SHAW v. ASTRUE
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 12 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 15 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 9/24/12. (gpr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MICHAEL D. SHAW,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 11-139J
MICHAEL J. AS TRUE ,
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER
AND
NOW,
cPV~ay
this
of
September,
2012,
upon due
consideration of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment
pursuant to plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the
Commissioner
of
Social
Security
denying
("Commissioner" )
plaintiff's applications for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental
security
income
under
Titles
respectively, of the Social Security Act
("Act"),
II
and
XVI,
IT IS ORDERED
that the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Document No.
15) be, and the same hereby is, granted and plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment
(Document No.
12)
be,
and the same hereby is,
denied.
As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge (IIALJ II ) has an
obligation to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and
may rej ect
or discount
reasons for doing so.
Cir.
1999).
any evidence
if
Plummer v. Apfel,
Importantly,
the
ALJ explains
186 F.3d 422,
429
the
(3d
where the ALJ's findings of fact are
.AOn
(Rev. 8/82)
- 2
416.964(b) (2).
Plaintiff has past relevant work experience as a
groundskeeper, janitor and car detailer, but he has not engaged in
any substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date.
After
reviewing
plaintiff's
testimony from plaintiff,
medical
records
and
plaintiff's friend and a
hearing
vocational
expert, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled within
the meaning of the Act.
evidence
establishes
The ALJ found that although the medical
that
plaintiff
suffers
from
the
severe
impairments of borderline intellectual functioning and cervical
spine degenerative disc disease,
those impairments, alone or in
combination, do not meet or medically equal the criteria of any of
the impairments listed at Appendix 1 of 20
C.F.R.,
Part 404,
Subpart P.
The
ALJ
also
found
that
plaintiff
retains
the
residual
functional capacity to perform light work with occasional postural
activities,
he can perform only simple and unskilled work,
he
cannot work at a production rate and he requires work consistent
with
a
marginal
education.
(R.17).
A vocational
expert
identified numerous categories of jobs which plaintiff can perform
based
upon
his
age,
functional capacity,
wrapper.
education,
work
experience
including laundry worker,
and
residual
maid and silver
Relying on the vocational expert's testimony, the ALJ
found that while plaintiff cannot perform his past relevant work,
he is capable of making an adj ustment to work which exists in
significant numbers in the national economy.
determined that plaintiff is not disabled.
~A072
(Rev, 8182)
- 3
Accordingly, the ALJ
The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in
substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period
of
at
least
twelve
1382c (a) (3) (A)
months.
42
U.S.C.
§§423(d) (1) (A)
and
The impairment or impairments must be so severe
that the claimant "is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education and work experience, engage
in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national
economy
"
42
U.S.C.
§§423 (d) (1) (B)
and
1382c (a) (3) (B) .
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations incorporating a
five-step sequential evaluation process 2 for determining whether
a
claimant
is
under
a
disability.
20
C. F . R .
§ § 404 . 1520
and
416.920; Newell v. Commissioner of Social Security, 347 F.3d 541,
545
(3d Cir.
2003).
disabled at any step,
If the claimant is found disabled or not
the claim need not be reviewed further.
Id.; see Barnhart v. Thomas, 124 S.ct. 376
Here,
findings:
plaintiff
raises
several
(2003).
challenges
to
the
ALJ's
(1) the ALJ erred at step 2 in finding that plaintiff's
2
The ALJ must determine in sequence:
(1) whether the claimant
currently is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether he has a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether his impairment
meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1; (4) if not, whether the claimant's impairment prevents him
from performing his past-relevant work; and, (5) if so, whether the
claimant can perform any other work which exists in the national economy
in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional
capacity.
20 C.F.R. §§404.1520 and 416.920.
In addition, when there
is evidence of a mental impairment that allegedly prevents a claimant
from working, the Commissioner must follow the procedure for evaluating
mental impairments set forth in the regulations. Plummer, 186 F.2d at
432; 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520a and 416.920a.
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4
carpal
tunnel
impairments;
syndrome
(2)
the
and
ALJ
low
erred
back
at
pain
step
3
are
by
not
severe
finding
that
plaintiff's borderline intellectual functioning does not meet or
equal
Listing
12.05;
and,
(3)
the
ALJ
improperly
assessed
plaintiff's residual functional capacity by failing to consider
all of plaintiff's impairments in combination.
