CHRISTY v. ASTRUE

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 13 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 15 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 3/21/12. (gpr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DAVID E. CHRISTY/

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff/

v.

) Civil Action No. 10-289J
)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE/
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY/

)

)
)
)
)

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER
AND NOW/ this
of the parties'

~~

of March, 2012, upon due consideration

cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to

plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the Commissioner
of

Social

Security

( "Commissioner" )

denying

plaintiff's

applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income under Titles II and XVI,

respectively,

of the

Social Security Act ("Act"), IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner's
motion for summary judgment
hereby is,

(Document No.

15) be,

and the same

granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment

(Document No. 13) be, and the same hereby is, denied.
As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an
obligation to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and
may rej ect or discount
reasons for doing so.
Cir.1999).

any evidence

if

Plummer v. Apfel,

Importantly,

the ALJ explains

the

186 F.3d 422,

(3d

429

where the ALJ1s findings of fact are

~A072

(Rev. 8/82)

supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court is bound by

those findings, even if it would have decided the factual inquiry!
differently.
2001).

Fargnoli v.

Massanari,

247 F.3d 34,

38

(3d Cir.

These well-established principles preclude a reversal or

remand of the ALJ' s
substantial

decision here because the record contains

evidence

to

support

the

ALJ' s

findings

and,

conclusions.

Plaintiff protectively filed his pending applications for

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income on
June 30, 2008, alleging a disability onset date of May 6, 2008,
due

to

diabetes

Plaintiff's

l

a

heart

applications

condition

were

hearing held on February 8,
February 24,
August 24,

2010,

2010,

denied

2010 1

and

a

back

initially.

problem.
Following a

an ALJ issued a decision on

finding that plaintiff is not disabled.

On

the Appeals Council denied review making the,

ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner.

Plaintiff was 48 years old at the time of the hearing and is

classified as a younger person under the regulations.
§§404 .1563 (c)

and 416.963 (c) .

He has a

which is classified as limited.
416.964(b) (3).

20 C.F.R.

tenth grade education

20 C.F.R. §§404.1564(b) (3) and!

Plaintiff has past relevant work experience as a

sandblaster and a cook in a personal care home, but he has not i
engaged in any substantial gainful activi ty since his alleged
onset date.
After
testimony

reviewing
from

plaintiff's

plaintiff

and

a

medical

records

vocational

and

expert,

hearingl
the

AL~

concluded that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the
'A072
(Rev. 8/82)

-

2 ­

Act.

The ALJ found that although the medical evidence establishes

that

plaintiff

suffers

from

the

severe

impairments

and diabetic

of

sinus

neuropathy,

those

tachycardia,

diabetes mellitus

impairments,

alone or in combination, do not meet or equal the

criteria of any of the impairments listed at Appendix 1 of 20
C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P.
The

ALJ

also

found

(R.14).

that

plaintiff

retains

the

residual

functional capacity to perform work at the sedentary exertional
level

but

limiting

with

a

effects

number
of

his

of

restrictions

impairments. 1

identified numerous

categories

perform

his

based

upon

age,

of

jobs

accounting

for

A vocational
which plaint

education,

work

the

expert
f

could

experience

and

residual functional capacity, including glass waxer, surveillance
systems monitor and cashier.

Relying on the vocational expert's

testimony, the ALJ found that while plaintiff cannot perform his
past relevant work, he is capable of making an adjustment to work
which exists in significant numbers in the national economy.
Accordingly! the ALJ determined that plaintiff is not disabled.
The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in
substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period
of

'Aon
(Rev. 8/82)

at

least

twelve

months.

42

U. S . C .

§ § 423

(d)

(1)

(A)

and

1
Specifically, plaintiff can only occasionally climb ramps and
stairs and never climb ladders! ropes and scaffoldsj he must avoid
exposure to extreme heat! cold! humidity and wetness; must avoid
exposure to vibration, noise, pulmonary irritants, unprotected heights,
dangerous machinery and uneven surfaces i and he must avoid strobe
lights! bright lights and fire work.
(R. 14).

- 3 ­

1382c (a) (3) (A) .

The impairment or impairments must be so severe

that the claimant "is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education and work experience, engage 1
in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national

economy

"

42

U.S.C.

§§423 (d) (1) (B)

i

and

1382c(a)(3)(B).

/

The Commissioner has promulgated regulations incorporating a
five-step sequential evaluation process 2 for determining whether
a

claimant

is

under

a

disability.

20

C. F . R .

§ § 404 . 1520

and

416.920; Newell v. Commissioner of Social Security, 347 F.3d 541,1
545

(3d Cir.

2003).

disabled at any step,

If the claimant is found disabled or not
the claim need not be reviewed further.

Id.; see Barnhart v. Thomas, 124 S.Ct. 376 (2003).
Here, plaintiff raises two challenges to the ALJ's findings:
(1)

the

ALJ

erred

at

step

3

by

finding

that

i

Plaintiff's/
I

impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet the criteria of;
any of the listed impairments; and,

(2) the ALJ erred at step 5 byl

improperly assessing plaintiff's residual functional capacity and/
improperly

rejecting

the

vocational

expert's

response

to

a!

