports and opinions, including those from Dr. Sheedy. The court has

reviewed the ALJ's decision and the record as a whole and is convinced that the ALJ's evaluation of the medical evidence is supported by substantial evidence. The court also finds no error in the ALJ's failure to

incorporate any additional limitations in his residual functional capacity findings for lifting, standing and walking. However, the

ALJ rejected any additional limitations as inconsistent with the objective medical evidence of record and supported only by

plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain, which the ALJ found to be only partially credible. (R. 377; 379).

~A072

(Rev. 8/82)

- 10

The

court

is

satisfied

that

the of 20 In

ALJ pain

properly evaluated and limitations in

plaintiff's accordance 416. 929!l:>i

subjective with see the also

complaints

regulations. SSR 96-7p.

C.F.R.

§§404.1529!l:> and plaintiff's

assessing

credibility, the ALJ considered plaintiff's subjective complaints, but also considered those complaints evidence, plaintiff's record, in light of the medical of the other

treatment history and all

evidence of

and concluded that plaintiff's subjective

complaints of pain and limitations were inconsistent with the totality of the evidence. substantial evidence. After carefully and methodically considering all of the (R. 377). This finding is supported by

medical evidence of record and plaintiff's testimony,

the ALJ

determined that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. substantial The ALJ's findings and conclusions are supported by evidence and are not otherwise erroneous.

Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.

~~~
Gustave Diamond united States District Judge

~A072

(Rev. 8/82)

- 11

cc: J. Kirk Kling, Esq. 630 Pleasant Valley Boulevard Suite B Altoona, PA 16602 John J. Valkovci, Jr. Assistant u.S. Attorney 200 Penn Traffic Building 319 Washington Street Room 224, Penn Traffic Building Johnstown, PA 15901

'A072
(Rev, 8/82)

- 12