Upon review, the
court is satisfied that the ALJ properly evaluated the evidence
and that all of the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial
evidence.
The court first will address plaintiff's challenge to the
ALJ's step 2 finding that his carpal tunnel syndrome and low back
pain are not severe impairments.
At step two,
the ALJ must
determine whether a claimant's impairments are severe as defined
by the Act.
20 C.F.R. §§404.1520 and 416.920.
or combination of
impairments
is
not
severe
"[An] impairment
if
it does
not
significantly limit your physical or mental ability to do basic
work activities."
20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(a) and 416.920(a).
step two inquiry is a de minimus screening device and,
evidence presents more than a slight abnormality,
requirement of
The
if the
the step two
severity is met and the sequential evaluation
process should continue.
Newell, 347 F.3d at 546.
Although "[r]easonable doubts on severity are to be resolved
in favor of
the claimant,
II
Newell,
347
F. 3d at
547,
the ALJ
concluded in this case that plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome and
low back pain do not have more
than a
de minimus ef fect
plaintiff's
basic
work
ability
to
perform
4!!rt.AOn
(Rev. 8/82)
- 5
activities
on
and,
therefore, are not severe impairments.
As
to plaintiff's
medical evidence
shows
carpal
(R. 13-14).
tunnel
syndrome,
that plaintiff has
the
obj ective
only minimal
right
medial neuropathy at the level of carpal tunnel, borderline left
medial neuropathy at
the
level of carpal
bilateral ulnar neuropathy at the elbow.
tunnel,
and minimal
In addition,
the ALJ
noted that although plaintiff has been prescribed a nighttime
wrist splint, he has not received any other treatment for carpal
tunnel syndrome.
(R. 13).
As to plaintiff's low back pain, the
ALJ noted that following physical therapy and the use of a TENS
unit, plaintiff himself indicated he was pain-free in the lower
back.
(R. 14).
Based on the lack of objective findings, the ALJ
reasonably concluded that plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome and
low back pain have no more than a minimal impact on his ability
to perform basic work activities, and the evidence outlined in the
ALJ's decision supports his conclusion.
Furthermore,
establishing
the claimant bears
that
an
impairment
is
the burden at step 2 of
severe.
McCrea
v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 370 F.3d 357,360 (3 rd Cir. 2004).
Although not exacting, plaintiff's burden here was to show that
his carpal tunnel syndrome and/or low back pain resulted in more
than a de minimus effect on his ability to perform basic work
functions.
However,
Instead, all plaintiff relies upon are diagnoses.
it is well settled that disability is not determined
merely by the presence of an impairment, but by the effect that
impairment
has
upon
the
individual's
~A072
(Rev. 8/82)
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ability
to
perform
substantial gainful activity.
129 (3d Cir. 1991).
showing
Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125,
Here, plaintiff failed to meet his burden of
that either carpal
tunnel
syndrome
or low back pain
resulted in any specific work-related limitations.
It also is
important to note that
the ALJ did not deny
Instead, he considered the impact
plaintiff's claim at step 2.
of all of plaintiff's medically determinable impairments, severe
and not severe, on plaintiff's residual functional capacity and
found plaintiff not disabled at step 5.
Accordingly, the ALJ's
finding that plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome and low back pain
are not severe not only is supported by substantial evidence but
also
had
no
disability.
effect
on
the
ultimate
determination
of
non-
Cf., McCrea v. Commissioner of Social Security, 370
F.3d 357, 360-61 (3 rd Cir. 2004)
(the Commissioner's determination
to deny a claim at step 2 "should be reviewed with close scrutiny"
because step 2 "is to be rarely utilized as a basis for the denial
of benefits".)
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred at step 3 by finding
that plaintiff does not have an impairment,
or combination of
impairments,
that meets or medically equals any of the listed
impairments.
Upon review, the court is satisfied that the ALJ's
step 3 finding is supported by substantial evidence.
At step 3,
impairment
impairments.
the ALJ must determine whether the claimant I s
matches,
or
is
Burnett
v.
equivalent
to,
Commissioner
one
of
(Rev. 8/82)
- 7
the
Social
Administration, 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000).