The ALJ must determine in sequence:
(1) whether the claimant;
currently is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,/·
whether he has a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether his impairment
meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix Ii (4) if not, whether the claimant's impairment,prevents him
from performing his past-relevant work; and, (5) if so, whether th~
claimant can perform any other work which exists in the national econom~
in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional
capacity.
20 C.F.R. §§404.1520 and 416.920.
In addition, when there
is evidence of a mental impairment that allegedly prevents a claiman~
from working, the Commissioner must follow the procedure for evaluatin~
mental impairments set forth in the regulations. Plummer, 186 F.2d at,
432; 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520a and 416.920a.
.
2

~A012

(Rev, 8/82)

-

4

­

hypothetical incorporating all of plaintiff's limitations.
review,

the

court

finds

that

the

Upon

ALJ properly evaluated

the!

evidence and that all of the ALJ's findings are supported by
substantial evidence.
First, the court is satisfied that the ALJ's step 3 finding
is supported by substantial evidence.
determine
equivalent

whether
to,

the

one

claimant's

of

the

At step 3, the ALJ must

impairment

listed

matches,

is

Burnett

impairments.

or

i

v.

i

Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 220 F.3d 112, 119
(3d Cir. 2000).

The listings describe impairments that prevent!

an adult, regardless of age, education, or work experience, from
performing any gainful activity.

Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 85

(3d Cir. 2000); 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(d) and 416.920(d).
impairment
claimant]
necessary."

is
is

equivalent
per

se

to

a

disabled

listed
and

no

impairment
further

"If the

then

analysis

[the
is

Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119.

Here, the ALJ found that plaintiff suffers from the severe
impairments of sinus tachycardia, diabetes mellitus and diabetic!
neuropathy.
the

The corresponding Listings for those impairments are

Listings

at

4.00,

seq.,

et

for

impairments

of

the

cardiovascular system, and at Listing 9.08 for diabetes mellitus. 3

Plaintiff also avers that he has an impairment that matches or i
is equivalent to the Listings at 6.00, et seq.
for genitourinary1
impairments. However the record does not contain any obj ective medicall
evidence suggesting that plaintiff suffers from any severe genitourinaryi
impairment.
3

I

I

'Aon
(Rev. 8/82)

-

5 ­

i

The court is satisfied that the ALJ adequately explained why
plaintiff's impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or
equal the severity of any of the relevant listed impairments.
14)

i

see Burnett, 220 F.3d at 120, n.2.

(R.

In particular, the ALJ

noted that the medical evidence does not contain any objective
signs,

symptoms

or

findings

on

the

degree

of

functional

limitations necessary to meet the severity of any listing and
further notes that no medical source has opined that plaintiff
meets or equals any listed impairment. 4

(R. 14).

Moreover, the

state agency reviewer did not find that plaintiff meets or equals
any of the relevant listings.
Plaintiff's

argument

(R. 248-253).

that

his

subjective

significant neuropathy in his extremities,

complaints

of

including "stinging"

in his feet and hands, are sufficient to meet the "A" criteria of
Listing 9.08 for diabetes mellitus,

is without merit.

i

Step 3

concerns the medical severity of plaintiff's impairment and each
listing
needed

"specif [ies]
to

the objective medical and other findings

satisfy the

criteria of

that

listing.

II

20

C.F.R.

§§404 .1525 (c) (3) and 416.925 (c) (3) .

4
In a block quotation in his brief, plaintiff cites to the
standard case law in this circuit relating to the evaluation of evidence
from a treating physician; however, he does not expressly contend that!
the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical evidence.
In fact,.
apart from some barely legible handwritten progress notes from Dr'l
McLucas, a family practitioner who saw plaintiff every three months from
August of 2008 to January of 2010 and who prescribed plaintiff
medication for high blood pressure and insulin for his diabetes (R. 270 !
75), and a cardiac evaluation by Dr. Janakiraman in June of 2008
232-34), there is a dearth of medical evidence in the record of any
kind, and there are no opinions or assessments from any treating source
which would support a finding that plaintiff meets or equals any!

(R'I

~A072

(Rev. 8/82)

listing.

I.'

- 6

Accordingly,

as

the

Commissioner

aptly

notes,

it

was

plaintiff's burden to present medical findings equal in severity
to the relevant listed impairment.
U.S. 521, 531 (1990).

See Sullivan v. Zebley, 493

Here, the only medical evidence relating

to any potential diabetes-related pain in the hands and feet are
two isolated handwritten references in Dr.
notes

(R.

265

&

271),

McLucas's progress

neither of which contain any discussion

i

regarding the extent or duration of plaintiff's pain nor any
corroboration
testimony,

of

the

level

of

and certainly do

pain

not

suggested by

constitute

plaintiff's

obj ective

medical

findings sufficient to establish the "A" criteria of Listing 9.08.
Moreover,

to the

extent plaintiff

suggests

that

the ALJ'

failed to consider his complaints of pain at all, that suggestion
is belied by the record.

