MCCLOSKEY v. ASTRUE

Filing 19

ORDER denying 10 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 16 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Alan N. Bloch on 3/6/2012. (kmw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GAIL F. McCLOSKEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil Action No. 10-281-J

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE ,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

o

R D E R

AND NOW, this 6th day of March, 2012, upon consideration
of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, upon
review of the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision, denying
plaintiff's claim for disability insurance benefits under Subchapter
II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §401, et seq., finds that the
Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence and,
accordingly, affirms.

See 42 U.S.C. §405 (g)

i

Jesurum v. Secretary of

U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir.
1995) i

Williams v . Sullivan, 970 F. 2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992), cert.

denied sub nom., 507 U.S. 924 (1993)
1213 (3d Cir. 1988).
944

(W.D.

Pa.

1990)

i

Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211,
v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942,

See also

(if supported by substantial evidence,

the

Commissioner's decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither
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reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided
the claim differently)

(citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705

(3dCir.1981)).1

Plaintiff argues, essentially, that the Administrative Law Judge
(\\ALJIt) erred in not considering evidence from February of 2008 and
going forward in finding that she was not disabled as of the date she
was last insured, September 30, 2006. She argues that this later
evidence demonstrates a pre-existing condition going back to before
September of 2006. The Court finds no merit in this argument.
\\ [M] edical evidence generated after the date last insured is only
relevant to the extent it is reasonably proximate in time or relates
back to the period at issue.1t Alston v. Astrue, 2011 WL 4737605, at
*3 (W. D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2011). See also Tecza v. Astrue, 2009 WL 1651536,
at *9-10 (W.D. Pa. June 10, 2009) (collecting cases). Here, the later
medical evidence on which Plaintiff relies post-dates her last insured
date by approximately 17 months or more. Moreover, nothing indicates
that the findings in any way relate back to the relevant time period.
To the contrary, both Dr. Michael C. Sal tzburg and Dr. Melissa Mi tchell,
PT, indicate that Plaintiff began to experience the back pain for which
they were treating her around or slightly before February of 2008.
This evidence in no way relates back to the insured period and
demonstrates no impairments to Plaintiff's abili ty to work during that
period.
The Court further notes that this case is not like the one in
Newellv. Comm'rofSoc. Sec., 347F.3d541 (3dCir. 2003). Here, unlike
in that case, there is a great deal of medical evidence prior to the
date last insured - there is just none that demonstrates disability.
Moreover, as discussed above, the later evidence expressly relates
to symptoms that began long after the expiration of the insured period.
Further, unlike the case in Newell, the present case was not decided
at Step Two of the five-step sequential process set forth at 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520, a de minimus screening device to dispose of groundless
claims.

2

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment (document No. 10) is DENIED and defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment (document No. 16) is GRANTED.

s
N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf:

Counsel of record

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