~A072
of
listed
Security
The listings
describe impairments that prevent an adult I
education ,
or
activity.
Knepp v. Apfel ,
C. F . R.
§ § 404
work
experience
. 1520 (d)
and
I
from
regardless of agel
performing
204 F.3d 78 1
85
(3d Cir.
"If
416. 920 (d) .
any
the
gainful
2000)
i
20
impairment
is
equivalent to a listed impairment then [the claimant] is per se
disabled and no further analysis is necessary.
Burnett
II
I
220 F. 3d
at 119.
The burden is on the ALJ to identify the relevant listed
impairment
in the
federal
claimant's impairment.
regulations
Id.
that
at 120 n.2.
compares with the
The ALJ must
develop the record and explain his findings at step 3
an analysis of whether and why [the claimant's]
1
"fully
including
... impairments
.. , are or are not equivalent in severity to one of the listed
impairments."
Here
I
Id.
the ALJ identified Listing 1.04 as the appropriate
listing for plaintiff/s cervical spine degenerative disc disease
and Listings 12.02 and 12.05 as the appropriate listings comparing
to plaintiff s
I
explained ,
meet
borderline
intellectual
functioning.
He
then
in great detail , why plaintiff's impairments do not
or equal
any of
those
listings,
and
his
conclusion is
supported by substantial evidence as outlined in his decision.
(R. 14 17).
The crux of plaintiff's step 3 argument to this court is that
the ALJ/s finding that he does not meet Listing 12.05(C) is not
~A072
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supported by substantial evidence. 3
The criteria for meeting
Listing 12.05(C) are as follows:
12.05. Mental retardation: Mental retardation refers to
significantly
subaverage
general
intellectual
functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning
initially manifested during the developmental period;
i.e., the evidence demonstrates or supports onset of
the impairment before age 22.
The required level of severity for this disorder is met
when the requirements in A, B, C, or D are satisfied.
* * *
C. A valid verbal, performance, or full scale 10 of 60
through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment
imposing an additional and significant work-related
limitation of function ...
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. I, §12.05.
Pursuant to the Regulations and case law in this circuit, in
order
to meet
Listing
12.05,
a
claimant
must
meet
both
the
introductory criteria to that listing, requiring "significantly
subaverage
general
intellectual
functioning
with deficits
in
adaptive functioning initially manifested [before age 22] ," and
the criteria of one of paragraphs A through D.
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,
Subpt. P, App. I, §12.00Ai Gist v. Barnhart, 67 Fed. Appx. 78, 81
(3d Cir.
2003) (" [a] s
is true in regard to any 12.05 listing,
before demonstrating the specific requirements of Listing 12.05C,
'Aon
(Rev. 8/82)
3
Although the heading to plaintiff's step 3 argument states that
the ALJ also erred in finding that plaintiff does not meet or equal
Listing 1.04, for disorders of the spine, or Listing 12.02, for organic
mental disorders, his actual argument focuses solely on Listing
12.05(C).
In any event, the ALJ explicitly analyzed plaintiff's
impairments under both Listing 1.04 and 12.02 and adequately explained
why plaintiff's impairments do not meet or equal those listings. (R. 14
17). The medical evidence of record supports the ALJ's finding.
- 9
a claimant must show proof of a 'deficit in adaptive functioning'
with an initial onset prior to age 22.") i Cortes v. Commissioner
of Social Security,
255 Fed. Appx.
646,
651
(3d Cir. 2007)
(to
meet the listing for mental retardation, the claimant must prove,
inter alia,
deficits
"subaverage general
intellectual
in adaptive functioning"
mani
functioning with
ing before age 22) i
Grunden v. Astrue, 2011 WL 4565502 (W.D. Pa., Sept. 29, 2011).
Here,
the ALJ found that plaintiff does not meet Listing
12.05 because he failed to show either significantly subaverage
general
intellectual
functioning
with
deficits
in
adaptive
functioning prior to age 22, as required under the introductory
paragraph, or a valid verbal, performance or full scale IQ of 60
through 70 as required under paragraph
(C). 4
In making this
determination, the ALJ discussed the relevant medical and other
evidence supporting his conclusion and adequately explained how
he arrived at his finding.