The ALJ expressly considered plaintiff's

subjective

in

complaints

his

decision

and

concluded

that

plaintiff's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and
limiting effects of his symptoms were not credible to the extent
they were inconsistent with the ALJ' s residual functional capacity
(R.15).

finding.

In assessing plaintiff's credibility,
plaintiff's

subjective

complaints

in

the ALJ considered

light

of

the

medical

evidence, plaintiff's treatment history, plaintiff's self -reported
activi ties of daily living,
record.

and all of the other evidence of

The court is satisfied that the ALJ properly evaluated'

plaintiff's
accordance

subjective
with

the

complaints

regulations,

of

pain and

20

C.F.R.

limitations

§§404.1529(c)

in
and.
I

~A072

(Rev. 8/82)

- 7 ­

416.929(c) & SSR 96-7p, and that the ALJ's credibility finding is
supported by substantial evidence.
In sum, plaintiff failed to meet his burden of presenting any
medical findings to the ALJ, or to this court, showing that any
of

his

impairments,

Listings

4.00

alone

seq.,

et

or

in

Listing

combination,
9.08,

or

meet

any

or

other

equal
listed

impairment, and the medical evidence of record does not support
such a finding.
Cir. 1992).

Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1186 (3d

The court is satisfied that the ALJ's step 3 finding

is supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff's remaining arguments relate to the ALJ's

finding

of not disabled at step 5 of the sequential evaluation process.
At that step, the ALJ must show that there are other jobs existing
in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant
can

perform

consistent

with

his

medical

impairments,

age,

education, past work experience and residual functional capacity.
20

C. F . R .

§ § 404 . 1520 (f)

and 416. 920 ( f) .

Residual

functional

capacity is defined as that which an individual still is able to
do despite the limitations caused by his impairments.

20 C.F.R.

§§404.1545(a) and 416.945(a); Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 40.
Here,

the ALJ

functional

found

capacity

to

that plaintiff

perform

retains

sedentary

work

the

residual

with

numerous

restrictions accommodating the limiting effects of plaintiff's
impairments.
finding,

(R.

14-16).

Although plaintiff

this

it is clear from the record that the ALJ adequately

considered all

of

the

relevant

medical

'A072
(Rev. 8/82)

disputes

- 8 ­

evidence,

as

well

as

plaintiff's reported activi ties, in assessing plaintiff's residual
functional capacity, and that he incorporated into his finding all
of the

limitations

that reasonably could be

supported by the

medical and other relevant evidence.
In addition, the ALJ specifically noted in his decision that
he considered all of plaintiff's impairments in combination and
his residual functional capacity finding demonstrates that he did
just that.

(R. 14).

The court is satisfied that the ALJ took into

consideration all of the medically supportable limitations arising
from all of plaintiff's impairments, both severe and not severe,
in combination,

and that the ALJ's assessment is supported by

substantial evidence.
Next, the court finds no error in the ALJ's decision not to
incorporate any additional limitations in his residual functional
capacity finding based upon plaintiff's subjective complaints of
leg or knee pain, the need for frequent bathroom breaks, or the
inability to maintain attendance, persistence or pace.

The ALJ

properly rejected any additional limitations as inconsistent with
the objective medical evidence of record and supported only by
plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain, which the ALJ found to
be only partially credible.
ALJ's

evaluation

of

(R. 15).

plaintiff's

As already discussed the

credibility

is

supported

by

substantial evidence.
Likewise, the ALJ did not err in rejecting the vocational
expert's

response

to

a

hypothetical

posited

by

plaintiff's

attorney incorporating a limitation requiring plaintiff to leave
~A072

(Rev. 8/82)

- 9 ­

his work station every hour for two to four minutes for a restroom
break.
those

A hypothetical to the vocational expert must reflect only
impairments

Podedworny v.

and

Harris,

limitations
745

F.2d

supported

210

(3d

Cir.

by

the

1984),

record,
and

the

additional limitation advanced by plaintiff is supported neither
by

the

objective

activities.

medical

Accordingly,

evidence

nor

by

plaintiff's

the vocational expert's response to

plaintiff's hypothetical properly was disregarded.
Barnhart, 364 F.3d SOl, 506 (3d Cir. 2004)
disregard

vocational

daily

expert's

See Jones v.

(ALJ has authority to

response

to

hypothetical

inconsistent with evidence) .
After

carefully and methodically considering all

medical evidence of record and plaintiff's testimony,

of

the

the ALJ

determined that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning ofl
the Act.
substantial

The ALJ's findings and conclusions are supported by
evidence

and

are

not

otherwise

erroneous.

Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.

~~

Gustave Diamond
United States District Judge

cc:

J. Kirk Kling, Esq.
630 Pleasant Valley Boulevard
Suite B
Altoona, PA 16602
John J. Valkovci, Jr.
Assistant U.S. Attorney
200 Penn Traffic Building
319 Washington Street
Room 224, Penn Traffic Building
Johnstown, PA 15901

"<>.A072
(Rev. 8/82)

- 10

i