(R.
15-17).
Plaintiff, however, argues that the ALJ improperly rejected
the
results
of
IQ
testing
administered
by Dr.
consultative psychologist, in August of 2009.
D'Agaro,
the
In that testing,
although plaintiff attained a performance IQ score of 75, his
4
The ALJ also considered whether plaintiff meets Listing 12.05
under paragraph (D), which requires a valid verbal, performance or full
scale 1Q of 60 through 70 and two of the following: marked restrictions
in activities of daily living;
marked difficulties in social
functioning i
marked
difficulties
in
maintaining
concentration,
persistence or pace; or, repeated episodes of decompensation, each of
extended duration.
The ALJ adequately explained his finding that
plaintiff satisfies neither the first or second prong of paragraph (D)
and his finding in this regard also is supported by substantial
evidence.
(R. 14-17).
4I1I.A072
(Rev. 8(82)
- 10
verbal and full scale IQ scores were 69, at the upper limit of the
60 through 70 range required by Listing 12.05(C}.5
Accordingly,
plaintiff contends that the requirements of that Listing have been
met. 6
The court disagrees.
Although
the
testing
administered
by
the
consultative
examiner resulted in verbal and full scale IQ scores of 69, the
regulations require valid scores, and it is well-settled that an
ALJ is not required to accept a
claimant's IQ scores and may
reject scores that are inconsistent with the record. Markle, 324
F.3d at 186.
Here,
the ALJ expressly acknowledged the 2009 IQ
scores and adequately explained why he did not accept them as
valid.
which
(R. 17).
were
Specifically, the ALJ found that these scores,
attained
when
plaintiff
was
45
years
old,
were
inconsistent with the other IQ scores found in the record from his
childhood, which ranged from 81-90, well above the range required
to meet Listing 12.05(C}.
Under the Regulations, where verbal, performance and full scale
IQ's are provided, the lowest of the scores is used for purposes of
Listing 12.05, and only one score within the 60 through 70 range is
necessary.
See §12.00D.6.cj Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 125, n.
6 (3d Cir. 2002).
5
6
Listing 12. 05C also requires a physical or other mental
impairment
imposing an additional
and significant work-related
limitation of function.
Under the regulations, the second prong of
12.0SC is satisfied by a finding that the "other" impairment is "severe"
within the meaning of step 2 of the sequential evaluation process. See
~~~, 324 F.3d at 186; 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(c) and 416.920(c) j 65 Fed.
Reg. 50746, 50772 (August 21, 2000).
Here, there is no dispute that
plaintiff's severe impairment of cervical spine degenerative disc
disease qualifies as an "other" impairment within the meaning of Listing
12.05 (C) .
~A072
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The court is satisfied that the ALJ' s conclusion is supported
by substantial evidence in the record.
In determining whether an
i.e., an accurate reflection of a claimant's
IQ score is valid,
intellectual abilities, the ALJ is to consider the entire record
before him.
Markle,
deemed invalid where
\\ [T] est results may be
324 F.3d at 186.
the
IQ scores are
inconsistent with the
claimant's prior educational or work history, daily activities,
behavior or
other aspects of his or her life. n
Manigault v.
Astrue, 2009 WL 1181253 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (J. Standish).
Here, it is clear that the ALJ considered the entire record
and determined that the IQ scores of 69 were inconsistent with the
other evidence.
First, as emphasized by the ALJ
I
the 2009 results
varied widely from the only other IQ results contained in the
record, from plaintiff's childhood, when he attained a verbal IQ
of 81 1 a performance IQ of 90, and a full scale IQ score of 84 at
age 10 (R. 215, 217) and a verbal IQ of 80
91
1
1
a performance IQ of
and a full scale IQ score of 84 at age 13.
(R.
215-16).
That the earlier scores are a more accurate reflection of
plaintiff's intellectual abilities than the 2009 test is supported
by the record as a whole.
plaintiff
never
has
First,
been
it is important to note that
diagnosed
even
with
mild
mental
retardation, not even by Dr. D'Agaro, who administered the 2009
test.
Instead,
Dr.
D'Agaro diagnosed plaintiff with borderline
intellectual functioning,
(R 312)
I
suggesting that despite the IQ
scores of 69 he himself did not believe that plaintiff is mentally
'Ito.A072
(Rev. 8/82)
- 12
retarded. 7
Manigault,
2009 WL 1181253 at *9
(psychologist who
diagnosed claimant with borderline intellectual functioning rather
then mild mental retardation,
despite
IQ scores
in the
61-70
range, implicitly found scores to be invalid.)
Dr. D'Agaro's narrative report also supports a finding that
plaintiff does not meet Listing 12.05(C).
In that report, Dr.
D'Agaro noted that plaintiff is able to tend to his own personal
needs,
being."
drives,
and "is otherwise responsible for his own well
(R. 310).
While acknowledging plaintiff's "intellectual
and academic limitations," he also recognized that plaintiff was
able to complete 12 years of formal education and graduated from
high school through special education services.
(R.
309).
The ALJ's conclusion that plaintiff's IQ scores in 2009 are
not an accurate reflection of his intellectual abilities also is
supported by his observation that plaintiff "has an extensive work
history that reflects consistent quarterly earnings from 1981
through
2008,
notwithstanding
his
limitations."
(R.
16).
Plaintiff's adult work history also was noted by Dr. D'Agaro in
his narrative report.
(R.
310).
It is clear from the ALJ's decision that he considered the
record as a whole in declining to accept the 2009 IQ scores and
his determination that those scores are not an accurate reflection
of plaintiff's actual intellectual abilities is supported by the
'Aon
(Rev. 8/82)
7
Under
indicative of
60 and 70 are
WL 1181253 at
the DSM-IV, standardized test scores between 71 and 84 are
borderline intellectual functioning, while scores between
indicative of mild mental retardation.
Manigault, 2009
*9[ n. 15.
- 13
evidence.
Accordingly, as Listing 12.05(C) requires a valid 10
score in the 60 through 70 range, the ALJ did not err in finding
that
plaintiff
satisfied
that
does
not
meet
the
ALJ's
that
step
3
listing. 8
finding
The
is
court
is
supported
by
substantial evidence.
Plaintiff's final argument relates to the ALJ's
finding of
not disabled at step 5 of the sequential evaluation process.
At
that step, the ALJ must show that there are other jobs existing
in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant
can
perform
consistent
with
her
medical
impairments,
age,
education, past work experience and residual functional capacity.
20
C. F . R .
§ § 4 04 . 152 0 (f)
and
416. 920 (f) .
Residual
functional
capacity is defined as that which an individual still is able to
do despite the limitations caused by her impairments.
§§404.1545(a) and 416.945(a)
Here,
the ALJ
found
i
20 C.F.R.
Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 40.
that plaintiff
retains
the residual
functional capacity to perform light work with occasional postural
activities and that he further is limited to only simple and
8
The ALJ also found that plaintiff does not meet the introductory
criteria to Listing 12.05 because he did not establish "deficits in
adaptive functioning" prior to age 22. Although the ALJ did a thorough
job setting forth the evidence supporting this finding, his assessment
technically did not comply with the SSA's directive in Technical
Revisions to Medical Criteria for Determinations of Disability, 67 FR
20018-01 (April 24, 2002), by identifying and applying one of the four
standards of measurement used by one of the professional organizations
in making his determination.
See Grunden v. Astrue, 2011 WL 4565502
(W.D. Pa., Sept. 29, 2011) i Logan v. Astrue, 2008 WL 4279820 at *8 (W.D.
Pa. Sept. 16, 2008) (D.J. Fischer). However, remand is not necessary on
this ground because the ALJ's finding that plaintiff did not meet the
first prong of the 12.05(C) criteria by showing a valid IQ score of 60
through 70 is supported by substantial evidence.
~A072
(Rev. 8/82)
- 14
unskilled
work,
he
cannot
work
at
a
production rate
requires work consistent with a marginal education.
Although plaintiff disputes this finding,
and he
(R.17).
it is clear from the
record that the ALJ adequately considered all of the relevant
medical evidence, as well as plaintiff's reported activities, in
assessing plaintiff's residual functional capacity, and that he
incorporated
into
his
finding
all
of
the
limitations
that
reasonably could be supported by the medical and other relevant
evidence.
17-21).
(R.
The court is satisfied that the ALJ's
residual functional capacity finding is supported by substantial
evidence as outlined in the decision.
To
consider
the
the
extent
plaintiff
combined
argues
effects
of
that
all
of
the
ALJ
failed
plaintiff's
to
medical
conditions, in assessing plaintiff's residual functional capacity,
or at any other point in the sequential evaluation process, the
record also fails to support that position.
noted
in his
decision that he
The ALJ specifically
considered all of plaintiff's
impairments in combination at steps 3 and 5 and his findings
demonstrate that he did just that.
The ALJ's residual functional
capacity
both
finding
limitations,
by
accommodates
restricting
him
to
plaintiff's
only
occasional
physical
postural
activities, and his mental limitations, by limiting him to simple
and unskilled work which does not require production rates and
which is consistent with a marginal education,
(R. 17), and these
limitations are consistent with the medical evidence, as discussed
in the ALJ's decision.
~A072
(Rev. 8/82)
- 15
Upon review of the ALJ's decision and the record as a whole,
the court is satisfied that the ALJ took into consideration all
of
the medically supportable
plaintiff's
impairments,
limitations arising from all of
both
severe
and
not
severe,
in
combination in assessing plaintiff's residual functional capacity,
as well as at every step in the sequential evaluation process.
Finally, although plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to
properly consider plaintiff's testimony in assessing his residual
functional capacity, the court is satisfied that the ALJ properly
evaluated plaintiff's subjective complaints as to his limitations
in accordance with the regulations.
416.929(c)
i
see
also
SSR
20 C.F.R. §§404.1529(c) and
96-7p.9
In
assessing
plaintiff's
credibility, the ALJ considered plaintiff's subjective complaints,
but also considered those complaints in light of the medical
evidence,
plaintiff's
evidence of record,
treatment history and all
of
the other
and concluded that plaintiff's subjective
complaints of pain and limitations were inconsistent with the
totality of the evidence.
The
ALJ
did
a
(R. 19-20).
thorough
job
explaining
why
plaintiff's
allegations of disabling symptoms are not supported by the record,
and, in particular the objective medical findings.
Based upon that evidence,
the ALJ
found plaintiff
(R. 19-20).
to be not
9
Allegations of pain and other subjective symptoms must be
supported by objective medical evidence, 20 C.F.R. §§404.1529(c) and
416.929(c), and an ALJ may reject a claimant's subjective testimony if
he does not find it credible so long as he explains why he is rejecting
the testimony. Schaudeck v. Commissioner of Social Security, 181 F.3d
429, 433 {3d Cir. 1999)i see also SSR 96-7p.
'Aon
(Rev. 8/82)
- 16
entirely credible.
The ALJ adhered to the appropriate standards
in evaluating plaintiff's credibility and it is not this court's
function
to
re-weigh
the
credibility determination.
whether
the
ALJ's
evidence
arrive
at
its
own
Rather, this court must only determine
credibility
substantial evidence.
and
determination
is
supported
by
The court is satisfied that it is.
It also is important to note that while the ALJ did not find
plaintiff's subjective complaints entirely credible, his decision
makes clear that, to the extent plaintiff's allegations as to the
limitations arising from his
impairment are
supported by the
medical and other evidence, the ALJ accommodated those limitations
in his residual functional capacity finding.
(R. 19).
Only to the
extent that plaintiff's allegations are not so supported did the
ALJ find them to be not credible.
After carefully and methodically considering all
medical evidence of record and plaintiff's testimony,
of
the
the ALJ
determined that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of
the Act.
The ALJ's findings and conclusions are supported by
substantial
evidence
and
are
not
otherwise
erroneous.
Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.
~~
Gustave Diamond
United States District Judge
'GloA072
(Rev. 8182)
- 17
cc: J. Kirk Kling, Esq.
630 Pleasant Valley Boulevard
Suite B
Altoona, PA 16602
Stephanie L. Haines
Assistant U.S. Attorney
200 Penn Traffic Building
319 Washington Street
Room 224, Penn Traffic Building
Johnstown, PA 15901
~A072
(Rev. 8182)
- 18
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